Bartley, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish School Board
Opinion
BARTLEY, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant-Relator,
v.
JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and American Equipment & Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appellees-Respondents.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Neal D. Hobson, Charles D. Marshall, Jr., Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer & Pierson, New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.
Raymond J. Salassi, Jr., Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, for Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
*281 Jack A. Grant, Gretna, for Jefferson Parish School Bd.
Edward J. Norton, Jr., New Orleans, for American Equipment & Systems, Inc.
Ralph L. Kaskell, Jr., Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, for Buchanan Blitch & Associates, Inc.
TATE, Justice.
A contractor ("Bartley") sues one of its subcontractors ("American") and the owner ("School Board") to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of a building contract. Bartley claims that, under the contract the defendants should submit to arbitration relative to (1) a determination of whether certain panels furnished by American to be used in the construction complied with specifications and (2) which party (American or Bartley) should bear the expense of any change order. The School Board and American, resisting arbitration, filed exceptions of no cause of action and of prematurity. The trial court maintained the exceptions, and Bartley appeals. The court of appeal affirmed. 290 So.2d 446 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974). We granted certiorari. 294 So.2d 543 (La. 1974).
The primary issues before us concern: (1) Did the subcontractor American agree to arbitrate disputes arising as to its performance under the subcontract (the exception of no cause of action)?; and (2) If so, is this demand for arbitration premature because the claims were not submitted to the architect prior to this demand for arbitration (the exception of prematurity)?
Of central concern in the decision of this case is the application of the Louisiana Arbitration Law, La.R.S. 9:4201 et seq. Under La.R.S. 9:4203 (1950)[1] a court, at the request of an aggrieved party, shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement, after it is found (a) that an arbitration agreement was made, and (b) that the opponent failed or refused to comply with it. The latter (a and b) are the only triable issues in a suit to enforce an arbitration agreement such as the present. Domke on Commercial Arbitration, Section 17.02 (1968).
1. Exception of No Cause of Action
In this case, there is no denial that the general contract between Bartley and the School Board included an agreement to arbitrate. *282 It is clear that neither the School Board nor American has submitted to arbitration, although Bartley has requested it.
American has alleged that it was not bound to arbitrate, since no specific language in its subcontract with Bartley requires it to arbitrate under the Bartley-School Board contract. (The contracts are in evidence without objection for trial of the exception.)
This contention is without merit.
The Bartley-School Board contract contains a general clause in Article 7, Section 10.1[2] providing for arbitration of "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof." A reading of the subcontract between Bartley and American unquestionably shows that these parties incorporated by reference[3] the Bartley-School Board contract and thus intended to be governed by its arbitration provisions. See J. S. & H. Construction Company v. Richmond County Hospital Authority et al. 473 F.2d 212 (CA5, 1973); Domke on Commercial Arbitration, section 7.01 (1968) (1974 Supp.) See also, Uniroyal, Inc. v. A. Epstein and Sons, Inc., 428 F.2d 523 (CA 7, 1970).
The federal cases relied upon by the defendant as holding to the contrary are Miller Act cases, 40 U.S.C.A., Section 270a et seq., based on special considerations applicable to that federal statute, and are thus distinguishable from the present. See J. S. & H. Construction Co., cited above, at 473 F.2d 214-215 which does so.
2. The Exception of Prematurity
The School Board and American contend that arbitration would be premature on the basis of Article 2, Sections 2.7 and 2.10[4]*283 of the Bartley-School Board contract. These provisions call for referral of claims to the architect prior to making demand for arbitration under Article 7, Section 10.1. Also, there is a contention by the School Board and American that Bartley has waived its right to arbitrate under the contract.
We do not reach the merits of these claims of prematurity and waiver. We determine only that these questions of procedural arbitrability should not be decided by the courts, without having been submitted to the arbitrator, when a party sues to enforce an arbitration agreement.
As noted earlier, Section 4203 of the Louisiana Arbitration Law requires a court to order arbitration, once it finds that there has been an agreement to arbitrate and a failure to comply therewith. Since these triable issues have been here determined in favor of arbitration, the court must order arbitration. The issues of waiver and prematurity address themselves to the arbitrator. They cannot be utilized to prevent the aggrieved party from securing an order directing arbitration, as required by Section 4203. See Domke on Commercial Arbitration, Sections 17.01, 17.02 (1968).
One of the basic reasons for the existence of arbitration agreements is to allow the parties to achieve speedy settlement of their differences out of court. Domke on Commercial Arbitration, Section 1.01 (1968). This purpose would be thwarted if, before being required to perform under the arbitration agreement, parties were permitted to litigate in order to secure an initial judicial determination (preliminarily to arbitration) that procedural formalities of the agreement had been complied with.
In Stone v. Stone, 292 So.2d 686 (La.1974), we interpreted La.R.S. 9:4201[5] to require arbitration when the parties had agreed to arbitrate, "save upon such grounds as exist at law ... for the revocation of any contract". While such grounds were present in Stone, we do not find them here.
Accordingly, under the Louisiana Arbitration Law, the Bartley-School Board contract and the Bartley-American contract require the parties thereto to arbitrate the questions involved.
The judgments of the previous courts are to this extent reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law. No review was sought of the dismissal of the third party claims of American against Avondale and J. Buchanan Blitch and Associates, Inc., so issues relating to this dismissal are not before us. The costs of review by the court of appeal and by this court are assessed against defendants-appellees, to the extent permitted by law; all other costs are to await final determination of the case.
Reversed and remanded.
NOTES
[1] La.R.S. 9:4203 provides:
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