SMITH, Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on a petition for review of the November 9, 1989 order entered by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission) which rejected the Recommended Decision of Administrative Law Judge Michael Schnierle (ALJ) and approved the use of a customer service reintroduced by Bell of Pennsylvania (Bell)1 identified as Caller*ID. This service would permit customers to identify the telephone number from which a call is being made to the customer and is to be offered with limited blocking for private, nonprofit, tax-exempt domestic violence intervention agencies; home telephones of staff members of such agencies whose personal safety may be at risk if blocking is not provided and who are certified to require blocking service by the agency head; federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; and persons for whom a duly authorized representative of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have certified a need for blocking to mitigate the risk of personal injury.
The Commission concluded that by implementing Caller* ID, lives can be saved; annoying, harassing, abusive, [291]*291obscene and terroristic telephone calls can be curtailed; false bomb threats to public schools, false fire alarms and other harassing and life threatening prank calls may be eliminated or reduced; and residential callers will have their privacy better safeguarded. Petitioners filed complaints before the Commission against the proposed Caller* ID service. On December 29, 1989, this Court granted Petitioners’ joint application for partial stay of the Commission order and directed that Caller* ID be offered only to emergency service providers pending final disposition of Petitioners’ appeal.
Multiple issues are presented for review, including questions as to whether the use of Caller* ID without a blocking mechanism constitutes a violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Wiretap Act);2 whether authorization of Caller*ID by the Commission without a blocking mechanism constitutes a violation of privacy rights protected by the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions; whether the Commission’s order requiring limited blocking violates due process and is unlawfully discriminatory where the certification procedure ordered by the Commission lacks procedural safeguards; and finally, whether the Commission’s order is supported by substantial evidence of record. The scope of review in this matter is limited to determining whether or not the Commission violated any constitutional rights, committed an error of law, or made findings which are not supported by substantial evidence. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 83 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 331, 478 A.2d 921 (1984), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 518 Pa. 76, 541 A.2d 314 (1988); 2 Pa. C.S. § 704 (Supp.1989).
I.
Bell filed its revision to Tariff Pa. PUC No. 1 on June 18, 1989 in which Bell proposed new services to its tariff. The [292]*292filing by Bell proposed to merge existing Customer Calling Service and Customer Local Area Signalling Service tariffs into a unified tariff labeled Bell Atlantic I.Q. Services Family, or services sold primarily to the residential and small business market. AU Recommended Decision (R. Decision), pp. 2, 9.3 Included in this filing is the following description of Caller*ID:
This service allows a customer to receive the calling telephone number for calls placed to the customer. The calling telephone number will be forwarded from the terminating central office to a customer provided telephone number display device attached to the customer’s telephone line. The calling telephone number will be delivered during the first silent interval of ringing. The telephone numbers which will be forwarded to the customer will include telephone numbers associated with private telephone number service and non-listed telephone number service, as described elsewhere in this tariff. For calls originating from a line within a multi-line hunting of four-party service, only the ‘main’ or ‘pilot’ telephone number will be delivered. A message indicating the unavailability of a calling telephone number will be [293]*293forwarded if the call originates from a telephone service which is not located in an appropriately equipped office. Caller* ID is available to individual line customers by monthly subscription, which provides unlimited use of the service.
Commission Order, p. 2. Caller* ID would not permit customers to identify the telephone number for calls being made from a pay telephone, by credit card, or by operator assistance.
On September 22, 1989, the AU issued his Recommended Decision finding that Caller* ID was not in the public interest unless Bell provided a “per-call” blocking option which is already built into the system. Bell’s proposal did not include the blocking option recommended by the AU which would permit customers to block transmission of their telephone numbers prior to placing a call. The AU determined that Caller*ID was a “trap and trace device” as defined by the Wiretap Act and that only by offering the blocking mechanism could Caller* ID become lawful under that statute.
The Commission entered its order on November 9, 1989 rejecting the AU’s Recommended Decision and permitting Bell to provide Caller* ID to its customers, but with the added requirement that Bell provide free subscription or per-call blocking at the customers’ discretion for (a) private, non-profit, tax-exempt, domestic violence intervention agencies; (b) home telephones of staff members of such agencies whose personal safety may be at risk although such individuals must be certified by the head of the agency and re-certified annually; (c) federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; and (d) individuals for whom a duly authorized representative of a federal, state or local law enforcement agency has certified a need for blocking to reduce the risk of personal injury. Such individuals must also be recertified annually. The Commission did not order that blocking be made available for any other individuals. Bell filed a new tariff on November 18, 1989 in compliance [294]*294with the Commission’s order, and this tariff was approved by the Commission on November 30, 1989.
II.
Initially, Petitioners argue that Caller* ID violates Section 5771(a) of the Wiretap Act, 18 Pa. C.S. § 5771(a), which states as follows:
(a) General Rule. — Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 5773 (relating to issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device).
Section 5702, 18 Pa. C.S. § 5702, defines a trap and trace device as:
[a] device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.
The Wiretap Act does however except certain forms of transmission from its provisions:
(b) Exception. — The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire communication service:
(1) relating to the operation, maintenance and testing of a wire or electronic communication service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider, or to the protection of users of the service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; or
(2) to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect the provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication or a user of the service from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service, or with the consent of the user of the service.
18 Pa. C.S. § 5771(b).
An historical perspective upon enactment of Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act will be useful for this discussion. [295]*295The initial history of anti-wiretapping legislation is described in part by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 43, 223 A.2d 102, 105 (1966), and its observations are illuminating:
When the Pennsylvania [anti-wiretapping] Act passed the State Senate, the prohibition read: ‘No person shall intercept a communication by telephone or telegraph without permission of one of the parties.’ ... However, this restriction to the consent of only one party was decisively rejected in the House by a vote of 128 to 61. The bill was then amended to provide for the consent of all parties to the communication before the interception could be defended. [Emphasis in original.]
Thus, enactment of the Wiretap Act, most recently amended October 21, 1988, was intended to develop a means for the prohibition of nonconsensual interception of wire, oral or electronic communication except where authorized by the statute. See Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 555 A.2d 1254 (1989). Dissenting Commissioner Joseph Rhodes, Jr., a former legislator who in 1977 chaired the House Judiciary Sub-Committee on Crime and Corrections and jointly introduced the Wiretap Act, indicated that the fundamental purpose behind enactment of the legislation was to minimize interceptions of telephone conversations and numbers. Commission Dissenting Opinion, pp. 4-6. Moreover, the Wiretap Act prohibits even a private individual from recording his or her own telephone conversation unless that individual has the consent of all parties to the conversation. Commonwealth v. Jung, 366 Pa.Superior Ct. 438, 531 A.2d 498 (1987).
Further, the General Assembly has provided protection to telephone numbers through enactment of the Wiretap Act by prohibiting the use of interception devices unless probable cause exists. 18 Pa. C.S. § 5773. In Commonwealth v. Beauford, 327 Pa.Superior Ct. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 508 Pa. 319, 496 A.2d 1143 (1985), although involving the use of pen registers and dialed number recorders by law enforcement [296]*296officials, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that telephone numbers are to be afforded protection. In Melilli, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Beauford:
In Beauford, the Superior Court intended to equate telephone numbers with other forms of telephone communication which are regarded as private. Telephone activities are largely of one piece, and efforts to create distinctions between numbers and conversational content are constitutionally untenable in our view.
Melilli, 521 Pa. at 414, 555 A.2d at 1259.
Petitioners argue that Caller* ID meets the definition of a trap and trace device prohibited by the Wiretap Act which clearly provides that use of a trap and trace device may only be conducted by an electronic service provider and not by individual customers to whom Bell wishes to offer this new class of service. They also invoke the general provision of the Wiretap Act prohibiting the interception or disclosure of electronic communications. 18 Pa. C.S. § 5703. Bell’s response is that Caller*ID does not constitute a trap and trace device nor an unlawful interception of electronic communications and further that the Wiretap Act is a criminal statute and must be narrowly construed. By applying this strict standard, according to Bell, it becomes apparent that the Wiretap Act does not prohibit the use of Caller*ID. Bell also asserts that the Wiretap Act applies only to third party interception and is designed to regulate surreptitious electronic surveillance of citizens by governmental officials and not to prohibit such surveillance by private individuals, and as such, no legislative prohibition exists against Caller* ID which Bell suggests is nothing more than routine telephone service offered by Bell in the course of its doing business. Bell’s interpretation of the Wiretap Act is simply incorrect inasmuch as unlawful interception can occur in the use of Caller* ID and private individuals may be prosecuted for violation of any of the Wiretap Act’s provisions.
The only exemption applicable here to use of a trap and trace device concerns use by an electronic service provider, [297]*297and Section 5771(b) sets forth those instances in which a trap and trace can be conducted. Bell argues, however, that the Wiretap Act does not apply to use of a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire communication service where consent of the user of the service is obtained. Followed to its logical conclusion, Bell would contend and have this Court believe that a Caller* ID subscriber is the user of the service and consents to use of a trap and trace device by subscribing to Caller*ID. This argument must fail when one considers that “user” includes “any person or entity” who uses the telephone network and that a contrary and reasonable interpretation of that term could also be construed as the calling party rather than the Caller*ID subscriber. 18 Pa. C.S. § 5702. Hence, Bell’s consent analysis fails to support an exception to the Wiretap Act.
Neither the Caller*ID device nor the data captured by the device is controlled or maintained by Bell but rather by the customer subscriber, clearly violating the trap and trace device prohibition. In concluding that Caller* ID violates the Wiretap Act, the AU correctly determined as follows:
[T]he Legislature has specifically excluded from the term ‘pen register’ devices used by the telephone company or by the customer to record outgoing numbers for billing or cost accounting purposes in the ordinary course of business. No similar exclusion is appended to the definition of ‘trap and trace device.’ Had the Legislature intended the term ‘trap and trace device’ to exclude a device, such as Caller* ID, which is used in conjunction with a service provided by the telephone company as an ordinary tariffed service, it would have added such an exclusion. The absence of such an exclusion to the term ‘trap and trace device,’ coupled with the existence of a specific exclusion to the term ‘pen register,’ suggests that the term ‘trap and trace device’ must be interpreted as including devices operated by the telephone subscriber, such as Caller*ID.
[298]*298By analogy, Bell’s argument that a Caller* ID device should not be considered a ‘trap and trace device’ because it ordinarily is used by a telephone subscriber in connection with a service furnished by the phone company is without merit.
Finally, if a Caller* ID device is attached surreptitiously to the phone line of a Caller* ID subscriber, the person attaching the Caller* ID device can intercept the calling party numbers without the knowledge of the subscriber____ Thus, a Caller* ID device can be used to implement a ‘trap and trace’ on a Caller* ID subscriber’s phone line.
ALJ R. Decision, pp. 38-41. Moreover, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania has agreed in his brief that Caller* ID is a trap and trace device as defined by the Wiretap Act, although contending that it is the service which falls within the definition and not the display unit purchased by the consumer. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, p. 4.
Petitioners suggest, however, that Caller* ID may satisfy the Wiretap Act if all parties to the interception consent to its use and that blocking would permit callers to consent to transmission of their telephone number. Section 5704 of the Wiretap Act, 18 Pa. C.S. § 5704, provides that it shall not be unlawful for:
(4) [a] person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception.
Thus, where making a call without blocking the calling number transmission, callers would provide implied consent for transmission of their telephone number information. For reasons discussed later in this opinion, Petitioners’ suggestion is untenable.
Ill
Petitioners next argue that providing Caller* ID without making available a blocking mechanism to the general public violates the privacy protections conferred by the Penn[299]*299sylvania Constitution and that Bell’s contention that state constitutional protections do not apply here is without legal foundation.4 The AU, while not finding a violation of Article I, sections 1 and 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, advanced the view that Caller* ID neither enhances nor threatens privacy rights “but merely increases the cost of privacy.” AU R. Decision, p. 73.
Bell argues that no constitutional violations occur through the offering of Caller* ID and moreover that the U.S. Constitution requires state action before a party may invoke constitutional rights, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 348 F.Supp. 954 (M.D.Pa.1972), affirmed, 483 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir.1973), affirmed, 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). Here, Bell contends that courts do not recognize a constitutional right to be free from any and all forms of electronic surveillance, wiretapping or eavesdropping and further that single party consensual recordings are constitutional, and as Petitioners fail to establish a property interest in telephone anonymity, their due process arguments must fail. Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988), affirmed, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). Although not waiving its claim that the constitutional issues were not properly preserved for review, Bell contends that the right to privacy, if one does exist, is the right to be left alone from governmental invasions and that if it is possible for a private citizen to violate another’s privacy rights at a constitutional level, it is the right to be left alone that must be preserved and that Caller* ID protects that right.
Petitioners persuasively argue that approval of Caller* ID by the Commission constitutes state action which [300]*300violates federal constitutional privacy protections in that the Commission as a regulatory agency is facilitating Bell’s intrusion into the privacy rights of citizens of this Commonwealth, thereby making federal constitutional protections applicable to the Commission action. Jackson. See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir.1980), for discussion of the balancing test applied in determining whether a particular government action violated constitutionally protected privacy rights.
One cannot refute the fact that Bell has enjoyed an historical monopoly and virtual domination in the telecommunications area. U.S. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C.1982), affirmed, 460 U.S. 1001, 103 S.Ct. 1240, 75 L.Ed.2d 472 (1983). Nor can one likewise challenge the fact that Bell may not offer Caller* ID to its subscribers without the imprimatur of the Commission. In Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
[i]t may well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be ‘state’ acts than will the acts of an entity lacking these characteristics. But the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself ... The true nature of the State’s involvement may not be immediately obvious, and detailed inquiry may be required in order to determine whether the test is met.
Id. at 350-51, 95 S.Ct. at 453. Ültimately, in construing what action constitutes state action for purposes of invoking constitutional prohibitions, courts must be guided by the following observations:
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance____ Owing to the very ‘largeness’ of government, a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the [Fourteenth] [301]*301Amendment’s embrace, but that, it must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 725-26, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 861-62, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). Courts are further cautioned that in making the particularized inquiry, focus should not be on whether a single fact or relationship demonstrates a sufficient degree of state action but whether considering the aggregate of all pertinent factors, a finding of state responsibility is required. Jackson; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). See also National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988), citing Jackson and Burton, for a general discussion of what constitutes state action.
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, within the framework of the relevant factual circumstances here, the action taken by the Commission to approve Bell’s amended tariff to allow Caller*ID must be construed as state action sufficient to justify the application of constitutional prohibitions, even recognizing the principle that furnishing of utility service is generally not considered to be a state function. See Bartholomew v. Foster, 115 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 430, 541 A.2d 393 (1988), affirmed, 522 Pa. 489, 563 A.2d 1390 (1989). Not only did the Commission require extensive investigatory hearings in selected locations throughout the Commonwealth, but its further action in ordering limited blocking to certain designated individuals or groups to prevent harm absent a request by the parties to do so and requiring a certification process to be implemented by federal, state or local law enforcement agencies effectively takes this case out of the realm of mere regulation of private enterprise and transforms the Commission’s decision into one of state action. Hence, an analysis of the aggregate of all relevant factors here compels a finding that a sufficiently close nexus exists between the state and the challenged service, thereby creating state responsibility in the approval of Caller*ID. See generally [302]*302Smith, We’ve Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional to Give It Out?: Call Identification Technology and The Right to Informational Privacy), 37 UCLA L.Rev. 145 (1989). Finding the necessary state action component, this Court shall review Petitioners’ constitutional challenges.
In Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission, 504 Pa. 191, 470 A.2d 945 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an independent constitutional right of privacy exists in the Pennsylvania Constitution arising under Article I, sections 1 and 8. In the context of unauthorized distribution or seizure of an individual’s telephone number, the Superior Court stated in Beauford:
[W]e are convinced that a person picking up a telephone in his home or office fully expects that the number he is about to dial will remain as private as the contents of the communication he is about to have. That number provides a strong, sometimes conclusive inference as to whom is being called, unquestionably a private matter. The caller certainly evidences no intention to shed his veil of privacy merely because he chooses to use the telephone to make private contacts. In modern-day America the telephone call is a nearly indispensable tool used to conduct the widest range of business, government, political, social, and personal affairs.
Id., 327 Pa.Superior Ct. at 265, 475 A.2d at 789. The foregoing leaves little doubt that an individual has a right to privacy in the use of his or her telephone and that unauthorized seizure or disclosure of one’s telephone number will not be permitted by the courts of this Commonwealth.5 Accord Melilli where the Supreme Court in reaffirming principles espoused in Beauford Stated that efforts to make distinctions between telephone numbers and conversational content are constitutionally untenable in that Court’s view.
The AU found that the private Bell customer would have less control over the distribution of his or her [303]*303telephone number and that many private customers testified that Caller* ID violated their privacy expectations in maintaining private telephone numbers. The ALJ also found that Caller* ID potentially increases telemarketing and other sales calls; threatens an individual’s ability to receive or make contact with groups and other organizations; presents a threat to battered women and those attempting to assist battered women; jeopardizes various other social, therapeutic and community groups in their contacts with clients; and threatens law enforcement officials and their informants and tipsters. AU R. Decision, pp. 88-96. Considering these findings, which are supported by credible evidence of record, Caller* ID poses a substantial invasion of the personal privacy rights of the citizens of this Commonwealth.
An issue which must therefore be addressed is whether Caller* ID with blocking is constitutionally permissible in view of the privacy intrusions caused by such service. Bell advocates that blockable Caller* ID is unfeasible and that anyone wishing to maintain anonymity and avoid transmission of his or her telephone number may do so by making pay telephone calls at the current twenty-five cents per call; credit card calls at the current forty cents per call; or operator assisted calls currently charged at one dollar twenty cents per call. Such suggestion rises to absurdity when considering the inconveniences and added costs imposed upon consumers to protect their privacy and the nominal advantages to accrue from Caller* ID when balanced against the grave intrusions of privacy threatened against the people of this Commonwealth.6
[304]*304Notwithstanding the Commission’s limited blocking order or whether wholesale blocking was made available by Bell to the general public either free or for charge, the potential for privacy violations, still exists for that undefinable segment of the general public who lacks notice of a blocking option; cannot afford the additional expense if blocking were available for a fee; forgets to trigger the blocking mechanism in cases of emergency or trauma;' ad infinitum.
In reviewing the privacy challenges presented to Caller*ID, this Court is guided by further observations of the Supreme Court in Murray:
It is clear ... that the privacy of the telephoning public is the interest which must first arrest one’s attention in dealing with this problem. A mere passing acquaintance with the daily newspaper suffices to substantiate the existence of a widely felt and insidious threat to individual privacy posed, not only by technological advances, but also by the evolution of contemporary social structures. A jealous regard for individual privacy is a judicial tradition of distinguished origin, buttressed in many areas by the imperative mandate of constitutional guarantees. Protection of individual privacy, however, appears frequently to reduce the methods available to law enforcement agencies in the detection and prosecution of crime. New would deny that in this country today concern with the growth of criminal activity is of the same order of magnitude as the concern with the erosion of individual privacy.
Id., 423 Pa. at 57, 223 A.2d at 112-113. Hence, consumers of telephone service should not suffer an invasion, erosion or deprivation of their privacy rights to protect the unascertainable number of individuals or groups who receive nuisance, obscene or annoying telephone calls which can already be traced or otherwise dealt with by existing services provided by Bell. Guided by the wise observations in [305]*305Murray, this Court will unhesitatingly uphold the judicial tradition of “jealous regard for individual privacy.” In so doing, this Court concludes that Caller*ID, either in its blockable or unblockable format, violates the privacy rights of the people of this Commonwealth. In the framework of a democratic society, the privacy rights concept is much too fundamental to be compromised or abridged by permitting Caller* ID.
IV
Next, Petitioners argue that the Commission’s order regarding the availability of a blocking mechanism on a limited basis violates due process. After recognizing that certain individuals may require blocking to maintain their personal safety, the Commission created a certification process to identify those individuals entitled to blocking which lacks procedural standards or any provisions for notice, hearing or appeal. In his opinion and order granting a partial stay of the Commission’s order, President Judge Crumlish stated that the record is devoid of evidence establishing even the most minimal guidelines for this certification process. As such, Petitioners aptly argue that the certification process which fails to provide for notice to the general public constitutes arbitrary government action and creates a procedure lacking in due process protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Fundamental questions remain unresolved by the Commission’s order. Questions appropriately posed by Dissenting Commissioner Rhodes include whether the certification process will create an unwanted burden upon law enforcement agencies; who will designate the duly authorized law enforcement official; whether the certification decisions are appealable, and if so, what appeal procedures are applicable; who will pay the cost for the certification process; who will perform certification in the event a particular law enforcement agency refuses to perform the certification; [306]*306and finally, who bears the risks in the event an individual denied blocking certification is subsequently injured as a result of Caller*ID. Hence, the Commission’s order in this regard is fatally flawed and thus unlawful as it lacks minimal due process standards. See Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 119 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 81, 546 A.2d 1296, following reargument, 119 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 81, 550 A.2d 257 (1988), appeal denied, 523 Pa. 652, 567 A.2d 655 (1989).
V
The blocking remedy was not proposed by any of the parties to the proceedings nor by the AU and is, according to Petitioners, unsupported by substantial evidence of record. The Commission adopted the AU findings and did not require additional evidence but concluded that the limited blocking to be offered to select individuals and groups would protect callers from any harm which might occur as a result of Caller*ID. Further, the Commission order neither refers to specific evidence to support its decision to allow blocking to selected individuals and groups nor adequately explains the basis for its rejection of the AU’s analysis.
Bell initially contends that all of the benefits it predicts from Caller*ID have been borne out in New Jersey relying upon testimony by various individuals that anonymous telephone calls, false alarms, and other annoying telephone calls have been reduced.7 Evidence was presented by Bell to demonstrate the benefits of Caller* ID which presumably supports the conclusion that Caller* ID would discourage or deter criminal and annoying behavior. Bell’s witnesses purported to show that a majority of Pennsylvania residents will benefit from Caller*ID and that it will reduce substantially the number of obscene and annoying telephone calls made to residents within this Commonwealth.
[307]*307It is conceivable that Caller* ID is just as likely to encourage criminal or annoying behavior as it would to discourage such conduct particularly in those instances where a prank or obscene caller subscribes to Caller* ID and consequently has the capacity to develop a list of telephone numbers in his or her data base for use in making such calls. (Caller* ID has the capacity to display sixty-four ten digit telephone numbers including area code along with the date and time of each call.) Moreover, it is highly unlikely that criminals plotting serious crime would do so from his or her own home telephone as a substantial amount of criminal contact occurs through the public telephone. To buttress its arguments, Bell cites testimony regarding assaults and murders of pizza delivery persons; bomb threats to hospitals; drunken or drugged persons who assault hospital staff; evidence of a baby’s life being saved in New Jersey because of Caller* ID; and false fire and other emergency reports which utilize the resources of emergency personnel and reduce their ability to respond to real emergencies. Yet, none of the parties recognize that if blocking were made available to the general public as advocated, the reasonable and anticipated result is that those who are inclined to make anonymous calls will secure the blocking feature to avoid transmission of the caller’s telephone number, effectively emasculating the purposes of and intent behind Caller*ID.
Bell contends that its existing services, i.e., Call*Trace and Call*Block are insufficient to provide the type of service which Caller* ID is designed to offer subscribers, in that the other services do not provide the immediate display of a telephone number in the event of an abusive call. Further, Bell argues that the only deterrent to abuse calling is Caller*ID; and any individual who wishes to retain anonymity may simply make operator assisted calls, credit card calls or coin operated telephone calls — methods of calling which can also justifiably apply to those obscene and annoying crank callers or other criminals whose contact Caller* ID is designed to minimize or deter. Petitioners’ arguments [308]*308here must be sustained as well. The Commission took no additional evidence on the issue of restricted blocking and sua sponte imposed limited blocking for those designated individuals and groups without the benefit of testimony or other evidence which may have demonstrated a different result.
Viewing the record in the context of this Court’s limited scope of review, the conclusion mandated here is that the Commission erred in rejecting the AU's determination that Caller* ID violates the Wiretap Act and further that the Commission’s order approving Caller*ID violates constitutional privacy and due process rights and is not supported by substantial evidence of record.8
ORDER
AND NOW, this 80th day of May, 1990, the order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission is reversed.
The decision in this case was reached prior to the retirement of former President Judge CRUMLISH, Jr.
PALLADINO, J., did not participate in the decision in this case.