Barbara Regina Schlein v. Anthony Griffin

Opinion

ACCEPTED 01-14-00799-cv FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/20/2015 4:09:18 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK

CAUSE NO. 01-14-00799-cv

FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/20/2015 4:09:18 PM FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

HOUSTON, TEXAS

BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN,

Appellant,

vs.

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,

Appellee.

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL

Appellant: Barbara Regina Schlein

Counsel for Appellant: Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. State Bar No. 24045596 scagle@csj-law.com Heather Panick State Bar No. 24062935 hpanick@csj-law.com 2302 Fannin, Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 659-7617 Facsimile: (713) 659-7641

-ii- Appellee: Anthony P. Griffin

Counsel for Appellee: Ms. Norma Venso State Bar No. 20545250 nvenso@earthlink.net 830 Apollo Houston, Texas 77058 Facsimile: (281) 286-9990 Telephone: (409) 789-8661

Trial Judge: Honorable Barbara E. Roberts

PARTIES IN UNDERLYING DIVORCE MATTER

Cross Plaintiff/Petitioner: Barbara Regina Schlein

Counsel for Plaintiff/Petitioner: Anthony P. Griffin

Cross Defendant/Respondent : Robert John Schlein

Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: Bill De La Garza

-iii- TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

I. The Trial Court Erred by Permitting Anthony Griffin, Individually, to Enforce This Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A. Standard for Privity and Capacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

B. Griffin Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Establishing Capacity to Enforce the Fee Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

II. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence of Griffin’s Habit, Custom or Routine Practice.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

A. Standard for Habit or Routine Evidence; Rule 406. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

B. Griffin Opened the Door to the Grievances by Attempting to Establish that He Always Kept All of His Clients Informed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

C. The Trial Court Erred by its Treatment of the Complaints. . . . . . . . 18

D. Complaints were Admissible as Similar Happenings Evidence. . . . 21

-iv- 1. Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2. Texas Cases Examined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

E. Exclusion of the Complaints Bolstered Griffin’s Credibility while Damaging Schlein’s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

F. The Complaints are Necessary Evidence for Exemplary Damages. . 25

III. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Undisclosed Character Witnesses to Testify as Rebuttal Witnesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

A. Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

B. Griffin Cannot Meet the Standard.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

IV. The Trial Court Erred in Charging the Jury on the Breach of Fiduciary Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

V. The Jury’s Answers to the Court’s Charge on Fiduciary Duty was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

A. Standard of Review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Attorneys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

C. The Evidence Admitted Established Breach Conclusively. . . . . . . . 34

VI. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence which Established a Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

A. Admissibility of Superceded Pleading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

B. Griffin’s Original Petition Establishes Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

VII. The Jury’s Refusal to Find Actual Damages Resulting from Griffin’s Unconscionable Conduct was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance

-v- of the Evidence.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

A. The Jury’s Verdict Should be Disregarded Because Some Evidence of Damages was Provided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

VIII. Griffin’s Expert Witness, Genevieve McGarvey, Should Not Have Been Permitted to Testify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

A. Procedural Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

B. Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Rules Governing Experts and its Own Discovery Control Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

IX. McGarvey’s Testimony was Legally Insufficient to Prove that Griffin’s Fees were Reasonable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

A. There is no Evidence to Support the Jury’s Finding of Damages in Question No. 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

-vi- INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Alvarado v. Farah Mfg., 830 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44, 45

Anglot-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1965).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997). . . . 46

Brown v. Green, 302 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Cas. Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50 (Tex. 1939).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Conquest Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int’l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2004, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

-vii- Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co. of Dall., 516 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Davis v. Raney Auto Company, 249 S.W.878 accord Kahn v. Imperial Airport, L.P., 308 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005). . . . . . . . . 36

Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1994, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22, 24

Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

First Texas Sav. Ass’n of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1982, no writ.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . 21

Hoover Slovacek, LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2001).. . . . . . . . . 20

In re Allied Chemical, 227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.– Dallas 2013, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

-viii- Kahn v. Imperial Airport L.P.,308 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010).. . . . . . 14

Keck, Mahin & Cale v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Kurtz v. Kurtz, 158 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Landry’s Seafood House-Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2007, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1996). . 12

Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, writ denied).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Ortiz v. Glusman, 334 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2011, pet denied) . . . . . 20

Perez v. Kirk Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Sanders v. Total Heat & Air, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 23

Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

-ix- 39 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1998) rev’d on other grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 25, 26

Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no writ).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22

U.S. v. West, 22 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34

Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Statutes

Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Tex. Gov’t §82.065(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Other Authorities

PJC 104.2-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44, 45

Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 45

Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

-x- Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Cond. 1.04. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Tex. R. Evid. 401.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Tex. R. Evid. 404.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Tex. R. Evid. 406.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

25 Tex. Jur. 3d Evidence 261 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary’s L.J. 3 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

-xi- STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case. This is a case involving breach of an attorney fee

agreement. Appellant Barbara Regina Schlein (“Schlein”) was persuaded to engage

Appellee Anthony Griffin (“Griffin”) in her ongoing divorce case. Parties to the fee

agreement were Appellant and “A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” (the

“Firm”). After a final decree was entered in the underlying divorce case, Appellant

was sued, alleging failure to pay on that case and other cases. [CR 3] The original

plaintiff was Griffin, individually. Schlein answered with a general denial, a verified

denial challenging Griffin’s capacity to sue, and counterclaimed for breach of contract,

legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraud for failure to disclose,

defamation, libel, libel per se, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

[CR 363] Subsequently, in response to Schlein’s traditional motion for partial

summary judgment on Griffin’s lack of capacity to maintain suit, Griffin amended his

pleadings to identify the plaintiff as “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers.” [CR

3; CR 628]

Course of proceedings. The parties’ claims were tried to a jury, which found

for “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” on its breach of contract claim. The

jury assessed $105,750 in actual damages, representing attorney’s fees incurred by

Griffin in representing Schlein in her divorce; $22,399.29 in costs related to same; and

-1- $62,866 in attorney’s fees for the instant action. The jury also found that Griffin had

knowingly engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action; it assessed actual

damages in the amount of “0” and $5,000.00 in exemplary damages. [CR-Supp-25-26]

Griffin subsequently filed two motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

and Schlein filed a motion for new trial, all of which were denied. [CR 1144; CR

1175; CR 1209; CR 1245] The trial court entered judgment on the verdict on June 30,

2014. [CR 1249] This appeal followed.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:

(1) The trial court permitted “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” to prosecute this case, although Anthony Griffin was not a party to the subject fee agreement. A Griffin Lawyers is not a registered d/b/a and Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. is a corporation that has not been in good standing since 1998. It further barred evidence that A Griffin Lawyers was a d/b/a, not of Anthony Griffin, but of Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. Did the trial court err?

(2) Griffin offered testimony that his habit and routine practice was to keep all of his clients informed about their cases. In rebuttal, Schlein offered 32 grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin by other clients since January 1, 2009 that raised issues about his fee and complained that he failed to keep clients informed . While Griffin was permitted to call former clients to testify that he kept them informed, the trial court excluded all 32 of these grievances and lawsuits brought against him. Did the trial court err?

(3) The trial court permitted Griffin to call undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses to testify that he always keeps them informed. They also provided favorable character testimony for Griffin. Griffin failed to show good

-2- cause for not disclosing these witnesses before trial. Did the trial court err?

(4) The trial court placed the burden on Schlein, rather than Griffin, on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. Schlein submitted a substantially correct form of the question, which placed the burden on Griffin. Schlein’s question was rejected. Did the trial court err?

(5) The jury’s answers to the court’s charge on breach of fiduciary duty were supported by insufficient evidence.

(6) Schlein offered Griffin’s original petition to establish that Griffin disclosed privileged communications and that Griffin sued Schlein on a non-existent contingency fee contact. The trial court excluded the original petition. Did the trial court err?

(7) The jury’s refusal to find actual damages resulting from Griffin’s unconscionable conduct was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

(8) Griffin failed to timely produce a report or disclose the information relating to his expert witness, Genevieve McGarvey, as required by Rule 194.2(f), Rule 195, and the docket control order issued by the trial court. After pr4eviously ordering that McGarvey was stricken as a result of Griffin’s failure to produce a report and make the requisite disclosures, the trial court changed her mind at trial, and allowed McGarvey to testify. Did the trial court err?

(9) The testimony of Griffin’s expert witness, Genevieve McGarvey, was legally insufficient to support a judgment awarding Griffin damages in the form of reasonable attorney’s fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Schlein’s divorce action had been ongoing for over thirteen months when she

was introduced to Griffin by a volunteer attorney in a women’s shelter. [RR 6, 42:6-

-3- 23] Griffin urged her to hire his firm to finish her difficult divorce action. Citing his

firm’s reputation as “the best,” he told her that he could effectively counter the tactics

of her husband’s lawyer. [RR 6, 45:7-18; RR 6, 51:11-21] According to Schlein,

Griffin also promised to finish her divorce case for a flat fee. [RR 6, 43:19-25] After

two meetings, Schlein agreed to hire A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. (the

“Firm”). Schlein testified that the promised fee structure, and Griffin’s statements

about the reputation of the Firm, were key to her decision to accept the offer. [RR 6,

45:14-18]

On November 3, 2009, Schlein and Griffin executed the five-page fee

agreement at issue in this case (the “Fee Agreement”). [RR 6, 49:12-50:9; PX-1 (Tab

3)] Also on November 3, Griffin tendered a “Letter of Explanation and Letter

Agreement” (“Letter Agreement”). The Letter Agreement was signed by Griffin,

referenced the Fee Agreement, and explained its terms and scope. [PX-2 (Tab 4)]

Appellant testified that Griffin used the Letter Agreement to explain the Fee

Agreement before she signed. [RR 6, 47:1-3] [PX-2] Read together, these two

documents outlined the scope of the relationship as follows:

(a) Schlein was hiring “A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” to

represent her in her divorce and certain listed claims involved in division

of property. [PX-1, p. 1]

-4- (b) As consideration, Schlein agreed to pay a $35,000 nonrefundable retainer

at a future date. [PX-1, p. 2-3] This retainer was set significantly higher

than the firm’s normal retainer for similar work. [PX-1, p. 2] “The

retainer is set at an amount that is anticipated that no additional fees will

be charged.” [PX-2, p.1] Although Schlein was only required to pay a

$35,000 retainer, the Fee Agreement entitled the Firm to seek recovery

of its full reasonable fee from Schlein’s ex-husband in the divorce

proceeding. [PX-1, p. 3]

(c) Two related claims – one involving a suit against a homebuilder (the

“Builder Case”) and one involving Schlein’s son – would be handled

outside the Fee Agreement. The Explanation Letter stated that for each

of these matters “[a] separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no

retainer is contemplated (contingent fee).” [PX-2, p.2] No written fee

agreements were drafted or executed in these matters. [RR 6, 48:1-9; RR

6, 48:10-15; RR 6, 48-49: 24-8; RR 7, 17:9-14]

(d) The Firm promised to “produce copies of documents as related to this

litigation and to keep the client fully informed.” [PX-1, p. 5]

The divorce action was tried to a jury verdict in May 2011; a final decree

was entered on October 24, 2011. [PX-6] However, the first and only bill by the Firm

-5- was created months after trial.1 [RR 4, 113-115; RR 6, 53] This bill was more than

triple the $35,000 retainer and purported to include fees for work on matters other than

the divorce proceeding, including the Builder Case. [PX-147 (Tab 5)] The Fee

Agreement provided that the Firm would “not bill for any additional work unless and

until the services rendered exceeded the retainer amount.” [PX-1] Griffin testified that

he rendered services in the amount of $35,000 on or about May 17, 2010. [RR 8,

103:2-5] However, Griffin created the only invoice on or about August 5, 2011, over

a year later. [RR 8, 103:6-8] Schlein offered to pay Griffin the $35,000 retainer;

instead, he terminated the relationship. [RR 4, 102:17-20; RR 4, 111:7-24; RR 4, 112-

115:16-4; RR 4, 133:5] A day later, Griffin sent Schlein an email threatening: (1) to

set aside the October 24th judgment by claiming fraud; (2) to retain the valuable tile

entrusted to him during the divorce proceeding; (3) assert a lien for his costs and fees

in the divorce proceeding; (4) to file a lien based on a contingent fee interest in the

Builder Case; and (5) to hold onto Schlein’s client file, comprised of approximately

30 boxes, for up to 30 days. [PX-146 (Tab 6)]

Griffin filed suit (in his individual capacity) on March 20, 2013. The Original

Petition sought recovery for Griffin’s work on both the divorce case and for a

contingent interest in the Builder Case. [CR 3 (Tab 8)] Specifically, Griffin sought “a

1 While the invoice [PX-147] is dated August 5, 2011, Schlein testified she did not see it until October 28. [RR 6 53:14-23]

-6- declaratory judgment with respect to the contingent fee contract on the construction

litigation that the contract is a valid and enforceable contract and remains in effect.”

[CR 3] Subsequently, Griffin amended his pleadings to drop this claim. [CR 296]

Schlein challenged Griffin’s capacity, claiming he could not recover against her

because he was not a party to the contract and “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” was not in

good standing. [CR 481] Griffin claimed he was a party because “A Griffin Lawyers”

was his assumed name, not the corporation’s. [CR 633; RR 8, 87:10-20] This was

contradicted by a bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of the corporation. [CR 522] The

trial court refused to consider the bankruptcy petition and did not take judicial notice

of same. [RR 10, 7-8:22-20]

Schlein’s counterclaim against Griffin was centered on Griffin’s breach of his

duty to keep her reasonably informed. [CR 26] Lacking copies of signed letters or

relevant emails, Griffin adduced testimony that it was his office’s habit or routine

practice to copy clients on all correspondence and pleadings. [RR 6, 165:7-18; RR 6,

125:7-15] In response, Schlein sought to introduce evidence of 32 grievances and

lawsuits filed against Griffin by clients whom he represented during the approximate

time frame he represented Schlein. Most, if not all of these grievances and lawsuits,

were based on Griffin’s fee and his failure to keep his clients informed. [RR 8, 67:3-

14; DX-32-46 and 75-79] Although Schlein was allowed to mention limited portions

-7- of three of the grievances, the trial court excluded all of the grievances and lawsuits.

[CR 1143; RR 10, 90:18-92:7; RR 10, 172:2-5] The trial court then permitted Griffin

to call undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses to refute these grievances. [RR 10, 168:2-13;

RR 10, 170:6-172:22]

After nine days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Griffin. This

appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Griffin failed to demonstrate his capacity to enforce the fee agreement at issue.

Griffin chose to contract with Schlein through a corporation that has not been in good

standing with the Texas Secretary of State since 1998. Such a corporation is barred

from using the courts of this state to enforce its obligations. And, as is apparent on

the face of the Fee Agreement, A Griffin Lawyers purports to an assumed name of the

Firm, not Griffin personally. Because Griffin is not a party to this contract, he cannot

enforce it.

The trial court erred in excluding the 32 grievances and lawsuits offered to rebut

Griffin’s evidence of habit or routine practice. Notwithstanding Griffin’s position

taken at trial, the grievances and lawsuits were admissible as habit evidence, as

evidence of similar happenings, and in support of Schlein’s claim for exemplary

damages. However, once Griffin testified that he always keeps his clients informed

-8- of everything going on in their cases, he opened the door to allow Schlein to present

this evidence to rebut Griffin’s own habit evidence. The door was opened even further

when Griffin was permitted to elicit testimony from his former clients that Griffin kept

them informed. The sheer number of grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin

since January 1, 2009, conclusively rebutted any inference of habit or routine practice

and destroyed any claim that Griffin kept all his clients informed. Therefore, by

excluding this evidence, the trial court permitted Griffin to create a false impression,

while depriving Schlein of the opportunity to prosecute her own claims.

The trial court compounded its error by permitting Griffin to rebut the mere

mention of grievances with a parade of the aforementioned undisclosed “rebuttal”

witnesses. These witnesses were permitted to testify as to the good character of

Griffin and his habit of keeping them informed. Because these witnesses were

undisclosed and because their testimony should have been reasonably anticipated, they

should have been excluded.

Schlein established that Griffin breached his fiduciary duties as a matter of law.

It is undisputed that Griffin took possession of Schlein’s valuable imported Travertine

tile during the underlying divorce. When Griffin terminated his relationship with

Schlein, he refused to release her tile until his motion to set aside the verdict in the

divorce case was heard. Griffin never filed this motion and never returned Schlein’s

-9- tile. It is also undisputed that Griffin only sent Schlein one invoice for his services,

an invoice that was created months after trial. The chronology of events demonstrate

conclusively that Griffin failed to keep Schlein informed, especially with respect to

the amount of attorney’s fees he was incurring.

Despite this evidence demonstrating Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty, the trial

court rejected Schlein’s jury issue, which placed the burden on Griffin to prove he

complied with his fiduciary duty.

The trial court further erred by excluding Griffin’s original petition in this

action, which asserts an interest in a non-existent contingency fee agreement and

discloses a privileged conversation between Schlein and Griffin. Thus, the excluded

petition establishes breach of fiduciary duty as a matter law.

Finally, Schlein was ambushed at trial not only by undisclosed rebuttal

witnesses, but also by a previously stricken expert who was permitted to testify when

the issue was raised at trial. Griffin failed to timely designate his expert, Genevieve

McGarvey, in accordance with the docket control order, Rule 194.2(f), and Rule 195.

Nevertheless, McGarvey was permitted to testify regarding the reasonableness of

Griffin’s attorney’s fees in the underlying divorce matter over Schlein’s objection.

McGarvey’s conclusory testimony, however, was legally insufficient to support

an award of attorney’s fees for Griffin.

-10- ARGUMENT

I. The Trial Court Erred by Permitting Anthony Griffin, Individually, to Enforce This Agreement.

The Fee Agreement listed "A Griffin Lawyers / Anthony P. Griffin, Inc." as

the only party, other than Schlein, to the agreements at issue. [PX-1] When Anthony

Griffin brought suit individually to enforce the Fee Agreement, Schlein raised the

issue of capacity by verified pleading, and sought summary judgment on the issue.

[CR 481] Attached to the Motion were discovery responses and deposition testimony

from Griffin, establishing that Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. was not a party to the lawsuit.

[CR 504-520] Also included was a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed in 2012 by

“Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.,” which claimed “A Griffin Lawyers” as its assumed name.

[CR 522 (Tab 7)]

In response, Griffin filed an amended petition, which added A Griffin Lawyers

to the suit and listed “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” as Plaintiff. [CR 628]

Anthony Griffin filed an affidavit asserting that, contrary to prior representations in

the bankruptcy court and his deposition, A Griffin Lawyers was not an assumed name

of “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” but was his own. [CR 640] Schlein objected, asserting

that Griffin’s response relied on a conclusory “sham” affidavit and failed to show

compliance with the mandatory provisions of Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 71.051-054,

or display an assumed name record which was filed pursuant to that statute. [CR 699]

-11- The trial court denied Schlein’s motion for summary judgment. [CR 751] The

trial court also denied Schlein’s effort to raise the issue at trial. [RR 3, 30:8-31:16; RR

3, 33:17-42:17; RR 4, 108:3-20]

A. Standard for Privity and Capacity

A party must have both standing and capacity to bring a lawsuit. “A plaintiff has

standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal

authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of

whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson

Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996). A challenge to a party’s

privity of contract is a challenge to capacity. See John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v.

SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2013, no pet.); Landry’s

Seafood House - Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430, 433-34 (Tex. App. - Dallas

2007, pet. denied). Privity between the injured party and the party sought to be held

liable is an essential element for recovery in any action based on contract. Sanders v.

Total Heat & Air, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). Privity

is established by proving that the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with

either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff. Conquest

Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int'l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004,

no pet.).

Once the issue of capacity is properly raised by a verified pleading, a plaintiff

-12- bears the burden of bringing forward evidence showing capacity to act. Coastal

Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001).

Failure to do so can result in waiver of a right to recovery. Id.

B. Griffin Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Establishing Capacity to Enforce the Fee Agreement

Because his capacity to sue had been challenged in the trial court, Griffin bore

the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate capacity to sue.

See Coastal Liquids Transportation L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 46

S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001). However, the only evidence presented by Griffin was his

own conclusory affidavit, which contradicted his earlier deposition testimony without

explanation. He produced no assumed-name certificate filed with any governmental

agency and, in fact, admitted that no assumed-name certificate was ever filed. [RR 3,

38:23-39:1] Because Griffin failed to adduce competent, admissible evidence of his

capacity to enforce the Fee Agreement, the trial court should have granted Schlein’s

motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.

Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 699 (Tex. 2000). Instead, the trial court

thwarted Schlein’s efforts to raise the issue during trial. The trial court’s actions

resulted in the rendition of an improper verdict.

It is axiomatic that an assumed or trade name has no separate legal existence

and cannot enter into a contract by itself. See, e.g., Davis v. Raney Auto Company,

-13- 249 S.W. 878; accord Kahn v. Imperial Airport L.P., 308 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. App.

– Dallas 2010). As a matter of law, Griffin’s signature on the Fee Agreement was on

behalf of the only party which it could be – Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., which is also

owned by Griffin. [RR 8 87:21-24] Because it was the corporation which Griffin

bound by his signature; only the corporation could bring suit. See Anglot-Dutch

Petroleum International, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445, 450-51

(Tex. 2011). Griffin’s own sister, who works for the Firm, testified at trial that the

legal name for A Griffin Lawyers is Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. [RR 6, 130:22-25] Yet

the corporation has never been a party to this suit. The trial court’s pretrial decision

to permit the suit to go forward is a clear abuse of discretion.

Further, no deemed finding can supply Griffin with the capacity to bring and

maintain suit, because no evidence supports the finding. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

256, 263 (Tex.2002). When challenged pretrial, Griffin failed to produce evidence of

compliance with mandatory filing requirements for assumed names. Tex. Bus. Comm.

Code 71.051. See [CR 699] At trial, Griffin offered the bare conclusion that A Griffin

Lawyers is the assumed name for him, individually. [RR 8, 87:7-20] These

conclusions, which are contradicted by overwhelming evidence, are no evidence at all.

At trial, the trial court intervened to keep Plaintiff’s capacity arguments away from the

jury. [RR 3, 30:8-31:16; RR 3, 33:17-42:17; RR 4, 108:3-20; DX-4; DX-26]. Cross-

examination of Griffin was limited to Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., the other “party” to the

-14- Fee Agreement. [RR 8, 87:1-88:11] Schlein’s attorney was reduced to a running

objection to any reference to Griffin as a party to the contract. [RR 4, 108:3-19]

Ultimately, it was Griffin’s burden to secure a finding on capacity, and absent

legally sufficient evidence, no finding can be deemed in his favor. In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 263. Because no legally sufficient evidence was introduced, the error

caused the entry of an improper judgment.

II. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence of Griffin’s Habit, Custom or Routine Practice

A significant portion of this trial boiled down to whether Griffin kept his client

informed. This issue was relevant to whether Griffin complied with the Fee

Agreement; it was also central to Schlein’s claims that Griffin misrepresented the

nature of their fee agreement and breached his fiduciary duty during and after he

represented Schlein. Both Griffin and Schlein offered evidence of habit or routine

practice pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 406. While Griffin’s offer was permitted,

Schlein’s was largely rejected. The trial court’s rulings on this issue fostered a

mistaken impression which led to the rendition of an improper verdict.

A. Standard for Habit or Routine Evidence; Rule 406

Texas Rule of Evidence 406 authorizes evidence of an entity’s routine practice

“to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was

in conformity” with that practice. See, e.g., Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities

-15- Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).

For testimony of the routine practice of an organization to be admissible, it must show

a regular response to a repeated specific situation. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v.

Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2002, writ denied). Under the

nearly identical Federal rule, courts require a showing that the cited conduct is “more

than a mere ‘tendency’ to act in a given manner;” the conduct must be “semi-

automatic” in nature. Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290,

1293 (7th Cir. 1988). Such a showing necessarily requires comparing the number of

transactions where the conduct occurred against the total number of transactions. U.S.

v. West, 22 F.3d 586, 591-592 (5th Cir. 1994).

B. Griffin Opened the Door to the Grievances by Attempting to Establish that He Always Kept His Clients Informed

On the crucial issue of whether Griffin kept Schlein informed, Griffin was

forced to admit that he had no proof that the vast majority of electronic transmittal

letters were actually sent to Schlein; that his firm did not bill copies to individual files;

that he did not bill postage to individual files; and that he did not have any of the

either. [RR 10, 9:1-19; RR 7, 21:12-14; RR 8, 63:5-10] Faced with this lack of direct

evidence, Griffin turned to evidence of routine practice under Rule 406. He offered

the testimony of himself and his sister/legal assistant, Linda Griffin, that it was the

customary practice of his office to keep clients informed. [RR 6, 126:20-24; RR 6,

-16- 165:7-18] In his enthusiasm to create this hypothetical paper trail, Griffin opened the

door to the grievances and lawsuits at issue.

On direct examination, Griffin testified:

Q. Did you keep Barbara Schlein informed of what you were doing on her behalf.

A. Absolutely. We have an office manual and we’ve always had this practice: If I write a letter and I send that letter to another lawyer, I copy the client on the letter and client gets a copy of everything. If somebody sends me something that relates to that client, I will then generate a letter to that client and sent it out to that client. There is – with the – if there’s a fax send out, the client gets a copy. If the client doesn’t have a fax, I’d mail it to them.

[RR 6, 165:7-18]

Linda Griffin’s testimony was in total agreement with her brother’s:

Q. Do you know if Barbara Schlein was mailed copies of any parts of her file as the file progressed?

A. The practice of the office is all clients receive every piece of paper that goes out from the beginning to the end of the case.

Q. So did Mr. Griffin give her copies of what the other side filed, as well?

A. Yes.

[RR 6, 125:7-15]

On the strength of this testimony, Griffin was able to leverage the admission of

literally dozens of unsigned electronic letters, which were not even on the Firm’s

letterhead, from his computer network as evidence of his communications with

-17- Schlein. [RR 10, 10:17-19; PX-85-94; PX-96-117; PX-118-134; PX-136; PX-138-

139; PX-142] Schlein’s objection that these constituted no evidence of sending

anything to Schlein was overruled. [RR 8, 14:10-16:6]

When Griffin raised the issue of his office’s routine practice with respect to all

his clients, he “opened the door.” Put another way, he raised the issue first, inviting

a response. Schlein was then entitled to offer evidence rebutting that issue. Serv.

Corp. Int'l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 234-35 (Tex. 2011).

Griffin represented to the jury that every client got every piece of paper that was

sent out or received in every case. [RR 6, 165:7-18] By doing so, he secured

admission of 48 word documents as evidence that he kept Barbara Schlein informed.

In doing so, he placed his regular practice with respect to all his clients at issue.

C. The Trial Court Erred by its Treatment of the Complaints

Schlein responded to Griffin’s evidence by offering the 32 grievances and

lawsuits filed against Griffin between January 1, 2009 and the close of discovery (the

“Complaints”). Each related to disputes regarding his “non-refundable retainer” and

alleged that Griffin failed to keep his clients informed. See Tabs 9, 10 and 11 for

samples of such grievances. The trial court limited Schlein’s original discovery

request to those which asserted malpractice, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary

duty or fraud. [RR 2, 25:20-24; RR 2, 29:23-30:6; RR 2, 31:19-24; DX-32-48; DX-75-

79; see also CR 1015, p.2] Of the grievances offered, five were final; ten were

-18- pending; the rest were dismissed by the disciplinary committee for various reasons.

[DX-32-48; DX-75-79]

The trial court refused to admit the Complaints. [RR 10, 56-59; RR 10, 67:10-

20; RR 11, 163-166] Schlein was restricted to questioning about only three of the

Complaints, which involved agreed judgments or public reprimands. [RR 10, 56:14-

57:9-64:22] Schlein was not allowed to discuss the findings in these cases, only their

ultimate outcome. [RR 10, 62:21-22] The trial court excluded one Complaint because

Griffin represented it was being appealed, though he never provided any

documentation supporting the same. [RR 8, 70:22-72:9; RR 10, 6:19-7:9] This

Complaint involved suspension of Griffin’s license. [RR 8 70:20-22]

When the trial court refused to otherwise admit the Complaints, the trial court

erred. The documents themselves were more reliable than the unsigned client letters

previously admitted.

The Complaints were offered not only to rebut Griffin’s Rule 406 evidence, but

to establish the opposite. The sheer number of grievances and lawsuits speak directly

to the way Griffin runs his law practice and the habits and routines that he uses in

billing and communicating with his clients. Thus, under rule 406, the Complaints are

evidence that “the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was

in conformity with the habit or routine practice.” Tex. R. Evid. 406.

-19- Whether to admit or exclude evidence is a matter committed to the trial court's

sound discretion. See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753

(Tex.1995). A complaint about exclusion of evidence requires a showing that the

error probably resulted in an improper judgment. McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756,

758 (Tex.1992). This requires the reviewing court to review the entire record.

McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 756; Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co, 765 S.W.2d 394, 396

(Tex. 1989). A successful challenge usually requires the complaining party to

demonstrate that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted.

Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex.2000); Interstate

Northborough P'ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001).

The 32 excluded grievances and lawsuits were relevant to rebut Griffin’s

testimony about the “habit or routine practice” of his office. Griffin relied on Rule

406 to establish a presumption that he acted in accordance with his habit or routine of

keeping his clients informed. The law affords a presumption based on Rule 406 only

when a response is Pavlovian; that is, “the same one directed at the same specific

stimulus.” Ortiz v Glusman, 334 S.W.3d 812 (Tex.App–El Paso 2011, pet. denied).

In the face of the sheer number of these Complaints, Griffin’s right to this presumption

is destroyed and admission of the 48 unsigned letters becomes a gross abuse of

discretion. The trial court’s error left an erroneous impression in the jurors’ minds and

likely led to the rendition of an improper verdict.

-20- D. Complaints Were Admissible as Similar Happenings Evidence

1. Standard

The Complaints were also admissible for another reason: to show a common

scheme or plan. While evidence of other wrongs or acts is generally not admissible to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, such

evidence may be admissible for other purposes. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence

is relevant and admissible for this purpose where the offering party can demonstrate

sufficient similarity of subject matter and parties. U-Haul Int’l Inc. v. Waldrip, 380

S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 2012). They are especially relevant if the acts involve the same

personnel. See Durbin v. Dal–Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263, 268–69 (Tex.App.-El

Paso 1994, writ denied), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Golden Eagle

Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex.2000); Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v.

Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).

2. Texas Cases Examined

In Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., the plaintiff alleged the Defendant wrongfully

terminated him after he sustained an on-the-job injury. Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 268-69.

The trial court excluded testimony and other evidence that referenced other lawsuits

brought against the employer for illegal terminations after a workers compensation

claim was filed and instances of other employees who had been similarly wrongfully

terminated. Id. The appellate court held that evidence showing that prior employees

-21- were terminated illegally was relevant and admissible. Id. The appellate court

remanded the case for a new trial holding that “the trial court's exclusion of evidence

prevented [the plaintiff] from receiving a fair trial.” Id. at 273.

In Cobb, the plaintiff was permitted to offer evidence of the defendant

underwriter's previous denials of claims. The court held they were admissible because

they were denied around the same time as the plaintiff's claim was denied, they were

denied on the same basis, and were admissible to show that the defendant's refusal to

pay the plaintiff's claim was “committed or performed with such frequency as to

indicate a general business practice.” Id., Cobb, 746 S.W.2d at 815. The court held

that the evidence was necessary to establish the plaintiff’s causes of action, especially

the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant had breached its duty of good faith and fair

dealing. Id.

Here, the grievances involve the “same . . . personnel,” the same law practice,

and “the same pattern of conduct.” Id. They all occurred in the same time period of

Schlein’s representation and establish an essential element of Schlein’s claims, that

Griffin breached the fiduciary duty of care owed to Schlein, that he made

misrepresentations regarding the fee agreement, and that Griffin intended to defraud

Schlein through a bait-and-switch scheme. The evidence the court ordered admitted

in Durbin was for pending lawsuits and unresolved allegations. Here, Schlein has not

only pending and dismissed grievances and lawsuits, but grievances that resulted in

-22- public reprimands as well. Schlein also has substantially more instances than existed

in Durbin which firmly establish the way Griffin ran his practice and communicated

with his clients. Both issues are crucial to Schlein establishing her case and

substantially more relevant than prejudicial under the Durbin court’s analysis.

Such evidence is uniformly held admissible if it shows a party’s material intent

because the prior acts were “so connected with the transaction at issue that they may

all be parts of a system, scheme or plan.” Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39 S.W.3d

608, 613 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998) rev'd on other grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex.

2001). This is “shown through evidence of similar acts temporally relevant and of the

same substantive basis.” Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex.

2011).

Here, like in Cobb, the grievances occurred around the same time, were made

on the same basis as Schlein’s claims, and are admissible to show Griffin’s business

practices. The grievances are essential to establish Schlein’s claims that Griffin

breached his fiduciary duties owed to her. Additionally, Griffin’s failure to disclose

his grievances and disputes with clients was a material omission made the basis of

Schlein’s fraud in the inducement and fraud by nondisclosure claim. Therefore, the

grievances are also necessary for Schlein to establish her fraud claim against Griffin.

-23- E. Exclusion of the Complaints Bolstered Griffin’s Credibility While Damaging Schlein’s

In Durbin, the Court held that the trial court’s exclusion of examples of other

workers being fired after making compensation claims left a false impression with the

jury that plaintiff was unable to rebut. The Court also considered the effect the

excluded evidence likely would have had on the credibility of key witnesses:

Minyard was himself terminated, and without specific examples of how the company policy was implemented, the jury may well have concluded he was simply a disgruntled ex-employee seeking revenge. Allowing testimony from other witnesses corroborating Minyard would have added to his credibility, but that was not an option for plaintiff, either. Precluding Minyard from discussing specific instances of termination following on-the-job injuries harmed plaintiff's case by seriously undermining the credibility of his star witness.

Second, the trial court's ruling made it impossible for plaintiff to refute Dal–Briar's claim that “no one was ever fired as a result of a worker's comp claim.” As plaintiff was prohibited from introducing examples of workers fired after making compensation claims, the jury was entirely justified in believing Dal–Briar's claim was correct. Had Durbin been allowed to introduce the excluded evidence, Dal–Briar's claim would have been far less plausible. We therefore conclude the exclusion of this evidence was reasonably calculated to lead to, and probably resulted in, an improper verdict. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1).

Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 271 (emphasis added).

In much the same way, if the jury had known that on 32 other occasions since

January 1, 2009, clients have complained about Griffin’s conduct, including his failure

to keep them informed. Schlein certainly would have benefitted greatly by having her

-24- story corroborated by other witnesses. Likewise, Griffin’s contention that he always

keeps every client informed, would appear much less plausible.

F. The Complaints are Necessary Evidence for Exemplary Damages

Schlein must be able to put on evidence of Griffin's intent to establish her

exemplary damages. Griffin's intent is shown through the numerous grievances filed

against him on the same basis on which Schlein brings her claims. Excluding the

grievances impermissibly limits Schlein's ability to establish her damages and is

therefore reversible error.

In Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the appellate court held that exclusion of

prior lawsuits as evidence resulted in the improper rendition of judgment and sent the

case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39

S.W.3d at 613. The trial court excluded evidence of five prior lawsuits and their

judgments that were brought on the same cause of action as the plaintiffs. Id. The

court stated that while prior bad acts may be prejudicial, and exception lies where

“they are so connected with the transaction under consideration in point of time that

they may all be regarded as parts of a system, scheme or plan.” Id.

The Court held that Wal-Mart's intent was required to establish exemplary

damages and the prior lawsuits resulting in judgment against Wal-Mart served to

establish Wal-Mart's intent. Because the trial court excluded the evidence, the

appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the issue of exemplarily damages.

-25- Because the evidence admitted made it appear that Wal-Mart's actions had been an

isolated incident, the court held that the prior judgments were necessary for the jury

to properly award damages. Id. at 614. The Court further stated:

The excluded prior lawsuit documents evidenced the frequency of similar wrongs Wal-Mart committed; the character of the conduct involved; the degree of Wal-Mart's culpability; the extent to which Wal-Mart's conduct offends a sense of public justice and propriety, and the amount needed to deter similar acts in the future. In addition, the prior lawsuits appellants sought to introduce were evidence of a course of conduct showing Wal-Mart's intent to interfere with prospective business relations. Id.

Here, Schlein has requested exemplarily damages. Because the prior and

current grievances and lawsuits filed by Griffin's clients are evidence of his intent, the

grievances are relevant, admissible evidence that Schlein must be allowed to present

to the jury.

III. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Undisclosed Character Witnesses to Testify as Rebuttal Witnesses.

Having excluded all 32 grievances and lawsuits, the trial court compounded its

error by permitting Griffin to call undisclosed rebuttal character witnesses in response.

Griffin claimed that the rebuttal witnesses were necessary to refute Schlein’s

accusation that he failed to keep her reasonably informed while representing her. [RR

9, 56:19-59:3] Thus, these surprise rebuttal witnesses were called for the purpose of

establishing that Griffin kept them informed when he represented them and that they

were satisfied with the services he provided. [RR 10, 168-173] Griffin’s former

-26- clients also provided character testimony that cast Griffin in a favorable light. [RR 11,

14-15:14-7; RR 11, 18:10-18; RR 11, 30:11-31:4] None of Griffin’s rebuttal

witnesses were disclosed in response to Schlein’s Request for Disclosure or identified

on Griffin’s Witness List. [CR 63; CR 573]

A. Standard

A party may introduce previously undisclosed rebuttal or impeachment evidence

if (1) the evidence is solely for impeachment or rebuttal, (2) its use could not have

been anticipated, and (3) the evidence is not responsive to a direct discovery request.

See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. 1994) (emphasis added).

B. Griffin Cannot Meet the Standard

Griffin cannot satisfy the above standard for several reasons. First, Schlein’s

Original Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed on June 18, 2013, specifically

alleges that Griffin breached his fiduciary duty owed to Schlein by failing to “inform

client of matters material to the representation.” [CR 29] Griffin knew for close to a

year before trial that his office’s practices with respect to keeping clients informed

would be at issue. Therefore, the need for such witnesses was forseeable for at least

that long.

Second, it is disingenuous for Griffin to contend they did not anticipate

Schlein’s attempt to introduce the grievances and lawsuits at trial, when Schlein

fought so hard to obtain them. Schlein’s interrogatories required Griffin to “[i]dentify

-27- and describe the nature, source, substance, and disposition or resolution of every claim

or complaint that has been made at or against you, including, but not limited to, claims

or complaints related to malpractice, misrepresentations, fraud, mishandling of funds

or any violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct.” [CR 152] As a result

of Griffin’s objection to this interrogatory, a hearing on Schlein’s motion to compel

was heard on October 31, 2013. [CR 196] The trial court narrowed the scope of

Interrogatory No. 3 and ordered to Griffin to “[i]dentify and describe the nature, scope,

substance, and disposition or resolution of every claim or complaint filed with the

State Bar or in which a lawsuit was filed that has been made at or against Griffin,

limited to claim or complaints relating to malpractice, misrepresentation, fraud and

breach of fiduciary duty. [CR 308]

On February 14, 2014, Griffin supplemented his answer to Interrogatory No. 3

and the corresponding request for production and identified 32 separate lawsuits and

grievances filed against him since January 1, 2009. [CR 624] Most, if not all of the

Complaints arose from issues regarding Griffin’s fee, usually his retainer, and his

failure to keep the client informed as required by Disciplinary Rule 1.03. [DX-32-48;

DX-75-79] Griffin was deposed regarding these lawsuits and grievances on February

28, 2014. [CR 624; RR 2, 32:22-34:12]

The Complaints brought by Griffin’s former clients relating to Griffin’s failure

to keep clients informed, among other things, were squarely at issue throughout the

-28- entire case. Consequently, Griffin was required to disclose the identity of these

character witnesses prior to trial and the trial court erred in permitting the testimony.

At trial, Schlein objected to these witnesses on the grounds that they were not

identified in Griffin’s Responses to Request for Disclosure and were not listed on

Griffin’s witness list. [RR 9, 58:17-24; RR 10, 161:16-21] Thus, it was Schlein who

was surprised by and unprepared for Griffin’s undisclosed rebuttal witnesses.

The trial court’s decision regarding Griffin’s rebuttal witnesses led to the

rendition of an improper verdict because the issue of whether Griffin keeps his clients

informed was key to nearly all of Schlein’s causes of action against Griffin. Because

the undisclosed character witnesses were permitted to testify, the jury was left with

an inaccurate impression regarding how Griffin treats his clients. Specifically, the jury

was left with the impression that Griffin always kept his clients informed, provided

periodic billings, and returned unearned fees.

IV. The Trial Court Erred in Charging the Jury on Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Schlein’s pleading raised the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. [CR 2, 764] The

Court’s original charge placed the burden on Griffin to prove he complied with his

fiduciary duty. [RR 12 26:22-28:15; see State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury

Charges Business-Consumer-Insurance-Employment 104.2] At the charge conference,

Griffin persuaded the Court to instead submit a question placing the burden on

Schlein. [RR 12 26:22-28:15; see PJC 104.3] Schlein tendered a substantially correct

-29- question based on PJC 104.2 which was marked “Refused” by the trial court. [CR-

Supp-31] Because the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof, reversible error

is shown.

Schlein’s breach of fiduciary duty allegations against Griffin center on actions

after the attorney-client relationship arose. These claims include his failure to keep

her informed of facts material to her case, his failure to safeguard property entrusted

to his care, and failure to keep her apprised of the status of the amount of attorneys’

fees incurred. As such, Schlein requested a jury question which placed the burden on

Griffin to show that his actions were fair. See PJC 104.2-3.

The trial court is required to submit to the jury such questions and instructions

as are raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 278.

Charge error is preserved by the proponent of a question or instruction by timely

requesting an issue, and, where refused, submits a question or instruction in

substantially correct form. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. “[A] judgment cannot be permitted

to stand when a party is denied proper submission of a valid theory of recovery or a

vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and evidence.” Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842

S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992).

Because the acts complained of by Schlein were committed during the

relationship, the burden should have been placed on Griffin to show the fairness and

reasonableness of his actions. Griffin benefitted because he secured a claim for over

-30- $100,000 in attorney’s fees. The trial court’s misplacing of the burden of proof

probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict.

V. The Jury’s Answers to the Court’s Charge on Fiduciary Duty was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence.

Schlein presented substantial evidence to the jury of Griffin’s breaches of his

duties during and after his representation. The jury’s failure to find that Griffin

breached his fiduciary duty was against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence. Alternatively, this failure to find breach of fiduciary duty was supported by

factually insufficient evidence.

A. Standard of Review

To prevail on her legal sufficiency challenge, Schlein must demonstrate that the

evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow

Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241-42 (Tex. 2001); Sterner v. Marathon Oil

Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). In reviewing a “matter of law” challenge, this

Court must first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while

ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d

at 690. If there is no evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court will then

examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a

matter of law. Id. The point of error should be sustained only if the contrary

proposition is conclusively established. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58

-31- (Tex.1983). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to

be given their testimony, and the fact-finder may choose to believe one witness and

disbelieve another. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex.2005). The

Court should presume the fact-finder resolved all evidentiary conflicts in accordance

with its decision, but only if a reasonable juror could have done so. See Id.

In this review, certain evidence contrary to the verdict cannot be disregarded by

the reviewing court, even if it leads to a reversal of the verdict. Favorable evidence

must always be placed in its proper context, even if that contextual evidence is not

favorable to the verdict. Similarly, the reviewing court must consider evidence

contrary to the verdict if it shows that favorable evidence is incompetent; this includes

unqualified experts. Finally, undisputed or otherwise conclusive evidence may not be

disregarded. Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 811-817; see also W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s

Standards of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary’s L.J. 3, 33-37 (2010).

When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue

on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse

finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Francis, 46

S.W.3d at 242; Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. The court of appeals must consider and

weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak

or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that

it is clearly wrong and unjust. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635

-32- (Tex.1986). In doing so, the court of appeals must “detail the evidence relevant to the

issue” and “state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence

in support of the verdict.” Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.

B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Attorneys

In Texas, attorneys are held to the highest standards of ethical conduct in

dealing with their clients. Hoover Slovacek, 206 S.W. 3d 557, 560 (Tex. 2006);

Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1965). Attorneys owe their clients

“absolute perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment

or deception.” Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.]

2001, pet. denied). The duties owed by an attorney to his client include duties of

loyalty; duties of confidentiality; and duties of candor.

The attorney’s duty of candor includes a duty of “full and fair disclosure of facts

material to the client’s representation.” Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.

1988). “A fact is material if it would likely affect the conduct of a reasonable person

concerning the transaction in question.” Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723, 736

(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed) (applying definition to alleged breach

of fiduciary duty by attorney); see also Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co.

of Dall., 516 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex.1974) (outlining same definition of “material” in

context of fraud). Because the client must trust his attorney’s advice, an attorney’s

-33- failure to disclose material facts is tantamount to concealment. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at

645.

The duty of loyalty includes a duty to safeguard client confidences and not make

hostile use of those confidences. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.

App. – Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Brown v. Green, 302 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex.

App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

C. The Admitted Evidence Conclusively Established Breach

Here, the jury’s verdict is contrary to the evidence, thus it cannot stand. Both

Griffin and Schlein testified that she entrusted certain valuable tile from an unfinished

house to Griffin’s care, and Griffin stored this tile in his warehouse. [RR CR765; RR

8 6:14-21; RR 8 7:] Griffin then threatened to keep the tile until the trial court heard

his motion to intervene and undo the verdict in Griffin’s underlying divorce case. [PX-

146 (Tab 6)] Griffin still had the tile on the date of trial, years later. [RR 6 91:20-22]

Lillian Hardwick, Schlein’s expert on duties owed by lawyers, testified this

action constituted a breach of the duty of safekeeping of the client’s property. [RR 10

137:25-138:8] This undisputed evidence conclusively establishes Griffin’s breach with

respect to safekeeping of his client’s property. This evidence established a breach of

fiduciary duty as a matter of law; alternatively, the jury’s verdict is against the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence.

-34- Similarly, Griffin’s own testimony established that he failed to keep Schlein

informed with respect to his billing. The Fee Agreement and Letter Agreement were

dated November 3, 2009. [PX-1 (Tab 3); PX-2 (Tab 4)] His first bill was dated

August 5, 2011; three months after trial and more than 21 months after engagement.

[PX-147 (Tab 5)] Griffin testified that he did not send Schlein a bill during that time.

[RR 8 72:20-73:18] The uncontroverted testimony of Schlein’s expert, Lillian

Hardwick, established that this alone was a breach of Griffin’s duty to keep his client

informed. [RR 10 132:5-25] These uncontroverted or undisputed pieces of evidence

establish a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of law; alternatively, the jury’s failure

to find this fact is a finding against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence.

VI. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence Which Established a Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law.

Schlein offered Griffin’s Original Petition as evidence of two further breaches

of fiduciary duty. The trial court excluded Griffin’s Original Petition because it was

superceded by Griffin’s amended petitions. [RR 10 44:2-12] By excluding Griffin’s

Original Petition, the trial court excluded evidence which presented a prima facie case

of breach of the duties of confidentiality and loyalty and prejudiced Schlein’s ability

to establish her breach of fiduciary duty case. In doing so, the trial court erred.

-35- A. Admissibility of Superceded Pleadings

Superseded pleadings in a civil action are admissible, although not as judicial

admissions. See generally 35 Tex.Jur.3d Evidence 261 (2015). Pleadings in a civil

action that are inconsistent with the pleading party's position in another civil action

are admissible as admissions of a party opponent. Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355

(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2005, no pet.).

B. Griffin’s Original Petition Establishes Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law

The Original Petition sought recovery for a contract which never existed – a

contingent-fee agreement in the Builder Case. See Tab 8. As a matter of law,

contingent-fee agreements must be reduced to writing in order to be enforceable. See

Tex. Gov’t §82.065(a). Griffin is charged with knowing this because the Fee

Agreement called for a separate, written agreement for any suit against Centre

Builders, and Griffin knew he didn’t have one. [RR 7 17:12-14]

Second, the trial court’s refusal to admit the Original Petition filed in this case

– a petition not superseded until just before trial – was a clear abuse of discretion. [RR

10, 44: 2-12] This Petition contained within its four corners two breaches of fiduciary

duty with respect to Schlein. First, the Original Petition allegedly disclosed

confidences revealed by Schlein within the context of the representation in the

underlying divorce case. The Petition quoted a conversation with Schlein to establish

-36- that she hid assets in the underlying divorce case. [CR-17] This disclosure, in a

publicly filed document, constituted a breach of loyalty and confidentiality.

The trial court’s action in excluding this previously-filed petition damaged both

Schlein’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and her claim for exemplary damages. These

pleadings were admissible as statements against interest and admissions of a party

opponent. No rule of evidence prevented their inclusion. The trial court’s failure to

admit these key pieces of evidence resulted in harmful error, which caused rendition

of an improper verdict.

VII. The Jury’s Refusal to Find Actual Damages Resulting from Griffin’s Unconscionable Conduct was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence.

The jury found that Griffin had engaged in an unconscionable course of

conduct, and that he had engaged in that conduct knowingly and intentionally. [CR

Supp 23-24; PJC 102.7; Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 17.49] However, the jury answered

the damages question as follows:

QUESTION NO. 20

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Barbara Schlein for her damages, if any, that resulted from such conduct?

a. The amount, if any, that Barbara Schlein paid in excess to Anthony Griffin for legal services promised by Anthony Griffin.

Answer: [0]

-37- b. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred as a result of Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to complete the divorce matter.

c. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's fee incurred as a result of Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to complete the other matters started by Anthony Griffin.

QUESTION NO. 21

What sum of money, if any, in addition to actual damages, should be awarded to Barbara Schlein against Anthony Griffin because Anthony Griffin's conduct was committed knowingly or intentionally? … Answer: [$5,000.00]

A. The Jury’s Verdict Should Be Disregarded Because Some Evidence Was Provided of Damages.

Schlein’s expert, Gary Jewell, testified as to his firm’s work directed at

completing the following matters: offered the following testimony as to the reasonable

and necessary fees accrued by Schlein and caused by Griffin’s unconscionable

conduct:

• Matters related to the underlying divorce action: $ 27,962.50 [RR 11 79:14- 23]

• Matters related to the case against homebuilders: $ 9,896.25 [RR 11 81:11- 24]

-38- • Removal of wrongful lien against unfinished home: $ 2,800.00 [RR 11 81:25-82:11]

• Expunction of arrest record related to divorce: $ 2,481.25 [RR 11 82:12- 19]

• Resolution of tax case related to the house: $7,498.75 [RR 11 82:20-83:3]

The trial court errred in entering judgment for no damages when some evidence

supported Schlein’s claim for damages. The cause should be remanded for a

redetermination of reasonable attorney’s fees.

Generally, if evidence of reasonable attorney's fees is offered, a finding that the

services of an attorney are without monetary value is factually insufficient. First Texas

Sav. Ass'n of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 188 (Tex.App.—Tyler

1982, no writ).

VIII. Griffin’s Expert Witness, Genevieve McGarvey, Should Not Have Been Permitted to Testify

The trial court erred in permitting Genevieve McGarvey (“McGarvey”) to testify

regarding whether the fees charged by Griffin in the divorce matter were reasonable

and necessary. At trial, the trial court reversed its previous order striking McGarvey’s

testimony without any showing of good cause by Griffin, or lack of surprise or

prejudice. [RR 3, 12:13-13:6; RR 4, 95:16-20; RR 5, 13:18-19:18 17] The trial court’s

ruling violated both the Rules and its own discovery control order and probably

resulted in rendition of an improper verdict.

-39- A. Procedural Background

On August 16, 2013, the trial court issued a docket control order (the “DCO”)

requiring experts for all plaintiffs to be designed by August 30, 2013. [CR 1, 85]

Likewise, the DCO set the deadline to designate all other expert witnesses for

September 27, 2013. Id. The DCO also stated the following:

Any party designating a testifying expert witness is ORDERED to provide no later than the dates set for such designation, the information set forth in Rule 194.2(f) and a written report prepared by the expert setting the substance of the experts’ opinions, unless a deposition is taken of the expert. Any expert not designated prior to the ordered deadlines shall not be permitted to testify absent a showing of good cause. Id.

On September 13, 2013, Schlein served her Designation of Expert Witnesses,

which disclosed the information called for by Rule 194.2(f). The designation also

included a 51 page report from Schlein’s expert, Lillian Hardwick. [CR 1, 312]

On September 23, 2013, the trial court entered an amended docket control order

(the “Amended DCO”). The Amended DCO set the deadline for all plaintiffs and all

other parties for September 30, 2013 and October 30, 2013, respectively. [CR 1, 115].

The Amended DCO contained the same disclosure requirements as the DCO, which

are set forth above.

On October 3, 2013, a hearing was held on Schlein’s Motion to Compel

Discovery and the Court extended Griffin’s deadline to designate his experts and

-40- provide the requisite report required by the Amended DCO until October 31, 2013.

[CR 1, 117; CR 1, 196; CR 2, 851. This October 31, 2013 deadline was never

modified or extended.

On October 8, 2013, Griffin identified Genevieve McGarvey as an expert in his

First Amended Response to Defendant’s Motion for Disclosures. [CR 1, 573-582]

However, Griffin neither disclosed the information required by Rule 194.2(f), nor

produced a report. Id. Instead the designation stated:

Witness can provide testimony with regards to work performed on behalf of Plaintiff and the issue of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in context of the breach of contract and the reasonable and necessary fees in context of the breach of contract and the reasonable and necessary attorneys’ nature of fees for the representation of Defendant.

[CR 1, 579]

Because Griffin failed to designate McGarvey in compliance with Rule 194.2(f),

as well as the Amended DCO, Schlein filed her Motion to Strike Expert Witnesses on

January 31, 2014. [CR 2, 568] No response to this motion was filed by Griffin. [RR

4, 95:16-96:22].

On March 14, 2014, the trial court heard and granted Schlein’s Motion to Strike

as to experts Greg Enos, Becky Reitz, Marcia Zimmerman, Christopher Beck,

Genevieve McGarvey and Norma Venso. [RR 3, 12:20-13:5; RR 4, 95-96; CR 2, 806]

On April 2, 2014, Griffin served his Second Amended Response to Defendant’s

Motion for Disclosures, which attempted to provide additional disclosures regarding

-41- McGarvey’s testimony. [CR 2, 814] However, this Second Amended Response was

both late and insufficient. Specifically, McGarvey’s export report attached to the

Second Amended Response failed to identify any amount she claimed was a

reasonable and necessary fee in the underlying divorce proceeding. [CR 2, 822]

On April 7, 2014–155 days after the court ordered deadline, 200 days after

Schlein served its expert reports, and 63 days after Schlein moved to strike Griffin’s

experts–Griffin filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order granting

Schlein’s Motion to Strike the Expert Designation of McGarvey and Norma Venso.

[CR 2, 806; RR 4, 96:21-22]

Schlein filed her response on April 10, 2014[CR 2, 833] Griffin’s Motion to

Reconsideration was never set for hearing.

Nor did Griffin raise the Motion for Reconsideration at the May 2, 2014 pre-

trial conference. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 248. [RR 4, 96:21-97:8] Not until the day before

trial – May 7, 2014 – did Griffin seek to be heard on his Motion to Reconsider. [RR

3, 82:8-86:18; RR 4, 95:10-100:15; RR 5, 4:5-19:18] Despite Schlein’s objections,

he trial court reversed its earlier decision and held that McGarvey was permitted to

testify. [RR 5, 4-8; RR 5, 12-13; RR 5, 16-17]

-42- B. Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Rules Governing Experts and its Own Discovery Control Order

The trial court permitted Genevieve McGarvey to testify, despite her untimely

designation and lack of an expert report. Griffin made no showing of good cause for

her untimely disclosures; further, surprise and prejudice is established on the face of

this record. The trial court erred in permitting her to testify.

Parties to a lawsuit are under a duty to make a “complete response, based on all

information reasonably available to the responding party or its attorney at the time its

response is made.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1. Such responses must be made timely; that

is, “within the time provided by court order or these rules.” Id. Failure to comply

results in automatic exclusion of the evidence or the witness in question, unless the

trial courts finds a) good cause; or b) that the opposing party was not surprised or

prejudiced. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. The burden is on the offering party, and such a

finding must be supported by the record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(b).

The “trial court has no discretion to admit testimony excluded by the rule

without a showing of good cause.” Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914; Good v. Smith Cty.

Judge Baker, 339 S.W.3d 260, 271 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2011, pet. denied). The

burden of establishing good cause is upon the party offering the evidence and good

cause must be shown in the record. Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp.,

965 S.W.2d 646, 652 (Tex. App.–El Paso, 1998, no pet.) (emphasis added). The good

-43- cause exception “permits a trial court to excuse a failure to comply with discovery in

difficult or impossible circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added).

In this case, Griffin failed to produce any evidence to support a finding of good

cause, or establishing a lack of surprise or prejudice. Griffin’s Motion for

Reconsideration and his argument in the trial court is devoted solely to explaining that,

as long as he provided the material at issue within 30 days of the actual trial date, his

designations and supplementations were timely. [CR 802; RR 4 95:10-100:8] This has

not been the case since the discovery rules were amended in 1999; plaintiffs “can no

longer simply choose to delay disclosure until the last minute.” In re Allied Chem.

Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Tex. 2007)(citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5 and 193.6).

Griffin’s later attempt to supplement his expert disclosures on April 2, 2014,

also failed to comply with the plain language of Rule 194, which requires disclosure

of the “general substance of the expert mental impressions and opinions and brief

summary of the basis for them,” as well all documents, tangible things, reports,

models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by

or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony.” [CR 2, 818-823] Tex. R.

Civ. P. 194.2(f). Likewise, the report attached to the supplemental disclosures failed

to comply with the Amended DCO and Rule 195.5, which requires “factual

observations, tests, supporting data, calculations, photographs, or opinions of an

expert” to be reduced to tangible form. Schlein’s attorney complained, on the first day

-44- of trial, that while an “expert report” containing McGarvey’s opinions was delivered

thirty days before trial, the attachments supporting the substance of her testimony were

not. [RR 4 99:3-100:8]

Schlein relied on the trial court’s order striking McGarvey as a witness and,

therefore, suffered surprise and prejudice by the trial court’s change of heart at trial.

In Alvarado, the Texas Supreme Court clearly holds that good cause must be

demonstrated by the noncomplying party to provide the trial court with the opportunity

to exercise discretion as to whether the untimely discovery should be admitted.

Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914. Griffin never tried to establish good cause for his

failure to timely produce McGarvey’s report. [RR 4, 99-100; RR 5, 5-17] Because

a showing of good cause is mandatory, the decision to permit McGarvey to testify was

reversible error. The evidence further supports a finding that the inclusion of

McGarvey’s testimony caused the rendition of an improper judgment, as McGarvey

was the only witness designated to testify regarding the reasonableness of Griffin’s

attorneys’ fees in the underlying divorce case. Therefore, the trial court’s decision led

to the rendition of an improper verdict because it provided credence to the amounts

included on Griffin’s invoice, which were otherwise unsubstantiated.

-45- IX. McGarvey’s Testimony Was Legally Insufficient to Prove that Griffin’s Fees Were Reasonable

Griffin was required to prove that the attorney’s fees he sought to recover from

Schlein were reasonable. Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Cond. 1.04; Arthur Andersen & Co. v.

Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997). In addition to the requirement of

Rule 1.04, Texas courts have held that “[w]here parties do not expressly agree as to

the amount, the law raises a promise to pay that which is reasonable.” Kurtz v. Kurtz,

158 S.W.3d 12, 18 (Tex. App. 2004)(citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.

Koenigsberg, 65 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1933, no writ). The court in

Kurtz agreed that, “as a matter of public policy, reasonableness is an implied term in

any contract for attorney’s fees.” Id. The court concluded that their holding was

consistent with Disciplinary Rule 104, governing a lawyer’s fee arrangement with his

clients. Id. at fn. 6.

In Texas, “[t]he issue of reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees requires

expert testimony.” Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422

S.W.3d 821, 830 (Tex. App. 2014). McGarvey was Griffin’s sole witness on the

reasonableness of his fees in the underlying divorce case. Over Schlein’s objection,

McGarvey was permitted to testify. However, her testimony was legally insufficient

to prove that the attorney’s fees charged by Griffin were reasonable, as required by

-46- Disciplinary Rule 1.04, which considers the following factors to determine the

reasonableness of a fee:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Of the 8 above-listed factors, McGarvey offered no evidence of numbers 1, 2,

4, 5 or 8. Moreover, McGarvey’s opinion regarding numbers 3, 6 and 7 was merely

conclusory and not evidence of the reasonableness of the entire fee charged by Griffin.

For the issues McGarvey did mention, her testimony was the classic ipse dixit of a

-47- credentialed witness, with no support or analysis. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,

235 (Tex. 1999).

Specifically, McGarvey testified that she is familiar with the reasonable and

necessary attorney’s fees in Galveston County, but offered little more than a bare

opinion as to the reasonableness of the $300 hourly rate charged by Griffin to Schlein.

[RR 10, 100:11-23 and 101:15-20). At no time did McGarvey testify that a certain

amount of attorney’s fees charged by Griffin were reasonable and necessary. [See

generally RR 10, 94-110]

Instead McGarvey offered irrelevant statements such as, “...[Griffin] spent about

700 days on this file...” (RR 10, 103:15-18). The number of days spent on a file is not

evidence of Griffin’s actual time spent working on the case.

A. No Evidence to Support Jury’s Finding of Damages in Question No. 5

Lastly, McGarvey’s opinion that the time included on Griffin’s bill “was

reasonable and necessary” is conclusory and not competent evidence. Opinion

testimony that is conclusory is not relevant evidence because it does not tend to make

the existence of a material fact “more probable or less probable.” See Tex. R. Evid.

401. McGarvey provides no analysis or underlying facts supporting how the time

spent was reasonable. As such, McGarvey’s testimony is incompetent evidence and

cannot support a judgment awarding Griffin damages for attorney’s fees. [See Supp.

CR 8] See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009); See Cas.

-48- Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939); Wadewitz v.

Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex.1997).

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

The trial court erred by allowing Griffin, individually, to prosecute this lawsuit.

Griffin’s attempt to cure was ineffective. As such, this court should reverse the

judgment of the trial court and render a take nothing judgment based on Griffin’s lack

of capacity.

The trial court erred by excluding Schlein’s offer of grievances and lawsuits

filed against Griffin, which were admissible for purposes of establishing Schlein’s

affirmative claims against Griffin. Additionally, Griffin opened the door by presenting

evidence that he keep all of his clients informed. Thus, the trial court permitted

Griffin to create a false impression regarding his habits in dealing with clients. The

trial court’s treatment on this hotly contested issue, probably led to the rendition of an

improper verdict.

The trial court erred in permitting undisclosed rebuttal witnesses to testify

regarding Griffin’s routine practice in keeping clients informed. This testimony, when

viewed against the backdrop of the trial court’s previous ruling, probably led to the

entry of an improper judgment.

-49- The trial court erred in placing the burden on Schlein with respect to her claim

for breach of fiduciary duty. This improper submission probably led to the rendition

The jury’s failure to find breach of fiduciary duty was against the great weight

and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, the evidence conclusively

established Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty.

The trial court erred by excluding evidence, which conclusively established

Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty. This omission likely led to the rendition of an

The jury’s finding of zero actual damages, in light of their findings on liability,

is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, some

evidence supported Schlein’s actual damages on this issue.

The trial court erred by permitting an expert witness to testify, whose opinions

were not timely disclosed and whose exclusion should have been automatic. Even if

considered, her testimony was incompetent to support the reasonableness of Griffin’s

damages. Her testimony was key, as no other competent evidence supported Griffin’s

recovery of actual damages. This Court should reverse and render a take nothing

judgment.

Appellant Barbara Schlein respectfully requests that this Court reverse the final

judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial, or where

-50- appropriate, render judgment in her favor, and for all further relief to which she may

be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTIAN , SMITH & JEWELL, LLP

By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. State Bar No. 24045596 scagle@csj-law.com Heather Panick State Bar No. 24062935 hpanick@csj-law.com 2302 Fannin, Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 659-7617 Facsimile: (713) 659-7641

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

-51- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been forwarded to all counsel of record via the Rules on this the 20th day of May, 2015

Ms. Norma Venso 830 Apollo Houston, Texas 77058 Facsimile: (281) 286-9990 Telephone: (409) 789-8661

By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. STEPHEN H. CAGLE, JR.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that Appellant’s Brief contains less than 15,000 words (counting all parts of the document). Specifically, this brief was prepared using WordPerfect and according to its word-count function, this document contains 13,696 words. Further, the typeface used in this brief is no smaller than 14-point, except for footnotes, which are no smaller than 12-point.

-52- CAUSE NO. 01-14-00799-cv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS

APPELLANT’S APPENDIX

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. Trial Court’s Judgment dated June 30, 2014, CR 3:1249. . . . . . . . . . Tab 1

2. The jury charge and verdict, RR 13:4-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 2

3. November 3, 2009 Retention Agreement, P. Ex. 1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 3

4. November 3, 2009 Letter of Explanation, P. Ex. 2.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 4

5. August 5, 2011 Invoice, P. Ex. 147. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 5

6. October 29, 2011 Email, P. Ex. 146. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 6

-53- 7. Anthony P. Griffin Lawyers, Inc. Bankruptcy Petition.. . . . . . . . . . . Tab 7

8. Anthony P. Griffin Original Petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 8

9. C. Vereen Grievance File.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 9

10. Guzman Grievance File.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 10

11. Reddin Grievance File. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 11

-54- TAB 1 001249

CAUSE NO. CV-0069481

IN THE COUNTY COURT

AT LAW N0.2

GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffy

s and Defendant Barbara Schlein appeared and alU1ounced

swom, it heard evidence and ar.f:,'tltnents of counsel.

estions of fact in the case to the jury. In

charge of the court and the verdict oftl

Griffin Lawyers is entitled to recover from Defenda

fees as set forth below.

Barbara Schlein, as follows:

a)

b) The sum of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUND!f:OUtlX 00/100 DOLLARS ($62,862.00) for reasonable and necj}sa~y ;tto,.; e~ fees. for preparation and trial; tf~-ti.>;"'' ,r, .x_:;:;;.li~ ;;~"·"'~IIY l~l. :::·~K GAl v-;:·.: :· .· ·i-'~.\S

Ex. 1 NOTICE OF HEARING PAGE 1 00~49 001250

c) Thesumof~USANDAND00/100DOLLARS($15,000.00)intheevent fa appeal to the Court of Appeals; for reasonable and necessary attorney 1s fees r representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000.00) in the event of an appeal e Supreme Court of Texas for reasonable and necessary attorney's fees f re esentatlon at the petition for review· stage in the Supreme Court of T

nterest on the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND EIGHTEEN AND :JG'-'·~~'''? ($16,018.66).

te est on the total sum awarded at the annual rate of Five Percent

g)

It is further ORDER

from Griffin's unconscionable

rt is further ORDERED, ADJUDGE

enforcement and collection of this Judgment or th

All relief not expressly t;,rranted is denied.

This is a final judgment which disposes of all clait s

SIGNED this <..30 day of June, 2014.

. /· APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY- Defendant ( 1) disagrees with the contt.mJ~J~j~{j~~i«MII:J51'-.., agrees only to the fonn of this judgment, and (3) plans to appeal this d tttnl' Yn ore, Defe11dant expr~ssly reserves all rights to modifY or appeal this proposed ju8~lrte · ·,..g r ···Flrsf NaP 5 Bank v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632,633 (Tex. 1989)

:"'OTICE OF HEARING PAGE2@~50 TAB 2 CAUSE NO. CV~0069481

v. AT LAW N0.2

B GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

COURT'S CHARGE

THE JURY:

estions about the facts, which you must decide fi·om l. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the e given th it testimony, but in matters of law, you must be

additional instructions which

L

2.

case.

3. Since every answer that is required by state or consider that any required answer · 1

4. You must not decide who you think should win an questions accordingly. Simply answer the qu ti concern yourselves with the effect of your answers.

5. You \Vill not decide the answer to a question by a lot ob~"" any other means of chance. Do not return a quotient ve ~ 'ent v · ict means that the jurors agree to abide by the result to be reache bx din ' ge er each juror's figures and dividing by the number of jurors to an era . Do not do any trading on your answers; that is, one juror should not a cettain question one way if others will agree to answer another q way.

Pagel of29 6. Unless otherwise instructed, you may answer a question upon the vote of 5 or o jurors. If you answer more than one question upon the vote of 5 or more jt rs, the same &rroup of at least 5 of you must agree upon the answers to each of those questions.

u have taken are for your own personal use. You may take your ii J the jury room and consult them during deliberations, but do not shO\ or · ad your notes to your fellow jurors during your deliberations. Your tes ·e not evidence. Each of you should rely on your independent recollection o 1e evi n e and not be influenced by the fact that another juror has or has not taken tes.

duct is subject to review the same as it should be found that you have uct and it may require another trial

When words are used in this charge i a sense understood, you are given a proper legal definitio any other meaning.

Answer "Yes" or "No" to all questions unless ot erwise ins must be based on a preponderance of the evidence un s.s otherlvise . ·tru find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "Yes'' a1 . then "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight a evidence introduced before you and admitted in this case. W answer other than "Yes" or "No," your ans,ver must be base evidence unless otherwise instructed.

A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstm ia fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary ev who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is establish evidence \Vhen it may be fairly and reasonably infened from other facts prove .

If you answer questions about damages, answer each question separa ely. Do not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of the instructions in or your answers to any other questions about damages. Do not speculate about what any party's ultimate recovery

Page 2 of29 may or may not be. Any recovery will be detennined by the court when it applies the la\v to - time of judgment. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

er ou retire to the jury room you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing esi · gjuror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud and then you will deliberate ur answers to the stions asked.

3.

4.

5. in the space provided; and

6.

r~[l n u rc=~ [[") L~~~ LU 01-~- 1 MAY Z3 2014

!!WVIGHT () SUt UV/\N G()UU1Y ClCRK .,

By \ Ol'-'lLVt::STON CO., T(£1(/\$

\; •

Page 3 of29 QUESTION NO. 1

ar 'ra Schlein fail to comply with the tem1s of the agreement for legal services er 3, 2009, between her and Anthony P. Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers?

Page 4 of29 QUESTION NO.2

Griffin fail to comply with the agreement for legal services dated

The circumstances to consider in detennining

c.

d. t the party failing to perform or to offer to perfonn will cure his · o ace unt the circumstances including any reasonable

e.

Answer "Yes" or6'{Q~ )

ANSWER: ;VC) -'------~ ...

Page 5 of29 If you ans\vered "Yes" to both Question 1 and Question 2, then answer the fol!O\ving question. Otherwise, do 1swer the following question.

QUESTION NO.3

with the Agreement Hrst?

Page 6 of29 If you answered ''Yes" to Question 1, then ans\ver the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the toll :v1 g question.

QUESTION NO.4

's failure to comply excused?

arhara Schlein is excused if compliance is waived by Anthony

it is excused if the following circumstances occurred:

1. a. false representation or concealed

h. kno\vledge or infom1ation that d . cover the facts, and p... o c. in would rely on the false et ·n ac '1 or deciding not to act; and ~''"· 2. a. b. of material f~tcts. 1t ·

Failure to comply \:vith one agreement is agr~ that a new agTeement would take its place. ;<"

Failure to comply \Vith a tenn in an agreement is ex~""""-~ term would take its place. ,u>

_,.,"""-~ ~----\

Answer "Yes" or(N()_:}

ANSWER: _ _c_.JJ_o_._ _

Page 7 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 1, then atlS\ver the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the foll 'I g question

for economic damages is subject to federal

QUESTION NO. 5

, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate iffin Lawyers, for his damages, if any, that resulted from such

nents of damages, if any, and none other.

a

ANSWER:

b.

Page 8 of29 If you ans,:vered "Yes" to Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not ans,ver the toll vi question

QUESTION NO. 6

'ona nd necessary attorney's fees and costs incurred to complete the atter ' m eel but not finished by Anthony Griffin.

b. neces · ry attorney's fees and costs incurred to complete the ut n 1ished by Anthony Griffin.

Page 9 of29 QUESTION NO. 7

What is a r , sot ' 1e fee for the necessary services of Anthony P. Griffin's attorney in this case, stated i c ol ' s and cents?

must be considered in detennining the reasonableness of an

• • • • • • ""'...,+-..:'. n results obtained or uncertainty of en ·endered.

A. For preparation , and trial.

ANSWER: .~, ( J (} 2., lc/I -~-J:).-1 / () , ;

B. For an appeal to the Court of Appeals. -+,' ANSWER: +ls~ooo C. For an appeal to the Supreme Comt of Texas J, ANSWER: ~) 251 {)00

Page 10 of29 If you ans\vered "Yes'' to Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not \Vi g question.

QUESTION NO. 8

for each of the following:

a.

c. in the Supreme Court of Texas.

d.

ANSWER: _--~:.r-2\J_,If--'-'/-'-'\_ _ __ e. For representation through oral ar the Supreme Court ofTexas.

)\11 A ANSWER: ---------1-------------

Page 11 of29 QUESTION NO. 9

ar , ·a Schlein substantially rely to her detriment on Anthony Griffin's promise, if 1is reliance foreseeable by Anthony Griffin?

Page 12 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 9, then answer the following question. Othenvise, do not answer the foil v1 ' question.

QUESTION NO. 10

if any, if paid now in cash, \vould fairly and reasonably compensate ages, if any, that resulted from her reliance on Anthony Griffin's

Do not

a. and cents for damages, if any.

b. and costs incuned to complete the ny Griffin.

ANSWER: ---'-f'-'-,j +'-j }.-'-·,_ _ _ __

Page 13 of29 QUESTION NO. 11

ny Griffin fail to comply with his fiduciary duty to Barbara Schlein?

arbara Schlein's attomey, Anthony Grift1n owed Barbara Schlein a fiduciary duty.

fiin failed to comply with his fiduciary duty, Barbara Schlein must

r 1sactions and actions in question were not fair and equitable to arba1 chlein; or Y

use of the conf1dences that

e. important

~

Answer "Yes" or "~"'L~·~

ANswER: tic;

Page 14 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 11, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the fo11 ~'1 question.

QUESTION NO. 12

if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate ges, if any, that were proximately caused by such conduct?

In answering or reduce the amount

ANSWER: _________i_'!J-_ 1 ;_4------~

ANSWER: _ __.:..:../V+/--A-_ _ _ __

Page 15 of29 d. the difference between the sales price of Barbara Schlein's house located at 1628 ·nt '·prise Avenue at foreclosure and the value of the house if repairs had been e because of the filing of an insurance claim.

" means the emotional pain, torment and suffering bara Schlein.

Page 16 of29 QUESTION NO. 13

ny Griffin commit fraud against Barbara Schlein?

Fraud occurs when: a party makes a material misrepresentation, and the misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and\ the misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be ted onby the other party, and 1e ther party relies on the misn~presentation and thereby suffers

g.

h. a result of acting without

a. b.

c. cl.

Answer "Yes" or{'No. '• ~'::.~·.,

ANSWER: /VO

Page 17 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question I 3, then answer the follmving question. Otherwise, do not answer the toll vr g question.

QUESTION NO. 14

. if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate ges, if any, that resulted ti·om such fi·aud'?

n answ .m' uestions about damages, answer each question separately. Do not increase 1c ans\ver because of your answer to any other question about ut what any party's ultimate recovery may or may not be. Any recovery will be le court when it applies the la\v to your answers at the time of judgment. De ot ' d any amo n for interest on damages, if any.

c. the amount of reasonable and n · ess y at Barbara Schlein having to hire new by Anthony Griffin. ' I /,1 ANSWER: /l,; /! /

d. mental anguish sustained f}·om November 3, 2009 to

"Mental anguish" means the emotional pain, tom1 experienced by Barbara Schlein.

ANSWER: ----'-/_'\;+'/_,_~/'-!_____ I

Page 18 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 13, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the fall vt g question.

QUESTION NO, 15

if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate ges, if any, that were proximately caused by such fraud?

ANSWER: ------~~~ Nil\.~.-----------

ANSWER: N(A c. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorn· Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to co1 by Anthony Griffin.

ANSWER: -----'--f\-'+-J/J._A___. I d. mental anguish sustained fi'om November 3, 2009 to date.

" ental anguish" means the emotional pain, tonnent and suffering experienced by Barbara Schlein.

Page 20 o£29 Answer the following question only if you unanimously ans\:vered "Yes" to Question 11 or Question I 3 1erwise, do not answer the follo-wing question.

o a ver "Yes" to any pmi of fhe following question, your answer must be unanimous. ay nswer ''No" to any part of the following question only upon a vote of 5 or more jurors. 0 1er •Jse, you must not a , wer that part of the following question.

QUESTION NO. 16

and convincing evidence that the hann to Barbara Schlein resulted

con rin ~ing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that b ief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be

nt by Anthony Griffin to cause substantial injury or

h.

Ans\ver "Yes" or "No."

Page 21 of29 QUESTION NO. 17

nt ny Grift1n engage in any false, misleading) or deceptive act or practice that ·n relied on to her detriment and that was a producing cause of damages to Barbara

b. agreement confers or involves rights that it did not

)

c. s rvices with intent not to sell them as advetiised, or

,/"""__.-~-~- ,\ ..

"'--~ v '

Answer "Yes" or~~'tJc::C?:;:'j

ANSWER: No

Page 22 of29 QUESTION NO. 18

1y Griffin engage in any unconscionable action or course of action that was a ·e of damages to Barbara Schlein?

, use" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringin .. ab t the damages, if any, and without which the ould not have occurred. There may be more than one

OWIOH·r D !lULUVAN GALVESl ON CO , ~

f)·~£)~-h~~!M)?dj Page 23 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 17 or Question 18, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do t , 1swer the following question.

QUESTION NO. 19

engage in any such conduct knowingly or intentionally'?

vin y" means actual awareness of the falsity, unH1irness, or ce · 'eness of the act or practice on which a claim for damages ased. ctual awareness may be inferred if objective ation · dicate that a person acted with actual awareness.

e in any such conduct intentionally?

In answering this question, consider only of damages .... to Barbara Schlein .

Answer '(Yes~) or "No." '~~ ·-''".<"

Page 24 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 17 or Question 18, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do 1 · , 1swer the following question.

ANS\VER:

c. the amount of reasonable and n Barbara Schlein having to hire ne\v by Anthony Griffin. L,

ANS\VER: - - - -I- ·

Page 25 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 19, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the toll v1 question.

Vhat sum of mon" if any, in addition to actual damages, should be awarded to Barbara G .. 'fin because Anthony Griffin's conduct was committed knowingly

Page 26 of29 If you answered ''Yes" to Question 17, then answer the tbllowing question. Othenvise, do not

QUESTION NO. 22

fee for the necessary services of Barbara Schlein's attorney in this

esentation and representation in the trial court.

c. 11 or review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER:

e. For representation through or 1 · the Supreme Court of Texas.

ANSWER: N fl1 I

Page 27 of29 Answer the following question regarding Anthony Griffin only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Que o 16 regarding Anthony Griffin. Otherwise, do ncrf..mswer the following question re rdi Anthony Griffin.

QUESTION NO. 23

that you must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of

any, should be assessed against Anthony Griftin and awarded to ar :tages for the conduct found in response to Question 16?

1 cans any damages awarded as a penalty or by way of atory puq)oses. Exemplary damages include punitive damages.

a. b. c. d. e. propriety.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

ANS WER: _ ____,t'--,}!--{A_·_ _ 1

Page 28 of29 Certificate

1e ry, have answered the above and foregoing questions as herein indicated, and 1 the same into court as our verdict.

PRESIDIN JUR · m - - - -

~~~d ~\\~t- ------ Printed Name of the Presiding Juror

Jurors' Printed Names

___.,~~=~;d ~~~~--

Page 29 of29 TAB 3 November 3, 2009

' CONTRACTUAL AG~EEMENT

Parties to Agreement

This is to authorize A GRIFFIN LAWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,

INC., hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act

as lawyers for the undersigned, BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN,

hereinafter and sometimes referred to as CLIENT(S), relative to

.all matters concerning the divorce/family related matter/civil

issues .(tort issues) in a matter styled In the Matter of the

Marriage of Barbara Regina Schlein and Robert Schlein; In the

County Court at Law, No. 2; Galveston County, Texas; Cause No.

08FD2371.

You are Hiring Us to Do What?

1. To investigate your case to determine the viability of

the case.

2. To advise· you as to the viability of same.

3. To work with you wi'th respect to your case including

appearing on your behalf before any corporation,

official, board, department, administrative body or to ll.l!!l!l!~P~LA~fNTf!!!!!!FP!!S..." l EXHIBIT ~ l fiie suit and in any Court (Federal or State), if

necessary and if warranted.

Retainer/What is it?/What does It Mean?/What It Isn't?

.1. In consideration of the services rendered and to be

rendered to client by the said law firm, the cl~ent

agrees to pay $35,000.00 (normal retainer $10,000.00 -

$25,0DO.OO) as a retainer fee. 1

2. The retai?er is based upon the history of the

litigation,, substituting in with a pending matter

{mentioned above) and the firm's obligation to make

sense of the disparate parts of the above matter and

other related matters (amending pleadings, joining

claims), etc.

2. Your retainer is the consideration to hire A GRIFFIN

~AWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC., LAWYERS. As stated

in the oral interview, the retainer herein and

attorneys' fees are structured with the reputation of

the firm, the related matters necessary to process the

family matter (tort allegations by Petitioner and/or on

behalf of the minor child), consistent with the

1 Currently Petitioner is under an order of the Court that prevents the expenditure of funds without the approval of the Court. No payment of fees will take place unless and until the Court approves the payment of the retainer amount and/or an order is entered releasing the injunction overbroad scope (can be interpreted to include separate property of Petitioner) . The attorneys anticipate filing a motion with the Court to address the broadness of the order and/or releasing of funds to pay the subject retainer. concept of reasonable attorney's fees based upon the

complexity of the issues at hand. The retainer is also

based on the consideration for this office not taking

other cases (time spent).

3. Said retainer is non-refundable. This means that once

the fee is paid, it shall be deemed earned. This does

not mean that the retainer represents the total

attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein) .

4. This retainer fee should not be interpreted as

constituting the full reasonable fee to which the

Lawyers may be entitled for services performed pursuant ··. to an award of the Court or settlement. ( •'

Attorney·Fee Determination

The determination of attorneys' fees shall be made as

follows:

1. The attorney will keep time records in this matter and

will not bill for any additional work unless and until

the services rendered exceed the retainer amount.

2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate

ranges from $250.00 to $500.00 an hour in the civil

rights arena. The rate depends on the nature of the

case, the tasks to be performed, the reputation of the

,r-· lawyers, and other factors defined by the relative ( ~-- case law and the civil rights industry/arena/practice. The hourly rate for Anthony P. Griffin will be billed

at $300.00 an hour; associate attorneys will be billed

at $150.00 an hour.

Cost - We Will Front Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise. How Do We Get Our Money Back?

Costs are the Client 1 S obligation, but the firm will front

cost and bill for the costs. 2 Costs reimbursement is due and

payable thirty (30) days from any such billing.

Guarantees - None

There are no guarantees held out with respect to the

results of this litigation. ·· . ( •.

(_ 2 Again, this is subject to approval of the Court and/or removal of the overbroad language affecting one's separate property. Withdrawal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract

1. Withdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obligation to

represent the Client zealously within the bounds of the

law, but the Lawyers also have an obligation, when

material representation surfaces or where there is a

breach of the terms of this contract by the Client, to

withdraw from the representation of the Client.

Nothing in this contract guarantees any results,

including whether a suit will or will not be filed or

any other matters that border on guarantees. The only

guarantee relates to the representation within the

confines of the Code of Professional Responsibility

(zealously within the bounds of the law). It has been

explained orally that the Lawyers' obligation to the

Court and the rules of ethics require investigation and

examination of the facts.

2. Investigation/If No Case: If the facts reveal no case

exists, the Lawyer shall promptly advise the client and

terminate the relationship. The retainer again is non-

·refundable.

3. Investigation/Material Breach: If the investigation

reveals a material breach, lie, or misstatement by the

client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how ( ''-~·· such breach affects the Lawyer's ability to proceed in the representation. If termination is appropriate, the

Lawyer(s) shall advise the client of her rights and

shall promptly take any necessary acts to protect the

Client (advise as to action) and the firm's rights.

Again, the retainer shall be deemed non-refundable.

Privilege of Firm

It shall be the exclusive privilege of Lawyers to determine

when and where suits shall be filed. Again, Lawyers retain the

discretion whether to obligate the office in the appeal process.

Compromise

No compromise or settlement of Client's claims will be rnade

·-..·. without the consent of both Client and Lawyers. ( ,.

Power of Attorney

Lawyers are hereby granted full authority to sign all legal

instruments, pleadings, drafts, authorizations and papers that

shall be reasonably necessary to conclude settlement and/or

reduce to possession any and all monies or other things of value

due to Client under this claim as fully as Client could so do in

person. ('.. ......~ Keeping the Client Informed

Lawyers agree to produce copies of documents as related to

this litigation and to keep the client fully informed.

Venue Lies in Galveston County

All sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston

County, Texas.·

~GCi~D AGREED to on this the ____ day of

--~.~--------L----~~------1 2009.

BARBAR~ REGINA SCHLEIN 2106 PLEASANT PALM CIRCLE

c LEAGUE CITY, TEXAS 77573 832.738.6047 EIYIA.IL: brsChlein@msn. com

SIGNED~ AGREED to on this the~~y of -id)"---_D~V-----'--}_, 2 oo9 .

~HONY~ A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 MOODY GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102 EMAIL: agriffin@agriffinlawyers.com

c :word. schlein_barbara_retain9r_,cont:ract. ~.1!"-··.. ·

(

NOTICE OF CLIENTS

The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys .

. Although not every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer involves professional misconduct, the State Bar Office of General Counsel will provide you with information about how to file a complaint.

For more information, please call 1.800.932.1900. This is a toll-free phone call. TAB 4 .. ~ .................

A GRIFFIN V. WYERS

Galveston island Galveston, Texas 77550 November 3, 2009

Barbara Regina Schlein 2106 Pleasant Palm Cixcle League City, Texas 77573

RE: CAUSE NUMBER 08FD2371i IN THE Y~TTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN AND ROBERT JOHN .SCHLEINi IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, NO. 2; GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

(EXPLANATION OF CONTRACT AND LETTER AGR.EEMENT)

Ms. Schlein:

. Please find attached the contract b:f employment. This letter is designed to explain our agreement and course of action, Please note the following:

• contr-~otrelates to Family Matters but Contemplates Amending Complaint. The contract relates to the family matter but contemplates adding claims and/or amending the pleading to address the abuse allegations the fraud in the marriage (forgery and misappropriation of identification that is the subject of pending criminal litigation. The retainer is set at an amount that it is anticipated that no additional fees will be charged.

• Separate Lawsuits t:h.at will be filed at tlle time of substitution and/or prior to sUbstitution. :r:t is contemplated that a separate lawsuit will be brought against the builder at or near the sW:>stitution. It is my belief the builder should be placed in a position of. payment for his breach of contract and that the house. We can bring the lawsuit and add your spouse and a necessary P~ltmFF'S I' EXHI~IT I _2;;;:;.___ A separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no retainer is contemplated (continge~t fee}.

• Separate Lawsuits that will be filed at the tixne of substitution and/or prior to substitution. It is contemplated that a separate lawsuit will be brought against your spouse for the discovered abuse of minor child. It is my belief a separate lawsuit broadens the playing field and makes the other side defend outside of the divorce and Dibrell's court. Of course there will be an attempt to move the matter back to the divorce court, but it is my belief that the action of your child is an independent action. A separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no retainer is contemplated (contingent fee}.

• Unsure and will need to research the Reitz. I am currently unsure on the breach of fiduciary lawsuit. The grievance matter can be addressed by obtaining a grievance form. After learning the file better, I will supplement and advise. ( '· ·.

.' ....._;.... ..·' If you have any questions, please inform.

Sincerely,

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Moody Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

APG/ files

Encl. -Contract of Employment

HAND DELIVERED fr-.. c:wora.schlein_barbara.client_transmittal ~->-·- ...·· TAB 5 A GRIFFIN LA WYERS

Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 August 5, 2011

Barbara Regina Schlein P. o. Box 1061 League City, Texas 77574

RE: CAUSE NUMBER 08FD2371; IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN AND ROBERT JOHN SCHLEIN; IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2i GALVESTON COUNTY,· TEXAS

BARBARA SCHLEIN V. ROBERT SCHLEIN, BILL DE LA GARZA, DAVID M. OUALLINE AND BILL DE LA GARZA & ASSOCIATESi IN THE 212TH JUDICJ:AL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY 1

TEXAS; CASE NO. 10CV0344

CAUSE NO. 10CV1237; BARBARA SCHLEIN V. CENTRE INTEREST, INC. D/B/A CENTRE BUILDERS V. ROBERT SCHLEIN; ,IN THE 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY TEXAS I

(BILLING STATEMENT)

This· is our billing statement with respect to the family case. I have exercised billing discretion and have not billed for telephone conferences, interviews or normal transmittal of information to the client and postage (this cost under normal circumstances would add another $30,000.00 to one's bill). I am setting out the work performed and then setting our proposal associated with the fee statement. It has been a challenge and pleasure to have represented your interest.

Our statement of time and task is as follows:

I' • PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT I 147 r-·-------.------------- -.---------------------.--- Date Task/Function Time Expended ~·3.:1009 Letter addressed to 2.0 client contract of employment; contract of employn1ent; discussion of other lawsuit 11.05.2009 Beck's "sup'f•ll;m.;ntal 2.0 production of documents; revie1w Letter to client - 11.23.2009 tramsmitting mediator responsive documents; :aec!k' s supplemental orc,duct:ion 12.04.2009 !-''----- :Getter to client ·--·-o- transmitting Beck's letter; retrieving file and De La Garza's request for new mediation 12.18.2009 - Lette:c t:o "'Client with -0-- respect to protective order hearing for .2.17.2010 and cancellation of '·., deposition ( .. · ~·------ 12.20.2009 Work on l?etitioneJ:' s Motion f<:>:t' Summary 4.0

.rudgment 12. 21.2009 ~ork on Petitioner's 5.0 111otion to Withdraw Funds; I?et.itioner' s Second Junended Petition; tJ:ansmi t tal to court 12.28.2009 Lett.er t:o client; -0- -· -- transmittal of affidavit 12.31.2009 -- Letter to client; -o .. mediation date for :1..27.2010 01.04. 2010 - •rra:nsmittal to -0- - d:i.ent/pro!ecti ve order 01.11.2010 -- Letter to client; hearing on motion to withdraw funds hearing set for January 25, 2010 01.10.2010 Work on ll'rit of mandamus 12.0 and mot:lon to stay 01.11.2010 Work on w:ri t of mandamus 10.0 and motion to stay 01.12.2010 Work on writ of mandamus 12.0 -- anq motion to stay 01.13.2010 Work on writ of mandamus 12.0 and m~_!:.ion to st~L_ ____ ~-13.2010 Transmitt.al of wr:i.t of ----- ··0·· -------- mandamus to client - 01.19.2010 Work on Petitioner's 5.0 Motion for Summary Judgment; transmittal to .. court 02.08.2010 Work on PetitioneJ:' s 3.0 Motion to Disqualify Counsel; t1·ansmi ttal to court 03.28.2010 Work on motion in 3 .o opposition to appointmer.1t of :~:·eceiver 03.29.2010 Lette:r to client/refund -0- of Lillian Hardwick; transmittal hearing date for de novo hearing and opposing second amended motion for appointment of receiver 04.05.2010 Transmittal of letter to 8,0 client/appointment of receiver date moved; preparation of writ of mandamus/court of cLppeals 04.06.2010 Preparation of writ of - 10.0 mandamus ·... Preparation of writ and s.o ( _ .. 04.07.2010 transmittal 04.14.2010 Amendmemt to mandamus 3.0 04.12.2010 - Transmittal of letter to -0- client/new hea.ring date on. motion for enforcement 04.21.2010 ·------.... Review and transnli ttal 1.0 of ruling on mandamus 05.04.2010 Preparation and 8.0 transmittal of writ of - mandamus Supreme court 05.11.2010 Transmittal of inventory -o- found in the file 05.24.2010 Transmittal to client -o- copy of order and respondent's motion to compel 05.15 . .2010 work on mandamus to s.o Texas Supreme Court 05.16.2010 Work on mandamus appeal 8.0 to supreme court 05.17.~!010 I Work on mandamus appeal to su12reme Court 8.0

05.24. ~lOlO 'l'ransmitta.l to client - 1---- -0- copy of order and respondent's motion to compel 06.03.2010 Transmittal to client; 4.0 -- 3 ---- confirmation of. filing; (~ hearing and preparation ·...... for hearing 07.06.2010 Transmittal to -0- client/confi:t'mation. of payment of vendorjch.ristopher Beck ~-.07.2010 Transmittal of notice ··0- from SupremE~ Court - 07.10.2010 Work on supplemental 8.0 diSC!OVery 07.11.2010 -------- Work on supplemental 10.0 ---------- discovE!J:'7f response 07.20.2010 -- Letter t,;, 2.0 clie:nt/Schlein' s Motion :Eor S~t.nctions and Second Notice of Deposition on Written Questions to Custodian of Investment Center; r-eview of documents 08.03.2010 - Transmittal of 3.0 -- Responde:n.t 1 s M'otion for Preferential Settinsr and c:c,nfirmation of mc,tion for sanctions; review of Respondent's Response to ·· .. Motion for Sanctions ( ... ' f (interim attorney's feE!Sl issue) ~-09.2010 Transmittal of motion ---- l.O -- for jury trial setting an~ pcLyment of jury fee 08.13.2010 Transmittal t.o client; -0- hea:dng trm1script of 06.03.2010 09.27.2010 --------- ----------- Order tra.n.srni t taJ. denial -·0- -- of Emergency ~~~oti on/Texas Supreme Court 09.30.2010 -- f-•Transm~tta ' 1 of response 4.0 to mandamus pending before court of appeals; :t:"eview o:E J=esponse; preparation of Petitioner's Emergency Motion to Allow Expenditure Clf Separate Prope:t:tv F~!!lds _ 10.22.2010 Review of suppl-ement 3.0 documents submitte:d by Respondent; t.ra_TL~Hni t tal to client 10.26.2010 Supreme COUl"t 1 S order -{)- denying disqualification '------------- of cotunsel/Supreme --------------------- -- --- 4 - Court's decision; transmittal information to client 11.24.2010 Transmittal of answer -0- and cross-claim/Robert Schlein 12.01.2010 Petitioner's Motion to 3.0 Recuse/preparation and fil:i.l:lg 01.0'7.20H '!'ransmi t tal letter to -o- client/ruling and referral of Admiliistrative Judge/motion to recuse 01.20.20U Petitioner's Motion for 4.0 Reconsideration Special Exceptions to Petitioner's Second Amended Petition and Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Denial to Allow Expenditure of Flmds from the SeparatE~ Property Account b'unds of Pe1:itionl3r -- 1-'---·----------- . --ol-"2 4 . 2 011 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of 3.0

C·' Interim Attorney's Fees Award and Motion for Preferential Setting 01.31.2011 Petitioner's Second 1.5 Amended Peti~ion/revision 0.2.21.2011 Preparation and amended 1.5 - petition/Petitioner's 'I'h.ird Amended Petition ------ 02.23.2011 ~- Letter to Court -0- Coordinator with respect to proposed order 02.25.2011 Letter to client; 1.5 amended motion to appoint and receiver; work on amended response to appointment of receiver 02.28.2011 Let tel: to client; plBa of intervention 03.04.2011 - Transmit t:;d of Schlein's ----- -0- motion t:o continue 03.10.2011 -- 1-· • NotJ.ce o f h E~ar~ng; . -0- transmittal 03.18.2011 !?reparation and 5.0 Hearing/motion to continue 04.14.2011 Review and transmittal 4.0 ------- '--·----------- ----

5 ,---------------------- ------------------------ of 9 02 Notice of ll':LlinHEl ------------.---------- of J'J? Morg·an Records r--- 04.25.2011 -----------r-::------ •.rransmi ttal of letter to ---· -0- client; reset of pretrial conference for 5.06.~~011

05.02.2011 --- Transmittal of lE:.tter to ----- -0- cliemt; :Rule l l J~greem-.mt/Inventory and Appraisement; Respondent's Special E;,.:ceptions and Notice of Deposition; Barbara Re1gi.na Schlein 05.03.2011 - -- Transmittal of -- -0- Respondent's Amended Answer to Petitioner's Third Amended Petition 05.06.2011 Pretrial conference 2.0 5.0.9.2011 - Work on inventory 5.10.2011 Work on inventory; - 3.0 6.0 deposition of Robert Sc:hlein Work Oil invtilltory ~·~ ~~~ ~~~~1 2.0 Depe~sition of Barbara 6.0 Regina Schlein; Helen Stewart 'l'ruscott; preparation f. or depositic•n. f--·------------- 05.13.2011 Trai.lsmit.t'S.ia£___ -0- Responder~.t' s Supplemental Answer to Production and Re:;rponde:r.t' s Inventory and Appraisement 05.13.2011 - Preparation for 1:a. o l?et.J.tione:r" s First. Amended lV!otion. for r~:i.mine and Petitioner's Er..hi.bit List --- n --- 05. J..4 .20].1 05.15.2011 ----------- r-;, 1\

\\ II

\\ 8.0 8.0 - 05.17.2011 ?reparation and Hearing 5.0 on Motion for Appointment of Receiver -05.18 .2011 Notice of Conflicting -o- Setting 05.20.2011 I?:r:eparation a."l.d filing 12.0 Petitione:r·r s Fourth Amended Petition and preparation for t:dal Prepar;;ltion fo:c tr.·ial 12.0 05.21.2011 05.22.2011 Pre;earat.!on for trial 15.0 -- - •rrial ].5. 0 05.23.2011 05.24.2011 - ----- •rrial- 12.0 - -----

6 r· '· 05.25.2011 05.26.2011 05.27.2011 Trial Trial Trial - 12.0 12.0 12.0 06.10.2011 --- Petitioner's Motion for 8.0 Entry of Final Judgment and Propo~ed Division of _¥roperty - 06.20.2011 Respondent's Motion to 4.0 Disregard Jury Findingsi J:eview and transmittal 06.27.2011 Transmittal and review 2.0 of Respondent's Proposed Division

Total hours work expended= 352.5

Billable hours x $250.00 an hour

'l'otal amount = $88,125.00 Copy costs $18, 000.00 2 Cost ( s) $4,399.29 2

Total bill including attorneys' fees and costs = ···... $110,524.29 ( ~·· ' ; Discounted amount of fees $8lr000.00 3

l. Total number of pa.ges 120,000 paHes x.l!'i a page; internal costs billed in- house. 2 Charles Cannon $75.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $37.25 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $200.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $ 3.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $104.00 Galvestcm [Clerk of Court] $ 16.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $ 30.00 [jury fee] Subpoena fees $130.00 First court of Appeals $250.00 [wJ:its] Supreme Court $250.00 Sandra L. Powell $1,630.00 Sandra L. Powell $ 475.00 Bank of America $528.15 Jl? Morgan $4.77.95 Stephanie Me Clure $192.94 3 The following cases are not being bille:d, to-wit: Civil litigation pending in the Justice of the Peace Court (Bank of America v. Barbara Schlein (you prevailed in this litigation) (normal fee ($3,500.00); State of Texas v. Barbara Schlein, M\mic:lpal Court City of Manvel {you prevailed in this litigation) (normal fee ($500.00}; State of Texas v. Austin Reed (League City, Texas) (normal fee ($500. 00}; State of Te:r.:a~ v. Barbara Schlein, County Criminal Court, Hal:ris Cmmty (n.OJ.."TTIal fee $7,500.00}; County of Galveston, et

7 .,

Total including discounted fees $103,383.29

Total discounted bill (discounting fees and costs) ~ $95,000.00 [amount d'Ue]

The relevant. documents confirming the payment of the subject fees and/or costs are enclosed. If you have any questions, please inform.

/S/ Anthqny P. Griffin Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

Encl (s). - Bills/confirmation of paymEmt, etc.·

EMAIL TR.ZillSMISSION AND REGULAR l\1AIL

c:word.schlein_barbara.billing_statement

(~. or- ---------- al. v. Barbara Schleln (tax suits) (normal fee $5,000 - $10,000.00). This is roughly $22,000.00- $25,000.()0 in feE~s nc•t billed).

8 TAB 6 Gmatl- demand tor payment/close ofbusmess on Tuesday, November ll LUll rage 1 or t

Anthony Griffin

demand for payment/close of business on Tuesday, November 1,2011 1 message

Anthony Griffin Sat,Oct29,2011 at10;03AM To: Barbara Schlein

Please accept this email as confirmation of the termination of our services for non-payment of fees. Your statement seeking to pay $50,000.00 for our work Is unacceptable. Your actions to hide funds to make them non-accessible for the payment of fees is intolerable. Your statements challenging my representation are insulting but are consistent with your previous actions associated with your underlying intent.

Please accept this our demand for payment of attorney's fees and costs ($95,000.00). If we do not receive a cashier's and/or certified check on or before the close of business Tuesday November 1, 2011 to pay both fees and costs incurred on your behalf, we will take actions, without future noti~ to protect our interest. Ariy future action taken will encompass additional fees and costs associated with your non-payment (roughly an additional $75,000.00).

If payment Is not made, please note we anticipate undertaking the following to protect our interest:

1. A motion to the trial court in the family case to set aside the v~rdict; we will do so In the form of a motion for _ Intervention and motion for new tried as an adverse party (allegation fraud on the court and the hiding of assets). We will work to unwind the agreement (and thus unwind the transactions at the Investment Center; fraud will vitiate any such transactions undertaken and place the matter before the trial court to start all over again); 2. We will retain and secure the tile in the warehouse until the motion is decided by the Court. We will not release any property until after the motion is decided by the Court; 3. We will bring on Wednesday of this week a lawsuit In the District Court with respect to our fees and costs. We will copy all parties in the other litigation in order to put them on notice of our lien and the dispute in question. We will sue for the non-discounted amount of fees and costs and not the discounted version (see previously billing statement of August 5, 2011 ). You have a copy of that bill and we have discussed the same {roughly $209,399.29 is non-discounted fees and costs will be the subject of the suit to recover~ due and owing to our firm). 3. We will file motions to withdraw on the following cases, to-wit: i) Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein, in the County Court at Law, No.3, Galveston County, Texas; U) Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein and Bill Qe La Garza, in the 212th Judicial District Court; Galveston County, Texas; iii) Ex Parte Barbara Schlein (expunction proceeding in Houston, Texas); iv) tax case pending in Galveston County; v) Barbara Schlein v. Centre Bu!!ders!Davjd Flores, in the 10th Judicial District Court; Galveston County, Texas. The m.otionswlll be on file by Wednesday ofthis week. On the Flores matter we will appear and obtain a trial setting In April/May 2012. We will file a lien In Flores matter In order to retain our interest; we will not waive our contingent fee in that case.

I wfll tender your file on or before December 1; 2011. You should make arrangements to travel to Galveston to retrieve the files. There are approximately thirty boxes of materials, therefore you should have a vehicle large enough to obtain all materials at one time. Any future interaction will be by fax, email or letter.

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

. •·1·.·•·__ PLAitmFF'S EXHIBIT

https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=35e2c7523a&view=Dt&a=barbata%20schlein&as ... 11/4/~11 TAB7 Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 3

0 Health Care Business 0 Chapfor7 0 Chapter IS Petition for 0 IndiVidual (iowludes Joint Debtors) D Single Asset Real Estate as dct.ned In 0 Chaptor9 Recognllion or a Foreign S"" Exillblt Don pag~ 2 r>ftlrl$form. I 1 U.S.C. § IOl(SlB) li2l Chapter I I Main Proceeding i!'J Corporation (Includes LLC and LLP) D Railroad 0 Chapter 12 0 Chapter IS Pelition for 0 8 Partne!sh!p Other (lfdebl

· Nature (Cfleek one box.) 0 Debts are primarily consumer lZl Debturc D Debtor Ia a ta~-e~ompt organizo.tlon debts, doflned In II U.S.C. primarily Elich oounl!y in which a foreign prftbe Unltcd States § I 0 I (8) as ulncurred by an bi!Siness debts. aGainst debtor is pending: Code (the lntemnl Revonue Code). Individual prlmarlly for a personal, family, or household

Cbe~ko b"Q;: Pull Filing Fee ottocbed. obtor is a small bualness debtor as deflned In II U.S.C. § 101(51D). Debtor Is nota small business debtor as deRned In II U.S. C.~ !Ol(SI D). 0 Filing l'ee to be paid lnlnstollmenl$ (•ppllcable to indlviduala only). Mijst attach signed application for tho oourl's conslderatlon certifYing that the dcbtot· is Qteck If:..-·· _ ..... ~nableto pay fee except in installments. Rule 1006(b), See Offlclal Form 3A. IU--'oebtor's aggrcgale noncontlngent liquidated debts (excluding debts owed to lnsl

UIISSPI\C.'BISFOR COORTVSEONI.11 Debtor estimates that funds will oo available for distribution to unseeuredcrodltors. Debtor estimates thai, after exempt property is cxoluded and admlnlslmtlve expenses paid, there will be no funds available for

D 0 0 D 0 D 1,000· 5,001· 10,001· 25,001- 50,001- Over 5,000 10,000 25,00(1 50,00(1 100,000 100,000

0 Ill D D 0 0 D 0 $100,00lto $500,001 $1,000,001 $10,000,001 $50,000,00 l $100,000,001 $500,000,001 Mor~than ssoo,ooo to$1 to$10 to$50 to$100 to $500 to$1 billion $1 blllion I I 477 D 0 0 liZI D 0 0 D 0 0 SOlo $50,001 10 $10(1,00110 $50(1,001 $1,000,001 $10,000,00! $50,000,001 $100,000,001 $SOO,OOO,OOJ Moretltan sso,ooo $10Q,{JOO $500,000 to$1 to$10 to$50 to $tOO to J500 to$1 bi!Hon $1 billion

I b-C-J Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 2 of 3 BlCOfficlal Form 0 (12/lf) l'aRe2 Vokmtary Petition N~RfDebt~r(sh . t ony . rlffm, lno. (fflis pa!(e 11lll&t1Ja comp/etedandllled in twe1y case.) All Prior Bankruptcy Ca~s Flied Withill Lavt 8 Yonrs If more than two attach additional $hect. Localloll Case Nutnber: Date Flied: Where Filed: NIA Location Coso Number: Date Filed: Where Filed: N/A Pendlna Bankrulltcv caso Flleil by 411Y _Spouse, Pat·tuer or Affiliate of this J)elltor (If more th•n on• attach additional sheet.}_ NnmoofDebtor. N/A Case Number: Date J?Ucd:

District: Rclntlonshlp: Judge:

Exhibit A ExhibitB (To be ¢0111pletcd if debtor Is required to tlle perl~dio repot1s (e.g., forms !OK. a~d (To be completed if debtor is an l~dividual IOQ) wldt the Securllios and Bxcho~ge Cotnmisslon pursuant to Section 13 or IS(d) whose debts are primarily consum~r debts.} oflbc Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is reque$1ing relief under ch~pter I I.) J, the attorney for the petitioner nnmed In tho foregoing petition, declare that I have informed tbe petitioner that [he or she] may proceed under chapter 7, II, 12, or 13 of title II, United States Code, and ltavo explained tbo relief avallabl~ under each $ucb chapter. I further certify that I have delivered to tho debtor the notice required by II u.s.c. § 342(b). D Bxhlblt A Is atlnchcd and made a part of this petition.

" sf~nature of Allo;nev tor Debtcrrs)· TDatll)_

ExbibltC Do" the debtor own or havo po3sesslon of any property that poses or Is allet:ed to polio a threat of Imminent and Identifiable harm to public health or safety?

D Yes, and Exhibit Cis attached ami made a part of this petition,

~ No.

ExhibitD (To bewmpleted by every individual debtor. Ifa joint petition Is flied, eaoh apouso must complete and attach a separat~ Exhibit D.} [i2l' Exhibit D, completed and $igned by tbc debtor, is attached and made a part of this p~lltlon. lfth!s is a joint petition:

0 Exhibit D, also completed and signed by tbojolnt debtor, Is attached and made a part or this petition.

.' InformaCion Regarilln&lhc Debtor ·Venue (Check any applicable box.) It! Debtor bas been domiciled or has had a residence, principal place of buslnoss, or principal agsetg In this District for 180 days lmmedlntely preceding tho date ~ftbis petition or f<>r a longer part of such I BO days. than in any other District.

D There !sa bankruptcy elSe concern In~: debtor's affillate, general partner, or paTtnershlp pending In this District.

D Debtor Is a debtor in a foreign proceeding and has its principal place of business or principal assets in the United States in this District, or has no prb>4:lpal placo of buslnoss or assets In the United Statos but Is a defendant In an action or proceeding [In 11 ftdernl or state eourl} in this D1811"1ot, or the Interests ofthe parties will bo served In regard to tho roliefsoughtln this Dlslrlot.

Certification by a DebtOI' Who Resides liS a Tenant or Residential Properly (Check all appllcablo boxes.)

0 Landlord has a judgment against tho debtor for possession of debtor's resldellco. (lfbox checked, complete tl«o foUowiog.)

(Name of landlord that obtalncdjudgment)

(Address of landlord)

D Debtor claims that UQder applicable nonbankt11ptoy !aw, there a~ clrcumataMIIS under which tho deblor would bo permitted to cure the elltlre moneta!')' de.filult that gave rise to the judgment for pos!Cssion, after tbc judgment for possession was entered, and

D Debtor has Included with this petition the depoolt with th~ court of any rent that would becotnc due during tho 30-day period after the filing of tho petition.

0 Debtor certifies that he/she has served tho Landlord with tblsoortiflcotion. (11 U.S.C. § 362(1)). 4'78 Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 3 of 3 Pa 3 Name ofDebtor{s): Anthony P. Gnffin, lnc. Sl S~unl(l) of Debtor{&) (lndivldoai/Joillt) Signature ora Foreign llepresenmtlve

I deoiare undcl· penalty of porjury t'hal the ill formation provided in this pel!!ion is truo I declero under penally of perjmy that the Information provided in this petl1ion Is true and correot. and ComlCI, thai I am the foreign representative of a dobtor in a fol·ofgn proceeding, (If pcMhioMI' Is an i~dlvldual whoso dclm aro primarily consumer dobts and hos and that I am authorized to me Ibis petition. ohoacn to file undcrclulpter7) I am awaro that I may proceed under chapter 7, II, 12 (Ckeck only on~ boK.) or 13 of title II, United States Coda, undel'81and tho rollefavaUable undor each such chapter, and cbooso to proceed under chapter 7. D I request relief in accordance wltb cbap!er IS of title II, United Stales Code. [If no llltorney repreoonts me and no bankruptcy petition preparer signs the petition) I Cerilned copies of tho documents requbod b,v II u.s.c. §ISIS aro attaQhed. have obtllined and read th0 notlco r<:qulrcd by J1 U.S.C. § 342(b). D Pursuant toll U.S.C. § 1511, [request relief in a<:cordanocwith th~ I request relief in accordance with the chapter of tltlo 11, United States Code, chapler of title 11 specified 111 this pelllion. Aocrtiflcd copy of the specified In this petllion. o1·der granting recognition of the foreig11 main procoodlnt~ls attached. x lSI Anthon • Glrffln x N/A (Signature ofi'orel!ln Representative) X NIA Signature of Joint Debtor (Printed Nameof'f'orelgn Representotive) Telophono Number (If not represented by atlomey) Date Date Slgn9ture of Non-Attorney Ilankmpwy hlltloll Preparer x /siAN I declare under penally of perjury that: (I) I am a bankruptcy petition prcparcr as Slenattll' torney for Debtor(s) defined In 11 U.S.C. ~ II 0; (2) I prepared this document for compensation and have ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN provided the debtor with e copy of Ibis document and the notlocs and lnfontlatfon required under 11 U.S.C. §§ IIO(b), !IO(h), and 342(b); and, (3) if rules or guidelines havo been promulgated pursuant to t I U.S.C. § liO(h) setting a maxlmu1n Firm Namo fee for smiccs chargeable by bankruptcy pelltlon prcparers, I have given the debtor notice of the 1n11XImum amount botoro preparing any dccumcnl fur filing for a debtor 1115 21ST STREET, GALVESTON, TEXAS 77650 or accepting any fee from tbe debtor, as required In that section. Off'lcial Form l91s attached. Addre5S 409.763.0386 N/a TelcJlhono NUinber Printed Name and title, if any, ofBankn!ptcy Petition Proparer 04104/2012 Date Social-Security number (If the bankruptcy pe~tion preparer 1$ not an individual, •In a case in which§ 707(b)(4XD) applies, this stgnaturc also constitutes a ~ate tho Socfai·Securlty number of the oCtlcer, prlnelpal, responsible person or certification that theattomey has no knowledge after an Inquiry that the lnfonnatlon parln~r .,fthe bankruptcy pelfticm proparor.) (Required by II U.S.C.§ II 0.) in the schedules is Incorrect.

Slgn~t11rc of Debtor (Corporatlon/Parbtonhlp)

I declare under penalty of perjury tbat the Information provided in this petition 1s true Address and correct, and that I have been autl101'lzed to tuc this petition on behalf of the dobtor. X Slgnatllfll

X /S/ Y P. GRIFFIN Dato Signature of Authodzed Indf vidual ANIHQ['jV p, @BYfFIN Signaturo of bankruptcy petition preporer or officer, princlP!II, responl$1ble per$on, or Printed Name of Autho•·lzed Jndlvidual partner whose Soclai..Security number is provided above. Presld$nt Title or Autllorizcd Individual Names and Social-Security numbors of all other Individuals who prepared or assisted 04104/2012 Date lr1 preparing this document unless the bankruptcy petition preparer Is nol nn !ndMdual.

If 111ore than one person prepared this document, attach additional sheets conforming to the appropriate official form tbr each person.

A baukn1ptcy petlllon prdpm-er's f«ilrwe to comply wlliiiM provM~1s oftitle II and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pl'ocedlll'e may result In fines or lmprlsonmem or both, ll (].S.C. 110; Ill U.S.C. 156.

479 Case 12-80185 Document 1-1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1

B IA (Official Fonn I, E~hlblt A) (9/97) i.to ftl~,/Je.l'i(Jcltct.tt/lfJPf$ (e.g.;lalto.~ toKcm.d 100) wifh the p~urlties tmd Exchange Commission pJmmanJ to '1},1/f'i/ 'e¢Ut1fi£'1:1!!:?i~ftmM..Il!:t;6JlJtMil.!Od Is requestmg relutJ under chapter 11 o; rhe Bankruptcy UJae, this ·comp etM?)JI({ a(fMIIillJ..fo· flleptarl!of.I;J

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Southern District of Texas - Galveston

Inre Aritl'lob}! P. 9riffin, Ina. ) Case No. Debtor )

) ) Chapter 11

EXHIBIT "A" TO VOLUNTARY PETITION 1. If any of the debtor•s securities are registered under Section 12 of the Seomitles Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC tile number is .;.N.:.:;IA;.;..._ _ _ _ _ _..,........,

2. The folloWing fmancial data is the latest avallable infonnation and refers to the debtor's condition on Q4.!):1.2012

a. Total assets $ _ _..._.~·9~87'-'! .• 6~3~3.~00 b. Total debts (including debts listed in 2.c., below) $ _ _ _1~,2~0~0:.z::.O~OO~.O~O

c. Debt securities held by more than SOP holders:

$ _ _ _ __ secured CJ unsecured 0 subordinated 0 $_..._ _...__ _ secured 0 unsecmed 0 subordinated 0 $ _ _ _ _ __ seemed CJ unseCW"ed 0 subordinated CJ s _____ secW'Cd CJ unsecmed CJ subordinated CJ secured 0 unseCW"ed 0 subordinated 0 s ___"'"""..,...._ d. Number of shares ofprefened stock e. Number of shares COJumon stock }PDQ Comments. ifanv: -·-·--'"'·-·---~".. ---,·-'-'-'-'-....:...-~-~--- Small business, closely held; 1000 shares all owned by Anthony P. Griffin.

3. Brief descrintion of debtor's business: Law practice/pre-development work In context of property acquisitions

4. Libi the names of any pt:rson who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 5% or more of the votilU!: securities of debtor: Anthony P. Griffin

480 Case 12-80185 Documen11-2 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1

aJl\l(Ol'fio.li!lJ!.Qrh!t, l'lthmit:<}){mflt) [lfito.t1IIi b~l i}fffie ilebtl)l;"s JvnowJtidg

t11Nl:TBD :STATES BANKRUPTCY ·CoURT .S:authe1'1l Dlsttlct,otT~xiiS - Galveston.

In re Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. ) C£Js~.'No. ----~--- Debtot ) ) ) Chl\pte't 11 ..,..-.....,...._.;,...;....----

EXIIIBIT "C" TO VO:LUNTARY PETITION

l, 'f~eJltlfY t111d~r:i~fi:Y ilc~\lr'ib.e:allrrSoll_iil.pt:qpiiJ!lY -uw.neil•hy flt' ill :p~$esstou,l)l''th.ed~btar :lbat, tQ ~he b~t 9f:thG ,\ill~Jw;l:;;itnc:>wl.~g9J,;p<>.~~~H>.r l~~~~~g_~i{:!p J!Osea_\hr<;lllllf •lm)JJ!nii!nlllndldDntitia'ble harm.i'llfhe-;pubtio health onsafo(y·(llijacli .addltionill sheets: if i\~0$81\ey):. :None;

. i. Wlth resp®H() -·ea® f)lll'OOI. ·ol':~ai propetfy odtwn af;'jlemnalpropetly 1drmll'fied ln

481 Case 12-80185 Document 1-3 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 2

BID (Official Form I, Exhibit D) (12/09)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Inre____~------~~~~- Case No,_ _ _ __ Debtor (if known)

EXHIBIT D -INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT

Warning: You must be able to check truthfully one of the five statements regarding credit counseling listed below. If you cannot do so, you are not eligible to file a bankruptcy case, and the court can dismiss any case you do ftle. If that happens, you will lose whatever filing fee you paid, and your creditors will be able to resume collection activities against you. If your case is dismissed and you tile another bankruptcy case later, you may be required to pay a second fiiing fee and you may have to take extra steps to stop creditors' collection activities.

Every individual debtor must file this Exhibit D. If a joint petition is filed, each spouse must complete and file a separate Exhibit D. Check one ofthe five statements below and attach any documents a:i directed.

if 1. Within the 180 days before the filing of my bankruptcy case, I received a briefmg from a credit counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator tbat outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted me in perfoiming a related budget analysis, and I have a certificate from the agency describing the services provided to me. Attach a copy of the certificate and a copy ofany debt repayment plan developed through the agency.

0 2. Within the 180 days before the filing of my bankruptcy case, I received a briefing from a credit counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted me in perfonning a related budget analysis, but I do not have a certificate from the agency describing the services provided to me. You must.file a copy ofa certificate from the agency describing the services provided to you and a copy ofany debt repayment plan developed through the agency no later than I 4 days after your bankruptcy case is filed.

482 Case 12-80185 Document 1-3 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 2 of 2

Pase2 B ID (Official Fonn 1, Exh. D) (12109)- Cont.

a 3. I certify that I requested credit counseling services from an approved agency but was unable to obtain the services during the seven days from the time I made my request, and the following exigent circumstances merit a temporazy waiver of the credit counseling requirement so I can file my bankruptcy case now. [Summarize eXigent circumstances here.]

If your certification is satisfactory to the court, you must still obtain the credit counseling briefing within the first 30 days after you file your bankruptcy petition and promptly me a certificate from the agency that provided the counseling, together with a copy of any debt management plan developed through the agency. Failure to fulflll these requirements may result in dismissal of your case. Any extension of the 30-day deadline can be granted only for cause and is limited to a maximum of 15 days. Your case may also be dismissed if the court is not satisfied with your reasons for filing your bankruptcy case without first receiving a credit counseling briefing.

tJ 4. I am not required to receive a credit counseling briefing because of: [Check the applicable statement.] [Must be accompanied by a motion for determination by the court.]

LJ Incapacity. (Defined in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) as impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so as to be incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to financial responsibilities.); LJ Disability. (Defmed in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) as physically impaired to the extent ofbeing unable, after reasonable effort, to parti~ipate in a credit counseling briefing in person, by telephone, or through the Internet.); 0 Active military duty in a militazy combat zone.

a 5. The United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator has determined that the credit counseling requirement of 11 U,S.C. § 109(h) does not apply in this district,

I certifY under penalty of perjnry that the information provided above is true and correct. ·

Signature of Debtor: A[lthony P. Griffin

Date: 04/04/2012

483 Case 12-80185 Document 1-4 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1

Certificate Number: 01267-TXS-CC-017816773

1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 01267-TXS-CC..O 17816773

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSELING

I CERTIFY that on Apri14, 2012, at 11:36 o'clock AM CDT, Anthony P Griffin received from Money Management International, Inc., an agency approved pursuant to 11 U.S .C. § 111 to provide credit counseling in the Southern District of Texas, an individual [or group] briefing that complied with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h) and 111. A debt repayment plan was not prepared. If a debt repayment plan was prepared, a copy of the debt repayment plan is attached to this certificate. This counseling session was conducted by internet and telephone.

Date: April 4, 2012 By: Is/Comfort Gayekpar

Name: Comfort Gayekpar

Title: Counselor

* Individuals who wish to file a bankruptcy case under title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code are required to file with the United States Bankruptcy Court a completed certificate of counseling from the nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency that provided the individual the counseling services and a copy of the debt repayment plan, if any, developed through the credit counseling agency. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h) and 52l(b).

484 Case 12-80185 Document 1-5 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1

B 4 (Official Fonn 4) (12107)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Southern District of Texas - Galveston

In re _An!lmny I?•.~rrffln, !~:~c. ~ . Case No·.-~~~~-- Debtor Chapter_1_1_ _,_...,_,

LIST OF CREDITORS HOLDING 20 LARGEST UNSECURED CLAIMS

Following is the list of the debtor's creditors holding the 20 largest unsecured claims. The list is prepared in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(d) for filing in this chapter 11 [or chapter 9] case. The list does not include (I) persons who come within the defmition of"in.sider" set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101, or (2) secured creditors unless the value of the collateral is such that the unsecured deficiency places the creditor among the holders of the 20 largest unsecured claims. If a minor child is one of the creditors holding the 20 largest unsecured claims, slate the child's initials and the name and address of the child's parent or guardian, such as "A.B., a minor child, by John Doe, guardian." Do not disclose the child's name. See, 11 U.S.C. §112 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(m).

(I) (2) (3) ·(4) (5)

Name ofcreditor Namu. telephoTUI.nllm/Jer and NaiUre ofclaim lndicatelfclaim Amo11111 of claim and complete complete mailing address, (trade debr, bank Is contingent, [ifsecured also mailing address, Including zip code, of loan, government unliquidated, stale value of Including zip empwyoa, agent. or dapartment contract, etc.) disputed or SOCI/rlty] code ofcreditor familiar with subject to seloff claim w/10 may be contacted

See attached

Date: .04.04.201.2 .. .Is/ ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN Debtor

[Declaration as in Form 2] Case 12-80185 Document 1-6 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 3

Creditors Names and Address Unliquidated/Unsecured Amount Due*

Associated Court Reporters 777 Post Oak Boulevard #875] Houston, TX 77056 (713) 963-9700 ..; $15,000.00 [N/D]

Frances 1704 Avenue K Carvey Galveston, Texas 77550 $50,000.00 [N/D] 409.762.6931

Kevin Correai 6150 Westgate Drive $10,000.00 [N/D] Beaumont, Texas 77706 409.860.4007

James Hobgood P.O.Box481 $10,000.00 {N/D] Texas City, Texas 77568 409.939.0006

Michael Jordon 695 Callaway Drive ..J $12,000.00 [N/D] Beaumont, Texas 77706 409.658.5544

Lexis Nexis Diversified Credit Service $6,197.68 P.O. Box 21726 Cleveland, Ohio 44121

Pitney Bowes P. 0. Box 5010 Woodlands, Hills, Ca 91365 818.225.6000 ..; 12,088.07 [N/D]

Randy Porter 1195 County Road 150 Alvin, Texas 77511 $10,000.00 [D] 713.828.4065

Newton Savoie 2475 Canal Street New Orleans, LA 70119 ..J $7,226.77 [N/D] 504.822.40 I 0

Joline Reese 1502 17th Avenue North ..J $10,000.00 [N/D] Texas City, Texas 77590 409.771.2505

486 Case 12-80185 Document 1-6 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 2 of 3

SST 4315 Pickett Road P. 0. Box 801997 Kansas City, Texas 64180-1997 1.877.810.0594 ~ $6,361.69 [N/D]

Ceasar Vereen 192 County Road 69 8B Angleton, Texas 77515 $7,500.00 [N/D]

Glenda Wallace 16031 Williwalk Drive Houston, Texas 77083 $5,000.00 [D][N/D]

Secured Debt

De Lage Landen c/o 1111 Old Eagle School Road Wayne, PA 19087 secured $19,389.22

Internal Revenue Service 1919 Smith Houston, Texas secured $800,000.00 Agent: Christopher Fletcher 713.209.3507 [accounting needed]

Property Taxes Galveston County secured $120,000.00 City of Galveston Galveston Independent School District [property taxes]

Lamson Nguyen secured $20,000.00 Lamson Construction Co 1011 61st Street Galveston, Texas 77550 secured 409.457.7774

487 Case 12-80185 Document 1-6 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 3 of 3

NID -represented not disputed D - represents disputed but intends to pay TABS Filed 13 March 14 P6:43 Dwight D. Sullivan County Clerk Galveston County CAUSE NO. CV-69481

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN IN THE COUNTY COURT

v. AT LAW NO. 2

BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

PLAINTIFF'S, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, ORIGINAL PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

This lawsuit is brought to collect on outstanding debts due

and owing to Anthony P. Griffin, hereinafter and sometimes

referred to as Plaintiff, with regards to services rendered to

Barbara Regina Schlein, hereinafter and sometimes referred to as

Defendant. Plaintiff would show unto the Court as follows, to-

wit:

I.

This is a Schedule 2 matter and as such it is requested

that the Court establish a scheduling order herein.

II.

At all times material to this action, Plaintiff is a

licensed lawyer in the State of Texas engaged in the practice of

law.

Defendant, Barbara Schlein, can be served with process by

serving her at 2106 Pleasant Palm Circle, League City, Texas

77573.

EXHIBIT

I j)- 2.t. All matters material to this action occurred in Galveston

and/or Harris County, Texas.

III.

Breach of Contract Claim - Family Claim

In November 3, 2009, Plaintiff entered a contract of

employment with Plaintiff. The contract called for the

Defendant to pay to Plaintiff an initial retainer of $35,000.00

and for counsel to be paid a reduced hourly rate of $250.00 an

hour for any work over $35,000.00. The contract was entered

with knowledge of previous counsel's representation of the

Defendant and the long-term and protracted nature of the 1 underlying family/business law litigation. Even though

referenced in the contract, the Defendant never paid the initial

retainer of $35,000.00, but explained to Plaintiff that she was

trustworthy, that she always paid her bills and that if the

Plaintiff took care of her interest, she would take care of him.

Plaintiff explained that she simply had to abide with the terms

of the contract.

Plaintiff represented Defendant in the family litigation

and maintained business records during the course of the

representation. At the end of the representation, Plaintiff

1 In the Matter of the Marriage of Barbara Regina Schlein and Robert John Schlein; Case No. 08FD2371; in the County Court at Law, No. 2, Galveston, County, Texas. 2 forwarded a bill setting out the total amount of time expended

on Plaintiff's behalf was 352.50 hours for a total of

$88,125.00. Plaintiff's office also incurred some $22,339.29 in

costs. The total attorneys' fee and costs incurred on behalf of

the client and due and owing is $110,524.29.

Plaintiff sues for this amount and prays for judgment.

IV.

Additional Work - Quantum Meruit

Plaintiff also engaged in other work for Defendant that was

external to the contract of employment surrounding the family

litigation. The agreement of representation was based upon

trust and promises that Defendant was "honest, trustworthy and a

Christian woman and that she paid her bills" (Defendant's

words). Plaintiff was informed by Defendant on multiple

occasions that if her money in the family case was cleared up

she would immediately get Plaintiff paid - "trust me." The

worked performed on Defendant's behalf included the following:

i) Civil litigation over debt in Justice Court (Bank of

America v. Barbara and Robert Schlein) - the defense

was successful;

ii) Criminal litigation in criminal case (State of Texas

v. Barbara Schlein, in the County Criminal Court,

Harris County, Texas) & ultimately work on an

3 expunction and filing an expunction in Harris County,

Texas with respect to same - the defense was

successful, the expunction matter is pending at this

submission;

iii) Ticket work/criminal litigation in Manvel, Texas -

(State of Texas v. Barbara Schlein) - the defense was

successful;

iv) Representation of Defendant's son (State of Texas v.

Austin Reed) - the defense was successful;

v) Representation of Barbara Schlein in tax litigation

matter pending in Galveston County, Texas (pending)

(County of Galveston v. Barbara Schlein and Robert

Schlein);

vi) Representation of Barbara Schlein in contingent fee

litigation with regards to builder's negligence

(Barbara Schlein v. Centre Builders, et al.; in the

lOth Judicial District Court; Galveston County, Texas);

vii) Representation of Barbara Schlein in litigation in

real estate litigation and lien placed on community

property (Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein and Bill

De La Garza, et al., in the 212th Judicial District

Court; Galveston County, Texas).

The reasonable value of the subject work is sixty

4 thousand ($60,000.00) dollars; this amount does not include the

contingent fee in existence in the building negligence matter

pending in Galveston County. Plaintiff sues for his reasonable

and necessary attorney's fees and costs incurred on behalf of

Plaintiff in these cases ($15,000.00 in costs). Plaintiff seeks

a declaratory judgment with respect to the contingent fee

contract on the construction litigation that the contract is a

valid and enforceable contract and remains in effects.

v. Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above information

for all purposes. In addition and/or in the alternative to the

foregoing, Plaintiff would show that it is entitled to recover

under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. According to this

equitable principle of justice, equity, and/or good conscience,

Plaintiff is entitled to recover for the products, materials,

and services that Defendant received and benefited from without

compensating Plaintiff. Under the theory of unjust enrichment,

Plaintiff is entitled to recover all actual damages, together

with attorneys' fees and costs of Court.

s VI.

Fraud Allegations

Plaintiff brings suit on the basis of fraud. It is

Plaintiff's contention that Defendant has defrauded both him and

the court during the course of the contractual relationship.

Plaintiff signed a contract imposing an obligation on the client

to be honest in her dealings with the Plaintiff and the court.

The applicable language under the contract reads as follows:

Withdrawal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract 1. Withdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obligation to represent the Client zealously within the bounds of the law, but the Lawyers also have an obligation, when material representation surfaces or where there is a breach of the terms of this contract by the Client, to withdraw from the representation of the Client. Nothing in this contract guarantees any results, including whether a suit will or will not be filed or any other matters that border on guarantees. The only guarantee relates to the representation within the confines of the Code of Professional Responsibility (zealously within the bounds of the law). It has been explained orally that the Lawyers' obligation to the Court and the rules of ethics require investigation and examination of the facts. 2. Investigation/If No Case: If the facts reveal no case exists, the Lawyer shall promptly advise the client and terminate the relationship. The retainer again is non- refundable.

6 3. Investigation/Material Breach: If the investigation reveals a material breach, lie, or misstatement by the client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how such breach affects the Lawyer's ability to proceed in the representation. If termination is appropriate, the Lawyer(s) shall advise the client of her rights and shall promptly take any necessary acts to protect the Client (advise as to action) and the firm's rights. Again, the retainer shall be deemed non- refundable.

Prior to the signing of the contract, the contract was

explained to the client and Plaintiff relied upon

Defendant's statements with regard to telling the truth, be

forthright and honest and not to conceal any information

during the process. Defendant affirmed her understanding

and held out that she would remain honest and that she

would not conceal information from Plaintiff and/or from

the Court. However, during the course of the relationship,

Defendants actions revealed fraud that struck at the

fundamental relationship between the parties. These

actions included the following:

1) Requesting to see banking records before the

lawyer after banking records were tendered

by the banking entity. After the lawyer

learned that the client had gone through the

records prior to his review, copying and

tendering to the other side, he prohibited

7 the client's access to any such documents

until after the lawyer touched the documents

first;

2) In preparation for trial, the lawyer

discovered a discrepancy in checks and the

financial records and inquired of the

client. In the discussion, the lawyer

became angry and stated that "if I was the

judge, I would put you in jail." The

Defendant, instead of addressing the

problem/discrepancy the client engaged in

tears and continued to repeat .... "I don't

know." When the contradiction was revealed

in the examination, the client simply

stated, "I just have to go to jail." The

client was instructed that if the question

was asked at a trial or hearing, Defendant

had to answer honestly, even if it meant not

answering and/or repeating her statement, "I

just have to go to jail." The question was

not asked at trial;

3) The client held out to Plaintiff that his

fees would be paid. "I have the money, I

will pay you. You trust me don't you?"

8 Defendant explained that when the process

was over she would immediately get a check

issued to pay Plaintiff. Plaintiff relied

on these statements.

4) After the presentation of the bill,

Plaintiff explained in the bill and orally

that he would discount the bill (fees and

costs), in order to make it better on the

client and in order to receive compensation.

On or about October 28, 2011, Plaintiff was

informed by Defendant that she would not and

could not pay Plaintiff's fees. Plaintiff

had been informed that she had worked with

her financial advisor, Ritchie Faulk to

protect her funds from collection. In the

conversation of October 28, 2011, Defendant

said the funds were placed in an IRA and

that she could not remove the same until she

was 59. Presumably, Defendant wanted

Plaintiff to wait until a period of in

excess of ten (10) years for compensation.

The Defendant's statement was related to the

IRA is inconsistent with Defendant holding

out that after taking out "your" lawyer's

9 fees, I will place my other funds in a

protective status. Plaintiff relied on the

Defendant's statements.

Plaintiff has been defrauded by Defendant and seeks a

judgment finding that "fraud" has taken place.

VII.

Theft of Services - Theft Liability Act

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above factual

paragraphs setting out the factual history. Defendant

misappropriated monies owed to Plaintiff with the intent to

deprive Plaintiff of that property and/or without

Plaintiff's consent. Defendant has engaged in theft of

services under the Theft Liability Act by intentionally and

knowingly securing the performance of services by

deception, false token, and/or by securing the performance

of those services by agreeing to provide compensation to

Plaintiff and, after the services were rendered, by failing

to make payment after receiving notice demanding payment.

To the extent necessary or appropriate, Plaintiff

incorporates the following provisions of the Texas Penal

Code:§§ 31.01(1), 31.01(3), 31.01(4), 31.01(5), and

31.01(6).

10 Defendant has unlawfully diverted and/or held monies

owed to Plaintiff for services rendered and, pursuant to

the Theft Liability Act.

VIII.

Prayer for Relief

Plaintiff prays for the following relief in this

matter:

1. Actual damages incurred by Plaintiff associated

with all claims asserted herein;

2. A declaratory judgment that Defendant has engaged

in fraud;

3. A judicial finding that Plaintiff is entitled to

quantum meruit and/or a finding of unjust enrichments on

the portions of the work that no contract existed;

4. A finding that Defendant has engaged in theft of

services in violation of Texas law;

5. Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages for Defendant's

conduct;

6. Plaintiff seeks pre-judgment interest, post

judgment interest, court costs, and reasonable and

necessary attorney's fees (fees associated when counsel is

hired to represent the Plaintiff's interest) that Plaintiff

is entitled to recover.

11 7. Plaintiff seeks the recovery of all damages under

law and equity that Plaintiff is entitled to recover.

DATE: March 14, 2013.

/S/ NORMA VENSO

NORMA VENSO ATTORNEY AT LAW 830 APOLLO HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058 409.789.8661 FACSIMILE NO. 281.286.9990

STATE BAR NO. 20545250

c:word.griffin_anthony_[schlein_barbara]_original_petition

12 TAB9 STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

. March 18, 2011

CMRRR#: 70040750000067289519

.:Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin Attorney At Law 1115 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624

Re: H0021132504 Ceasar William Vereen- Anthony Paul Griffin

Dear :Mr. Griffin:

·The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy of which is enclosed with tlus notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined that the infonnation provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint.

Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney.

You must funlish to this office a written response to the Complaint within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained iri. the Complaint, and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a determination of Just Cause as defined in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a copv of your response directlv to the Complainant.

Pursuant to Rules 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes Professional Misconduct.

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings, except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived conlidentiality or the Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel may provide appropriate information, including the response, to law enforcement agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

EXHIBIT 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002· Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292 6, 'k/ )·-vuj J I b-Y~ ~ You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter.

Sin~erely, Q lt?'\ (-;a;1:W '-AsSistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of the ChiefDisciplinary Coun.Sel State Bar of Texas JLJ/ra

Enclosure(s): Grievance (Copy of Complaint)

CF2-3. OFFICE OF THE CHJEF DiSCIPLINARY COUNS L STATE BAR OF TEXAS RETU lNG ,(

GRIEVANCE FORM To ender /

... )'//···-·-. L GENERA.L INFORMATION . - .... ~ ,., . / . -~"'"''"'" 0 !=(lr i -· Before you fi]} ou~ this ~aperwork, there may be a faster way to resolv21he issu~ yol:i.fB 18 20ii are currently havmg wtth an attorney. \ / ,. If you are considering filing a gri:vance against a Texas attomey for any of the following reasons:

You believe your attomey is neglecting your case. ¥.l Your attomey does not retum phone calls or keep you informed about the status ::r ~ ,.,.• s:: ot~ your case. ~m :;:: fD JI> = You have fired your attomey but are having problems gett1ng your file back fi·om ~ 5; the attorney. · ~0 .......... c:n ~... ,....., ~~ = ~ You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program i ~

' (CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900.

C!\..AP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of issues with attomeys quickly, without the filing of a fonnal grievance.

CAAP can resolve many problems without a g1ievance being filed by providmg information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by contacting the attomey either by telephone or letter.

I have not ___ contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program.

II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOU -- PLEASE KEEP CURRE}'I'T @ 1. TDCJ/SID # - - - ' 'rJ /;c., -"--------- t'v1s. Name:

Address: -----------------------------------------------------

City: -~---------------- State: _ _ Zip Code: _______

Employer and address _____!_!NL.'_citc.::1~--------------------------------------------

3. Telephone number: Residence _ _ _ _ _ __ Work: __N~'/.:_;__I>:.c___ _ __

0709 Other: ____________________

4. Drivers L1cense # Date of Birih ----------------- 5. N:.1me, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you.

Name --"'-----------~--------------- Address .

I' Telephone _____________________~---

6. Do you understand and write in the English language? -------~-"·-<.£_ _,_·-____________ If no, what is your pnrnary language? _______ Wl1o helped you prepare ibis fonn? __L.:_"~·---'---":>'--v--'--'-'--'-/~_... _______________________ Vi'ill they be available to translate future conespondence during this process? )1.1/77

7. Are you a member of the judiciary? ____::_N_!L_~v_-___________ If yes, please provide Comi, Com1ty, City, State:

III. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY

Note: Grievances are not accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the attomey against whom you are complaining. A separate gnevance fonn must be completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining.

State: -~ y_- ,, ,.

Telephone number: Work L/D'i -7~5 --CJir/... Home _______________

3_ Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attomey previously? Yes_ No v If "yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. /V/4

4 Please check one of the following: / This attorney \vas hired to represent me. Th1s attorney was appointed to represent me. This attomey was hired to represent someone else.

Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed and what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. 3 t'J c 7 #-z oo F

0709 2 5. What was your fee arrangement with the attomey? -+·._,__>:......• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you signed a contract and have a ~' please attach. If you have~ of checks and/or receipts, please attach. Do not send originals.

6. If you did not hire the attorney, what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly ·-:t h :""-<. ~ /.rl-!o rz. N"' · ·

'"7 I. Are you cmTently represented by an attorney? ~-L.,tl/,..!:....:t.J=-·------- lf yes, please provide information about your cuuent attomey: _ _LN"'--"-f~"'l'----------

8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment such as depression or a substance use disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations of the attomey such as sluned speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and location).

9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that ·would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment such as depression or a substance use disorder? If so, please provide details.

IV. INFORMATION ABO liT YOUR GRIEVANCE

1. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur?

City: /~ ,.4 l VI? do rJ

2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the followmg, if known:

a. Name of court --~------------------------------

0709 3 b Title of the suit £4 c/c; i ,'). >(..Jl:,..,_?.....:.:·'.N=--·;:..:d_.'....:.'....:.'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

c Case number and date suit was filed --------------------- d. If you are not a party to this suit, wl1at is your connection with it? Explain briefly. r.J/.;

U you have~ of court documents, please attach.

3. Explain in detail why you think this attomc:y bas done something improper or has failed to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if necessaty.

If you have~ of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance, please attach. Do not send originals.

Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who know something about your grievance.

Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance will be forwarded to the at'tomey named in yom· grievance.

0709 4 V. HOW DID YOU LEAR.N ABOlJT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTOR.N"EY GRIEVANCE PROCESS?

Yellow Pages Internet / Other

VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER

I hereby expressly v,:a1ve any attomey-client p1ivilege as to the attomey, the subject of this grievcmc.e, and authorize such attorney to reYeal any inforrnation in the professional relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Cmmsel of the State Bar of Texas.

I understand that the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel mamtains as confidential the processing of Grievances. 1 / i 1 .

Signature: ) ~frv-JJV1,.. hJ< \/-., v r Vi......L-0"-\_ D ate: "';'•!·J/ ,.... I/ ""-'lY"'/. ,- . '

TO ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTION, THE GRJ.EVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:

THE OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL P.O. Box 13287 Austin, Texas 78711

0709 5 ·~- ......·~-t"!,,' -~- •••.,.... . . :,.,., ......... . · - 1 . ! .' ) ..

A GRIFFIN LA WYERS

October 3, 2008 Gah'eston Island Gah'esron. Texas 17550

Cea.c::.,_r Vereen 'I

RE: CONTRAcT OF EMPLOYMENT Mr. Vereen:

Please find enclosed the contract of emploYment. Please retain the original for reoords. ~ur

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers llls Moody Galveston, Texas 77sso 409-763- 0386 l.8oo.7so.soJ4 APG; Facsimile No_ 409.763.4102 files

c =worrJ. ve reen. Ceasar. client. t J.

CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

INC., hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act

as laWyers for the undersigned, CEASAR VEREEN, hereinafter and

sometimes referred to as CLIENT(S), relative to all matters

concerning the denial of bonding .license (discrimination;

section 1981 cause of action).

2. To advise you as to the viability of same.

3. To work with you with respect to your case including

official, board, department, administrative body or to

file suit and in any Court (Federal or State), if

necessary and if warranted. Retainer/What is it?/What does It Mean?/What It Isn't?

1. In consideration of the services rendered and to be

rendered to client by the said law firm, the client

agrees to pay $10,000.00 (normal retainer $10,000.00 -

$25,000.00) as a retainer fee.

LAWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC., LAWYERS. As stated

attorneys' fees are structured consistent with the

history of the Civil Rights Act and the recognized

concept of the private Attorney General. The retainer

is also based on the consideration for this office not

taking other cases, the reality that there is a

scarcity of civil rights lawyers in Texas generally and

in the Gulf Coast area in particular, and the

reputation of the firm.

attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein).

Lawyers may be entitled for services performed pursuant

to an award of the Court or settlement. Attorney Fee Determination

1. The attorney has the right to petition the Court, in

the event the plaintiff prevails in this litigation,

for reasonable attorneys' fees, consistent with the

Civil Rights Act. Any such fees awarded by the Court

shall not be paid by the client or out of the client=s

portion. The paragraph contemplates the attorney

petitioning the Court for additional fees. This does

not take place unless you are the prevailing party in

the litigation.

2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate

lawyers, and other factors defined by the relative

case law and the civil rights industry/arena/practice.

3. As explained orally, oft-times the corporation and/or

defense counsel(s) will seek to pit the lawyer against

the client and/or vice versa. In this regard, please

note: The lawyers are entitled to forty percent (40%)

of any and all recovery obtained on behalf of the

client (gross recovery) which may be obtained by virtue of compromise settlement/trial/verdict.

4. This provision allowing a contingent basis for

recovery of attorneys' fees does not prevent the

attorney from applying for the collecting attorney

fees under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act (see

paragraph 3 above) . Any fee awarded by the Court

shall be applied dollar for dollar to offset the

contingent fee set out above (by way of example - if

the client recovers $100.00, the attorney fee award

shall derive •off the top" of the $100.00 and forty

percent (40%) shall be deducted leaving the client a

recovery of $60.00). If on application for reasonable

attorney fees the Court awards $35.00 in lawyer fees,

the client=s obligation shall be $5.00 (a dollar for

dollar application) .

5. In the event the reasonable attorney fee award exceeds

the contingent fee award, there shall be no deduction

of fees from the Client's portion and the fee award

will be the attorney's sole recovery of fees. No

excess over the contingent fee amount shall be applied

to the Client's recovery.

6. In the event the contingent fee award exceeds the

award by the Court, the Lawyers are awarded the

greater of the two sums. Cost - We Will Front Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise. How Do We Get Our Money Back?

Cost associated with this litigation shall be deducted from

the client's portion. By way of example -

If recovery is $100.00 (by compromise settlement)

and

- Attorney fees deducted at 40% = $60.00

- Then costs would be deducted from the client's

balance. Therefore,

If costs associated with the suit was $10.00, then

the client's recovery would be $60.00 minus $10.00 ~

$50.00.

The same type of deduction of costs takes place under

circumstances where contingent fees do not apply.

results of this litigation. Withdrawal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract

explained orally that the Lawyers= obligation to the

refundable.

client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how

such breach affects the Lawyer=s ability to proceed ln the representation. If termination is appropriate, the

Lawyer(s) shall advise the client of his/her/their

rights and shall promptly take any necessary acts to

protect the Client (advise as to action) and the firm=s

rights. Again, the retainer shall be deemed non-

when and where suits shall be filed. Again, Lawyers retain the

discretion whether to obligate the office in the appeal process.

No compromise or settlement of Client=s claims will be made

without the consent of both Client and Lawyers.

instruments, pleadings, drafts, authorizations and papers that

reduce to possession any and all monles or other things of value

due to Client under this claim as fully as Client coula so do in

person. Keeping the Client Informed

All sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston

County, Texas.

to on this the ____ day of

2008.

CEASAR VEREEN

~ ~n this the ____ day of

1 00 .

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 MOODY GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102 EMAIL: agri ffin@agri ffi nla•JyYers. com

c:word.vereen.ceasar.contract.employrnent From: Vereen, Ceasar W.

Dear Anthony P. Griffin {Attorney},

I Ceasar W. Vereen regret to alert you under these circumstances in regards to my civil rights case. On or around the 21 September 2008 I enlisted your services in regards to. an unfair act committed against me whenever I inquired about acquiring a bail bonds license. The following events led to this notification:

1. Before we even spoke on the fees of your services, I presented my case to you in which at that time you assured me we had a valid case. I gave you all required documents and credentials regarding this case. Once that was done we agreed on your cost of $10,000.00 to begin the process of alleviating this matter.

2. Mr. Griffin, It has been 26 months and no progression has been made on this case. You fail to notify me of our standings in resolving this matter. I have contacted your office over 21 different occasions on contacting you to speak on this case.

3. l have even spoken with you and your secretaries as well and have constantly received rescheduled appointments in which your party failed to comply with. I as one of your customers feel that your services are not sufficient considering the seriousness of this matter.

4. Lastly, on 18 November 2010, I called your office and your secretary put me on hold. She went to consult with you in which she returned and told me to call you at one o' clock. I called at one and you, yourself told me to call you back at five o' clock. I complied with that and then at that time, you then told me that you were leaving for the day and to call you Monday. That same Monday I called you back and you told me to call you at seven o'clock. It greatly upsets me of the level of professionalism portrayed on behalf of this case; therefore I feel, it is best for you to refund my $10,000.00 fee. I expect a reply at least within the next ten working days.

Thank~ Signe Ceasa W. e A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

Galve.rton Island Galveston, Texas 77550

August 13, 2008

RE: THANK YOU

Mr. Vereen:

Thank you for visiting with our firm on August 11, 1 2008. Good luck in obtaining your retainer. 2 Thank you for considering our firm.

1 We would be required to show either the Board improperly and arbitrarily denied the permit after granting same (thus bringing the suit under state law/arbitrary act) and/or by bringing suit under federal 2 law (racial discrimination in violation of federal law). The retainer is $10,000.00 and is deemed earned upon payment. The retainer would be non-refundable. In context of additional attorneys, no such attorneys' fees would be due and owing unless we are the prevailing party and would be on contingent basis. Any costs associated with the litigation will be incurred by the firm and will not be reimbursed unle.ss we are the prevailing party and/or the case settles. A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Moody Galveston, Texas 77550 409_763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

c:word.rnisce127.vereen.ceasar.interviewedbutnotretained Bennie M. Ramirez Client-Attorney Assistance Program Program Director 1-800-932-1900 February I, 2011

Mr. Ceasar W. Vereen

RE: Mr. Anthony P. Griffin, Attorney at Law Record: #482965

Dear Mr. Vereen,

On December 28, 20 l 0 you contacted our oft'ice regarding your concerns about the communication between you and Mr. Anthony P. Griffin, Attorney-at-law. Unfortunately, since then you have indicated that the issues which you had contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance (CAAP), remained unresolved to -your satisfaction. Furthermore, you have decided to file a grievance against Mr. Griffin.

Enclosed, please find the State Bar of Texas' grievance form that you requested. If you should have any questions regarding the status of your grievance after it has been filed, please contact the State Bar ofTexas Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's by dialing 877-953-5535.

This letter also serves to advise you that CAAP will now be closing our file on this matter. The CAAP staff is pleased to have been able to provide you with some assistance and do hope you reach a satisfactory conclusion.

If CAAP services are not longer needed, please take a few minutes to fill out the enclosed postage-paid survey. Your response will be appreciated.

l f you have any additional questions, please don't hesitate to contact me at J -800-204-2222, ext. 1768. .

:~:~~ Program Assoc1ate

Enclosure i I

P.O. Box 12487, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 Grievance JnfornJatiou Holline: 1-800-932-1900 CAAP Fax: 512-427-4122 CAAP E-mail: c:J~I!@k~l~PMr·.\'!'111 Ii I STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Bennie !Vl. Ramirez Clie1it-Atlorney Assistance Progn1m Program Director 1-800-932-1900

.January 13,201 l

~'lr. Anthony P. Griffin Attorney at Law 111 5 21" St. . Galveston, TX 77550-4624

RE: ,r-.1r. Ceasar W. Vereen Record: #482965

Dear Mr Griffin:

Mr. Ceasar W. Vereen again contacted the Client-Attorney Assistanee Program (CAAP) requesting

Afr. Ceasar W Vereen 192 CR 698 B Angleton, J:.'( 77515 (979) 549-0000

lf I can be of any assistance to you, please contact me at (800) 204-2222, ext. I 777.

BMR/ng

Cc: fv1r. Ceasar W. Vereen

P.O. Box 12-!87, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 Grievance Information Hotline: 1-800-932-1900 CAAP Fax: 512-427-4122 CA.-\P E-mail: caapji'iitcxasbar.com STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Bennie l\1. Ramirez Client-Attorney Assistance l'n>gram Program Director 1-800-')32-1 900

December 29, 2010

[Vlr. Ceasar W. Vereen

Dear Mr. Vereen:

Thank you for contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) for assistance in resolving a problem you are experiencing with your attorney. CAAP is a statewide dispute resolution progrnm of the State Bar of Texas. lts objective is to assist the public in resolving concerns, disputes, or misunderstandings with Texas lawyers and to facilitate and improve communications betv.-'een clie!lts and their lawyers.

The attorney gnevance process extsts to address lavv·yer misconduct or unethical behavior according to the Texas Disctp!Jnary Rules of Professional Conduct.

The enclosed Jetter was mailed to Mr. Griffin. This is a formal but friendly effort intended to facilitate communications and to prompt an effective and positive solution.

Please allow a reasonable time for Mr. Griffin to respond to our letter. However, should you not hear from him, please contact me at 1-800-204-2222, ext. 1768 to discuss other options that may bring about resolution. If! do not hear from you in thirty (30) days, I will assume matters have been resolved and close your file.

Yours truly,

Program Associate

Enclosure

P.O. Box 12487, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 787ll-24S7 Grievance Information Hotline: 1-800-932-1900 CAAP Fax: 512-427-41.22 CAAP E-mail: c:lap@texasbar.co)!! From: Vereen, Ceasar W.

I Ceasar W. Vereen regret to alert you under these circumstances in regards to my civil rights case. On or around the 21 September 2008 I enlisted your services in regards to an unfair act committed against me whenever I inquired about acquiring a bail bonds license. The following events led to this notification:

1. Before we even spoke on the fees of your services, I presented my case to you in which at that time you assured me we had a valid case. I gave you all required documents and credentials regarding this case. Once that was done we agreed on your cost of $10,000.00 to begin the process of alleviating this matter.

. 2. Mr. Griffin, It has been 26 months and no progression has been made on this case. You fail to notify me of our standings in resolving this matter. I have contacted your office over 21 different occasions on contaCting you to speak on- this case.

3. I have even spoken with you and your secretaries as well and have constantly received rescheduled appointments in which your party failed to comply with. I as one of your customers feel t_hat your services are not sufficient considering the seriousness of this matter.

4. Lastly, on 18 November 201 0, I called your office and your secretary put me on hold. She went to consult with you in which she returned and told me to call you at one o' clock. I called at one and you, yourself told me to call you back at five o' clock. I complied with that and then at that time, you then told me that you were leaving for the day and to call you Monday. That same Monday I called you back and you told me to call you at seven o'clock. It greatly upsets me of the level of professionalism portrayed on behalf of this case; therefore I feel, it is best for you to refund my $10,000.00 fee. I expect a reply at least within the next ten working days.

Thank~Y Signe Ceasa W. e --"--

Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550

Ceasar VerPAr.

1Thank you for visiting with our firm on August 11, 2008. Good luck in obtaining your retainer. 2 Thank you for considering our firm.

Sincerely/

Griffin

We would be required to show either the Board improperly and arbitrarily denied the permit after granting same (thus bringing the suit under state law/arbitrary act) and/or by bringing suit under 2federal law (racial discrimination in violation of federal law) .

The retainer is $10,000.00 and is deemed earned upon payment. The retainer would be non-refundable. In context of additional attorneys, no such attorneys' fees would be due and owing unless we are the prevailing party and would be on contingent basis. Any costs associated with the. litigation will be incurred by the firm and will not be reimbursed unless we are the prevailing party and/or the case settles. A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Moody Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

c:word.miscel27.vereen.ceasar.interviewedbutnotretained NOTICE OF CLIENTS

The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys.

Although not every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer involves professional misconduct, the State Bar Office of General Counsel will provide you with information about how to file a complaint.

For more information, please call 1.800.932.1900. This is a toll-free phone call. BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5B GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, H0021132504 PETITIONER, [CEASAR W. VEREEN]

v. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, RESPONDENT.

RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER

TO THE HONORABLE ~JIDENTIARY PlL~L:

Respondent, Jl...nthony P. Griffin, submits this his original

answer to the Original Evidentiary Petition and would answer as

Response to Factual Allegations

1. Respondent admits that Complainant paid a retainer of

ten thousand dollars ($10, 000. 00) a..11.d would assert that

the retainer was non-refQT1.dable:

2. Respondent would admit that the Complainant called the

office on a number of occasions and left messages with

staff. Respondent denied that he did not make attempts

to contact the client and call the Complainant.

Respondent also denied that he didn't have time to talk

with the Complainant/Client and that he answered the

client's questions.

3. Respondent denies not working on the

Cowplainant's/Client's file and denies that the only

action taken was the making of an open records request. 4. Respondent denied paragraph B in that relationship was

terminated prior to the letter from the client.

Response to Rule Violations

5. Respondent denies neglecting the client's matters and

violating Rule ~Ol(b) (l). Respondent will admit to not

working at his usual efficiency and such state had

existed during the restructuring related to the

h1.1.rricane.

6. Respondent denies keeping the client informed, denied

comply with respect and any violation of 1.03(a).

7. Respondent denies taking steps to protect the client's

interest and any violation of Rule l.lS(d). The time

line associated with the facts prevent a violation of

1.15 (d) and is inconsistent >'lith the oral request of

the client.

8. It is prayed that the relief requested be denied in all

parts.

DATE: August 29, 2011.

ANTHO~i P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWY~~S 11J.5 TWENTY FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102

STATE BAR NO. 08455300 CERTIFI~~TE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this the 30th day of August,

20ll, a true and correct copy of Respondent's Original Answer

was forwarded to opposing counsel by facsimile transmission and

regular mail, to-wit:

Sa~ON BREAUX SAUCEDA ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL 600 JEFFERSON, SUITE lOOO HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002

--

c, word. grei vancef i l.e_ [ varr;!en_ ceasar] _original_ ans>~er STATE BAR OF TE-XAS

July 31,2012 RECEIVED AUG - 2 201Z DISTR1C SB EVIDENTIARY PANEL Lindsa Glover, Chair Tim Beeton Mere th J. Duncan Kelly M. Haas Je William B. Harvey

RE: NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING Case No. H0021132504 [Ceasar Vereen], Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Anthony P. Griffin, Before the Evidentiary Panel of the State Bar District 5B Grievance Committee

Dear Panel Members:

Attached please find Petitioner's Original Evidentiary Petition, Respondent's Original Answer, and the Notice ofEvidentiary Hearing (08/13/12) for the hearing scheduled on Monday, August 1 13, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., at the Galveston County Justice Center, 600 59 h, 2nd Floor, Room 2100, Galveston, Texas 77551.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. If you will not be able to attend the hearing, please contact Rosie Solis, Docket Coordinator, as soon as possible.

Shannon Breaux Sauceda

,, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel

SBS/sml Endosures

Anthony P. Griffm 1115 21 51 Street Galveston, Texas 77550 Via Certified Mail No. 7005 2570 0000 1445 3047~ Return Receipt Requested

g:\gencral\gri !lin .a_sbs\504 _ vereen\correspondence\08!312_hearing_packets_panel_respondenl 073 l 12. do ex

600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292 ~ .~

BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5B GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § H0021132504 [CEASAR W. VEREEN] § Petitioner, § § v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, ~ RECEIVED ,C..UG - 2 lOl2.- FILED § Respondent. § AUG D9 2011 ORIGINAL EVIDENTIARY PETITION STATE BAR OF TEXAS HOUST~OC /1 COMES NOW Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, V ~

committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, and would respectfully show unto the Evidentiary Panel

as follows:

I. PARTIES

Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (hereinafter referred to

CJS "Petitioner"), a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

Respondent is ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"),

Texas Bar Card No. 08455300, a licensed attorney and a member of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING

Petitioner brings this disciplinary proceeding pursuant to the STATE BAR AcT, TEXAS

GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 2003); the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. The

Complaint that fom1s the basis of this cause of action was filed on or after January 1, 2004. /

III. VENUE

Respondent's principal place of practice is Galveston County, Texas; therefore, venue is

appropriate in Galveston County, Texas, pursuant to Rule 2.11B of the TEXAS RULES OF

·DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent may be served at 1115 21st Street, Galveston, Texas

77550, or any place he may be found.

IV. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

The acts and omissions of Respondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professional

misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06Vofthe TEXAS RULES OFDISCIPLlNARY PROCEDURE.

V. CAUSE OF ACTION

I. On or about October 3, 2008, CEASAR W. VEREEN (hereinafter referred to as

"VEREEN") hired Respondent for representation in a discrimination claim associated

with the revocation and/or denial of VEREEN'S bail bonding license.

2. VEREEN paid Respondent Ten Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($1 0,000.00) for the

representation.

3. During the course of the representation, VEREEN made numerous attempts to contact

Respondent to ascertain the status of the case.

4. Upon calling Respondent's office, VEREEN was usually informed that Respondent

would have to answer his questions; but that Respondent was not available at that time.

5. Respondent did not return VEREEN'S calls.

6. On a few occasions VEREEN reached Respondent directly and during these brief calls,

Respondent indicated that he did not have time to speak and told VEREEN to call back.

7. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to take any action to pursue VEREEN'S case, other than

.to make an open records request.

Originnl Evidenrimy PelitiOIIIAnthony P. Griffin Page 2 ( ·,:IGENERALiGR IFFlN.A_SBS\504 _ Vereen\PLEADINGS\EP_COD _RFD.docx ; ) . '

8. By letter dated December 2, 2010, VEREEN effectively terminated the representation

and requested a refund of his fees; however, Respondent failed to return any unearned

fees.

VI. RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omissions of Respondent described above constitute conduct in violation

of the following Rules of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:

• l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter;

• 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

• l.lS(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned.

The Complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of

the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS by CEASAR W.

VEREEN'S filing of a grievance on or about February 18, 2011.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR

LAWYER DISCIPLINE, respectfully prays that this Evidentiary Panel discipline Respondent,

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as the f.acts shall warrant;

order restitution to Complainant, if applicable; and grant all other relief, general or specific, at

law or in equity, to which Petitioner may show itself to be justly entitled including, without

limitation, costs and attorneys' fees.

Original E••ir!emimJ' Pernion!Anthony P. Grinin Page 3 l i:'tiENER.AL'.GRlFFlN.A_SBS\504_ Vereen\PLEADINGS\EP_COD_RFD.docx Respectfully submitted,

STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

LINDA A. ACEVKPO Chief Discip 1· ·· ounsel

s Assistant Disciplinary Counsel State Bar No. 24002896 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Fax: (713) 758-8292

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August Cj, 2011, a true and correct copy of the Original Evidentiary Petition was delivered to the ~wing: Via Certified Mail No. 7004 0750 0000 6728 4477

Anthony P. Griffin 1115 21st Street / Galveston, Texas 77550 /

£J.< s /

Page 4 Origin<1/ E1·ide111iary Petition/Anthony P Griffin G:\GEN ERALIGRJFFJN.A_S BS\504_Vereen\PLEADlNGS\EP _COD _RFD.docx A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 April 26, 2011

Jai L. Jones Assistant D~sciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002

P.E: H002ll3250-1 CEASAR WILLIAM VEREEN - ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN

{P~SPONSE TO GRIEVP~CE ~IT APOLOGY)

Ms. Jones:

Please acc~flt tl~1is letter as rr~y· response to tb.e g-rievance. !'1y apology for the delay in transmitting; the response wa.s due in part to my being in trial during the relevant period. In addition, in context of the above, I spoke with the State Bar Investigator on Good Friday and informed him that I i-.rould this response done post haste. My trial in Dallas scheduled for Wednesday has just been non-suited and thus my ability to complete this response. J>,gain, r.he Bar's consideration of t.his delay in responding would be appreciated. In context of Mr. Vereen's case, I am attaching a copy of my file with this submission. The file materials are under Attachment Ai my notes as attached under .t>Lttachrnent B; materials reviewed and tendered by the client are attached under at.tachment C. I'4:r. Vareen hired our firm on or about October 3, 2008. We v.rere hired to explore whet.her Mr. vareen had a claim of discrimination associated with the revocation and/or denial of his bail bonding license. It was the client's position that he had done all things required by the County of Brazoria to allow him to obtain his bonding license. In fact the record reveals that lVJ.r. Vareen v-1as granted a license (see J>,ger,da records for 3uly 3, 2008) , but the license was ul.t imat.;:;ol y· :cescinde,::t by ·the Ba.il Bond Board. I have no reco:cd c. E. the client contacting our firm tv-1enty one times during our period of representation, I re.r:1ernber t-hat t"he.re was an extended pe!:iod of time bet\,.ree:n our hiring and :r-tr:·. Vereen's next contact. with our firm. He preceded his termination of our firm with two phone calls (one E!Xplaining that his ·long period of non-contacti approximat.ely one year) ; the other seeking an update of my reviei•J of t.he :~:·ecords (I requested that he come in for an interview to e)..--plain the pro's and con's of the litigation. I explained that I needed have all the information at present (we 'i'JeJ~e st:Lll within r.:.he statutory period), but would have the :l.r,fonnat ion -vir.cen he caine in for an appointment. t'Ir. Vereen also expressed his lack of desire not proceed. His 1etter reque;;ting a f:ull refund is reflective of this position. The next request was through the bar for a fee refLmd. Mr. Vereen signed a non-refundable retainer contract. The time expended Ciri his case was approximately twenty five (25) hours, If you desire a time and accou...Tlting record I can provide t.he same. t"'ly billable rate in cases such as this is $350.00 an hour. In context of resolution of the money issue, vJe '~JiLl refund ~E},g_Q_Cl__~-(~_g on or before June 1,

I haoo:Je r1crt !';:r.. e.ac~i.l-:..:;ci. by,.. relationship ~.rith ttte cli7.-rlt:.r Because of int:e:cvening cir::::umstances, a lawsuit was not filed but the non- filing· 1111ere not. the fault of this firm. Thank you for your attention to same.

Sincere).¥; ~_/ - . ;, // / / ~- / ~---- "- '·~---- ~ Anthony P. Griffi'IT, A Griffin I ..awvers ~' - '-.. lJ.15 Twent.y First Street Galvest.on, Texas 77550""' '· 409.763.0386 ' 1.800.750.5034 ' Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

APG/. files license (see ?.geLda records for ,July 3,. 2008), but th·.:: licer1se was ultirna.tel.)r :cescir1ded. t>)l the Ba.il Bc)n.d Board. I have no rec;.~·rd 0f the cJ.:lent contacting our fi:t'm tvJenty one i::imes during our period of representatic·n. I remember that there was an extended period of time bet'i•teen our hiring and }1r. Vereen's 1-:ext contact with our firm. He preceded his termination of our fiL~ with two phone calls (one explaining that his.long period of non-contact; approximately one year) ; t.h€: other seeking an update of my revie1...- of t.he record.s (I requ.ested that he come in for an interview to explain the p:n.)'S and con's of the litigation. I explained that I need..3d have all the infm."1nat.ion at present (we we1~e still within c:he st.atutory period), but would hav.e the info:cmat ion when he came in for cUl. appointment. lV.i:r. Vereen a.lso expressed his lack of desire not proceed. His Jetter reqv.esting a full refund is reflective of this position. The next request was through the bar for a fee refund. Mr. Vereen signed a non-refundable retainer contract. The time expended on his case was approximately twenty five (25) hours. If you desire a. time and accounting record I can provide t.he same, !Jly billable rate in cases such as this iB $350.00 an hour. In context of resolution of the money issue, 'iile wiLl refund ~?t_QQ_Q_-_c~g on or before June 1,

I ll.a:\.re not. b!~e.ache.cl b}'" rc:l2:.::ionshi_p v~rit.h ttu:; client:~ Because of intJ2~l.-vening cir:::·umstances, a lawsuit was not filed but the non-filing were not the fault of this firm. Thank you for your attention to same.

Bin·:en~].y;.

/~ ./'- L·---~-----.// "" "-., Anthony P. Griffii'h, J._ Griffin Law-yers ',,"-.. ll.l5 T·v.1ent:y First Street '\. Gal·v·est.(::.n, Texas 77550 ·,·,. 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

APG/ files xc: Ceasar Vereen l92 Cou...Tlty Road 69BB .P-..r1gleton ~ ~re;:eaEJ 7rl515

Interoffice - Rita Westerman (please note docket) BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. SB GRIEVANCE COMMITI'EE

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § 80021132504 [CEASAR W. VEREEN] § Petitioner, § § v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS § ANmONY P. GRIFFIN, § § Respondent. §

JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Parties and Appearance

On AugUst 13, 20 12, came to be heard the above-styled and numbeted cause. Petitioner, the

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, appeared by and through its attorney of record,

Shannon Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and announced ready. Respondent,

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent''), Texas Bar Number08455300,

appeared in person and through attorney of record, Norma Venso, and announced ready.

Jurisdiction and Venue

The Evidentiary Panel SB having been duly appointed to hear this complaint by the chair of

the: Grievance Committee for STAiE BAR OF TEXAS District 5, finds that it has jurisdiction over the

parties and the subject matter of this action and that venue is proper.

Professional Misconduct

The Evidentiary Panel, having considered all of the pleadii:J.gs, evidence, stipuhitions, and

argument, finds Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of

the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

Judgment of Ppblls Reori.mwnd Pqe tor4 Findings of Fact

The Evidentiary Panel, having considered the pleadings, evidence aqd argument of counsel,

makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. Respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas and is a member of THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

2. Respondent resides in and maintains his principal place ofpractice in Galveston County, Texas.

3. On or about October 3, 2008, Ceasar Vereen (hereinafter referred to as "Vereen") hired Respondent for representation in a discrimination claim associated with the revocation and/or denial of his bail bonding license. Vereen paid Respondent Ten Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($1 0,000.00) for the represem.tion.

4. During the course of the representation, Vereen madenumerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of the case, but was usually informed that Respondent was not available at that time. Respondent did not return Vereen's calls. On a few occasions Vereen reached Respondent directly and during_these brief calls, Respondent indicated that he did not have time to speak and told Vereen to call back..

5. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to take any action to pursue Vereen's case, other than to make an open records request

6. By letter dated December 2, 20 I0, Vereen effectively terminated the representation and requested a refund of his fees; however, Respondent failed to return any unearned. fees.

7. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS has incurred reasonable attorneys' fees and direct expenses associated with this Disciplinaiy Proceeding in the amount ofThree Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Nine and 48/100 Dollars ($3,979.48)

8. Respondent owes restitution in the amount of Nine Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($9,000.00) payable to Ceasar Vereen.

Conclusions of Law

The Evidentiary Panel concludes that, based on foregoing findings of fact, the following

TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf have been violated: l.Ol(b)(l) [in

representing a cl.ient, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter]; 1.03{a) [a lawyer shall keep a client

reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for

CFI.-13 Judgment of Publjs Beprimand P~t~:elof4 information}; and 1.15(d) [upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent

reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client.

allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client

is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that bas not been earned].

Sanction

The Evidentiary Panel, having found Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct,

heard and considered additional evidence regarding th~ appropriate sanction to.be imposed against

Respondent After hearing all evidence and argument and after having considered the factors in Rule

2.18 of the TEXAS RULE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, the Evidentiary Panel finds that the proper

discipline of the Respondent for each act of Professional Misconduct is a Public Reprimand.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that a Public Reprimand be

imposed against Respondent in accor(jace with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE..

The Evidentiary Panel finds that the sanction imposed against Respondent is the appropriate sanction

for each of the violations set forth in this Judgment.

Restitution, Attorneys' Fees and Expenses

It is further 0 RDERED Respandent shall pay restitution on or before September 14, 2012, to

Cell:lar Vereen in the amount ofNine Thousand and No/ I 00 Dollars ($9,000.00). Respondent shall

pay the restitution by certified or cashier' s.check or money order made payable to Ceasar Vereen and

delivered to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDiscipliruuyCounsel's Office, P.O. Box.l2487, Austin.

Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701).

It is further ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees

and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of Three Thousand Nine Hundred

Seventy-Nine and 48/l 00 Dollars ($3,979.48). The payment shall be due and payable on or before

Cf6·13 Judgment or Public RePrimand PllfleJ of4 ..

September 14, 2012, and shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent

shall forward the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAs, to the Chief Disciplinmy

Counsel's Office. P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St, Austin, Texas

78701).

It is further ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct of

Respondent, are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y) of the TExAs

RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the maximum

legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF TEXAS shall have all writs and other post-

j udgrnent remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amowtts.

Publication

This reprimand shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance

with the TEXAS RULES OF DISC!PLINAR V PROCEDURE.

Other Relief

All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED.

SIGNED this ~day of~uat. '2012.

EVIDENTIARY PANEL DISTRICT NO. SB STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Judgment of Public Re.primand Pqe4of4 TABlO STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Office of the ChiefDisciplinalJ' Counsel RECEIVED MAR I 0 ~e~@ March 19, 2012

Via Certified Mail No. 7004 1350 0002 6835 5366, Return Receipt Requested

Anthony P. Griffin 1115 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624

RE: Case No. H0111134143 Kristina Guzman- Anthony P. Griffin

Dear Mr. Griffin:

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has completed its investigation of the above-referenced Complaint and determined on March 6, 2012, that there is Just Cause to believe that you have committed· one or more acts of Professional Misconduct, as defined by the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE (TRDP).

In accordance with TRDP 2.14D, a statement of your acts and/or omissions and the TEXAS DlSCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel contends are violated by the alleged acts and/or omissions follows:

On or about May 12, 2010, Kristina Guzman (hereinafter referred to as "Complainant") hired Anthony P. Griffin (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") for representation in an employment retaliation matter. Respondent's tee was Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). Complainant paid Respondent a total amount of Four Thousand One Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($4,100.00), with an agreement to pay the remaining balance in installments. Respondent and Complainant did not execute an employment contract.

Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on Complainant's part except for preparing a rough draft of the petition in or around April20 11.

During the course of the representation, Complainant made numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to communicate with Complainant.· ·

g.\general\griffin.a_ sbs\143_guzman\correspondence\election letter.docx

600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 EXHIBIT Phone: (713) 758:-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292 l :b-Ji STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Anthony P. Griffin March 19, 2012 RE: Case No. Hllll-34143 Page2

On or about July 11, 2011, Complainant left a message for Respondent notifying him that she might be moving out of state and therefore, was requesting a refund of unearned fees. Minutes later, Respondent finally responded that he would not refund her money, but would look at her file and call her back. Respondent failed to call Complainant as promised. As such, on or about August 24, 2011, Complainant sent Respondent a letter whereby she terminated Respondent's representation and requested a detailed invoice of the services he provided, as well as the return of her client file. Respondent failed to provide Complainant with an accounting and further failed to return her client file.

These alleged acts violate the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:

l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;

1.04(a) a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable fee;

1.04(d) a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined;

1.14(b) upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property upon request; and

l.lS(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned.

Pursuant to TRDP 2.15, you must notify this office whether you elect to have the Complaint heard by an Evidentiary Panel of the District Grievance Committee or in a district court of proper venue, with or without a jury. The election must be in writing and served upon the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office no later than twenty (20) days after your receipt of this

g:\general\griffin. a_sbs\ !43_guWJan\correspondence\election Jetter .docx STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary CoullSel

Anthony P. Griffin March 19,2012 RE: Case No. H111134143 Page 3

notice. Failure to file a timely election shall conclusively be deemed an affirmative election to proceed before an Evidentiary Panel in accordance with TRDP 2.17 and 2.18.

Enclosed is a form in which to indicate your election and principal place of practice. It should be mailed to the undersigned at the address shown at the bottom of this letter. In making your election, you should be aware than an Evidentiary Panel proceeding is confidential unless a public sanction is entered and that a private reprimand is only available before an Evidentiary Panel. District court proceedings are public and a private reprimand is not an available sanction.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the undersigned at the phone number listed below.

annon Breaux Sauceda Assistant Disciplinary Counsel

Enclosure: Respondent's Election and Principal Place of Practice Certification

CF8-IB

g:\general\gri ffin. a_sbs\ 14 3___.,ouzman \correspondence\election letter .do ex COMPLAINT AGAINST § § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN § H0111134143 [KRISTINA GUZMAN] § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS §

RESPONDENT'S ELECTION & PRINCIPAL PLACE OF PRACTICE CERTIFICATION

I, Anthony P. Griff"m, hereby elect: (Choose one of the following)

_ _ _ _ District Court

_ _ _ _ Evidentiary Hearing - District Grievance Committee

I, Anthony P. Griffm, hereby certify that:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(Physical Address- no P.O. Box)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _(City), _ _ _ _ _ _ _(County),

Texas, is my principal place of practice.

SIGNED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2012.

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN

**RETURN TillS FORM WITHIN 20 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ELECTION NOTICE**

g:\general\griffin.a_ sbs\143_gu zman\correspondence\election lerter.docx A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

January 27, 2012

Jai Collier Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson{ Suite 1000 Houston/ Texas 77002

RE: H0111134143 - KRISTINA GUZMP~ - ANTHONY PAUL GRIFFIN

(RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCEj

Ms . Collier:

Please find enclosed the hard copy of the above referenced documents. Thank you for.your attention to same.

n hony P. Griffin A. Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile ~o. 409.763.4102

Encls. - Response & Attachments 1 - 4

91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562 fACSIMILE TRANSMISSION AND REGULAR MAIL

xc: Kristina L. Guzman

CER'l'IF'IED MAIL, RRB. NO. 91. 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562

c: wc.rd. grievancefile_ [guzrnan_kristina]_oppcsingco·llllsels_t.ransmi ttal A GRIFFIN LA WYERS

Galveston island Galveston, Texas 77550 January 27, 2012

Jai Collier Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinaly Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000. Houston, Texas 77002

RE: H0111134143 - k'RISTINA GUZMll..N - Al~THONY P. GRIFFIN

(RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCE}

Ms. Collier:

Please accept this letter as our response to the grievance filed by tbe above person. Please note as follows:

" We were hired on May 10, 2010 by Ms. Guzman. The client was referred by Barbara Smith, a former client. 11 We were hired to look at an employment discrimination case and a tortious interference claim. 2 A copy of my file materials are enclosed under herein (attachment 1} . " There is in the file a copy of a letter dated May 10, 2010, confirming the payment of a retainer $5,000.00 and one-third of the recovery. I have searched my computer and have not found that I followed through and provided a contract. of employment, but I am willing to provide

1 The problem with the client's EEOC charge related to her not being an employee of BP. This was axplained to her; she was not capable of bringing an employment discrimination claim against a uon-employer. xc: Kristina Guzman

CERTIFIED MAIL, RP$ NO. 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562

c: word. grievancefil.e_gu:;man_krist:\.J::a. 20~1. 3314. CAUSE NO. 12CV1732

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Petitioner, § § vs. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAs § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, § § Respondent. § lOth JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION

On this day, came to be heard the above-styled and numbered cause. Petitioner, the

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, by and through its attorney of record, Shannon

Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Respondent, ANlliONY P. GRIFFIN

(hereinafter referred to as "Respondent), Texas Bar Number 08455300, by and through his attorney

of record, Norma Venso, announce that an agreement has been reached in the above-styled matter.

On the 18th day of July, 2012, pursuant to Rule 3.02 of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY

PROCEDURE, the SUPREME CoURT OF TEXAS appointed the Honorable Darlene Byrne to preside over

this disciplinary action. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject

matter of this action, and that venue is proper. Both Parties waived their rights to trial by jury.

The Court, hav1ng considered the pleadings and the agreement of the parties, finds that

Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) ofthe TEXAs RuLEs

OF DJsC!PLlNARY PROCEDURE. Respondent has committed professional misconduct as de.fined by

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Pa~te) ort Rule 1.06V of the TExAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE and in violation of Rules 1.03(a) [a

lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status ofa matter and promptly comply with

reasonable requests for information]; 1.04{d) [a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and

shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined]; and 1.15(d) [upon termination of

representation. a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's

interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client. allowing time for employment of other

counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance

payments of fee that has not been earned], of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES Of PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT; Article X, Section 9, of the STATE BAR RULES.

It is AGREED and ORDERED that the sanction of a Probated Suspension shall be imposed

against Respondent in accordance with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with the suspension being fully probated

pursuant to the tenns stated below. The period of probated suspension shall begin on August 30,

2013, and shall end on August 29, 2014.

Terms of Probation

It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that during all periods ofsuspensio~ Respondent

shall be under the following terms and conditions:

1. Respondent shall not violate any term of thls Judgment.

2. Respondent shalt not engage in professional misconduct as defined by Rule l.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Ptge:Z orz 3. Respondent shall not violate any state or ferleral criminal statutes.

4. Respondent shall keep the STATE aAR. OF TEXAs membership department notified of current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone .numbers.

5. Respondent shall comply with Minimum Continuing Legal Education requirements.

6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers Trust Account(IOLTA) requirements.

7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of professional misconduct.

8. Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses as ordered in this Judgment.

9. Respondent shall pay restitution as ordered in this Judgment.

Prob2tion Revocation

Upon determination that Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment, the Chief

Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to all other remedies available, file a motion to revoke

probation with the Court and serve a photocopy of the motio~ on Respondent pursuant to

Tcx.R.Civ.P, 21a. Revocation will not be invoked on the basis of grievance matters pending

against Respondent at the time that this Judgment is executed.

The Court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Court shall determine by

a preponderance of the evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgmenl. If the

Court finds grounds for revocation, the Court shall enter an order revoking probation and imposing

an active suspension upon Respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year

commencing on or after the date of revocation. Respondent shall not be given credit for any term of·

probation served prior to revocation.

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Pagel of .3 It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that any conduct on the part ofRespondent which

serves as the basis for a motion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for

discipline as allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS

RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

Restitution, Attornevs' Fees and Expenses

It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Kristina Guzman

in the amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty and No/1{}0 Dollars ($2,350.00). The

restitution payment shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to

Kristina Guzman. The payment shall be submitted to the ChiefDisciplioary Counsel's Office, P.O.

Box 12487, Austin. Texas 7871 l-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), on or before

March 5, 2013.

It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary

attorneys' fees and direct ex,penses to the STATE BAR Of TEXAS in the amount ofTwo Thousand Five

Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($2,500.00) . The payment or attorneys' fees and direct expenses shall

be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to the STATE BAR OF

TEXAS. The payment shall be submitted to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box

12487,Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), onorbeforeMarch5,

2013.

It is further AGREED and ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the

misconduct ofRespondent and are assessed as o part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y)

of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the

maximum legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF.TEXAS shall have all writs and other

AGREED JUDCMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION .!'ate 4of4 post-judgment remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amoun.ts.

This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance

with the TEXAS RL'LES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk ofthis Court shall forward a certified copy of

the cvrrent Disciplinary Petition on file in this case, along with a copy of this Judgment to the

following: (1) CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, Supreme Court Building, Austin, Texas

78711; (2) The STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, P. 0. Box 12487,

Austin. Texas 7&711; and (3) Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, Norma Venso, 83 0

Apollo SL, Houston, Texas 77058.

IT IS ORDERED that all costs of court incurred in the prosecution ohhis lawsuit shall be

taxed against Respondent, for which the Clerk may have execution if they are not timely paid.

AU'"'""""' relief not oxpress!y gmctod horein1 exp=dy DENIED.

SIGNED this _gQ_ day of Ha' f( '2013. ......

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSlON Page SofS AGREED AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chid Disciplinary Counsel

LINDA A. ACEVEDO

SAUCEDA ~IJ.· ~ N VENSO jl,\lfYJl Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Attorney at Law State Bar No. 24002896 State Bar No. 20545250 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 &30 Apollo Street Houston, Texas 71002 Houston, Texas 77058 Phone: (713) 758-&200 Phone: (409) 789-8661 Fax: (7l3) 758-8292 Fax: {281) 286-9990

ATIORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, AITORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN

State Bar No. 08455300

AGREED JUDGMENT 0 F PROBATED SUSPENSION Page 6 of6 CITATION ~'ROFESS!ONAl Cl\/ll PROCESS. THE STATE OF TEXAS COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE VS. ANTHONY P. Cause No.: 12-CV-1732 GRIFFIN lOth District Court of Galveston County

TO: Anthony P. Griffin,lllS 21st Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any other place he may be found.

GREETINGS: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED. You may employ an attorney.lf you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the Clerk who issued this citation by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days from the date you were served this citation and petition/motion, a default judgment may be taken against you. Said written answer may be filed by mailing same to: District Clerk's Office, 600 59th Street, Suite4001, Galveston, Texas 77551-2388. The case is presently pending before the lOt\District Court of Galveston County sitting in Galveston, Texas, and the; Original Petition- DCA was filed; July 30, 2012. It bears cause number 12-CV-1732 and see the attached petition/motion for named parties to the suit.

Issued and given under my hand and the seal of said court at Galveston, Texas, on this the 30th day of July, 2012.

Issued at the request of: Doryn Danner Glenn, District Clerk Shannon Breaux Sauceda Galveston County, Texas State Bar of Texas Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel By: 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002

SEE AlTACHED FORM NOTE: Status Conference set: 11/01/2012 at 10:00am

OFFICER/AUTHORIZED RETURN Came to hand on the ___ day of _ _ _ _ _ __, 20_ at o'clock_. M. and executed at._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ in __________County,Texas,on the _ _ day of 20_ at ___ o'clock _m, by delivering to in person a true copy of this Citation together with the accompanying _ _ copy(ies} of the ; Original Petition -DCA attached thereto and I endorsed on said copy of the Citation the date of delivery. To certify which I affix my hand officially this the ___ day of - - - - - - - - - ' 20_.

Fee-Serving: _ _ __ Sheriff/Constabie Amount: _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ County, Texas

BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Authorized Person/Deputy Signature

On this day personally appeared known to me to be the person whose signature appears on the foregoing return, personally appeared. After being duly sworn by me, he/she stated that this citation was executed by him/her in the exact manner recited on the return. ·

Sworn to and subscribed before me, on this dayof 20 ------ -------------------------- Notary Public CAUSE NO.

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE,

Petitioner,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PETITION

COMES NOW Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, a

committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, and would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:

I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

Pursuant to Rules 190.1 and 190.3 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Petitioner

intends discovery in this case to be conducted under the Level2 Discovery Control Plan.

II. PARTIES

Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (hereinafter referred to

as "Petitioner"), a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

Respondent is ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"),

Texas Bar Card No. 08455300, a licensed attorney and a member of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

III. NATURE OF PROCEEDING

Petitioner brings this disciplinary action pursuant to the STATE BAR AcT, TEXAS

GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 2003); the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. The

Complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was filed on or after January 1, 2004. IV. VENUE

Respondent's principal place of practice is Galveston County, Texas; therefore, venue is

appropriate in Galveston County, Texas, pursuant to Rule 3.03 of the TEXAS RULES OF

DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent may be served at his business address, 1115 21st

Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any place he may be found.

V. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

The acts and omissions of Respondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professional

misconduct as defmed by Rule 1.06V of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

1. On or about May 12, 2010, KRISTINA GUZMAN (hereinafter referred to as

"GUZMAN") hired Respondent for representation in an employment retaliation matter.

Respondent's fee was Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). GUZMAN paid

Respondent a total amount of Four Thousand One Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($4, 100.00),

with an agreement to pay the remaining balance in installments. Respondent and GUZMAN did

not execute an employment contract.

2. Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on GUZMAN'S part except for

preparing a rough draft of the petition in or around April2011.

3. During the course of the representation, GUZMAN made numerous attempts to

contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to

communicate with GUZMAN.

4. On or about July 11, 2011, GUZMAN left a message for Respondent notifying

him that she might be moving out of state and therefore, was requesting a refund of unearned

fees. Minutes later, Respondent finally responded that he would not refund her money, but

Original Disciplinary Peliliow"Anlhony P. Gnffin Page 2 g:\litdocs\gri ffin .a. p_sbs\ 143 _,ouzman _lit\pleadings\dp.docx would look at her file and call her back. Respondent failed to call GUZMAN as promised. As

such, on or about August 24, 2011, GUZMAN sent Respondent a letter whereby she terminated

Respondent's representation and requested a detailed invoice of the services he provided, as well

as the return of her client file. Respondent failed to provide GUZMAN with an accounting and

further failed to return her client file.

VII. RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omissions of Respondent described above constitute conduct in violation

of the following Rules of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:

l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;

1.04(a) a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable fee;

1.04(d) a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined;

1.14(b) upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property upon request; and

1.15(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned.

The Complaint that forms tl1e basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of

the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS by KRISTINA

GUZMAN'S filing of a grievance on or about November 28, 2011.

Original Disciplinary PetlliDIVAnthony P. Griffin Page 3 g.:\litdocs\griffin. a.p_sbs\ 143 _guzman _I it\pleadings\dp.docx PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR

LAWYER DISCIPLINE, respectfully prays that this Court discipline Respondent, ANTHONY

P. GRIFFIN, by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as the facts shall warrant; order

restitution to Complainant, if applicable; and grant all other relief, general or specific, at law or

in equity, to which Petitioner may show itself to be justly entitled including, without limitation,

expenses, costs of court, and attorneys' fees.

STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Clrief Disciplinary Counsel

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel State Bar No. 24002896 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Fax: (713) 758-8292

Original Disciplinary Pet ilion/Anthony P. Gritlin Page4 g \litdocs\griffin.a.p_sbs\143 _guzman_lit\pleadings\dp.docx THE DISTRICT COURTS OF GALVESTON COUNTY CIVIL CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT The case Information Statement is for administrative purposes only. It shall be filed with the Parties Original Pleadings and shall be served upon all other parties to the action. All Status Conferences will be set for Thursdays following 90 days from the date of filing according to each Courts scheduled times 10m District Court- 10:00 A.M. 212m District Court- 9:00 A.M. 56tll District Court- 9:30 A.M. 405Ut District Court - 9:30 A.M. 122na District Court-9:30A.M. Notice of Status Conference Setting: Please calendar this event Date 11101/2012 set in the lOth District Court

12-CV-1732- lOth District Court

Commission For Lawyer Discipline vs. Anthony P Griffin

Nameofp· 11ng t h"IS t orm nmary_ Attorney fT Name of Opposrng Attorney, if known Attorney Name Attorney Name

Attorney Bar No. Attorney Bar No.

Attorney Address Attorney Address

Attorney Phone No. Attorney Phone No.

Attorney Fax No. Attorney Fax No.

Briefly describe the case, including special characteristics that may warrant extended discovery or accelerated disposition. If discovery LEVEL 3 is requested, explain why. Attach additional sheets, if necessary.

Estimated time for discovery Estimated trial time

Do you presently anticipate adding any parties? If so when?

Level Assignment Preferred: (please check one)

Level1 Level2 Level3 $50,000 or less All Other Cases Court Order Only

Is this case suitable for ADR? (yes or no) _ _ _ _ _ __ ADR M e t h o d ? - - - - - - - - -

Signature of Attorney_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date signed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Printed Name of Attorney: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Misc. Docket No. 12-9119

Appointment of a District Judge to Preside in a State Bar Disciplinary Action

The Supreme Court of Texas hereby appoints the Honorable Darlene Byrne, Judge ofthe 126th District Court, Austin, Texas, to preside in the Disciplinary Action styled:

The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Anthony P. Griffin

to be filed in a District Court of Galveston County, Texas.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall promptly forward to the District Clerk of Galveston County, Texas, a copy of the Disciplinary Petition and this Order for filing pursuant to Rule 3.03, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

As ordered by the Supreme Court of Texas, in chambers,

With the Seal thereof affixed at the City of Austin, this JB:I:..da-y of July, 2012.

~~-~ BLAKE HAWTHORNE, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS This assigrunent, made by Misc. Docket No. 12-9119, is also an assignment by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Texas Government Code,§ 74.057. fL Signed this {~ day of July, 2012.

Wallace B. Jefferson Chief Justice

Misc. Docket No. 12-9119 Page2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Ojfzce of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

December 21, 2011

CMRRR#: 70101870000315035500

Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin 1115 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624

Re: H0111134143 Kristina Guzman- Anthony Paul Griffin

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy of which is enclosed with this notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined that the information provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint.

Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney.

You must furnish to this office a written response to the- Complaint within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained in the Complaint, and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a determination of Just Cause as defmed in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a copy of your response directly to the Complainant.

·Pursuant to Rules 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Ru1es of Professional Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes Professional Misconduct.

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings, except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived confidentiality or the Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel may provide appropriate infonnation, including the response, to law enforcement agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter.

600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292 s· erely, 1 1. ~euVt\L~ L. Collier stant Disciplinary Counsel Office ofthe Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas JLC/ra

CF2-3. RECEIVED DEC 20 2611 STAlE BAR OFTEXASOFFICE OF THE CHJEF))ISCIPLINARY COUNSEL HOUSTONCDC . STATEBAROFTEXAS RETU NING GRIEVANCE FORM lt ender /

I. GENERALINFORMATION ~QV} 0 20!1 Before you fill out thi~ pap~nvork, there may be a.faste:r way to resolve the iss are currently having with aii attorney.

If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any of the f, reasons: Chief Disciplinary Counsel You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. · State Bar of Texa~/ Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed about the statuS'~~-··..-· of your case. · You have fired your attorney l:lut are having problems getting your file back from the attorney. ' ·

You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900.

CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of issues with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal grievan9e.

CAAP can resolve many problems without a grievance being filed by providing information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by contacting the attorney either by telephone or letter.

I have L_ I have not ___ contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program. NOTE: Please be sure to fill out each section completely. Do not leave any section blank. If you do not know the answer to any question, write "I don't know." . ' .

I!. INFORM:ATION ABOUT YOU-- PLEASE KEEP CURRENT

I. TDCJ/SID # PIMr. -f\lf-V-L..!..llA--L--.,---- r¢ Ms. Name:. \) 'f\.YI5fl (/\.?! 6uzm:::u1 Imiriigration # _ _ _ _ _ __

Address:

City:~·~~----.-- State: _ _ _ _ Zip Code: ---~-.--

0411 2. Employer:_

Employer's Address: ---------------------------------------------

3. Telephone number: Residence e-·. I • I' •. Work: -----~-----~

Other: - - - - - - - -

4. Drivers License # Date of Birth ' -------- 5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you.

Name Address

Telephone.

6. Do you understand and write in the English language? -·--".~"+-'-e~5_,_______~_ If no, what is your primary language? · Who helped you prepare this form?----------:---:-:----....._- Will they be.available to transla'te future correspondence during this process? - - - -

7. Are you a Judge? :-'-b>.::::.-!!0"------.,.-,------- If yes, please provide Court, County, City, State: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Note: Grievances are not accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the attorney against whom you are complaining. A separate grievance form must be completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining.

1. Attorney name: \\(')\='nOb~ 0ri.f-.fi V1 Address: ! I (6 Moody fu;oe: City: Gu \ves\o Y\ State:_U~--- Zip Code: :r'l S&o 2. Telephone number: Work tfotl ·J !f3· o 32>11 Home _ _ _ _ _ __

3. Have you or a me!)l'l:fer of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously? Yes_ No _../_1lff'"yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. _ _ _ _ __

0411 2 Have you or a member of your family ever filed an appeal with the Board of Disciplinary Appeals about this attorney?

Yes __ No L If"yes," please state its approximate date and outcome.

4. Please _9heck one of the following: _L_ This attorney was hired to represent me. This attorney was appointed to represent me. This attorney was hired to represent someone else.

Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed. Malj \ 1.. 12Dl 0 Please state what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. IZ..tpr.e~i

5. What was your fee arrangement with .the attorney? __,$.___5"""+1.... ()""0--"0"'-------·-·_·_ _ _ _ __

How much did you pay the attorney? ~~~'--~.Yf'-'-\4.QPO-L----------------

If you signed a contract and have a~' please attach. If you have~ of checks and/or receipts, please attach. Do not send originals.

6. If you didcr;ot hir~ the attomey;what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly

7. Are you currently represented by an attorney? __N-'--"'-'l"")_ _ _ _ __ If yes, please provide information about your current a t t o r n e y : - - - - - - - - - - - -

8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment, such as depression or a substance use disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations ofthe attorney

0411 3 such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and lJ)Cation). (J ·.

9. -Did the attorney ever make any statem-ents or admissions to you or·in your presence that would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment, such as depression or a substarice:use disorder?':Jfso, please prov1de.details. -.. --

IV. INF.ORMATION ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE

I. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur? · .·

2. If ymlr grie_vance is. about a ·lawsuit, ariswer the following, if known: ..

a: Name ofcourt --------------------------------~-----------------

b. Title of the suit·- ------------------~------~-----------------------

c. Case number and date suit was· filed_-____c,__...:,..__ _ _ __.:.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

d. If you are not a party to this suit, what is your connecti-on with it? Explain briefly .

....~ ...

:...::-. :.... ' .

3. .··Explain in detail why you think this attorney has done ·something improp~r or has fa lied to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if . : . . . • ' ·,j:' \ .• ' necessary.

If you have copies of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance, please attach. Do not send originals.

Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who k'~ow something about your grievance. -

0411 4 Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance will be forwarded to the attorney named in your grievance.

DY\. ~ W.,'l..OIO Nv; brlfBn Was ~ -tv. cqr.eSeb;t me fov c.t_, t{.-\-o.llo..:haf\ c..o.s-e ll1jlLlf\51: mlj pr'E-v,oas .emplnr:jPY, &i&hno -vs-12e ~ fwif'fi, ~tiN ~ V\t 'Jjou.Ld. f..epr&nt rru fn v-

~l~ CtWi \DO..S ar'\ly wtdJu be. CA ftz.U to roo..Kr o.. P~ m:C.Dt t.u\il--,"1 T fuv..nJ. "'- Ji,b. 1~n w~s \Cc.Nlo(_V'o~h 4o a..Cup+ ±hat orj..(frt'

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~s\o- ~.QfOir.tto\ttlt Sc.h.td.I.U-<(( ~ woi- wwn c,r;;.f;n -\l,y= 'E»:ot~po. 'Dr! or =\-\> dciVlh" -M lit.41u1">h?n .frl>tn. VAS 6~ ;1. ~t.(J 'ro C:Onbrrn ±N. a. ppni~n-t. lf-+ ~roll.! n,~-\f lJ. t:{-.GSptr. :::Z: o..yri v'..fd e:i bri~.fi f'\ ·fit.(.. \.\.t ~c. \0\oW\.(&_'j:l.d '(\AQ. and £111 n,(\~ spoK-1 4-'hat ht lb)t'l.S i V) cou.tr au A!Uj ~ ~ ~

A:JuJ..JJ...4 ~~l.. To rN.. ~ec...u,S& V>£ hctd: a.... NAAac,Vu . Ht ~~ wi+-n N.s Q.Ss;s~ ~ Y'i. rul.v\ s.-ed 'vu..t -\1> '5~, \!'f\1. a..n a.f2P oi f\tnv nf b ( ~ folio~ 111j 3\A.nrla :; f¥ri ( I ? ~l. ( 1

tV' o.. \O'.OOo.-""9-~f'~il'\~± bl\ ~01 tf) 1'ta!\.T...- \Uj'Stif¥\C':7tA."L~ ll-rrivd CL-+~ ilPf-i~

11' \O'.OOCU'A· ~~fin s~ IIDW?jhl~ \5 ybdtw.-.(.-c'> ~pinCj ~ yo~b olmf+ u£ \A)hcl h.t. ~ d ~ ~ ~~'NJ -\-D er..e.W\J-, \k_ eM a l'lM- t.ompkJe -\N... ro~h d-nrt4 and ,fretted-~ 4 w~ ~l c;u)- ~ f1~iu t&>e~. \tL shU \0.\!J.fW'\\ I f\qu.i fin, ±ht.sw-u.& o~\-4- br~eJ:nd et>.f~.lli~ ct.ssis.t-:ud- &1-s ~~d- '{\).. N.t.d. s.~,\lS~ ttWI.Y ~Wr t\..t I tH.Yf b~A..)--,~,-1.- :k- f\).e-w.K (nti I{£ an.'-3--}tu..~

V. HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE PROCESS?

Yellow Pages Internet Other

0411 5 VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER

I hereby expressly waive any attorney-client privilege as to the attorney, the subject of this grievance, and authorize such attorney to reveal any information in the professional relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas.

I understand that the Office o( Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential the processing ofGrievances. · ·

Sighatur~~ ~·· _!_f..LI·_,3~·-=-'l.L/~~~~- ·Date: ·.....

To ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTiON; THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:

THE OFFICE OF' CHIEF DISCIPUNARY COUNSEL P.O. Box 13287 · ·Austin:, Texas 78711 .. -·;

. :··

.'(' .

0411 6 On July 30, 2011 at 10:30am I contacted Griffin law firm and spoke with a male assistant who answered the phone and advised that Griffin was out of the office and wouldn't be returning until later that week. I stated to the individual that I've been calling for weeks and months and was tired of leaving a voicemail message and would never receive a call back. The individual suggest that I call Griffin on a direct cell phone line, and the number he gave me was {713} 408-1346. At 10:32 am I contacted Griffin who didn't answer so I left him a voice message stating that I had made many calls inquiring the status of the case and had not received a call back and that I was possibly moving out of the states and was requesting my refund of money back due to the false agreement we·;held from the May 12, 20:!.0. Griffin returned my phone call back and at approximately 10:36am and replied that "it didn't work like that, and give him a couple of days to look over my files". He stated that he would contact me within a couple of days. I never received a call from Griffin like he said from the previous phone conversation we held. So on August 24,20111 sent Griffin a certified letter through the USPS letting. him know that I wanted all work to be stopped, I wanted a bill receipt of all the work he have done, and to turn over all files. In return Griffin sent in the mail a letter stating NO REFUND/ CLOSING FILE. He had stated in his letter that "We have performed consistent with our contract," which was a false statement. No work other than the rough draft he typed was done which took place on April17, 2011. Mr. Griffin had confirmed that the lawsuit would not take longer than a year to finalize. After our meeting we held on April17, 2011 he stated that from that date it would be one month exactly and everything would be finalized. - ') 2. 010 -~I

P::~eas-:= accep-c t::h.is let t>=-r o_s c-.::-.::lfirTnat.i.c)n c>f ~-~~= ~-?ayTnerlt: :>f $3,00C~OO on yot:r :ceta.ine.r:- c~f $5,..00C~O·~; Coal2:-1.c~2 ·r~.:~ 11 be. p-3.ya!.:·J_e o-\p:::-~ 9 0 · da~:.. fJ~=.r:!. o6.) _ Pl ea.se: :-:: ·:: t.e t 11-=~ t. -.~Je will prepare a contract and forward ~nder ssparate ccve~­ Th;.:mk yc.-cJ. for coE.sid·;:,ring our finn.

Si11ce:cely, ---- ------- /_..........- __ ..-····' · .•.. _ ·~----AII-:.:~iC;ny Griffi-r1 P. A Griffi_n Lawyers 11~'--~i ~~()Cd~{ Galvescon, Texas 7'7550 4t)9. 75~:.: _ 03BE- i. SOli .. 750- 5(!:!4 Facsimile No. 409.763_4102

E~.PG/ files

::; : ··1o.r:d g:.l7.m-=.n __ kr.ist.i:::1..3._ clie::-}t:_G0::Jfirr:l<::t: i.o-:-,;, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN. INC. A Projessiona l C01poratioH Lawyers

Galveston Is land Galveston, Texas 77550

,_7uly 6 r 2C:O

Tc: K~istina Guzman

~~':::-orr:: 1-'..nthony P. GriffiD. 1 ::.inc. CAUSE NO.

KRISTINA - GUZMAN IN THE.

v. JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

E? CORPORATION - USA ~~u MICHAEL CASTANEDA GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS

PLAINTIFF, KRISTINA L. GUZMAN'S, ORIGINAL PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COUIRT:

This lawsuit is brought by Kristina L. Guzman, J

hereinafter and sometimes referred to as Plaintiff, against

BP Corporation and Michael Castaneda, hereinafter referred

to as Defendants. Plaintiff brings this suit complaining

that her rights under Texas law have been violated.

Plaintiff sues for damages:

This matter is a schedule 2 matter as that term is

defined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

At all times material to this action, Plaintiff has

been a resident of the County of Galveston.

Defendant, BP Corporation, can be served with process

by serving its registered agent, to-wit:

Defendant, Michael Castaneda, can be served with

process by serving him at III.

Plaintiff began employment with Wackenhunt Security on

November 3, 2009 as a Patrol Officer at the BP, Texas City,

Texas site. Plaintiff worked the site without incident or

complaint.

On or about September 27, 2009, Plaintiff was called

in office, based on a complaint from Ben Weir, Security j Operations Center. Plaintiff told that Weir complained

with respect to her having a tongue ring. Plaintiff denied

having a ring and a picture was taken of her tongue.

During the process of taking the picture, Plaintiff was

informed as to who made the complaint and was informed by

Reza Ahwazi, Wackenhut BP Project Manager, that Ben Weir

wanted her out of the plant.

On or about September 25 1 2009, Ben Weir, approached

Plaintiff and inquired whether she changed her hair for

him. Plaintiff didn't know what to say·to the comment.

Plaintiff then went to her management Reza Ahwazi and

reported the comment. She informed her management she

didn't know Mr. Weir and did not know why the comment was

being made (a good faith complaint). Mr. Ahwazi stated he

would investigate the matter.

IV. In Ahwazi's investigative report he explains that he

presented the complaint to Ben Weir and Castaneda. The

following information is found in the report:

I immediately proceeded to SOC to communicate the incident with Ben Weir first and ask him If he was involved in these inappropriate comments. I brought the matter to Officer Ben Weir attention. He answered its bunch of B.S. and asked to bring this matter to Michael Castaneda's attention. Officer Ben Weir and I walked to Mr. Castaneda's office and I handed over the statement by Officer Guzman to Mr. Castaneda, after a very brief look at the statement Mr. Castaneda aia, (this is stupid) and that nothing makes sense, moments later Mr. Castaneda turned over the statement hack to me and said (forget about it) and there's no merit to this and no one needs to know about this. Although I believed that this matter should be investigated by BP further, I decided that for the sake of our contract and of our officers, I thought it would be best that I closed the case with no fault on Officer Ben Weir's side.

Wackenut's contract and existence ln the BP ended

February 12, 2010. The new contract was taken over by

Securitas Security. Securitas hired all of the other

patrol personnel that were under the contract with

Wackenhut, but did not hire Plaintiff. ' When Plaint.iff

inquired of Securitas why she was not hired, Plaintiff was

informed that BP did not want her out at the facility. It

is Plaintiff's belief that she was denied employment with

Securitas because of her good faith complaint that she

reported about Weir's comments.

v. ,-",nthony Gdfin

M:r. Griffin per ou:.- conversation '\Ve held on 07-30-2011 at 2.?proximately l032am. I am requesting that all vwrk on the case Kristin2. Guzman -vs. - BP be stopped. I ru'TI also requesting that you provide a detailed bill receipt and tunwver all files. I have made previocs phone calls a week after-talking with you about requesting my funds of $4. 100 dollars back that \Vas advised b:,: yourself.

Thank You

Kristina L. Guzman ' ~-- ~· -~. ~ .-,~--~ -~- _v··-.,/ .-. !\

l •

_~ ••

,•· ,"'. ,.· -~: /-~-~-_( ~ _.....--:..... ~ -::·-~----·-.. (:,_ ~ ! /-h ··----~ i .j

. ,.. !·L_.. i·;__ _c__ .·

•.- ; ·-''··./ A GRIFFIN LA WYERS

Galvesron Island Galveston, Texas 77550

August 29, 2011

Kristina L. Guzman

J

RE: NO REFUND/CLOSING FILE

Ms. Guzman:

Please note that I am acknowledging that you have a desire to terminate t.he processing of your case because of your movin9 from the area. Please note that there will be :no refund. We have· performed consistent with our contract. Good luck in the future and on your move.

Sincerely, ___ ::.--:-- ' '

(/ ------ __________ ./"' ~ ---_.-/- /~--- -· .................

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lavryers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

xc: Interoffice -Rita Westerman (close file)

c: word-guzman_J-:ristina_cli6nt3_transrni ttal CAUSE NO. 12-CXV-1732

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN THE lOTH

V. JUDICIAL DISTR~;,, ~C§!JRT \%

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN GALVESTON COUNt:.~{ ~:S";gAS ~~.. h·,~~ -~ RESPONDENT'S, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, FIRST AMENDED

TO THE HONORABtE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Respondent, Anthony P. Griffin, files this his fir~t /

amended answer to the complaint filed and would shm< unto the

Court as follows, to-wit:

The allegations are denied in all parts and Respondent

asserts a general denial to same.

Respondent would plead more specifically, as follows:

A. The Commission is correct that Guzman entered a

contract of employment and failed to comply with the

full terms of the contract. Under the terms of the

contract of employment the relationship is terminated

by the failure to comply with the full terms of same,

including payment of all fees. To Respondent's

knowledge the contract was both discussed orally and

in writing; the written document can not be located.

B. Respondent engaged in work for Guzman, met with Respondent on a number of occasions and discussed with

her the viability of any claim she sought to bring

against any opposing party. In context of the

representation, Respondent prepared a rough draft of a

petition for Guzman and discussed with her what was

viable and what was not a viable claim. At some point

in time in the representation, Guzman decided not to

proceed forward with her claims and said she no longer

wanted to proceed with the litigation. Respondent

explained that her new adventure was commendable, but

that counsel was not an insurance company and that

work had been performed on her behalf and that she was

not entitled to a retainer refund. Guzman sought a

full retainer refund when in fact the agreement was

the retainer was non-refundable; Respondent although a

lawyer is entitled to quantum meruit for his work,

time and effort in this matter.

c. Respondent denies any rule violation. Respondent had

kept in touch with the client, the fee in question was

not illegal or unconscionable and the lawyer engaged

in activity to protect the client's interest.

D. Respondent also has provided to the client the

client's file and provided the basis for no fee

refund, including the recitation of the contract of employment and then an accounting when the contract

was not located and a request by the State Bar of

Texas.

PRAYER

It is prayed that the subject relief be denied in all parts.

DATE: January 9, 2013.

/S~GRIFFIN ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 TWENTY FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102

STATE BAR NO. 08455300 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this the gili day of January,

2013, the foregoing document was forward·2d to opposing

counsel by facsimile transmission and regular mail, to-wit:

SHANNON BREAUX SAUCEDA ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL STATE BAR OF TEXAS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL 600 JEFFERSON, SUITE 1000 HOUSTON, TEY~qS 77002

c::word.grievance_folder_[guzman_kristina]_respondent_first_arnended_answer A GRIFFIN LA WYERS

February 21, 2C13

Shannon Sauceda Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinary C6unsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002

RE: H01lll34143 - KRISTINA GUZMAN - ANTHONY PAUL GRIFFIN; IN THE 10TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO. 12-CV-1732

(AGREED JUDGMENT)

Ms. Sauceda:

Please find enclosed the above referenced documents. The ~arne are for your processing. Thank you.

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

l\.PG/ files

Encl. - Agreed Judgment xc: Norma Venso, Esq. Attorney at Law 830 Apollo Street Houston, Texas 77058

[WITH ATTACHMENTS]

c:word.grievancefile_[guzrnan_kristina)_opposingcounsels3_transmittal CAUSE NO. 12CV1732

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Petitioner, § § ·vs. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS § ANTHO~~P.GRDnnN, § § Respondent. § lOth JUDICIAL DISTRICT

On this day, came to be heard the above-styled and numbered cause. Petitioner, the

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, by and through its attorney of record, Shannon

Breaux Sauceda. Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Respondent, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN

(hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"), Texas Bar Number 08455300, by and through his attorney

of record, Norma Venso, announce that an agreement has been reacbed in ;the above-styled matter. . Jurisdiction and Venue

On the 18th day of July, 2012, pursuant to Rule 3.02 of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY

PROCEDURE, the SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS appointed the Honorable Darlene Byrne to preside over

this disciplinary action. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject

matter of this action, and that venue is proper. Both Parties waived their rights to trial by jury.

The Court, having considered the pleadings and the agreement of the parties, fmds that

Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES

OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent has committed professional misconduct as defined by

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Page,l of 1 Rule 1.06V of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE and in violation of Rules 1.03(a) [a

lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with

reasonable requests for infom1ation]; 1.04(d) [a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and

shall state the meth~d by which the fee is to be determined]; and'1.15(d) [upon termination of

representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's . .

interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other

counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance

payments of fee that has not been earned], of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT; Article X, Section 9, ofthe STATEBARRULES.

It is AGREED and ORDERED that the sanction of a Probated Suspension shall be imposed

against Respondent in accordance with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with the suspension being fully probated

pursuant to the terms stated below. The period of probated suspension shall begin on August 30,

It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that during all periods of suspension, Respondent

1. Respondent shall not violate any term of this Judgment.

2. Respondent shall not engage in professional misconduct as defined by Ru1e 1.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Page2 of2 3. Respondent shall not violate any state or federal criminal statutes.

4. Respondent shall keep the STATE BAR OF TEXAS membership department notified of current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone numbers.

5. Respondent shall comply with l:vfiillmum Continuing Legal Education requirements.

6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers TruSt Account (IOLTA) requirements.

7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of professional misconduct.

8. Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses as ordered in this Judgment.

9. Respondent shall pay restitution as ordered in this. Judgment. ·

Probation Revocation

Upon detennination that Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment, the Chief

Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to .all other remedies available, file a motion to revoke

probation with the Court and serve a photocopy of the motion on Respondent pursuant to

Tex.R.Civ.P. 21a. Revocation will not be invoked on the basis of grievance matters pending

against Respondent at the time that this Judgment is executed.

The Court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing .. At the hearing, the Court shall determine by

a preponderance of~e evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment. If the

Court fmds grounds for revocation, the Court shall enter an order revoking probation and imposing

an ·active suspension upon Respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year

commencing on or after the date of revocation. Respondent shall not be given credit for any term of.

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Page3 of3 It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that any conduct on the part ofRespondent which

serves as the basis for a motion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for

discipline as allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS

It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Kristina Guzman

in the amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($2,350.00). The

restitution payment shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to

Kristina Guzman. The payment shall be submitted to the ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, P .0.

Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas·78701), on or before

It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary

attorneys' fees and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of Two Thousand Five

Hundred and Noll 00 Dollars ($2,500. 00). The payment or attorneys' fees and direct expenses shall

be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to the STATE BAR OF

TEXAS. The payment shall be submitted to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box

12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), on or before March5,

It is further AGREED and ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the

misconduct of Respondent and are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y)

of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the

maximum legal rate per annum until paid and the STATEBAROFTEXAS shall have all writs and other

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Page4 of4 post-judgment remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amounts.

This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance

with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall forward a certified copy of

the current Disciplinary Petition on file in this case, along with a copy of this Judgment to the

following: (1) CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, Supreme Court Building, Austin, Texas.

78711; (2) The STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Office ofthe ChiefDisciplinary Counsel, P. 0. Box 12487,

Austin, Texas 78711; and (3) Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, Norma Venso, 830

Apollo St., Houston, Texas 77058.

IT IS ORDERED that all costs of court incurred in the prosecution of this lawsuit shall be

taxed against Respondent, for which the Clerk may have execution if they are not timely paid.

All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED.

SIGNED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2013.

HON. DARLENE BYRNE, JUDGE PRESIDING

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Page 5 ofS AGREED AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

. LINDA A. ACEVEDO Chief Disciplinary Counsel

SHANNON BREAUX SAUCEDA ~a.~ .QMfrD N VENSO Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Attorney at Law State Bar No. 24002896 State Bar No. 20545250 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 830 Apollo Street Houston, Texas 77002 Houston, Texas 77058 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Phone: (409) 789-8661 Fax: (713) 758-8292 Fax: (281) 286-9990

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN

THONYP.G State Bar No. 08455300

AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Page6 of6 TAB 11 BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5-2 GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLil'i'E, § H0031234738 [POLLY REDDIN] § Pe-titioner, § § v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, § § Respondent. §

JUJ)GMENT OF PARTIALLY PROBATED SUSPENSION

Parties and Appearanr.e

On October I 4, 2013, came to be heard the above-styled and mm1bered cause. Petitioner, the

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, appeared by and through its attorney of record.

Shannon Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and armounced ready. Respondent,

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinaftt;Jr refeJTed to as "Respondent"), Texas Bar Number 08455300,

appeared in person and through his attorney of record, Norma Venso, and announced ready.

The Evidentiary Panel 5-2 (formerly SB) having been duly appointed to hear this complaint

by IJ1e chair of the Grievance Committee for STATE BAR OF TEXAS District 5, finds that it has

jurisdiction over the parties and the. subject matter of this action and that venue is proper.

The Evidentiary Panel, having considered all of the pleadings, evidence, stipulations, and

arg1.unent, finds Respondent bas committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of

the TEXAS RULES OF DlSCfPL!NARY PROCEDURE.

Judgment of Pn1·tinlly f'mbated Suspension EXHIBIT Page J of9

I J) .. l(~ Findings ofFact

The Evidentiary Panel, having considered the pleadings, evidenc.e and argument of counsel,

makes the follow-ing findings of fact and conclusions of lavv:

1. Respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas and is a member ofthe STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

2. Respondent resides in and maLTJ.tains his principal place of practice in Galveston County, Texas.

3. On or about October 4_, 2011, PolJy Reddin (hereinafter referred. to as "Reddin") hired Respondent to :file a civil suit related to the payment of a debt. Reddin paid Respondent Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00) for the representation with the understanding from Respondent that he would :file suit ori her behalf.

4. During the course of the representation, Reddin ma.de numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to communicate with Reddin.

5. Throughout the representation, Reddin made several appointments to meet with Respondent, which were later canceled. ·when Reddin met with Respondent on F ebruruy 27, 2012, Respondent presented Reddin with a petition that contained several errors. As a result, on March 6, 2012, Reddin sent Respondent an email whereby she terminated his representation and requested a refund of her retainer. Respondent failed to refund any tmem·ned portion of the retainer until July 2013.

6. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel of tbe STATE BAR OF TEXAS has incurred reac;;onable atlomeys' fees and direct expenses associated with this Disciplinary Proceeding in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred a..'ld No/100 Dollars ($1,610.00), Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($500.00) of which has aJready been paid by Respondent.

7. Respondent owes restitution in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars (5,000.00), to Polly Reddin. This amount has already been paid by Respondent.

The Evidentiary Panel concludes that, based on foregoing findings of fact, the following

TEXAS DJSCJPLINARYRULES OFPROFESSlONALCONDUCThave been violated: Rules 1 .Ol(b)(1) [in

representing a client, a lav,ryer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer]; 1.03(a) [a

Judgment of Partially Pro!Jated Suspension Page 2 of9 la:wyer shall keep a client reasonably infonned about the status of a matter and promptly comply with

reasonable requests for information]; and LlS(d) [upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall

take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable

notice to the client, all owing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and prope1ty

to which the client i.s entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned].

The Evidentiary Panel, having found that Respondent has committed Professional

Misconduct, heard and considered additional evidence regarding the appropriate sanction to be

imposed against Respondent. After hearing all evidence and argument and after having considered

the factors in Rule 2.18 of the TEXAS Rt.JLES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, the Evidentiary Panet

finds that the proper discipline of the Respondent for each act of Professional Misconduct is a

Partially Probated Suspension.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Respondent be suspended

f1-om the practice of law for a peliod of six (6) months, beginning October 15, 2013, and ending

April 14, 2014. Provided Respondent complies Vlrith the following tenns and conditions, Respondent

shall be actively suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, beginning

October 15,2013, and ending January 14,2014. IfRespondent complies with all ofthe following

terms and conditions timely, the three (3) month period of probated suspension shall begin on

January 15,2014, and shall end on April14, 2014.

1. Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred Ten andNo/100 Dallal'S ($1,610.00). In July 2013, Respondent made a payment to tlle STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of Five Hlmdred and Noll 00 Dollars ($500.00). The remaining payment One Thousand One Hundred TcnandNo/100 Dollars ($1,110.00) shall be due and payable on or before January 14, 2014, and shall be made by certified or cashier's _ check or money order. Respondent shall forward the b.nds, made payable to the STATE

.Jnd2ment of Partially Probated Suspension Pnge 3 of9 BAR OF TEXAS, to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701).

2. Respondent shall pay resti1ution to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($5,000.00). In July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00), a.Tld ha..;; therefore satisfied this condition of the Judgment.

3. Respondent shall complete the Law Office Management Program by January 14, 2014, and provide proof of compleiion to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), by January 14, 2014.

4. Respondent shall make contact with the Chief Disciplinary Com1sel's Offices' Compliance Monitor at 877-953-5535, ext. 1334 and Spedal Programs Coordinator at 877-953-5535, ext. 1323, not later than seven (7) days after receipt of a copy of this Judgment to coordinate Respondent's compliance.

Should Respondent fail to comply with all of the above terms and conditions timely,

Respm:1dent shall remain actively suspended until the date of compliance or until Aplil 14, 2014,

whichever occurs first

Terms of Active Suspension

Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses to the

STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of One Thousand Six: Hundred Ten and No/100 Dollars

($1 ,610.00). In July 2013, Respondent made a payment w the STATEBAROFTEXAS in the amount

of Five Hundred and Noll 00 Dollars ($500.00). The remaining payment One Thousand One

Hundred Ten and No/100 Dollars ($1,110.00) shall be due and payable on or before January 14,

2014, and shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent shall forward

the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDisciplinary

Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Au..">tin, Texas

Judgmcn1 ofPlll1:ially Prob9ted Suspension Page 4 of9 Respondent shall pay restitu1jon to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00

Dollars ($5,000.00). In July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to Polly Reddin in the amount of

Five Thousand aud Noll 00 Dollars ($5,000.00), and has therefore satisfied this condition of the

Judgment. Respondent shall complete the Law Office Management Program by January 14,2014, and

provide proof of completion to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O.

Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), by January 14,

2014.

It is further 0 RD ERED that during the term of active suspension ordered herein, or that may

be imposed upon Respondent by the BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS (hereinafter referred to as

"BODA") as a result of a probation revocation proceeding, Respondent shall be prohibited from

practicing law in Texas; holding lumself out as an attorney at law; performing any legal services for

others; accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services; appearing as counsel or in any

representative capacity in any proceeding in any Texas or Federal court or before any administrative

body; or holding himself out to others or using his name, in any mmmer, in conjunction with the

words "attorney at law,'' "attorney,." "counselor at law," or "lawyer."

It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall immediately notify each of Respondent's

current clients and opposing counsel in writing of this suspension.

in addition to such notification, it is fmther ORDERED that Respondent shall return any

files, papers, unearned monies and other prope1ty belonging to current clients in Respondent's

possession to the respective clients or to another attorney at the client's request.

:It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file with the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief

Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711~2487 (1414 Colorado St.,

Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension Page 5 of9 Austin, Texas 78701) on or before thirty (30) days after the date this Judgment is signed, an affidavit

stating all current clients and opposing counsel have been notified of Respondent's suspension and

· that all files, papers, morues and other property belonging to all current clients have been returned as

ordered herein.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall, immediately, notifY in writing each and every

justice of the peace, judge, magistrate, administxative judge or officer and chief justice of each and

every court or tribunal in which Respondent has any matter pe!iding of the tenus of this Judgment,

the style and cause number of the pending matter(s ), and the name, address and telephone number of

the client(s) Respondent is representing.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file with the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief

Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St.,

Austin, Texas 78701) on or before thirty(30) days aflerthe date this Judgment is signed, an affidavit

stating Respondent has notified in writing each and every jmtice of the peace, judge, magistxate, and

chiefj mstice of each and every court in which Respondent has any matter pending of the terms ofthis

judgment, the style and cause number of the pending matter(s), and the name, address and telephone

number of the client(s) Respondent is representing in Court.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall immediately surrender his law license fu'1d

permanent State Bar Card to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ChiefDisciplinMy Counsel's Office, P.O.

Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), to be forwarded to

the SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS.

It is furt..'ter ORDERED that during all periods of suspension, Respondent shall be under the

following terms and conditions:

Judgment of Partially P1·o bated Suspwsion Page 6 of9 1. Respondent shall not violate any term of this Judgment.

2. Respondent shall not engage :in professionai misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLTI-.!ARY PROCEDURE.

3. Respondent shall not violate any state or federal criminal statutes.

4. Respondent shall keep the STATE BAR OF TEXAS membership department notified of current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone numbers.

5. Respondent shall comply with Minimum Contin.uing Legal Education requirements.

6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) requirements.

7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of professional misconduct.

Upon information that Respondent has violated a term of this Judgment, the Chief

Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to all other remedies available, file a motiori to revoke

probation pursuant to Rule 2.23 of the TEXAS RULES OF DJSCIPLINAR Y PROCEDURE with the Board of

Disciplinary Appeals (hereinafter refened to as "BODA") and serve a copy of the motion on

Respondent pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 21 a.

BODA shall conduct an evidentiary hea.ring. At tl1e hearing, BODA shall determine by a

preponderance of the evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment. If

BODA finds grounds for revocation, BODA shall enter an order revoking probation and placing

Respondent on active suspension from the date of such revocation order. Respondent shall not be

given credit for any term of probation served prior to revocation.

It is further ORDERED that any conduct on the part of Respondent which serves as the basis

for.a ~notion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for discipline as

Judgment of Partially Probated Suspr.nsion Page 7 of 9 allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS RULES OF

DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.

Restitution. Attorneys' Fees and Expenses

It is fwther ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Polly Reddin in the amount of

Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). 1".1 July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to

PollyReddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($5,000.00), and has therefore

satisfied this condition of the Judgment.

It is further ORDERED Respondent shall pay aU reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees

and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred Ten

and No/100 Dollars ($1 ,61 0.00). In July 2013, Respon~cnt made a payment to the STATE BAR OF

TEXAS in the amount of Five Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($500.00). The remaining payment One

Thousand One Hundred Ten and Noll 00 Dollars ($1, 11 0.00) shall be due and payable on or beJore

January 14, 2014, and shaH be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent

shall forward the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS,

ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, p_Q_ Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado

St., Austin, Texas 78701).

It is fw.ther ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct of

Respondent, are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule l.06(Y) of the TEXAS

RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accme interest at the maximum

legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF TEXAS shall have all writs and other post-

judgment remedies against Respondent in order to r.ollect all unpaid amounts.

Judgm~.nt of Partially Probated Snspcnsinn Page 8 of9 Publ.ication

This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance

All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED.

siGNED this 22nd.dayof Ocrobey '2013.

EVIDENTIARY PANEL DISTRICT NO. 5-2 STATE DAR OF TEX...\.S

Judgment of Partially Probated Suspensioo Page 9of9 STATE BAR OF TEXAS

I RECEIVED JUL .L 8 201 ~ Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

July 16, 2012

Via Certified Mail No. 7010 1870 0003 1503 6200, Return Receipt Requested

Anthony P. Griffin 1115 21 51 Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624

RE: Case No. H0031234738 Polly Reddin- Anthony P. Griffin

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has completed its investigation of the above-referenced Complaint and deterrriined on July 5, 2012, that there is Just Cause to believe that you have committed one or more acts of Professional Misconduct, as defined by the TEXAS RULES OF DlSCIPLfNARY PROCEDURE (TRDP).

In accordance with TRDP 2.14D, a statement of your acts and/or omissions and the TEXAS DlSClPLfNARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel contends are violated by the alleged acts and/or omissions follows:

On or about October 4, 2011, Polly Reddin (hereinafter refened to as "Complainant") hired Anthony P. Griffm (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") to file a civil suit related to the payment of a debt. Complainant paid Respondent Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00) for the representation with the understanding from Respondent that he would file suit on her behalf.

During the course of the representation, Complainant made numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to communicate with Complainant. Complainant made an appointment to meet with Respondent on February 24, 2012, which was later canceled. When Complainant met with Respondent on February 27, 2012, Respondent presented Complainant with a petition that contained several enors. Complainant made another appointment to meet with Respondent on March 2, 2012, but that appointment was also canceled. At the next appointment scheduled on March 5,

g: \general\griffin. a_sbs\73 B_red dm\corres pondencc\el ecti on letter docx

600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292 STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Anthony P. Griffin July 16,2012 RE: Case No. H0031234738 Page2

2012, Complainant was informed that the corrected paperwork was not ready and to come back the next day. On March 6, 2012, Complainant called Respondent's office before she made the trip and was told that Respondent was out of town and her corrected paperwork still was not ready. As a result, on March 6, 2012, Complainant sent Respondent an email whereby she terminated his representation and requested a refund of her retainer. Respondent failed to refund any unearned portion of the retainer.

These alleged acts violate the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 1.15(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned.

Pursuant to TRDP 2.15, you must notify this office whether you elect to have the Complaint heard by an Evidentiary Panel ofthe District Grievance Committee or in a district court of proper venue, with or without a jury. The election must be in writing and served upon the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office no later than twenty (20) days after your receipt of this notice. Failure to file a timely election shall conclusively be deemed an affirmative election to proceed before an Evidentiary Panel in accordance with TRDP 2.17 and 2.18.

Enclosed is a form in which to indicate your election and principal place of practice. It should be mailed to the undersigned at the address shown at the bottom of this Jetter. In making your election, you should be aware than an Evidentiary Panel proceeding is confidential unless a public sanction is entered and that a private reprimand is only available before an Evidentiary Panel. District court proceedings are public and a private reprimand is not an available sanction.

g:\general\griffin.a_sbs\738_reddin\correspondence\election Jetter.docx COMPLAINT AGAINST § § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN § H000031234738 [POLLY REDDING] § GALVESTON, TEXAS §

RESPONDENT'S ELECTION & PRINCIPAL PLACE OF PRACTICE CERTIFICATION

I, Anthony P. Griffin, hereby elect: (Choose one of the following)

- - - - District Court

I, Anthony P. Griffin, hereby certify that:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Physical Address- no P.O. Box)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _(City), _ _ _ _ _ _ (County),

SIGNED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2012.

**RETURN THIS FORM WITHIN 20 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ELECTION NOTICE**

g:\general\gri ffin .a_sbs\73 8_red din \correspondence\election letter. do ex STATE BAR OF TEXAS

April10,2012

CMRRR#: 70101870000315040597

Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin 11 15 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624

Re: H0031234738 Polly Reddin- Anthony Paul Griffin

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy of which is enclosed with this notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined that the information provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint.

Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney.

You must furnish to this office a written response to the Complaint within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained in the Complaint; and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a determination of Just Cause as defmed in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a copy of your response directly to the Complainant.

Pursuant to Rules 8.0l(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes Professional Misconduct.

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings, except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived confidentiality or the Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel may provide appropriate information, including the response, to law enforcement agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter.

600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292 Enclosure(s): Grievance (Copy of Complaint)

CF2-J. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL STATE BAR OF TEXAS RECEIVED GRIEVANCE FORM APR 02 2012 I. GENERAL INFORMATION STATE BAR OF TEXAS Before you fill out this paperwork, there may be a faste~~e£~ the issue you are currently having with an attorney.

If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any of the following reasons:

You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed about the status of your case. You have fired your attorney but are having problems getting your file back from .the attorney.

You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900.

CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of . issues with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal grievance.

CAAP can resolve many problems without a grievance being filed by providing information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by contacting the attorney either by telephone or letter.

I have ___ I have not V contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program.

NOTE: Please be sure to fill out each section completely. Do not leave any section blank. If you do not know the answer to any question, write "I don't know."

II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOU- PLEASE KEEP CURRENT

1. TDCJ/SID# _ _ _ _ _ ~:. Name: flJI~KcJJin Immigration# _ _ _ _ _ __

State: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip Code:-~----

Employer's Address:_··

3. Telephone number: Residence Work: Other: - - - - - - - -

4. Drivers License # _ _ Date of Birth___,~~~.:::....._.:::.....___

5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you.

Name _______________ Address.....:_______________~~-=---

Telephone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

6. Do you understand and write in the English language? ---'k\"4-.~...t'_SL......._ _ _ __ lf no, what is your primary language? · Who helped you prepare this form? _....!N...!.·~o=--~o:.Lr.J..:.ceO::::...._______________ Will they be available to translate future correspondence during this process? _____

7. Are you a Judge? _ _....~.rJ:...!....!:o=--._ _ _ __ If yes, please provide Court, County, City, State: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ffi. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY

Note: Grievances are not accepted against law fmns. You must specifically name the attorney against whom you are complaining. A separate grievance form must be completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining. ·

Address: .//IS . (Y)ooal'-1

City: C-rc. lves +t>11 State: lex 'i .s Zip Code: ""]I s-s- D 2. Telephone number: Work 4o1- ·7 &3-· o381..Jlome _ _ _ _ _ __ Other 'gOO-').S'D-'5o:Jf

3. Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously? Yes~ No V If"yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. _ _ _ _ __

0411 2 Have you or a member of your family ever filed an appeal with the Board of Disciplinary Appeals about this attorney?

Yes _ _ No JL If''yes," please state its approximate date and outcome.

4. Please check one of the following: V This attorney was hired to represent me. This attorney was appointed to represent me. This attorney was hired to represent someone else.

Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed. _ __._f....:O=-----=~J_---.:..1-'1:..___ _ __

Please state what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. X bi reJ hiM +6 reprebe,J- fhe C1ar11:xl {!h tr:.a'jt> Utle C:C~td /(e/sA..,..__'>

5. What was your fee arrangement with the attorney? JJ5·DOD. qp re--+a ,·tfl er "'f

How much did you pay the attorney? _.ff_--"S~~"""a"""m~'-'----C?_P___________~-

If you signed a contract and have a ~ please attach. If you have~ of checks and/or rec~ipts, please attach. Do not send originals.

6. If you did not hire the attorney, what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly

7. Are you currently represented by an attorney? ___,f'l'--.o_______ If yes, please provide information about your current attorney: --------------------

8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment, such as depression or a substance use disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations ofthe attorney

0411 3 such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and location).

9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment, such as depression or a substance use disorder? If so, please provide details.

IV. INFORMATION .ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE

1. Wbere did the activity you are complaining about occur?

County: ~u.\ves-ton

2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the following, if known:

a. Name of court --------------------------------------------------

c. Case number and date suit was filed ------'N'-'-'e=---"-oJ--"e"---'--r__......[__,,'-·.u.lc_.'""'J'---------

d. If you are not a party to this suit, what is your connection with it? Explain briefly.

If you have~ of court documents, please attach.

3. Explain in detail why you think this attorney has done something improper or has failed to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if necessary. A He.. c 1\e cl

If you have ~ of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance, please attach. Do not send originals.

Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of aU persons who know something about your grievance.

0411 4 Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance wiD be forwarded to the attorney named in your grievance.

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'I 1 VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER

I hereby expressly waive any attorney-client privilege as to the attorney, the subject of this grievance, and authorize such attorney to reveal any information in the professional relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas.

I understand that the Office ofChiefDisciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential the processing of Grievances.

Signatureo-~~ Datc:3-/2-/Z. TO ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTION, THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:

THE OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL P.O. Box 13287 Austin, Texas 78711

0411 6 HP Officejet J6400 All-in-One series Fax Log for Rrst Step Daycare 2 (409) 948-9901 Mar 06 2012 1:02PM

Last Transaction

Date Time Type Station ID Duration Pages Result

Mar 6 1:00PM Fax Sent 7634102 1:08 2 OK

Note: Image on Fax Send Report is set to Off

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From: Polly < > To: anthonypgriffin Subject: re:fund of retainer Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2012 12:24 pm

Dear Mr. Griffin, I am writing this letter to end our client I Lawyer relationship. I am requesting a refund of my retainer for the following reasons: I came in and spoke to you about my situation and you agreed to take the case. At that time you told me our best bet was to file suit against the title compa.ny because they had neglected to do there jobs to protect me and included First Step Learning Center also. You told me you would be filing suit the followng week so you needed a $5000.00 retainer. I agreed to this and rushed to come up with the money. Here we are 5 months later and nothing has been done. I have e-rnailed you and recieved no response to e-mails I have called on several occasions and dont even get the courtesy of a returned call. I finally drove to Galveston to see if your office was even still there to be told by the secretary you werent there you were out getting rid of junk. She set me up an appointment for February 24th 2012 and it was cancelled by your office. I was told to come in on Monday the 27th when I got there I felt like some papers had been thrown together to shut me up. When I asked about the lawsuit against the title company you asked me why would I sue them? I then reminded you it was your idea. I then had to refresh your memory on that. Which just proves my point Ive been pushed to the side and its been to long since my file has even been looked at. I then got another appointment to come back on March 2nd 2012. I explained to you we have wasted to much time and needed to move on this. So March 2nd comes and again your office cancelled my appointment. When I asked for my money back your response to me was to calm down you would have everything together for me Monday March 5th 2012 so I again drove to Galveston to collect my paperwork and I was again informed they werent ready to come in the morning .So March 6th is here I thought I better call before making another wasted trip to Galveston I was then told by your office that you were in Lousianna and my stuff was still not ready and you had e-mailed me. I checked my e-mail and never recieved anything from you. When I questioned her the response I get is all I can do is tell you what he said. Well I think Ive been patient enough and clearly not treated in a professional manner. I am very disppointed in the way things have been handled. I would like to recieve my retainer back ASAP so we can move forward. Thank You, Polly Reddin

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From: Polly< To: anthonypgri:ffin Subject: Suit for First Step Daycare or Polly World Inc . . Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2012 3:55pm

--i Mr. Griffin, I was trying to follow up on the suit. I looked on my books and I paid the retainer in october. I thought by now we might have started something but I still havent heard anything from your office. Do You --now when we might get things started? Please call and let me know something. Thank You Polly Reddin 409-771-1854

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I ' 20111006005500626455 3475

I • 0: A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 October 4, 2011

Parties to Agr~ement

INC. , hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act

as lawyers for the undersigned, POLLY REDDIN, hereinafter and

sometimes referred to as CLIENT{S), relative to all matters

concerning breach of contract, deceptive trade, etc ..

3. To work with you wit.h respect to your case including

appearing on your behalf b~fore any corporat~on,

file suit and in any Court {Federal or State), if

necessary and if v.rarranted.

rendered to client by the said law firm, the client agrees to pay $5,000.00.

2. Your retainer is the consideration to hire ANTHONY P.

GRIFFIN, INC., h~wfZRS.

3. Sa.id retainer is no:.1-refundable. This means that once

attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein}.

cor:stituting the full reasonable fee to which the

loav..ryers may be entitled for services performed pursuant

to an award of the Court or settlement.

Att.orney Fee Determination

The determina.tioD of attorneys' fees shall be made as

follow~::

1. The attorney ~J.as the right to petition the Court, in

Texas la·;.,;. If -::t~e lawyer elects to receive the fee

award from the Court, then any such fees awarded by

1:he Court shall noi: be paid by the client or out of

1:he client's portion. This paragraph contemplates the

attorney petitioning the Court for additional fees.

'I'his does not take place unless you are the prevailing

2 party in the litigation.

2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate

rights arena. '.rhe rate depends on the nature of the

case, ·the tasks t:o be performed, the reputation of the

lawyers, and other factors defined by the relat.i ve

case la·w and the civil litigation and/or area of

practice.

3. 'I'he lawyers are entitled to thirty three and third (33

1/3%) of any and all recovery obtained on behalf of

the client (gross recovery) which may be obtained by

virtue of compromise settlement/trial/verdict.

attorney from applying for the collecting at.torney

fees under the Texas law.

5. .P.ny fee awarded by the Court shall be applied dollar

for dollar to offset the contingent fee set out above

(by way of example - if the client recovers $100.00,

the attorney fee award shall derive off the top of the 3~~" $100.00 ~~d forty percent (~) shall be deducted.

leaving the client a recovery of $60.00). If on

application for reasonable attorney fees the Court

3 awards $35.00 in lawyer fees, the client's obligation

shall be $25.00 (a dollar for dollar application).

6. In the ev-ent the reasonable attorney fee award exceeds

the contingent fee a~ffird, there shall be no deduction

of fees from th~ Clientrs portion and the fee award

will be the attor:neyrs sole recovery of fees. No

7. In· the event the contingent fee, or vice versa, award

exceeds the award by the Court, the Lawyers are

awarded the greater of the two sums.

Cost - We Will Front Litigation Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise. Hm..• Do We Get Our Money Back?

Cost associated 'I'Tit:h this litigation shall be deducted from

the client's portion .. By way of example-

If recov-ery is :;noo. 00 (by compromise settlement) and 3\\:J~C) Attorney fees deducted at~= $60.00

Then costs would be deducted-from the client's

balance. ThE!r•afore,

the client's recovery would be $60.00 minus $10,00

4 The srune type of deduction of costs takes place under

There are no guarantees held cut lfli th respect to the

results of this litigation.

Withdra\ltal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract

1. Wit:hdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obli•:ration to

material repr·O!sentation surfaces or where there is a

breach of '·:he terms of this contract by the Client, to

'\Ti'!:hdraw from the represe·ntation of the Client.

No;:hing in this contract guarantees any results,

;;my other rr,atters t.hat border on guarantees. The only

guarantee re1:5tt:es to the repr:eHentation within the

(ze3.lously within the bounds of the law) . It has been

e.Arplained orally tbat the Lawyers' obligation to the

2. Investig.::Lt:i.on/If No Case: If t:he facts reveal no case

5 exists, the La\\ryer shall promptly advise the client and

tenninate ·the relationship. The retainer again is non-

3. Investigat.ion/I'iaterial Breach: If the investigation

reveals a material breach 1 lie, or misstatement by the

such breach affect.s the J:.awyer' s ability to proceed in

the representation. 'lf termination is appropriate, the

La.1ryer (s) shall advise the client of her rights and

A9ain, the :cetainer E~hall be deE>.nled non-r·efundable.

when and where sui:.s shall be filed. Agc-.in, Lawyers retain the

discretion whether i:o obligate the office in the appeal process ..

No compromise Ol:- settlement of Client's claims will be made

without the consent of both Client and r.awyers. I

6 Power of Atto~~eY.

instruments, plead.ings,. drafts, aut.hori_zations and papers that

shall be J:easonably ner::essary to conclude settlement and/or

reduce to possession any and all monies or other things of value

due to Client under this claim as fully as Client could so do in

person.

~.

' Keeping__ the Client Inf.:>rmed

this litigation .and to keep the client fully informed.

-~11 sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston

County, Texas. -~ SIGNED AND AGREED to on this the ___ .day of

---~-' 2011.

d14.~~~__:___ POLLY REDDIN

. >REED ~ef2~ 2011.

liNTH·ClNY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 11.15 MOODY GAL"i?ESTON, 'rEXP..s 77550 409.763.0385 1.800.750.5034 FACBilvfiLB N:::>. 409.753.43.02 agr.iffin@agriffinlawyers. com anthonypgriffin@grnail.com

c:: \'iord. redd.iJl_L:-olJ.y. con.t::ract_ernploym·:mt

8 NOTICE OF CLIENTS

The Stat.e Bar of Texas investigate::; and prosecutes professional misconduct c-Jr~mitted by Texas attorneys.

Although not every complaint against. or dispute with a la:wyer involves professi.::mal misconduct, the State Bar 1

Office of G-eneral Counsel w:ill provide you with information aJxmt how to file a complaint:. j

For more information, plea.se call 1.800.932.1900. a toll-free phone call. '!'his ·l· J.l

I i I

9 A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

February 27, 2012

Polly Reddin

RE: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. RERSHAW ENTERPRISES, INC. AND DEBBIE KERSHAWr IN THE ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO.

(PLAINTIFf'' S ORIGINAL PE'riTION) {ROUGH DRAFT)

{DEMAND LETTER)

(NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS)

Ms. Reddin:

A rough draft of the lawsuit is attached. I need the total amount due on the note as of March 1, 2012. I am also enclosing a new demand letter, to perfect the recovery of attorneys' fees.· The lis pendens will be filed once the lawsuit is filed. If you have any questions, please inform.

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 l.B00.750.5034 Facsiwile No. 409.763.4102 -----·---· ···--- - ·~-·-- --·----·--- -----

Encls.

c: word. reddin_yolly. client~_tr-~nsmittal. 2011_334€' A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

Debbie Kershaw Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. 2910 Mary Moody Northern Boulevard Galveston, Texas 77551

RE: DEMAND ON NOTE - CONTRACT ON LOAN AGREEMENT DATED FEBRUA.I

(DEMAND)

Ms. Kershaw and/or To Whom It May Concern:

Please accept this letter as supplement to the letter forwarded to you back on December 23, 2010. Please note that note in past due and demand is made on same. If payment is not made within ten (10) days from the receipt of this letter, a suit will be brought to protect the client's interest. The suit will also include a claim for reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees to collect the subject debt. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

thony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galvest·:::>n, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 l.B00.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files

Encl. - Contract

CERTIFIED MAIL, RRR NO. 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8494 AND REGULAR MAIL

c:word.r~ddin_polly.kershaw_demand_letter.201133~8 2012-03-08 14:36 X544 014097634102 » 409 948 9901 p 1/3

A GRIFFIN lAWYERS

Gah•e.'>TOII lslatld Galvestml, Te.>::as 77550

March 8 , 2 0 12 ·· 1 0 : D11 ,tL • M •

TO: POLLY REDDIN

. --·--:::;.> -- ~

FROl"': AN'l'HONY P. GRIFFIN A GR IFFH1 T.JAWYKr~S 1.1.1.5 MOODY GALVES'I'O::N' I TEX..ll.S ~ 775<;:,0~ ..- 409.763.4102

RE: P"JLLY WO~D, r;.-.c_ \/. KKRSJ-tr..W ENTER??.J:S.E::S, HJC. AND DEBBI8 KER.SH,'\.W; :tN 'I'HE JUDICil'J.J DISTRTCT !:'OUR'l'; GAl.V.E~:"l-;-(~1\f COi.l1-ITY 'J'EXA.S j C'l-!lj 0:;£ NO. I

{Cm.JFim•·1A·;:ION ·r-m~·r RELA'flOUSHIP 'I'BRi~IIDl.TED)

NO. OF PAGES FAXED ~clu!;'ive of cov;::;r.)

If you have difficult:y receivin~J l:his t.ransmission or any part thereof, please call 409.76~.038£. 2012~03-QS 14:37 X544 014097634102 » 409 948 9901 p 2/3

Call'e.ttcm /sltmd Gal1•esto11. Texas 77550

March 7, 2012

Polly Redd5.IJ

RE:: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. KERSHP~W m.TTERPRISF:S 1 INC. AND DEBBIE KERSHAW; IN TilE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT i GALVERJ'Ol'i crmN"'l'Y, TRXAS; ('AuSE NO.

(CONFIRMATION THAT Rll!I.Ll',TICNSHIP 'rEID-UN"Al'.f.W)

{CO:NFIF.MATION TEAT C0NTPACT Ol'' RMPLOYNMENT Cil.LIJS !i'<~R A NObT-RRI<'OND.P.B!:.~ Rf-:'~'J;l:t~E.P..}

FJ!s . Reddin :

Please note tha·:: t;hi.s r::c-nfirrns the t:eTir'.ination of our relationship. If you need atld::.t:.io.na:: copies of t.he mat:e·cials fJ~om yo:rr· file, ple::~He i:nfoJ.J:fi. '1"11e ~cpy and/or documents in my fi::i..e are copies of .jocuruEnts tende~·ea to me by you. This also confirms tlm.t our retainer is non· refundable. If yc-u d.::!sire us 1·o provide you a des(!r:ipL.ion of the scope and :ur..tu!·e of the wut:·k pe:1:formed, ple<.=tSI.! inform. 2012-03-08 14:38 )(544 014097634102 » . 409 948 9901 p 3/3

A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 -409.763.0386 1.. 800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

xc: Interoffice - Rita Westerman \please close file)

c 'word. r.edLl:iH_polly. client3_trar-.sml ttal. 2011_3348 A GRIFFIN lAWYERS

Galveston lsland Galveston, Texas 77550

RE: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. KERSHAW ENTERJ?RISES, INC. AND.DEBBIE KERSHAW; IN THE ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON CO~ITY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO.

(CONFIRMATION THAT RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED)

(CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRACT OF EMPLOYNMENT CALI...S FOR A NON-REFUNDABLE RETAINER) Ms. Reddin;

Please note that this confirms the terwination of our relationship. If you need additional copies of the materials from your file, please inform. 'The copy and/or documents in my file are copies of documents tendered to me by you. This also confirms that our retainer is non- refundable. If you desire us toprovide you a description of the scope and nature of the work performed, please · · inform. A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1..800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files

xc: Interoffice - Rita Westerman (please close file)

c:word.reddin_polly.client3_transmittal.2011_3348 CAUSE NO.

POLLy WORLD I INC. IN THE

v. JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT

KERSHAW ENTERPRISES, INC. , AND DEBBIE KERSHAW GALVESTON COONTY, TEXAS}

PLAINTIFF, POLLY WORLD, INC.'S, ORIGINAL PETITION

This lawsuit is brought by Polly World, Inc., herein

after and sometimes referred to as Plaintiffr against

Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. and Debbie Kershaw, hereinafter

and sometimes referred to a.s Defendants. Plaintiff would

show unto the Court as follows;

This matter is a Schedule 2 matter as that terin is

defined by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 190.3.

Plaintiff, Polly World, Inc. is a corporation doing

business in the State of Texas. ..

Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. is an entity incorporated in

the State of Texas and be served with process by serving

its registered agent, to-wit:

Debbie Kershaw can be served with process by serving

her at 2910 53ru Street, Galveston, Texas. III.

On or about Jl,pril 15, 2008, the parties entered into

agreements associated with property described as Abstract

628, Page 101, M. Menard Surface of Tract 83 (542 Acres),

City of Galveston, Galveston County, Texas. The agreements

included Contract of Loan Agreement in which Kershaw

Enterprises, Inc., and Polly World, Inc. acknowledged

documentation of· agreement between the Buyer (Kershaw) and

Seller {Polly World) surrounding the sell of the subject

property, with all existing and proposed improvements,

including personal property. The written agreement

provided that Lender (Polly World) agrees to a secondary

lien on said property subject to Borrower's lender {Moody

Bank) haYing the first lien on the subject property. The

Contract of Loan Agreement evidencing "the loan a.'llount of

$170,000.00 being evidenced by a promissory note to Seller

bearing interest at the rate of nine (5%) per annum payable.

in monthly installments of $1,200.00 per month. The note

shall be payable at any time prior to maturity without

penalty" ·- (a copy of t:he Cor'•Lract of Loa..J. Agreement is

attached herein) . The parties also entered into a Purchase

and Sale Agreement (attached and incorporated for all

purposes) . Polly World also executed a Warranty Deed with

Vendor's Lien and a General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill

···- --------·-·-------..---·------- of Sale {attached and incorporated for all purposes herein) .

DAMAGES AND PRAYER

Defendant has failed to pay ~~d has defaulted on the

subject due. Defendant's r.Jutstanding debts on said note is

$ , for which Plaintiff brings this claim.

Plaintiff also prays -for prejudgnient and post-judgment

interest, costs ·:>f court and. all matters under law and

equity that Plaintiff may be entitled.

Plaint:iff sues for reasonable and attorneys fees.

Plaintiff prays for trial by jury.

DATE: February 27, 2012.

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 T~ FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102

ATI'OR..Y'iEY FOR PLAINTIFF POLLY WORLD, INC. c:word.reddin_polly.plaintiff_crigio~l-l,e~ition.20ll·334a

------~-----·--- -·- . - -·- .. --- -·--- NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF GAL'i.lESTON

Consistent with § 12.007, Texas Property Code, this

Notice of Lis Pendens is filed in order to encumber real

property described as follows: Abstract 628, Page 101, M.

Menard Surface of Tract 83 (542 Acres), City of Galveston,

Galveston County, Texas. This lis pendens pertains to the

establishment of an interest in renl propert.y, or the enforcement

of an encumbrance against real property. An action has

been filed in the district court with respect to same,

styled Polly World, Inc .. ..:~.: Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. and

Debbie Kershaw, in the Judicial District Court,

Galveston County, Texa.s, Cause No.

Affiant so swears and affirms on this the

day-· _ _ _ , 2012.

POLLY REDDIN SUBSCRIBED P~ SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this the

day of _ _ _ , 2012.

·NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR STATE OF TEXAS

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

c;wo~d.reddin_pally_lis_peodeae

---· ··--· ---· ---·--- ·-· -- ··- - -- ------- BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY P~~EL OF THE

STA.TE BAR DISTRICT NO. 58 GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

CO~n~ISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, PETITIONER,

v. H0031234738 [POLLY REDDIN]

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS RESPONDENT.

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE:

Respondent files this his response to the original

evidentiary petition and asserts as follows:

1. Respondent asserts a general denial and prays that the

Commission proves the allegations by the strictest proof allowed

under law.

2. Respondent admits in part and denies in part the

allegations contained in paragraph 1. Plaintiff was hired by

the client to advise and consult. The client does not have the

right under the Code/Disciplinary Rules to dictate when and

where the lawsuit is filed as long as the cause ls filed timely.

3. Respondent admits and denies paragraph 2. The

Respondent admits that appointments were made and sometimes

canceled. During one particular appointment, . Respondent did

tender a "rough draft" to the client to make corrections. A

rough draft is what is connotes - and the notion that the same represents malfeasance is consistent with the practice of law.

In addition, Respondent would show that a lawyer's schedule oft-

times is controlled by the lawyer's trial docket and the

cancellation of an appointment (with notice) is a proper

practice and not a violation of the Disciplinary Rules.

4. With respect to the rule violations, Respondent denies

violating with respect to neglect. The facts set out by the

Commission do not support same as a matter of law. In addition,

the client was informed as to the status of her case and the

client was tendered her paperwork in a timely fashion. The

Respondent contends that the retainer was non-refundable and the

work having been performed.

5. It is prayed that the requested relief be denied herein.

DATE: October 26, 2012.

ubmitted,

ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 TWENTY FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102

This is to certify that the foregoing answer was

forwarded to opposing counsel on this the 26th day of

October, 2012 by email transmission/facsimile transmission

and/or by regular mail, confirmation copy, to-wit:

SHANNON BREAUX SAUCEDA ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL 600 JEFFERSON, SUITE 1000 HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002

/S/ ANTHONY P.

ANTHONY

c:word.grievancefile_reddin_polly_original_answer A GRIFFIN LAWYERS

Galveston island Galveston, Texas 77550 May 22, 2012

Robert Nelson Chief Investigator Office of the Chief Disciplin~ry Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002

RE: H0031234738 POLLY REDDIN - ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN

Mr. Nelson:

Please accept this as our response to tbe subject grievance. Please note that it is our position that we have not violated any rights and/or duties due and owing to the client. In context of background, please note as follows:

• The initial interview took place on September 29, 2011. The client was referred by a former client, Kenny Childs. • A copy of the contract of employment is attached. The retainer was $5,000.00, nonrefundable. • The client came to this office conce.:cned with respect to a debt that was due and. ow:i.ng to her from a Debbie Kershaw, and Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. The debt originated out of the purchase of a property from the client the note was 1

$170,000.00 and was signed on or about February 2008. The client was conc<2:rned that Kershaw Enterprises, Inc./Debbie.Kershaw d/b/a First Step had violated the terms of the Loan Agreement . . The client's ar~urnent related to the title company related to the client's feelings that the title company did not prepare the appropriate paperwork to protect their interest. ~ Attached under Tab B are copies of the contractual documents prepared by the title company "' The client had previous counsel in the form of Lyons & Plackemeir, P.L.L.C. This firm wrote a letter dated December 23, 2010 providing notice of the debt (Tab C) . m Under Tab 4 is the work performed for the client, to-wit: (i) letter dated October 4 2011 1

transmitting the contract of employment; ii) demand letter to Kershaw adding "reasonable an.d necessary at·torneys fees"; letter from former counsel did not have this language and thus this would have p1:ecluded the client recovering attorneys' fee; iii) the rough draft of Notice of lis pendens prepared for the client; iv) our letter dated February 27, 2012 to the client transmitting the rough draft of the lawsuit, the lis pendens and the demand letter; v) the rough draft of the lawsuit; vi) our letter dated March 7 1 2012 making clear the relationship between this office and the client is now terminated.

My disagreement with the client is one related to time-line and the decisions that the lawyer traditionally makes (when and where file suit) . Plea.se note that the language contained in the contract is borrowed from the Disciplinary Code and case law. The then followed her time-line with an e}::plicit threat - if the lawsuit is not filed by a. certain date and/or the rough completed by a certain date, then our relationship will be terminated. I agreed - the relationship should be terminated. My letter followed this agreement. The client also inquired with respect to refund of part and/or all of the non-refundable retainer. I informed the client that I had performed work and this would not occur; our letter followed.

2 If any additional information is needed, please inform; my apology for the delay in transmitting this information.

Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Le.vfYers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas · 77550 409.763.0386 l . BOO. 750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102

APG/ ·files

FACSH1ILE TR.I:illSMISSION AND REGULAR J.V1.~IL

XC: .Polly Reddin

c:word.grievancc_folder_reddin.polly_respcnse_grieva.nce