Opinion
MOSK, J.
This is an original petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Therapeutic Abortion Committee of Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center to consider on its merits petitioner Carlos’ application for a therapeutic abortion without the consent of her parents. We construe for the first time Civil Code section 34.51 to determine whether it emancipates minors for the purpose of obtaining therapeutic abortions without parental consent.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Charles Ballard is a licensed physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. Petitioner Ana Maria Carlos, appearing by guardian ad litem, is a 20-year-old, unmarried, in[876]*876digent minor who lives with her one infant child and her mother in Los Angeles County.
On August 14, 1970, petitioner Carlos requested a therapeutic abortion at the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center. She was referred to Dr. Ballard, who, after a thorough examination, concluded that she was qualified for the surgery according to law. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 25950-25954.) The Therapeutic Abortion Committee of the Medical Center refused to consider the merits of the Carlos application for the sole reason that Miss Carlos, an unmarried minor living at home, had not obtained parental consent for the abortion.
Petitioners initiated mandamus proceedings before the Court of Appeal on September 14, 1970, at which time Miss Carlos was approximately 10 weeks pregnant. They contended that Civil Code section 34.5 permits minors, otherwise qualified, to receive legal therapeutic abortions without the consent of their parents. An order to show cause was issued on September 28, but the order was discharged and the petition for writ of mandate denied on October 21, 1970. We granted a hearing.
Due to the normal passage of time required for petitioning this court, preparation of briefs, presentation of oral argument and completion of the opinions herein, the petitioner Carlos is no longer eligible for assistance under the Therapeutic Abortion Act because the 20-week period of eligibility provided in the act has expired. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25953.) Nature proved to be more fleet than the judicial process. Therefore, we face a threshold question of mootness.
Well established principles regarding the exercise of judicial jurisdiction persuade us that the instant action should not be dismissed because of mootness. As we stated in our recent unanimous decision, In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23 [89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737]: “[I]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot. ‘Such questions [of general public concern] do not become moot by reason of the fact that the ensuing judgment may no longer be binding upon a party to the action.’ (County of Madera v. Gendron (1963) 59 Cal.2d 798, 804 [31 Cal.Rptr. 302, 382 P.2d 342, 6 A.L.R.3d 555].)” (Fn. omitted.) And, in an earlier case, a Court of Appeal applied identical principles with specific reference to a writ of mandate: “As a general proposition courts will not issue a writ of mandate to enforce an abstract right of no practical benefit to petitioner, or where to issue the writ would be useless, unenforceable or unavailing. [Citation.] [877]*877However, where the problem presented and the principle involved are of great public interest, the courts have deemed it appropriate to entertain the proceedings rather than to dismiss the same as being moot.” (Kirstowsky v. Superior Court (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 745, 749 [300 P.2d 163]; see also Moore v. Ogilvie (1969) 394 U.S. 814, 816 [23 L.Ed.2d 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1493]; Collier v. Lindley (1928) 203 Cal. 641, 645 [266 P. 526].)
There can be no question that interpretation of Civil Code section 34.5 with regard to the necessity of parental consent for therapeutic abortions is a matter of great public concern. The section has never been construed, and literally thousands of young women comparable to this 20-year-old petitioner will be affected by our decision.2
To eliminate any lingering doubt that the instant case involves a recurring problem, Dr. Ballard appended a declaration to the petition stating that the application for therapeutic abortion of another of his patients, Miss Judy Defufco, was rejected by the Therapeutic Abortion Committee on January 22, 1971, solely for lack of parental consent; Miss Defufco, who was 12 weeks pregnant on January 22, 1971, was also under 21 years of age, indigent, and living at home with her parents.3
Moreover, Dr. Ballard is a petitioner in this proceeding, and it is clear that the case is not moot as to him, even though any judgment we render has ceased to have practical implications for Miss Carlos. As a physician, Dr. Ballard has standing to raise the interests of his patients, like Judy Defufco, who seek to have him perform therapeutic abortions without parental consent under Civil Code section 34.5. Dr. Ballard’s standing arises'from his right to practice medicine consistent with law and his potential liability if he performs an abortion, otherwise justified under the Therapeutic Abortion Act, but without parental consent. (Cf. Griswold [878]*878v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 481 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 512, 85 S.Ct. 1678]; Barrows v. Jackson (1953) 346 U.S. 249, 257 [97 L.Ed. 1586, 1595, 73 S.Ct. 1031]; People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 963 fn. 5 [80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194].)
For the foregoing reasons we conclude the proceeding has not become moot.
Turning to the merits, we must determine whether the Therapeutic Abortion Committee of the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center properly declined to consider petitioner Carlos’ application for therapeutic abortion on the sole ground that she had not obtained parental consent. We conclude that a reasonable construction of Civil Code section 34.5, taking into account its language, legislative history and context, and contemporaneous construction, indicates that minors may obtain therapeutic abortions under law without the necessity of parental consent.
As a general proposition, parental consent is required for the provision of services to minors for the simple reason that minors may dis-affirm their own contracts to acquire such services. (See Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) 62 Cal.2d 606, 610 [43 Cal.Rptr. 697, 401 P.2d 1].) Civil Code section 34 provides that a minor may enter into contracts “in the same manner as an adult, subject only to his power of disaffirmance.
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Opinion
MOSK, J.
This is an original petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Therapeutic Abortion Committee of Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center to consider on its merits petitioner Carlos’ application for a therapeutic abortion without the consent of her parents. We construe for the first time Civil Code section 34.51 to determine whether it emancipates minors for the purpose of obtaining therapeutic abortions without parental consent.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Charles Ballard is a licensed physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. Petitioner Ana Maria Carlos, appearing by guardian ad litem, is a 20-year-old, unmarried, in[876]*876digent minor who lives with her one infant child and her mother in Los Angeles County.
On August 14, 1970, petitioner Carlos requested a therapeutic abortion at the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center. She was referred to Dr. Ballard, who, after a thorough examination, concluded that she was qualified for the surgery according to law. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 25950-25954.) The Therapeutic Abortion Committee of the Medical Center refused to consider the merits of the Carlos application for the sole reason that Miss Carlos, an unmarried minor living at home, had not obtained parental consent for the abortion.
Petitioners initiated mandamus proceedings before the Court of Appeal on September 14, 1970, at which time Miss Carlos was approximately 10 weeks pregnant. They contended that Civil Code section 34.5 permits minors, otherwise qualified, to receive legal therapeutic abortions without the consent of their parents. An order to show cause was issued on September 28, but the order was discharged and the petition for writ of mandate denied on October 21, 1970. We granted a hearing.
Due to the normal passage of time required for petitioning this court, preparation of briefs, presentation of oral argument and completion of the opinions herein, the petitioner Carlos is no longer eligible for assistance under the Therapeutic Abortion Act because the 20-week period of eligibility provided in the act has expired. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25953.) Nature proved to be more fleet than the judicial process. Therefore, we face a threshold question of mootness.
Well established principles regarding the exercise of judicial jurisdiction persuade us that the instant action should not be dismissed because of mootness. As we stated in our recent unanimous decision, In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23 [89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737]: “[I]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot. ‘Such questions [of general public concern] do not become moot by reason of the fact that the ensuing judgment may no longer be binding upon a party to the action.’ (County of Madera v. Gendron (1963) 59 Cal.2d 798, 804 [31 Cal.Rptr. 302, 382 P.2d 342, 6 A.L.R.3d 555].)” (Fn. omitted.) And, in an earlier case, a Court of Appeal applied identical principles with specific reference to a writ of mandate: “As a general proposition courts will not issue a writ of mandate to enforce an abstract right of no practical benefit to petitioner, or where to issue the writ would be useless, unenforceable or unavailing. [Citation.] [877]*877However, where the problem presented and the principle involved are of great public interest, the courts have deemed it appropriate to entertain the proceedings rather than to dismiss the same as being moot.” (Kirstowsky v. Superior Court (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 745, 749 [300 P.2d 163]; see also Moore v. Ogilvie (1969) 394 U.S. 814, 816 [23 L.Ed.2d 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1493]; Collier v. Lindley (1928) 203 Cal. 641, 645 [266 P. 526].)
There can be no question that interpretation of Civil Code section 34.5 with regard to the necessity of parental consent for therapeutic abortions is a matter of great public concern. The section has never been construed, and literally thousands of young women comparable to this 20-year-old petitioner will be affected by our decision.2
To eliminate any lingering doubt that the instant case involves a recurring problem, Dr. Ballard appended a declaration to the petition stating that the application for therapeutic abortion of another of his patients, Miss Judy Defufco, was rejected by the Therapeutic Abortion Committee on January 22, 1971, solely for lack of parental consent; Miss Defufco, who was 12 weeks pregnant on January 22, 1971, was also under 21 years of age, indigent, and living at home with her parents.3
Moreover, Dr. Ballard is a petitioner in this proceeding, and it is clear that the case is not moot as to him, even though any judgment we render has ceased to have practical implications for Miss Carlos. As a physician, Dr. Ballard has standing to raise the interests of his patients, like Judy Defufco, who seek to have him perform therapeutic abortions without parental consent under Civil Code section 34.5. Dr. Ballard’s standing arises'from his right to practice medicine consistent with law and his potential liability if he performs an abortion, otherwise justified under the Therapeutic Abortion Act, but without parental consent. (Cf. Griswold [878]*878v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 481 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 512, 85 S.Ct. 1678]; Barrows v. Jackson (1953) 346 U.S. 249, 257 [97 L.Ed. 1586, 1595, 73 S.Ct. 1031]; People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 963 fn. 5 [80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194].)
For the foregoing reasons we conclude the proceeding has not become moot.
Turning to the merits, we must determine whether the Therapeutic Abortion Committee of the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center properly declined to consider petitioner Carlos’ application for therapeutic abortion on the sole ground that she had not obtained parental consent. We conclude that a reasonable construction of Civil Code section 34.5, taking into account its language, legislative history and context, and contemporaneous construction, indicates that minors may obtain therapeutic abortions under law without the necessity of parental consent.
As a general proposition, parental consent is required for the provision of services to minors for the simple reason that minors may dis-affirm their own contracts to acquire such services. (See Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) 62 Cal.2d 606, 610 [43 Cal.Rptr. 697, 401 P.2d 1].) Civil Code section 34 provides that a minor may enter into contracts “in the same manner as an adult, subject only to his power of disaffirmance. ...” Section 35 delineates the scope of the minor’s power of disaffirmance and sections 36 and 37 specify certain general exceptions to that power.4
The policy underlying the rule permitting minors to disaffirm contractual obligations is described in our opinion in Burnand v. Irigoyen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 861, 866 [186 P.2d 417]: “One deals with infants at his peril. [Citation.] The right of the infant to avoid his contracts is one conferred by law for his protection against his own improvidence and the designs of others. The policy of the law is to discourage adults from contracting with an infant and they cannot complain if as a consequence of violating the rule they are injured by the exercise of the right of dis[879]*879affirmance vested in the infant.” (See also Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 606, 609; Sparks v. Sparks (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 129, 137 [225 P.2d 238].)
Civil Code section 34.5, enacted in 1953, provides an express limitation on the power of minors to disaffirm their contracts for medical services. An unmarried pregnant minor “may give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical and surgical care related to her pregnancy, and such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because of minority. The consent of the parent or parents of an unmarried, pregnant minor shall not be necessary in order to authorize hospital, medical and surgical care related to her pregnancy.” The question before us is whether a therapeutic abortion authorized under the Therapeutic Abortion Act is “surgical care related to her pregnancy.”
A legal therapeutic abortion under the act may be given only if qualified medical opinion finds (1) a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy will impair the mental or physical health of the prospective mother, or (2) that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. It is obvious that legal abortion is a surgical procedure, and the Therapeutic Abortion Act establishes that a legal abortion is “care” of the prospective mother “related to her pregnancy.” In California, law and medicine recognize that therapeutic abortion is a legitimate medical treatment which may be necessary for the preservation of a pregnant woman’s fife and health. Had the Legislature intended to exclude legal abortion from the class of surgical care to which the section refers, it would have limited its terminology to “maternity care” or to “prenatal, delivery, and postpartum care.”
Respondent contends that the references to “surgical care” in section 34.5 could not encompass legal abortion because the passage of the section in 1953 preceded by 14 years the passage of the Therapeutic Abortion Act. Respondent concedes, as he must, that legal abortions were permitted in California at the time section 34.5 was enacted, but he suggests that consent, whether by the patient or her parents, was not then a relevant consideration since abortions were permitted only in emergency situations when necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
The assertion is specious. In 1953, as under the Therapeutic Abortion Act, legal abortion was “surgical care related to pregnancy”; the only difference was that abortion was permitted then under more limited circumstances.5 Respondent’s suggestion that consent was not relevant to abortion [880]*880presumes that abortion was permitted only in cases of such extreme emergency that neither the approval of the parents or of the patient herself was required. But that simply was not the fact. As explained by the Court of Appeal in People v. Ballard (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 803, 814 [335 P.2d 204]: “Surely, the abortion statute (Pen. Code, § 274) does not mean by the words ‘unless the same is necessary to preserve her life’ that the peril to life be imminent. It ought to be enough that the dangerous condition ‘be potentially present, even though its full development might be delayed to a greater or less extent. Nor was it essential that the doctor should believe that the death of the patient would be otherwise certain in order to justify him in affording present relief.’ ”6
In enacting section 34.5 as a limitation upon a minor’s power to disaffirm contracts, the Legislature apparently determined that the public interest in encouraging pregnant minors to seek and doctors to provide medical care related to pregnancy outweighed the public policy designed to protect minors from their own improvidence.7 Although no definitive history is available to explain the legislative purpose, it seems evident the Legislature recognized that an unmarried pregnant minor understandably might be reluctant to seek parental consent for medical care related to her pregnancy and that the parents of such a minor might refuse consent for reasons unrelated to the health of the minor. Certainly, therapeutic abortion, as permitted to save the life of the pregnant woman under pre1967 law and as authorized under current law, falls within the thrust of such a legislative policy.
A policy which would exclude therapeutic abortion from the class of pregnancy-related surgical care available to minors without parental consent would necessarily be based on some compelling interest of the parents or the state in preventing therapeutic abortions. However, as we have explained, [881]*881at the time section 34.5 was enacted therapeutic abortion was authorized only in cases in which the continuation of the pregnancy potentially threatened the life of the pregnant woman. Therefore, any such interest of the parents or the state, to the extent that it prevented a medically authorized therapeutic abortion, would be dangerous to the life of the pregnant minor and incompatible with the policy of the abortion law. We may not assume an irrational legislative purpose to deny to minors life-saving therapeutic abortions for lack of parental consent while permitting all other pregnancy-related surgical and medical care without the necessity of such consent. As we stated in People v. Belous (1969) supra, 71 Cal.2d 954, at page 969: “[T]he law has always recognized that the pregnant woman’s right to life takes precedence over any interest the state may have in the unborn.”
Respondent suggests that the absence of provision for parental consent in the Therapeutic Abortion Act is evidence of a legislative understanding in 1967 that parental consent was a prerequisite to therapeutic abortion. The implication is that a parental consent provision was deliberately omitted because the legislative sponsors believed that Civil Code section 34.5 required such consent. In support thereof respondent relies on language in a recent law review commentary: “Parental consent in the case of a minor . . . was . . . deemed unnecessary [as a requirement in the Therapeutic Abortion Act] since ‘no hospital will perform surgery on such persons in California without such consent, and the bill requires all legal abortions to be done in hospitals.’” (Note (1967) 19 Hastings L.J. 242, 254.) The author of the Note was quoting from a letter received on July 17, 1967, from the office of Senator Anthony C. Beilenson, the co-author of the Therapeutic Abortion Act.
Any authoritative impact of the quotation from a legislative source is dissipated by the sworn declaration of Senator Beilenson executed on November 3, 1970: “. . . I was the principal author of the Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967; . . . My administrative assistant . . . responded to the inquiries of the Hastings Law Journal by letter, signing my name, in the course of which he made the statement . . . printed at . . . [page] 254 . . . ; I did not write that letter, sign it, nor make that statement; ... I do not share the above opinion expressed and would in fact have advanced a contrary opinion at the time; . . . The absence of a parental consent provision in the Therapeutic Abortion Act was in contemplation of relying on the existing law, which in the opinion of the Legislative Counsel was that parental consent is not necessary for a minor to obtain a therapeutic abortion.” Thus, legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Therapeutic Abortion Act, to the extent that it is persuasive, supports a [882]*882view contrary to that espoused by respondent and consistent with petitioners’ interpretation of section 34.5.
An additional contention of respondent, drawing upon legislative history, is equally unconvincing. He asserts that a 1970 amendment to section 34.5 although vetoed by the Governor, reflects a legislative judgment that section 34.5 does not encompass therapeutic abortions within its language. Had the amendment become law it would have permitted female minors to consent “to the furnishing of medical care related to the prevention of pregnancy” as well as to the furnishing of hospital, medical and surgical care related to pregnancy. (Senate Bill No. 542.) Respondent urges that because abortion involves the termination of pregnancy, it is no more “related to pregnancy” than medical care for the “prevention of pregnancy”; and the Legislature recognized that medical care for the prevention of pregnancy was not encompassed within the original language of section 34.5.
Mere recitation of the argument demonstrates its fallacy. Medical care aimed at preventing pregnancy is obviously not “related to her pregnancy,” an existing condition, because such care is administered before any pregnancy exists and for the purpose of avoiding the condition of pregnancy. Therapeutic abortion, on the other hand, is a surgical procedure to terminate an existing pregnancy which threatens the health of the pregnant woman and, as such, is unquestionably surgical care related to her pregnancy. Indeed, except for a Caesarean section, there is no other surgery common to pregnancy; and a Caesarean, like an abortion, results in terminating pregnancy.
If we examine other medical emancipation sections in the Civil Code, we find that section 34.5 was the first of a consistent series of enactments designed to free particular classes of minors from the necessity of obtaining parental consent to various medical services. In each section the Legislature recognized the interest of the minors in availing themselves of various medical services without parental consent and the interest of the community in permitting the ready availability of medical aid. Thus, section 25.6 enacted in 1961 permits married minors to consent to the furnishing of all hospital, medical and surgical care; section 25.7 (1961) permits minors on active duty in the armed services to consent to all hospital, medical and surgical care; section 34.6 (1968) authorizes minors 15 years of age or older, who are living away from home, to consent to all forms of hospital, medical, surgical, and dental care; and section 34.7 (1968) permits minors 12 years of age or older, who have come into contact with infectious diseases, to consent to medical care related to the treatment of such diseases.
Sections 25.6 and 34.6, by their all-inclusive language, clearly permit certain minors to consent to therapeutic abortion as well as all other types [883]*883of medical care. Respondent apparently concedes as much, but fails to explain why therapeutic abortion must be excluded from the classes of surgical care available to pregnant minors without parental consent under section 34.5. Certainly, the incidence of overlapping coverage among the various medical emancipation statutes in no way implies that therapeutic abortions are not encompassed within the language of section 34.5. Sections 25.6 and 34.6 enable married minors and minors over 15 years old who are living away from home to obtain, without parental consent, all types of medical, hospital and surgical care. Section 34.5 emancipates a minor of any age, only if she is pregnant and unmarried and only for medical, hospital and surgical care related to her pregnancy. There is no rational basis for discriminatorily singling out therapeutic abortion as the only type of pregnancy-related surgical care which requires parental consent.
We are aware that section 34.5, unlike section 34.6, contains no specific age limitation. The age of fertility provides the practical, minimum age requirement under section 34.5. However, there is an additional limitation implicit in each of the medical emancipation statutes: the minor must be of sufficient maturity to give an informed consent to any treatment procedure. (See generally Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 1533, 1555-1558.) A minor of any age who is unable to convince competent medical authorities that she has the requisite understanding and maturity to give an informed consent for any medical treatment, including a therapeutic abortion, will be denied such treatment without the consent of either a parent or legal guardian.8
Finally, we consider the contemporaneous construction of section 34.5 in several county counsel legal opinions which have pondered the question whether minors may obtain therapeutic abortions without parental consent in hospitals in their communities. Notable are the opinions of the Marin County Counsel, the Fresno County Counsel, the Santa Barbara County Counsel, the Sacramento County Counsel and also the California Legislative Counsel and the General Counsel to the Regents of the University of California. Each of the aforementioned legal opinions expresses the considered view that section 34.5 permits an unmarried pregnant minor to [884]*884obtain a therapeutic abortion without the consent of her parents.9 An identical stance is taken in the only published commentary on the Therapeutic Abortion Act, cited in West’s Annotated Health and Safety Code, sections 25950-25954—Leavy and Charles, California’s New Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure (1967) 15 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1, 10.10
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that section 34.5, reasonably construed, permits minors to seek therapeutic abortions without parental consent.11 Finally we must determine whether petitioners are entitled to relief by way of an extraordinary writ.
Petitioners seek to compel the Therapeutic Abortion Committee of the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center to consider on its merits Miss Carlos’ application for therapeutic abortion without requiring her to obtain parental consent. Petitioners do not request us to order the committee to authorize an abortion, but they ask only that the committee be compelled to exercise its discretion to approve or disapprove the application for abortion according to the statutory criteria set forth in Health and Safety Code sections 25951-25954.
The petition for writ of mandate thus falls clearly within the principle enunciated in Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d 562]. In that, case, the Governor refused to consider the petitioner’s application for appointment as a notary solely because he believed his discretion was limited by a then existing section of the Government Code. We issued a writ of mandate to compel the Governor to exercise his discretion and consider [885]*885the application on its merits because we determined that the statute relied upon by the Governor was invalid: “While ordinarily, mandamus may not be available to compel the exercise by a court or officer of the discretion possessed by them in a particular manner, or to reach a particular result, it does lie to command the exercise of discretion—to compel some action upon the subject involved.” (Id. at p. 355.)
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Wright, C. J., Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.