TERNUS, Justice.
This case concerns the enforceability of an owned-but-not-insured exclusion in the uninsured motorists (UM) coverage of a motor vehicle liability policy. The trial court held that the exclusion was enforceable and precluded the plaintiffs’ recovery under the UM coverage. We agree and so affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The facts underlying this case were undisputed by the parties. The plaintiff, Craig S. Miller, Sr., was injured in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, Miller was riding a motorcycle that he owned and had insured through Midwest Mutual Insurance Company. The Midwest policy did not include UM coverage, however, because Miller had expressly rejected, in writing, Midwest’s offer of such coverage.
Miller also owned a pickup that he had separately insured under a liability policy issued by the defendant, Westfield Insurance Company. The Westfield policy included UM coverage. This action was [303]*303commenced by Miller, his wife, Karen Sue Miller, and his children, Dani Lee Miller and Craig S. Miller, Jr., to recover benefits under the UM coverage of the Westfield policy.
Westfield claimed that the following exclusion in its policy precluded any recovery by the plaintiffs:
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person:
I. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is- not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This exclusion is commonly referred to as an owned-but-not-insured exclusion. The plaintiffs did not dispute that the exclusion, if applied, would prevent them from recovering under the UM coverage of the Westfield policy. They argued instead that the exclusion was unenforceable under our decision in Lindahl v. Howe, 345 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1984), which held that under the facts of that case the owned-but-not-insured exclusion was contrary to Iowa’s uninsured motorist statute, Iowa Code chapter 516A, and therefore was unenforceable. The district court held that Lindahl was distinguishable because Miller, unlike the insured in Lindahl, had expressly rejected UM coverage in the policy insuring the vehicle involved in the accident. Accordingly, the court applied the exclusion and ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover under the Westfield policy.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision. Our review is for correction of errors of law. See Iowa R.App. P. 4.
II. General Principles Governing Statutory Interpretation.
As we have already mentioned, there is no disagreement that the owned-but-not-insured exclusion contained in Westfield’s insurance policy precludes Miller from recovering under the policy, if the exclusion is enforceable under chapter 516A, Iowa’s uninsured and underinsured motorist statute. The enforceability of the exclusion under chapter 516A becomes an issue because' we have repeatedly held that the terms of this statute “form a basic part of the policy.” Hollingsworth v. Schminkey, 553 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 1996); accord Hornick v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1993). Consequently, the resolution of this case depends on the legislative intent encompassed in chapter 516A.
In determining legislative intent, we apply well-settled rules of statutory construction:
In construing statutes, our goal is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intention. We seek a reasonable interpretation which will best effectuate the purpose of the statute and redress the wrongs the legislature sought to remedy. We will consider all parts of an enactment together and will not place undue importance on any single or isolated portion.
Mewes v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 718, 722 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we now examine chapter 516A to ascertain the legislature’s intent.
' III. Legislative Intent as Shorn by the Uninsured Motorist Statute.
The fundamental goal of the UM statute is to provide insureds with insurance protection when injured as a result of the fault of an uninsured motorist. See Iowa Code § 516A.1 (1997) (stating that no motor vehicle liability insurance policy may be issued in this state unless uninsured motorist coverage is provided in such policy with limits at least equal to the liability limits' required under Iowa Code section 321A.1(10)); see also Douglass v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1993) (stating that the purpose of UM coverage-is “to provide to the victim of an accident the same protection [304]*304that the victim would have had if the negligent tortfeasor had had minimum insurance coverage”). The goal of providing UM coverage to Iowa insureds is not, however, without its limitations. Section 516A.1 specifically allows an insured to reject UM coverage, if done so in writing. See Iowa Code § 516A.1 (“However, the named insured may reject all of such coverage....”). In effect, then, Iowa’s UM statute does not implement mandatory UM coverage; it merely mandates that such coverage be offered to all insureds purchasing motor vehicle liability insurance.
Once an insured chooses to purchase UM coverage, Iowa Code section 516A.2(1) becomes relevant.1 That statute allows insurers to limit UM coverage to the minimum limits prescribed by section 321A.1(10). See Iowa Code § 516A.2(1). More important, it permits insurers to include in UM coverage “terms, exclusions, limitations, conditions, and offsets which are designed to avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits.” Id. We first had an opportunity to interpret this provision of chapter 516A in the Lindahl case, which we now discuss.
IV. Lindahl Decision.
In Lindahl, this- court considered the enforceability of an owned-but-not-insured exclusion contained in the insured’s UM coverage provided under his automobile policy. 345 N.W.2d at 549. As in the present case, at the time of the accident the insured was operating a motorcycle he owned, but had not insured under the auto policy. Id. We first determined that “[t]he conditions for mandatory coverage specified in section 516A.1 [were] present.” Id. at 550. We then examined whether the exclusion was, nonetheless, authorized under section 516A.2(1). Id. at 551. We specifically focused on the statutory language permitting exclusions “which are designed to avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits.” Id.
In interpreting this language, this court noted that the record before it lacked any evidence of the “insurance or benefits the exclusion is designed to avoid duplicating.” Id.
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TERNUS, Justice.
This case concerns the enforceability of an owned-but-not-insured exclusion in the uninsured motorists (UM) coverage of a motor vehicle liability policy. The trial court held that the exclusion was enforceable and precluded the plaintiffs’ recovery under the UM coverage. We agree and so affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The facts underlying this case were undisputed by the parties. The plaintiff, Craig S. Miller, Sr., was injured in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, Miller was riding a motorcycle that he owned and had insured through Midwest Mutual Insurance Company. The Midwest policy did not include UM coverage, however, because Miller had expressly rejected, in writing, Midwest’s offer of such coverage.
Miller also owned a pickup that he had separately insured under a liability policy issued by the defendant, Westfield Insurance Company. The Westfield policy included UM coverage. This action was [303]*303commenced by Miller, his wife, Karen Sue Miller, and his children, Dani Lee Miller and Craig S. Miller, Jr., to recover benefits under the UM coverage of the Westfield policy.
Westfield claimed that the following exclusion in its policy precluded any recovery by the plaintiffs:
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person:
I. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is- not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This exclusion is commonly referred to as an owned-but-not-insured exclusion. The plaintiffs did not dispute that the exclusion, if applied, would prevent them from recovering under the UM coverage of the Westfield policy. They argued instead that the exclusion was unenforceable under our decision in Lindahl v. Howe, 345 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1984), which held that under the facts of that case the owned-but-not-insured exclusion was contrary to Iowa’s uninsured motorist statute, Iowa Code chapter 516A, and therefore was unenforceable. The district court held that Lindahl was distinguishable because Miller, unlike the insured in Lindahl, had expressly rejected UM coverage in the policy insuring the vehicle involved in the accident. Accordingly, the court applied the exclusion and ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover under the Westfield policy.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision. Our review is for correction of errors of law. See Iowa R.App. P. 4.
II. General Principles Governing Statutory Interpretation.
As we have already mentioned, there is no disagreement that the owned-but-not-insured exclusion contained in Westfield’s insurance policy precludes Miller from recovering under the policy, if the exclusion is enforceable under chapter 516A, Iowa’s uninsured and underinsured motorist statute. The enforceability of the exclusion under chapter 516A becomes an issue because' we have repeatedly held that the terms of this statute “form a basic part of the policy.” Hollingsworth v. Schminkey, 553 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 1996); accord Hornick v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1993). Consequently, the resolution of this case depends on the legislative intent encompassed in chapter 516A.
In determining legislative intent, we apply well-settled rules of statutory construction:
In construing statutes, our goal is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intention. We seek a reasonable interpretation which will best effectuate the purpose of the statute and redress the wrongs the legislature sought to remedy. We will consider all parts of an enactment together and will not place undue importance on any single or isolated portion.
Mewes v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 718, 722 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we now examine chapter 516A to ascertain the legislature’s intent.
' III. Legislative Intent as Shorn by the Uninsured Motorist Statute.
The fundamental goal of the UM statute is to provide insureds with insurance protection when injured as a result of the fault of an uninsured motorist. See Iowa Code § 516A.1 (1997) (stating that no motor vehicle liability insurance policy may be issued in this state unless uninsured motorist coverage is provided in such policy with limits at least equal to the liability limits' required under Iowa Code section 321A.1(10)); see also Douglass v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1993) (stating that the purpose of UM coverage-is “to provide to the victim of an accident the same protection [304]*304that the victim would have had if the negligent tortfeasor had had minimum insurance coverage”). The goal of providing UM coverage to Iowa insureds is not, however, without its limitations. Section 516A.1 specifically allows an insured to reject UM coverage, if done so in writing. See Iowa Code § 516A.1 (“However, the named insured may reject all of such coverage....”). In effect, then, Iowa’s UM statute does not implement mandatory UM coverage; it merely mandates that such coverage be offered to all insureds purchasing motor vehicle liability insurance.
Once an insured chooses to purchase UM coverage, Iowa Code section 516A.2(1) becomes relevant.1 That statute allows insurers to limit UM coverage to the minimum limits prescribed by section 321A.1(10). See Iowa Code § 516A.2(1). More important, it permits insurers to include in UM coverage “terms, exclusions, limitations, conditions, and offsets which are designed to avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits.” Id. We first had an opportunity to interpret this provision of chapter 516A in the Lindahl case, which we now discuss.
IV. Lindahl Decision.
In Lindahl, this- court considered the enforceability of an owned-but-not-insured exclusion contained in the insured’s UM coverage provided under his automobile policy. 345 N.W.2d at 549. As in the present case, at the time of the accident the insured was operating a motorcycle he owned, but had not insured under the auto policy. Id. We first determined that “[t]he conditions for mandatory coverage specified in section 516A.1 [were] present.” Id. at 550. We then examined whether the exclusion was, nonetheless, authorized under section 516A.2(1). Id. at 551. We specifically focused on the statutory language permitting exclusions “which are designed to avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits.” Id.
In interpreting this language, this court noted that the record before it lacked any evidence of the “insurance or benefits the exclusion is designed to avoid duplicating.” Id. The court concluded, therefore, that the ■ case was distinguishable from prior cases wherein the “potential duplication identified in the policy was found to exist.” Id.. This distinction was important to the court because it “believe[d] our legislature intended only to authorize insurers to exclude coverage for contingencies in which duplication actually occurs.” Id. (emphasis added). We explained:
The broad mandate of coverage under section 516A.1 would mean little if an insurer could • defend any exclusion of coverage by asserting it was designed to prevent a possible duplication of insurance or other benefits without regard to whether such duplication occurs.
Id.
The district court did not apply Lindahl to the case before us, concluding that it was distinguishable because here the insured expressly waived UM coverage under his motorcycle liability policy, a fact not apparent from the record before the court'in Lindahl. We find it unnecessary, however, to consider whether this fact renders the Lindahl decision inapplicable here. Upon our examination of Lindahl, we conclude it was erroneously decided and should be overruled.
[305]*305Our first concern with Lindahl is our failure to apply a fundamental rule of statutory construction: “a statute [will not be construed] to make any part of it superfluous unless no other construction is reasonably possible.” Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 522 N.W.2d 82, 86 (Iowa 1994); accord Iowa Auto Dealers Ass’n v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760, 765 (Iowa 1981). Accordingly, “[w]e presume the legislature included every part of a statute for a purpose, and intended each part be given effect.” George H. Wentz, Inc. v. Sabasta, 337 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 1983), overruled on other grounds by Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Iowa 1995); accord State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery, 218 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974). In addition, the Lindahl decision violates the rule of statutory construction quoted earlier in this opinion: the court “will not place undue importance on any single or isolated portion” of a statute. Mewes, 530 N.W.2d at 722.
The legislature stated in section 516A.2(1) that exclusions “which are designed to avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits” are permissible. Iowa Code § 516A.2(1) (emphasis added). In Lindahl, this court simply read the words “are designed to” out of the statute. By holding that an exclusion is permissible under the statute only when actual duplication occurs, this court effectively rewrote the statutory language to read: “Such forms of coverage may include exclusions which avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits.” If we presume that the legislature “included every part of a statute for a purpose, and intended each part be given effect,” Sabasta, 337 N.W.2d at 500, then we must give meaning to the words “are designed to.”
We assume the legislature intends the words it uses in a statute to be given their common and ordinary meaning when the words are not otherwise defined by the legislature. See State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998). Here,.the common meaning of the word “design” is “to plan or have in mind as a purpose: INTEND, PURPOSE, CONTEMPLATE.” ■. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 611 (unabr. ed.1993). Using this common meaning of the language chosen by the legislature, there is no reasonable interpretation of the provision in question other than that the General Assembly meant to authorize exclusions that are intended to or have the purpose of avoiding duplication of benefits. Requiring the actual duplication of benefits is simply contrary to the language used by the legislature.
An apparent rationale for our decision in Lindahl was our observation that “the broad mandate of coverage under section 516A.1 would mean little if an insurer could [rely on an exclusion] designed to prevent a possible duplication of insurance ... without regard to whether such duplication actually occurs.” 345 N.W.2d at 551. This rationale is flawed for two reasons. First, coverage is not mandated by section 516A.1, only the offer of such coverage. If the legislature had truly wanted to mandate UM protection for all insureds, it simply would have eliminated the provisions of chapter 516A allowing insureds to reject such coverage and allowing insurers to include certain exclusions to and limitations bn such coverage. Thus, Lindahl is based on a faulty premise — that the sole intent of the legislature in chapter 516A whs to mandate UM coverage. Second, the quoted rationale gives overriding importance to one part of the statute, which is contrary to our estáblished rules of statutory construction. .The legislature’s desire to provide insureds with the opportunity to. purchase UM coverage must be read in .conjunction with section 516A.2(1), which permits exclusions “designed to” avoid duplication of benefits.
In summary, under a proper application of the rules of statutory interpretation, we conclude that actual duplication of benefits is not required by section 516A.2(1). Our imposition of such a requirement in Lin-dahl was clearly wrong. See generally [306]*306State v. Burgs, 479 N.W.2d 323, 324 (Iowa 1992) (“When a statute’s terms are unambiguous and its meaning plain, there is no room for second-guessing legislative intent.”).
To make matters worse, we have not required an actual duplication of benefits when an owned-but-not-insured exclusion is contained in underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage. We have said that, in the context of UIM coverage, there is “no duplication of benefits until the victim has been fully compensated.” McClure v. Northland Ins. Co., 424 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Iowa 1988) (applying section 516A.2(1)’s duplieation-of-benefits provision). Yet in Kluiter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 417 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1987), we upheld an owned-but-not-insured exclusion with no discussion of whether the insured had been fully compensated for his injuries. 417 N.W.2d at 76. Instead, we merely found “potential duplication.” Id.(emphasis added); see also Hornick, 511 N.W.2d at 374 (holding the UIM policy provision at issue “may be viewed as an attempt to avoid duplication of insurance coverage and is therefore permitted under Iowa Code section 516A.2” (emphasis added)).
Our inconsistent application of the statute’s duplication-of-benefits provision finds no support in the language of the statute; either section 516A.2(1) requires actual duplication, or it does not. As we have explained, based on the words used by the legislature, we hold that actual duplication is not required under section 516A.2(1).
We are sensitive to the possibility that the insurance industry and the public may have relied on our Lindahl decision in considering their insurance sales and purchases. Clearly, adherence to precedent has value. See Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973) (“Stare decisis is a valuable legal doctrine which lends stability to the law....”). On the other hand, stare decisis does not prevent the court from reconsidering, repairing, correcting or abandoning past judicial announcements when error is manifest, including error in the interpretation of statutory enactments. See Lehigh Clay Prods., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 545 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Iowa 1996); Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Iowa 1978), overruled on other grounds by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa 1989). Thus, stare decisis “should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous result.” Kersten Co., 207 N.W.2d at 121; accord State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 1056, 135 N.W.2d 518, 521 (1965) (holding the court has a duty to correct erroneous past decisions). It is especially critical that stare decisis not shield court-created error from correction when the error is related to a matter of continuing concern to the community. See People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, 1331 (Cal.1987). See also Henriksen, 540 N.W.2d at 258-61 (overruling fourteen-year-old case interpreting workers’ compensation statute governing the compensability of an injury occurring outside the territorial limits of Iowa).
This case presents such a situation. To paraphrase our discussion in Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956), wherein we overruled long-established precedent, our holding in Lindahl “proceeded] upon a wrong principle, [was] built upon a false premise, and arriv[ed] at an erroneous conclusion.” 247 Iowa at 714, 74 N.W.2d at 216. Therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis does not protect that holding from correction. Accordingly, our decision in Lindahl is overruled.
V. Enforceability of Exclusion.
Having concluded that actual duplication is not required, we now examine whether the exclusion upon which West-field relies was “designed to avoid duplication of insurance.” See Iowa Code § 516A.2(1): The record shows that Miller purchased a liability policy on his motorcycle but rejected the insurer’s offer of UM [307]*307coverage. Clearly, if Miller had purchased UM coverage under his motorcycle policy, there would have been a duplication of UM coverage. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer, 574 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Iowa 1998) (enforcing owned-but-not-insured exclusion in UM coverage in automobile policy in which same coverage was provided under insured’s motorcycle policy). It was this anticipated duplication that the exclusion was intended to avoid. Under these circumstances, we conclude the exclusion satisfies the statutory requirement that it be “designed to avoid the duplication of insurance.” See Iowa Code § 516A.2(1). Consequently, the exclusion is enforceable, and the trial court did not err in upholding the validity of the owned-but-not-insured exclusion in Westfield’s UM coverage.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except CADY, LARSON, and SNELL, JJ., who dissent.