IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 22–2085
Submitted December 13, 2023—Filed June 14, 2024
SALLY SPLITTGERBER and HOWARD SPLITTGERBER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, THE RICHARD G. HANSEN REVOCABLE TRUST, and CITY OF DES MOINES,
Defendants. ________________________________________________
BANKERS TRUST COMPANY,
Appellant,
CITY OF DES MOINES,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph Seidlin,
Judge. An abutting property owner appeals the district court’s summary
judgment ruling holding the property owner liable for damages resulting from a
pedestrian’s fall on a sidewalk. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,
C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, and May, JJ., joined. Oxley, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which McDonald, J., joined. 2
James W. Bryan (argued) of Andersen & Associates, West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Luke DeSmet (argued), Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellee. 3
MCDERMOTT, Justice. Sally Splittgerber fell while strolling on a city sidewalk. She and her hus-
band filed a personal injury lawsuit against the owner of the adjacent property
(a revocable trust), the lessee of that property (Bankers Trust), and the City of
Des Moines, alleging that they were negligent in maintaining what had become
an uneven sidewalk. After settling the Splittgerbers’ claims, Bankers Trust and
the City continued the fight, with Bankers Trust seeking contribution from the
City for the settlement payment on the theory that the City, and not the owner
or lessee of the property, was responsible for maintaining the sidewalk. The dis-
trict court, relying on our holding in Madden v. City of Iowa City, 848 N.W.2d 40
(Iowa 2014), granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Bankers Trust ap-
peals, asking us to overrule Madden.
I.
Cities own public sidewalks. Fulps v. City of Urbandale, 956 N.W.2d 469,
472 (Iowa 2021). “[S]idewalks are a portion of the city street reserved for pedes-
trian traffic for which the city bears a responsibility of care, supervision, and
control.” Spechtenhauser v. City of Dubuque, 391 N.W.2d 213, 214–15
(Iowa 1986) (en banc); see also Iowa Code § 364.12(2) (2022). In light of their ownership and maintenance duties, cities also bear liability for personal injuries
resulting from improperly maintained sidewalks. Fulps, 956 N.W.2d at 472. “This
principle of municipal liability makes sense given that the city owns the side-
walk.” Id.
The legislature has modified these duties and liabilities. See Iowa Code
§ 364.12(2). Iowa Code § 364.12(2) provides in relevant part:
2. A city shall keep all public grounds, streets, sidewalks, . . . and commons open, in repair, and free from nuisance, with the fol- lowing exceptions: 4
....
b. The abutting property owner is responsible for the removal of the natural accumulations of snow and ice from the sidewalks within a reasonable amount of time and may be liable for damages caused by the failure of the abutting property owner to use reason- able care in the removal of the snow or ice. If damages are to be awarded under this section against the abutting property owner, the claimant has the burden of proving the amount of the damages. To authorize recovery of more than a nominal amount, facts must exist and be shown by the evidence which afford a reasonable basis for measuring the amount of the claimant’s actual damages, and the amount of actual damages shall not be determined by speculation, conjecture, or surmise. All legal or equitable defenses are available to the abutting property owner in an action brought pursuant to this paragraph. The city’s general duty under this subsection does not include a duty to remove natural accumulations of snow or ice from the sidewalks. However, when the city is the abutting property owner it has the specific duty of the abutting property owner set forth in this paragraph.
c. The abutting property owner may be required by ordinance to maintain all property outside the lot and property lines and inside the curb lines upon the public streets, except that the property owner shall not be required to remove diseased trees or dead wood on the publicly owned property or right-of-way.
d. A city may serve notice on the abutting property owner, by certified mail to the property owner as shown by the records of the county auditor, requiring the abutting property owner to repair, re- place, or reconstruct sidewalks.
e. If the abutting property owner does not perform an action required under this subsection within a reasonable time, a city may perform the required action and assess the costs against the abut- ting property for collection in the same manner as a property tax. This power does not relieve the abutting property owner of liability imposed under paragraph “b”.
(Emphasis added.)
A.
In Madden, a bicyclist fell and suffered injuries while riding on a sidewalk
on the University of Iowa campus. 848 N.W.2d at 43. She sued the City of Iowa
City for failing to maintain the sidewalk. Id. Iowa City, in turn, sued the State of 5
Iowa, which funds and operates the university, for contribution. Id. The city ar-
gued that one of its ordinances required abutting landowners to maintain side-
walks and imposed liability on them for any resulting personal injuries. Id. The
state moved to dismiss the city’s lawsuit, arguing (among other things) that Iowa
Code § 364.12(2)(c) doesn’t shift liability to abutting landowners for failing to
repair sidewalks. Id. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Id.
On appeal, we examined the liability imposed on abutting landowners for
sidewalk accidents under common law principles. Id. at 44–45. We observed that
abutting landowners under the common law bear no liability for injuries arising
from defective sidewalks. Id. at 44. Even when a statute requires an abutting
landowner to maintain a sidewalk, Iowa follows the common law rule that this
alone will not give rise to liability for damages. Id. at 44–45. An abutting land-
owner risks liability for damages, we concluded, only when an ordinance or stat-
ute “expressly makes an abutting landowner liable for damages occasioned by
the defective condition of sidewalks.” Id. at 45.
We discussed in Madden an earlier case that addressed whether a side-
walk maintenance responsibility also created liability for damages to injured pe-
destrians. Id. at 48. In that case, Peffers v. City of Des Moines, we had analyzed a prior version of Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(b) that imposed a duty on an abutting
landowner to remove snow and ice from sidewalks but made no mention of lia-
bility to the public for injuries resulting from a failure to do so. 299 N.W.2d 675,
677–79 (Iowa 1980), superseded by statute, 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1 (codi-
fied at Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(b) (1985)), as recognized in Fritz v. Parkison, 397
N.W.2d 714 (Iowa 1986). We noted that the statutory duty on an abutting owner
to remove snow and ice from sidewalks is owed to the city (via monetary penalty),
not to the pedestrians (via liability for accidents). Id. at 677. As a result, we held that the abutting owner who failed to remove snow and ice from a sidewalk was 6
not liable for damages to an injured person since the statute did not expressly
impose that type of liability. Id. Several years after Peffers, the legislature
amended § 364.12(2)(b) to expressly impose liability on abutting landowners for
sidewalk accidents that result from the abutting owner’s failure to remove snow
and ice. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(b)
(1985)); see also Fritz, 397 N.W.2d at 717 n.1 (recognizing that this statutory
amendment nullified the holding in Peffers).
Iowa City’s ordinance in Madden sought to impose both maintenance du-
ties and liability on abutting landowners. 848 N.W.2d at 46. The ordinance pro-
vided that “[t]he abutting property owner shall maintain the sidewalk in a safe
condition, in a state of good repair, and free from defects.” Id. (quoting Iowa City,
Iowa, City Code § 16–1A–6). It further stated that “[t]he abutting property owner
may be liable for damages caused by failure to maintain the sidewalk.” Id. (quot-
ing Iowa City, Iowa, City Code § 16–1A–6). The state in Madden argued that Iowa
City had no power to impose liability on abutting landowners for all types of
failures to maintain sidewalks because Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(c) expressly limits
liability to damages resulting from a landowner’s failure to remove snow and ice.
Id. We analyzed § 364.12(2) to determine whether its terms conflicted with Iowa City’s ordinance and thus impliedly preempted the ordinance. Id. at 49–50.
Under the conflict preemption doctrine, a state law can supersede or sup-
plant a local ordinance if the two enactments are in conflict. Livingood v. City of
Des Moines, 991 N.W.2d 733, 742 (Iowa 2023). We attempt to read a state statute
and local ordinance “in a manner that renders them harmonious” and will only
find conflict preemption if the local “ordinance is ‘irreconcilable’ ” with the state
statute. Id. at 743 (quoting City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 539
(Iowa 2008)). 7
Although Madden recognized that § 364.12(2)(b) doesn’t impose liability on
an abutting landowner for failing to maintain sidewalks beyond snow and ice
removal, we concluded that “nothing in the statute expressly or impliedly pro-
hibits cities from” imposing such liability on them. 848 N.W.2d at 50. In other
words, even though § 364.12(2) expressly permits liability based only on a failure
to remove snow and ice, Madden held that this did not create an implied prohi-
bition on cities from separately making abutting landowners liable for damages
resulting from other types of failures to maintain sidewalks. Id. Madden thus
rejected the argument that the statute and the ordinance conflicted and held the
abutting landowner liable for damages under the ordinance. Id.
Two justices dissented. Id. at 54 (Mansfield, J., dissenting, joined by
Waterman, J.). The dissent would have held that § 364.12(2) preempted Iowa
City’s ordinance, making cities both responsible for sidewalk maintenance—
except as permitted in paragraph (d)—and liable for damages to members of the
public—except those related to snow and ice removal as permitted in paragraph
(b). Id. at 54–55. The dissent viewed the ordinance as “an effort by the City to
alter this statutory division of responsibility between city and property owner” in
clear conflict with both § 364.12(2) and Iowa’s common law. Id. at 54. Specifically, the dissent read the preamble to § 364.12(2) (“[a] city shall
keep all . . . sidewalks . . . in repair”) and paragraph (d) (“[a] city may serve notice
on the abutting property owner” requiring the “owner to repair, replace, or re-
construct sidewalks”) to require the city to maintain sidewalks unless the city
served notice on the abutting owner to make repairs. Id. at 54–55 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Iowa Code § 364.12(2), (d)). The dissent stated that, conversely,
“under [paragraph] (b), the abutting property owner is responsible for removing
snow from sidewalks ‘within a reasonable amount of time’ without regard to no- tice and may be liable in damages for failing to do so.” Id. at 55 (quoting Iowa 8
Code § 364.12(2)(b)). Turning to paragraph (c), the dissent noted that “the city
has the option of requiring the property owner to maintain city property that is
inside the curb line,” such as mowing a lawn between the sidewalk and the
street. Id. But paragraph (c), by the dissent’s reading, does not cover sidewalk
snow removal or sidewalk repair since the statute expressly covers those sub-
jects in paragraphs (b) and (d). Id. To read the statute any other way, the dissent
argued, would make paragraphs (b) and (d) superfluous. Id.; see also In re Chap-
man, 890 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Iowa 2017) (“[W]e apply the fundamental rule of
statutory construction that we should not construe a statute to make any part
of it superfluous.”).
The Madden dissent concluded that Iowa City’s ordinance, which not only
made the abutting owner liable for the cost of sidewalk repairs but also liable for
damages for all manner of sidewalk accidents, “expands the property owner’s
liability well beyond the confines” of what Iowa Code § 364.12 allows. Madden,
848 N.W.2d at 56. The change to the statute after Peffers, argued the dissent,
makes clear that “[h]ad the legislature contemplated a shift from the common
law rule that abutting property owners were not liable to pedestrians in any area
other than snow removal, it would have included language in [paragraphs] (c) or (d) similar to the language it added to [paragraph] (b).” Id. at 57. Because the
statute expressly authorizes liability only for sidewalk accidents caused by the
failure to remove snow and ice in paragraph (b), the dissent concluded that the
statute cannot be read to authorize liability for failures to maintain or repair
sidewalks described in paragraphs (c) or (d). Id.
B.
Turning back to this case, the City’s ordinance mirrors the Iowa City ordi-
nance at issue in Madden. It provides: 9
(a) The abutting property owner shall maintain the border area in a well-kept and safe condition free from defects, garbage, junk, rubbish, debris, solid waste, nuisances, obstructions or any other hazards, except as permitted in section 98–54 or 98–58 of this Code; provided, however the property owner shall not be required to remove diseased trees or dead or fallen tree limbs.
(d) The abutting property owner may be liable for damages caused by failure to maintain the border area.
Des Moines, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 102–2 (2022). The ordinance defines
“border area” as “all property between the lot lines or property lines and the
curblines upon the public streets or travelled street surfaces, if no curbing is
constructed.” Id. § 102–1. The border area thus logically includes sidewalks. This
corresponds to Iowa City’s ordinance in Madden. See 848 N.W.2d at 56.
Bankers Trust acknowledges the similarities in the ordinances and that
the holding in Madden, if applied in this case, would support holding Bankers
Trust liable for the Splittgerbers’ damages claim. But Bankers Trust urges us to
overrule Madden and to adopt the Madden dissent’s reasoning in interpreting
Iowa Code § 364.12(2). The City, conversely, argues that Madden was correctly
decided and that we should thus affirm the district court’s ruling.
We respectfully believe that Madden was wrongly decided. In our view, Madden failed to recognize a clear conflict between what the state statute per-
mitted cities to do and what the city attempted to do through its ordinance. The
statute permits cities to require abutting landowners to repair sidewalks, but
only if the city first notifies the landowners by certified mail that a repair is nec-
essary. Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(d). Likewise, the statute permits cities to hold
abutting landowners liable for damages, but only for damages that result from
failing to use reasonable care in removing snow and ice from the sidewalk. Id. § 364.12(2)(b). In ascertaining the ordinary and fair meaning of statutory text, 10
“we take into consideration the language’s relationship to other provisions of the
same statute and other provisions of related statutes.” Rottinghaus v. Lincoln
Sav. Bank (In re Est. of Franken), 944 N.W.2d 853, 859 (Iowa 2020). By imposing
open-ended sidewalk repair duties and making abutting landowners liable for
damages caused by defective sidewalks, the ordinance expanded a landowner’s
liability far beyond what § 364.12(2) allows.
Under the statute, abutting landowners are liable to members of the public
only if they fail to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk. Iowa Code
§ 364.12(2)(b). And abutting landowners are only required to repair sidewalks if
the city provides them notice by certified mail that the sidewalk requires repair.
Id. § 364.12(2)(d). The legislature could have opened abutting landowners to the
additional duties or additional liabilities that the City seeks to impose through
its ordinance; it did not. The paragraphs of § 364.12(2) are specific in what they
provide—and what they don’t provide. It bears significance, too, that when the
legislature revised the statute after Peffers to expand the duties of abutting own-
ers as to sidewalks, it did so narrowly and specifically. See Madden, 848 N.W.2d
at 56–57.
The statute’s different liability scheme irreconcilably conflicts with the one the City seeks here (and Iowa City sought in Madden) to impose through its local
ordinance. Section 364.12(2) speaks directly to the question of liability, leaving
the City’s argument about home rule authority unavailing. The City’s attempt to
shift costs to abutting landowners for sidewalk maintenance beyond what the
statute allows, and to shift liability to abutting landowners for sidewalk accidents
beyond what the statute permits, runs headlong into the legislature’s express
determination about where such burdens reside. 11
What’s more, as the Madden dissent explained, interpreting § 364.12(2) as
we do today facilitates a logical division of responsibilities between an abutting
owner and a city concerning sidewalks:
Snow removal from sidewalks has to be performed several times each winter. It is relatively inexpensive and convenient for property owners to clear adjacent sidewalks at the same time they are shov- eling their own driveways and walks. Therefore, it makes sense for property owners to bear this obligation. It would be inefficient to im- pose on cities the duty to inspect sidewalks for snow and ice or to keep them clear of snow and ice.
On the other hand, sidewalk repairs are a rarer and more costly undertaking. Determining whether a repair is needed and the kind of repair needed may involve some engineering or cost-benefit judgment. Thus, it makes sense for the city to shoulder much of this obligation, even if the city is given the right to ask the property owner to make the repairs according to the city’s specifications and, if the property owner does not do so, to charge back the costs of repair to the abutting property owner.
Id. at 55–56.
Although “[w]e are hesitant to overrule a precedent where a significant re-
liance interest has developed,” Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289, 303 (Iowa
2023), nothing before us suggests that Madden is such a case. In Burnett, we
overruled one of our precedents, decided six years earlier, noting that it had not
become “an entrenched precedent” for which “a meaningful reliance interest has
accrued.” Id. at 304. Madden is of only slightly longer vintage. No published case
relies on its holding. The lone case discussing Madden’s holding did so in the
context of explaining that a city could seek contribution from an abutting land-
owner but could not avoid its own direct liability to sidewalk users. See Fulps,
956 N.W.2d at 472–73.
II.
“[S]tare decisis,” we have said, “does not prevent the court from reconsid- ering, repairing, correcting or abandoning past judicial announcements when 12
error is manifest, including error in the interpretation of statutory enactments.”
Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). For the rea-
sons stated, we overrule Madden to the extent it permitted the imposition of
sidewalk maintenance duties and liability beyond what the legislature has ex-
pressly authorized in Iowa Code § 364.12(2). We reverse the district court’s sum-
mary judgment ruling because it was premised on Madden’s holding and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, and May, JJ., join this opin-
ion. Oxley, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which McDonald, J., joins. 13
#22–2085, Bankers Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines
OXLEY, Justice (dissenting). The majority gives only passing lip service to stare decisis in overruling
Madden v. City of Iowa City, 848 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa 2014), basing its decision
solely on its conclusion that the dissent in that case had the better statutory
interpretation. I am unwilling to throw our “venerable doctrine of stare decisis”
out the window, Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890
N.W.2d 50, 60 (Iowa 2017) (quoting McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394
(Iowa 2005)), and I therefore respectfully dissent.
I start by noting that this is a case of statutory interpretation where the
general assembly can fix something if we misconstrue a statute’s meaning. Cf.
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 975 N.W.2d
710, 733 (Iowa 2022) (“Constitutional cases tend to invoke a weak or less strict
form of stare decisis, on the theory that only the courts can correct bad consti-
tutional precedent, absent constitutional amendments. In other words, courts
must be free to correct their own mistakes when no one else can.” (quoting Tyler
J. Buller & Kelli A. Huser, Stare Decisis in Iowa, 67 Drake L. Rev. 317, 322 (2019))). This fact has led us on numerous occasions to declare that “interpreta-
tion of a statute . . . [is an] area[] where historically we have been most reluctant
to disturb precedent.” Youngblut v. Youngblut, 945 N.W.2d 25, 39 (Iowa 2020)
(citing cases); see also State v. Lee, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 2096203, at *3
(Iowa May 10, 2024) (“We do not overturn our precedents lightly and will not do
so absent a showing the prior decision was clearly erroneous.” (quoting Garrison
v. New Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67, 83 (Iowa 2022))); Haskenhoff v. Home-
land Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 585 (Iowa 2017) (“We are adhering to our consistent prior interpretations of the Act since 1992—interpretations that 14
have not been disturbed by the legislature—and the doctrine of stare decisis.”);
Bd. of Water Works Trs., 890 N.W.2d at 61 (“The rule of stare decisis ‘is especially
applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has
been long acquiesced in by the legislature . . . .’ ” (omission in original) (quoting
In re Est. of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2011))).
The majority disregards the distinction between our review of prior cases
interpreting statutory text and constitutional text. It describes stare decisis by
quoting from Burnett v. Smith, where we overruled Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d
844 (Iowa 2017), as “misinterpret[ing] the relevant constitutional text” in article
I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 990 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 2023). But we
did so only after first identifying seven observations about why Godfrey needed
to be overruled. Id. at 298–305. In this case involving statutory interpretation,
where we give greater import to stare decisis, the majority fails to proffer any
justification for overruling Madden other than its agreement with the Madden
dissent’s interpretation of the statute.
There is no stability in our law if it changes every time there is a shift on
our court. See Bd. of Water Works Trs., 890 N.W.2d at 60–61 (“Courts adhere to
the holdings of past rulings to imbue the law with continuity and predictability and help maintain the stability essential to society.” (quoting State v. Miller, 841
N.W.2d 583, 586 (Iowa 2014))). “If courts are viewed as unbound by precedent,
and the law as no more than what the last Court said, considerable efforts would
be expended to get control of such an institution—with judicial independence
and public confidence greatly weakened.” Planned Parenthood, 975 N.W.2d at
751 (Christensen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Henry
Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev.
723, 753 (1988)). 15
True, stare decisis is not an inexorable command that prior precedents
can never be overruled. See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 515 (Iowa 2014)
(Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Although ‘not an inexorable command,’ stare decisis
is a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary to ensure that legal rules
develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion.’ ” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014))). But we still require “that ‘any
departure’ from the doctrine ‘demands special justification.’ ” Id. (quoting Bay
Mills, 572 U.S. at 798). And it’s not enough that a majority of different members
of our court believe that a prior interpretation was wrong. Rather, we may only
overrule our previous interpretation of a statute when the prior decision
“proceed[ed] upon a wrong principle, [was] built upon a false premise, and
arriv[ed] at an erroneous conclusion.” Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301,
306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Stuart v. Pilgrim, 74
N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 1956)) (noting we had inconsistently applied the
duplication-of-benefits provision at issue in Iowa Code § 516A.2(1)). For example,
in McElroy v. State, we overruled Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa
1990) (en banc), only after first concluding that “the majority’s statutory analysis
in Smith was fundamentally flawed” based on its misunderstanding that the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) “framework was administrative in nature.” 703 N.W.2d at
393. We further explained that experience putting the Smith holding into
practice, coupled with changes in federal law, revealed the problems with that
interpretation. Id. at 394–95 (recognizing the problems created when “plaintiffs
bringing several different causes of action would have some of them tried by a
jury, with others tried to the court” and noting that the ICRA claims tried in
federal court alongside Title VII claims, which were entitled to a jury trial, were
tried to a jury despite our holding). 16
The same is not true here. The majority simply agrees with the Madden
dissent’s interpretation of Iowa Code § 364.12(2) (2022) over that majority’s in-
terpretation. But its only disagreement concerns application of the rules of stat-
utory interpretation. The majority has identified no underlying misunderstand-
ing of substantive law or problems that flow from the Madden majority’s holding.
Stare decisis does not allow us to overrule a prior decision the next time it comes
up merely because the current members of the court agree with its dissent in-
stead of its majority. Rather, stare decisis requires us to adhere to an opinion we
disagree with—unless there is a reason for overruling it beyond mere disagree-
ment. Another way to look at it is like this: We cannot overrule a prior opinion
merely because we would have agreed with the dissenting position had we been
on the court deciding the appeal. But that is exactly what the majority does to-
day.
Given that stare decisis demands upholding prior precedent unless it is
shown to be egregiously wrong, overruling Madden is unwarranted and incorrect.
Although we may have decided Madden differently today if given the chance, that
does not authorize overturning it. As explained further below, the Madden ma-
jority’s application of the implied conflict preemption doctrine was not clearly erroneous; therefore, faithful application of stare decisis prevents Madden from
being overruled. Cf. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455–56 (2015)
(“Indeed, stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect
decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up.”).
The majority concludes that Madden’s interpretation of Iowa Code section
364.12(2) was wrong (without ever explaining why it was “egregiously” wrong as
required to overrule it) by focusing on general principles of statutory interpreta- tion in conducting its implied conflict preemption analysis. In doing so, it fails to 17
acknowledge a critical distinction between general statutory interpretation and
implied conflict preemption, specifically “that every effort should be made to har-
monize a local ordinance with a state statute.” City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755
N.W.2d 533, 542 (Iowa 2008).
We have repeatedly recognized that our “standard for concluding that a
local ordinance is impliedly conflict preempted is demanding.” Behm v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 559 (Iowa 2019); see also Seymour, 755 N.W.2d
at 539 (describing the legal standard for application of implied conflict preemp-
tion as “demanding”). This stringent standard is necessitated by the “home rule”
authority that is provided to municipalities in article III, section 38A of the Iowa
Constitution. “Under legislative home rule, the legislature retains the unfettered
power to prohibit a municipality from exercising police powers . . . . [But] as long
as an exercise of police power over local affairs is not ‘inconsistent with the laws
of the general assembly,’ municipalities may act without express legislative ap-
proval or authorization.” Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 538 (quoting Iowa Const.
art. III, § 38A). The new constitutional provision significantly expanded the leg-
islative power of municipalities because it “granted cities broad authority to reg-
ulate matters of local concern.” City of Clinton v. Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Iowa 1995) (en banc); see also Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. As a result, “[c]ities no
longer have only those powers granted by the legislature.” Id. at 695; see also
City of Des Moines v. Master Builders of Iowa, 498 N.W.2d 702, 703–04 (Iowa
1993) (en banc) (“[H]ome rule can be said to have reversed the presumption of
authority; cities now have authority to act unless a particular power has been
denied them by statute.”).
Under our caselaw, implied conflict preemption “occurs where an ordi-
nance prohibits an act permitted by statute, or permits an act prohibited by statute.” Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 538. The municipal ordinance is presumed 18
valid unless it is “irreconcilable” with state law, which means “the conflict must
be ‘obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable debate.’ ” Hensler v.
City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569, 585 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Seymour, 755
N.W.2d at 539). Furthermore, our “cases demonstrate that the phrase ‘irrecon-
cilable’ used in preemption analysis is a hard-edged term. In order to be ‘irrec-
oncilable,’ the conflict must be unresolvable short of choosing one enactment
over the other.” Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 541.
A general search for the legislature’s policy behind its text is not
appropriate in the context of our implied conflict preemption analysis. Rather,
“the notion that the mere failure of the legislature to authorize invalidates
municipal action is without merit. . . . In the context of state-local preemption,
the silence of the legislature is not prohibitory but permissive.” Id. at 543. The
majority opinion disregards this established principle of conflict preemption to
conclude that Madden’s interpretation constituted manifest error by permitting
the City ordinance to impose liability “beyond what the legislature has expressly
authorized in Iowa Code § 364.12(2).” We have an obligation to interpret the
statute in harmony with the ordinance, and Madden’s interpretation of section
364.12(2) is not inconsistent with our caselaw in its recognition of home rule authority. Conversely, the majority’s conclusion here contradicts these legal
principles by finding an irreconcilable conflict even though the City’s ordinance
does not permit anything prohibited by the statute. In determining the ordinance
is inconsistent with state law simply because it permits something that is not
expressly authorized by state law, the majority confuses the proper analysis for
conflict preemption. The majority’s characterization of the Madden dissent’s interpretation as facilitating the “logical division of responsibilities” further reveals its flawed ap- plication of our conflict preemption doctrine. It is not the privilege of this court 19
to make those policy determinations when interpreting statutes—especially in the context of conflict preemption, where the ordinance is entitled to a presump- tion of validity, and we are expressly obligated to reconcile the two if at all pos- sible. We do this to safeguard the separation of powers. See 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 228, at 257 (2021) (“An appellate court’s consideration of whether there is a conflict between a city ordinance and state law must be informed with the constitutional command to liberally construe the home-rule power so as to give to cities the largest measure of self-government.”). The majority’s decision is unmoored from the proper analysis, threatening our proper constitutional role by its lack of judicial restraint. Finally, the majority’s discussion of the statutory amendment enacted by the legislature following our decision in Peffers v. City of Des Moines lends no support to its position. See 299 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1980), superseded by statute, 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(b) (1985)). If anything, the fact that the legislature directly responded to our Peffers decision by “narrowly and specifically” amending the statute undermines its position. It shows that the legislature is aware of our decisions interpreting this particular legislation and would presumably take action to rectify the erroneous interpre- tation of statutes, so the legislature’s silence after Madden was decided cuts against the conclusion that it was egregiously wrong. “If the general assembly intended to preempt municipal . . . powers, it could have done so by express and unambiguous statutory language.” Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d at 695. And beyond this indication of legislative acquiescence, Peffers has no relevance to our deci- sion in Madden because that case did not involve any preemption analysis. For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that the application of stare decisis requires adherence to Madden, and I respectfully dissent from the ma- jority’s decision to overrule it. McDonald, J., joins this dissent.