1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *
7 AUGUSTO CESAR REYES CAMPOS1,
8 Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-00850-RFB-BNW
9 v. ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 10 JOHN MATTOS, et al.,
11 Respondents.
12 13 Before the Court is Petitioner Augusto Cesar Reyes Campos’ (ECF No. 6) First Amended 14 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and (ECF No. 14) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 15 (“TRO”). He challenges the lawfulness of his ongoing detention in the custody of Immigration and 16 Customs Enforcement (“ICE’). For the following reasons, the Court grants the Amended Petition 17 and orders Petitioner’s immediate release from detention. The Court further denies the Motion for 18 TRO as moot. 19 20 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 21 On March 12, 2026, Petitioner submitted a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 22 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through the prison mail system at Nevada Southern Detention Center 23 (NSDC). See ECF No. 1-1. The pro se Petition was received and docketed on March 24, 2026. 24 ECF No. 1. The same day this Court granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 25 appointed the Federal Public Defender as counsel, ordered Federal Respondents to produce 26 relevant discovery to Petitioner’s counsel, and set a deadline of April 7, 2026 for Petitioner to file
27 1 The docket and case caption currently incorrectly names Petitioner as “Augusto Cesar 28 Campos Reyes.” The Court will thus order the Clerk of Court to correct the docket and case caption to reflect Petitioner’s name as Augusto Cesar Reyes Campos. 1 an amended petition with the assistance of that discovery and counsel. See ECF No. 4. 2 On April 3, 2026, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition (“Am. Pet.”). See ECF No. 3 6. The Amended Petition asserts that Petitioner’s continued detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 4 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and asks the Court to order his immediate 5 release from custody. See Am. Pet. at 6. Petitioner attached his Form I-862 Notice to Appear issued 6 by the Department Homeland Security (“DHS”) on June 4, 2023, which alleges that he is an 7 “arriving alien” who “applied for admission into the United States of America at the Nogales, 8 Arizona port of entry, and was not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry 9 permit, border crossing card or other valid entry document required by the Immigration and 10 Nationality Act.” See Am. Pet., Ex. 3 at 5 (“NTA”). The NTA commenced removal proceedings 11 against Petitioner, charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). See id. at 2. 12 The NTA further states that Petitioner was paroled into the United States under 13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). See id. Pursuant to the NTA Petitioner was ordered to appear before an 14 immigration judge in West Valley, Utah on April 7, 2026. See id. 15 On April 3, 2026, the Court reviewed the Amended Petition and determined that Petitioner 16 was likely entitled to the same relief as the Court granted to a similarly situated petitioner in 17 Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (D. Nev. 2025), given he was paroled into the 18 country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and detained without pre-deprivation notice and 19 an opportunity to be heard. See Order to Show Cause at 1, ECF No. 7 (“OSC”). The Court ordered 20 Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted, by filing a return certifying the 21 true cause of Petitioner’s detention by April 8, 2026. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243). The Court 22 further ordered Federal Respondents to file all documents reflecting Petitioner’s parole into the 23 United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) or certify that such documents are not in their 24 possession, custody, or control. See id. at 2. 25 On April 8, 2026, Federal Respondents filed their Return to Petitioner’s Amended Petition 26 (“Return”). See ECF No. 9. Federal Respondents asserted Petitioner is a member of the certified 27 class in Jacobo-Ramirez v. Mullin, No. 2:25-cv-02136-RFB-MDC based on the “Order to Show 28 Cause in this matter” even though the OSC made no reference to Jacobo-Ramirez. See Return at 1 1. The Return did not address why the Court should not order the same relief in this case as it did 2 in Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (D. Nev. 2025). See id. The Return similarly 3 failed to address the fact that Petitioner was paroled into the country—even though the documents 4 attached to the Return confirm that fact, see Return, Ex. A at 3 (DHS Form I-213) [hereinafter “I- 5 213”]; id. at 5 (NTA). See id. The Return further did not provide any individualized justification 6 for Petitioner’s arrest and detention—it merely preserved the issue of whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) 7 applies to Petitioner for appeal by reference to Respondents’ briefing in Jacobo-Ramirez. See id. 8 On April 10, 2026, Petitioner filed his Traverse. See ECF No. 11. On April 22, 2026, 9 Petitioner filed a Notice of Class Membership, asserting he is a member of the certified class in 10 Jacobo-Ramirez v. Mullin and entitled to relief pursuant to the classwide declaratory judgment 11 and vacatur issued by this Court in that case. See ECF No. 13 (citing Jacobo Ramirez v. Mullin, 12 No. 2:25-cv-02136-RFB-MDC, 2026 WL 879799 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2026). 13 The Court’s Order granting the Amended Petition follows. 14 15 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 16 The Constitution guarantees the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within 17 the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, 18 cl. 2). “Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide an 19 effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the 20 detention of a person.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (citations omitted). 21 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of 22 Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. 23 Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (citations omitted). Federal courts “have a time-tested device, the 24 writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.’” 25 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536). The writ 26 protects against “arbitrary imprisonments,” which “have been, in all ages, the favorite and most 27 formidable instruments of tyranny.” Id. at 744 (quoting the Federalist No. 84 (Alexander 28 Hamilton)). This Court has jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to noncitizens who are 1 being detained “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 2 § 2241(c)(3); see Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts 3 retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration 4 detention”). 5 Although habeas corpus is “civil in nature[,] and the petitioner bears the burden of proving 6 that his detention is illegal[,]” Carlson v. Landon, 186 F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1950), the mechanics 7 of habeas proceedings are unique. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294–95 (1969). When a 8 court confronts a viable habeas petition, it must either award the writ or order respondent(s) to 9 show cause why the writ should not be granted—i.e., to “make a return certifying the true cause 10 of [ ] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also Harris, 394 U.S. at 298–99 (citation omitted). Since 11 habeas petitions must be verified, see 28 U.S.C. § 2242, their undisputed factual allegations should 12 be taken as true. See Carlson, 186 F.2d at 188 (quoting Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 13 (1895)) (citations omitted). Similarly, the certified, undisputed allegations of respondent(s) should 14 also be accepted as true unless they are contradicted by relevant evidence. See Carlson, 186 F.2d 15 at 188. 16 17 II. FINDINGS OF FACT 18 The Court makes the following findings of fact based on the undisputed verified allegations 19 in the Amended Petition and the documentary evidence supplied by the parties. Petitioner, his wife, 20 and their five children came to the United States from Mexico in June 2023, after fleeing violence 21 and persecution. See Am. Pet. at 3, ECF No. 6. On June 4, 2024, Petitioner applied for admission 22 to the United States at the Nogales, Arizona Deconcini Port of Entry. See id., Ex. 1 at 3 (DHS 23 Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (“I-213”)), ECF No. 6-2; id., Ex. 3 at 2 24 (NTA), ECF No. 6-4. The examining immigration officer determined Petitioner was inadmissible 25 pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). See id., Ex. 26 1 at 3 (I-213) (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)). Petitioner was personally served an 27 NTA in Spanish, signed by a Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) supervisory officer, which 28 designated Petitioner as an “arriving alien” and not as “an alien present in the United States who 1 has not been admitted or paroled” and commenced removal proceedings based on the charge that 2 he was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), because he lacked valid entry documents 3 at the time he applied for admission. See id., Ex. 3 at 1 (NTA), ECF No. 6-4. The NTA required 4 Petitioner to appear for an immigration judge in West Valley, Utah on April 7, 2026. See id. Rather 5 than detain Petitioner, the CBP Officer paroled Petitioner into the country for one year pursuant to 6 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” See id., Ex. 7 1 at 3 (I-213). In paroling Petitioner into the country under § 1182(d)(5), the CBP Officer 8 determined Petitioner was “neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” See 8 C.F.R. 212.5(b). 9 As a § 1182(d)(5) parolee, Petitioner was eligible to obtain authorization to legally work within 10 the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(11). 11 While at liberty in the country for nearly two years, Petitioner obtained a work permit, 12 hired an immigration attorney, timely applied for asylum, and awaited his scheduled hearing in 13 immigration court. See Am. Pet at 3, ECF No. 6. He provided for his family, as the sole 14 breadwinner, by working in drywall and construction. Id. On February 17, 2026, he went to state 15 court in St. George, Utah to pay a fee for a misdemeanor property damage offense. See id. There, 16 ICE Officers apprehended him. See id. at 3–4. They arrested him without a warrant, and when 17 Petitioner asked why he was being arrested, given he had obtained a work permit and was awaiting 18 his immigration court date, the ICE Officers used profane language, took his work permit, and told 19 him he was going to jail. See id. He has remained detained since. 20 According to the I-213, the ICE Deportation Officer Oliver Radtke who arrested Petitioner 21 arrested him on the basis that “he entered the United States on June 4, 2023 through Nogales, 22 Arizona without inspection by U.S. Immigration Officers” and not at a “designated port of entry.” 23 See Return, Ex. A at 3–4, ECF No. 9-1. At the time he was arrested, Petitioner’s immigration court 24 hearing was scheduled for September 23, 2027 in West Valley Utah. Id. at 3. The arresting ICE 25 Officer charged him as being “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” and 26 arrested him on that basis. Id. at 4. The basis for his arrest was obviously erroneous, because the 27 same I-213 Form that alleges Petitioner entered without inspection includes a description of his 28 immigration history which states on June 4, 2023, Petitioner applied for admission to the United 1 States at the “Nogalez, AZ DeConcini Port of Entry” and was “paroled for one year.” Id. Further, 2 the arresting ICE Officers did not issue a new NTA to Petitioner; they relied on the NTA that was 3 served to Petitioner in 2023 in arresting and detaining him, and that NTA did not allege that 4 Petitioner was “present in the United States without having been “admitted or paroled.” See id. at 5 5 (NTA). 6 On February 18, 2026, the arresting ICE Deportation Officer Radtke apparently initiated 7 an initial custody determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and decided Petitioner would remain 8 detained—however nothing in the record indicates Officer Radtke considered whether Petitioner 9 was dangerous or a flight risk or found any other individualized justification for Petitioner’s 10 detention, as required by regulation. See id. at 9 (DHS Form I-286 Notice of Custody 11 Determination); 8 C.F.R.§§ 1236.1(8), 236.1(8) (providing a noncitizen arrested under § 1226(a) 12 an opportunity to “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the [arresting] officer that [release on bond or 13 conditional parole] would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that [the noncitizen] is 14 likely to appear for any future proceeding.”). Officer Radtke failed to sign the Notice of Custody 15 Determination. See id. Further, it does not appear Officer Radtke served the Notice of Custody 16 Determination on Petitioner, as the line for “signature of alien” under “I acknowledge receipt of 17 this notification” is blank and unsigned. See id. Despite apparently being arrested and detained 18 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Petitioner was arrested without a warrant, as required by statute 19 and regulation, see 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b), and when he asked for release on bond, he was told he 20 was ineligible. See Am. Pet. at 5. On March 10, 2026, Petitioner was told by an immigration judge 21 for the Las Vegas Immigration Court that he was ineligible for bond. See id. at 6. 22 As a result of Petitioner’s months of detention, Petitioner’s wife has been suffering from 23 anxiety and panic attacks, his family is behind on their bills, and their three minor children are 24 depressed, anxious, and have been missing school. See Mot. for TRO at 2–3, ECF No. 14. 25 Petitioner further “continues to suffer every moment that his unlawful detention is further 26 prolonged.” Id. at 3. 27 /// 28 /// 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Class Membership and the Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Detention Under the INA 3 Both Petitioner and Federal Respondents assert Petitioner is a member of the Jacobo- 4 Ramirez Class. See generally Return at 1, ECF No. 9 (“Based on the decision by this Court in 5 Jacobo-Ramirez . . . Petitioner is a Class Member.”); see also Notice of Class Membership at 1, 6 ECF No. 13 (“Petitioner . . . herby notifies this Court that he is a member of the certified class in 7 in the case Jacobo Ramirez v. Mullin, No. 25-cv-02136-RFB-MDC (D. Nev.) currently pending 8 in this district.”). However, based on the record, the Court finds the parties are incorrect. 9 The Jacobo-Ramirez Class is defined as “[a]ll noncitizens in the U.S. without lawful status 10 (1) who are or will be arrested or detained by ICE; (2) who are or will be in removal proceedings 11 before an Immigration Court within the District of Nevada; (3) whom DHS alleges or will allege 12 to have entered the United States without inspection or parole; (4) who are not or will not be 13 subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 1231 at the time they are scheduled 14 for or request a bond hearing; and (5) whose most recent arrest by ICE occurred inside the United 15 States and not while arriving in the United States.” Jacobo Ramirez v. Mullin, No. 2:25-CV-02136- 16 RFB-MDC, 2026 WL 879799, at *33 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2026) (emphasis added). The Court finds 17 Petitioner meets all but the third parameter for Jacobo-Ramirez Class Membership. 18 While Petitioner is (1) actively being detained by ICE, see generally, Am. Pet. at 6, ECF 19 No. 6, (2) is currently in removal proceedings before the Las Vegas Immigration Court, see id., 20 (3) and based on Federal Respondents’ Return, is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 21 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 1231, the Court finds DHS does not allege that Petitioner entered the 22 United States without inspection or parole. To the contrary, Petitioner’s NTA, which sets forth the 23 basis for Petitioner’s on-going removal proceedings, charges Petitioner as inadmissible because 24 he was not in possession of a valid entry document when he applied for admission and was 25 inspected and paroled at the Nogales, Arizona Port of Entry, on June 4, 2023. See id., Ex. 3 at 2 26 (NTA). As such, the Court finds Petitioner is not a Jacobo-Ramirez Class Member, because he 27 lawfully applied for admission at a designated port of entry, was inspected by immigration officers, 28 and was paroled into the country on June 4, 2023. 1 Nevertheless, the record demonstrates Petitioner’s most recent arrest by ICE was pursuant 2 to 8 U.S.C § 1226(a) based on Federal Respondents own records, see Return, Ex. at 9 (DHS Form 3 I-286 Notice of Custody Determination), and the fact that he was arrested while “already inside 4 the U.S.” and not while Petitioner was “seeking admission” i.e. seeking to come “‘from outside’ 5 into the United States.’” Jacobo Ramirez, 2026 WL 879799, at *16 (emphasis in original) (citing 6 Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2020)). The Court thus finds that Petitioner’s arrest 7 without a warrant and without a meaningful initial custody determination, and his ongoing 8 detention without a bond hearing, violates the INA, § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations. 9 See Djiwaje v. Bondi, No. 2:26-cv-00344-RFB-MDC, 2026 WL 926753 (D. Nev. Apr. 6, 2026) 10 (explaining the regulatory and statutory background of the warrant requirement for detaining 11 noncitizens under § 1226(a) and holding that immigration authorities’ failure to effectuate a 12 noncitizen’s arrest under the authority of a properly issued Form I-200 necessitated that 13 noncitizen’s immediate release from detention); see also Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. 14 (explaining that noncitizens arrested and detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to an initial custody 15 determination by the arresting ICE officer, and if ICE denies bond or conditional parole, a “bond 16 hearing before an [immigration judge]” where they will be released if they can demonstrate that 17 they are not “‘a threat to national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, 18 or otherwise a poor bail risk.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.129; Matter of Guerra, 24 I. 19 & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006); Matter of Barreiros, 10 I. & N. Dec. 536, 537–38 (B.I.A. 1964)). 20 The Court thus finds Petitioner’s arrest and ongoing detention by ICE is unlawful under 21 the INA and its implementing regulations. 22 B. Due Process 23 For the reasons that follow, the Court further finds Petitioner’s arrest and ongoing detention 24 violates his constitutional right to due process. The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of 25 life, liberty, and property without due process of law. See U.S. Const., amend. V. There is no 26 question that these protections extend to noncitizens present in the United States. See, e.g., Trump 27 v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 28 entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceedings.’”) (quoting Reno v. 1 Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 2 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 3 including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); 4 Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding the “Fifth Amendment entitles aliens 5 to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”).“[T]he government's discretion to incarcerate 6 non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 7 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). 8 Noncitizen detainees charged with being in the U.S. illegally are entitled to procedural due 9 process, meaning “notice and opportunity to be heard ‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’” 10 J.G.G., 605 U.S. at 673 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 11 (1950); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). “Procedural due process rules are 12 meant to protect” against “the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” 13 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 259 (1978). Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the 14 particular situation.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 15 Substantive due process protects individuals from government action that interferes with 16 fundamental rights. See Regino v. Staley, 133 F.4th 951, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2025). “Governmental 17 action that infringes a fundamental right is constitutional only if ‘the infringement is narrowly 18 tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’” Id. at 960 (citing Reno, 507 U.S. at 302). “Freedom 19 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 20 lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 21 Substantive due process thus protects noncitizens from arbitrary confinement by the government, 22 which violates a noncitizen's substantive due process rights except in certain “special and narrow 23 nonpunitive circumstances where a special justification . . . outweighs the individual's 24 constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Id. at 690 (internal quotations 25 omitted) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 26 346, 356 (1997). 27 1. Procedural Due Process 28 To determine whether immigration detention violates procedural due process, courts apply 1 the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) to analyze and balance 2 both the private and governmental interests affected. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1203–1207 3 (collecting cases and clarifying that the Mathews test is appropriate in the context of immigration 4 detention). Specifically, courts weigh the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will be 5 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 6 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 7 safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 8 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement[s] would entail.” 9 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted). 10 On balance, the Court finds the Mathews factors weigh heavily in favor of Petitioner. First, 11 Petitioner has a paramount interest in his physical liberty, “the most elemental of liberty 12 interests[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). That interest is especially weighty 13 considering the process he has received, and that was available to him, upon his arrest and 14 throughout his months of detention—that is, regarding the basis for his arrest and the government’s 15 custody determination, no process at all. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.th at 1208 (considering the 16 process the immigration detainee had already received during his detention pursuant to § 1226(a) 17 and the further process that was available to him in weighing his private liberty interest). 18 Further, Petitioner’s liberty interest is particularly strong given the government’s decision 19 to parole Petitioner into the county after he presented himself for lawful inspection at the border. 20 The government’s decision to release Petitioner and provide him work authorization created “‘an 21 implicit promise’ that [his] liberty [would] be revoked only if [he failed] to abide by the conditions 22 of his release.” Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1179 (D. Nev. 2025) (citations 23 omitted); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (“The parolee has relied on at 24 least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole 25 conditions.”) When Petitioner was inspected by border officials without being detained and 26 granted entry into the country “on parole, Petitioner took with him a liberty interest which is 27 entitled to the full protections of the due process clause.” Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. 28 Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing Doe v. Becerra, 787 F.Supp.3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. 1 Cal. 2025) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that individuals who have been 2 released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a liberty interest in their 3 continued liberty.”). 4 Petitioner’s actions as a parolee show that he reasonably relied on his liberty interest, by 5 obtaining work authorization, serving as the primary breadwinner for his family, applying for 6 asylum, attempting to pay a fine for his sole misdemeanor conviction, and awaiting his 2027 7 immigration hearing. Although Petitioner’s parole may have expired after one year, that does not 8 diminish the significance of his liberty interest. See Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F.Supp.3d 1025, 1032 9 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[E]ven when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 10 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected 11 liberty interest in remaining out of custody”) (collecting cases). Further, the fact that Federal 12 Respondents did not seek to detain Petitioner upon the automatic expiration of his parole in June 13 of 2024 or even acknowledge Petitioner’s prior grant of parole in arresting and detaining him in 14 February 2026, based on an obviously erroneous charged that he entered without inspection, 15 further strengthens his liberty interest. Likewise, Federal Respondents have made no effort to 16 explain why they found Petitioner to be neither dangerous or at risk of absconding and eligible for 17 humanitarian parole in 2023, but not in February 2026, when they arrested him at a courthouse 18 without a warrant, took his work authorization permit, used profane language, refused to answer 19 when Petitioner asked why he was being arrested, and failed to make any individualized 20 determination as to why his detention was justified. At the time he was arrested, Petitioner had 21 developed strong financial and community ties to the country and timely applied for asylum, and 22 nothing in the record indicates he was dangerous or a flight risk. 23 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is extraordinarily high 24 given the absence of any meaningful notice or opportunity to be heard upon Petitioner’s arrest and 25 throughout his detention. That risk of error is illustrated by the facts of this case, where ICE 26 arrested Petitioner based on a mistaken assertion that he entered the United States without 27 inspection or parole at a designated port of entry—even though ICE’s own records described 28 Petitioner’s inspection and parole at a designated port of entry in Nogales, Arizona. Even if ICE 1 had detained him due to the fact that his parole had automatically expired, pursuant to regulation, 2 Petitioner’s detention would only have been permissible if the arresting officer considered whether 3 he could be excluded, deported, or removed “within a reasonable time”—if not, regulation requires 4 that he “shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of the official . . . the public interest 5 requires that the alien be continued in custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)-(2)(i). Here, however, there 6 is no indication that the arresting officer made such a determination, and there has been no 7 mechanism for Petitioner to challenge ICE’s decision to return him to custody by ensuring either 8 that his removal will be executed within a reasonable time or that ICE had a reasonable basis for 9 deciding that the public interest requires his continued detention. Petitioner thus had no recourse 10 to challenge his detention after his parole expired as based upon an erroneous or mistaken factual 11 or legal predicate, or as otherwise arbitrary. 12 In contrast longstanding procedures under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations— 13 which the government has only recently abandoned after thirty years of consistent prior practice— 14 would require a determination that Petitioner’s detention is justified based on his individual 15 circumstances, notice of that determination, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral 16 decisionmaker, subject to multiple levels of administrative and judicial review. See Jacobo- 17 Ramirez, 2026 WL 879799, at *29–31; see also Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1210. Further, given 18 Petitioner’s prior parole status, a pre-deprivation hearing, where Petitioner would have notice and 19 an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker, would greatly reduce the risk of error. Cf. 20 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483 (explaining that “the State has no interest in revoking parole without 21 some informal procedural guarantees”). 22 Third, the Court considers the government’s interest and the fiscal and administrative 23 burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. The government has 24 “no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the 25 community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured 26 by a lesser bond or alternative conditions.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 27 994 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, the government’s interest in enforcing immigration law and presumed 28 interest in detaining noncitizens who are dangerous, or a flight risk, is served, and not unduly 1 burdened, by the longstanding procedural protections provided to noncitizens like Petitioner to 2 ensure they are indeed dangerous or at risk of absconding. Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, 809 F. Supp. 3 3d. 1123, 1160–62 (D. Nev. 2025). Moreover, the additional procedural requirements afforded 4 under § 1226(a) which Petitioner has been deprived of reduce the fiscal and administrative burden 5 of civil immigration detention. See Jacobo-Ramirez, 2026 WL 879799, at *30 (Recent estimates 6 by the federal government find that supervised release programs such as those available under § 7 1226 cost less than $4.20 each day per participant, compared with detention costs of $152 per 8 day.”) (citation omitted). 9 In sum, the Court finds the Mathews factors weigh heavily in favor of Petitioner and his 10 arrest and ongoing detention violate his right to procedural due process. 11 2. Substantive Due Process 12 The Court further finds Petitioner’s ongoing detention violates his right to substantive due 13 process, because the government has asserted no special justification for his detention that 14 outweighs his constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691–92 (“once 15 the flight risk justification evaporates, the only special circumstance [ ] present is the alien's 16 removable status itself, which bears no relation to a detainee's dangerousness.”). To date, Federal 17 Respondents have not asserted an individualized justification—let alone a special or compelling 18 justification—for depriving Petitioner of his freedom. Accordingly, the Court further finds that 19 Petitioner’s ongoing detention violates his right to substantive due process. Cf. Escobar Salgado, 20 809 F. Supp. 3d. at 1162 (elaborating on this same analysis and reaching the same conclusion). 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court has little difficulty concluding that Petitioner’s 22 detention violates his right to procedural and substantive due process and is, therefore, 23 unconstitutional. 24 25 IV. REMEDY 26 Having found Petitioner remains in detention in violation of his statutory, regulatory, and 27 constitutional rights, the Court’s task is to determine the appropriate remedy for these violations. 28 See Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A federal court is vested with the 1 largest power to control and direct the form of judgment to be entered in cases brought up before 2 it on habeas corpus. The court is free to fashion the remedy as law and justice require[.]”) (cleaned 3 up) (citations omitted). Petitioner asks for his immediate release, or in the alternative, a prompt 4 bond hearing where the government bears the burden of justifying his detention by clear and 5 convincing evidence. The Court finds that Petitioner’s immediate release from detention on the 6 same conditions as his prior release, before he was arrested by ICE at the Utah courthouse, is the 7 appropriate equitable remedy in this case. 8 The Supreme Court has consistently held that “the Constitution requires some kind of 9 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 10 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). While a post-deprivation hearing may be appropriate in 11 situations that urgently require arrest, absent evidence of such urgent concerns, a pre-deprivation 12 hearing is required to satisfy due process. Id. at 128. No such concerns are present here. Thus, 13 “because the constitutional violation is the absence of pre-deprivation process, the proper remedy 14 is to restore the status quo ante—that is, to return [Petitioner] to the conditions that existed before 15 his unlawful detention.” Kirykovich v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-cv-00695-JNW, 2026 WL 890459, at 16 *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2026) (emphasis in original). Further, a bond hearing would not adequately 17 vindicate Petitioner's rights. Indeed, ordering a hearing while Petitioner remains detained would 18 reward the government for arresting and detaining him on a clearly erroneous basis without 19 process, in violation of his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. See id. The Court 20 therefore finds that the appropriate remedy here is immediate release subject to the conditions of 21 Petitioner's prior release on parole. 22 Additionally, the Court finds that it must adopt equitable remedies to ensure that Federal 23 Respondents abide by due process moving forward, in the event of Petitioner’s re-detention 24 pursuant to § 1226(a). Cf. Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Federal courts 25 have a fair amount of flexibility in fashioning specific habeas relief.”); U.S. v. Handa, 122 F.3d 26 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing the broad, flexible power federal courts possess to fashion 27 equitable relief in the context of habeas corpus proceedings). Here, the Court finds it appropriate 28 to order that in the event of Petitioner’s re-detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Federal 1 Respondents must provide Petitioner a pre-deprivation bond hearing wherein the government must 2 prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that detention is appropriate under § 1226(a) and its 3 implementing regulations. See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024) (reviewing 4 the immigration court’s compliance with a district court’s order that the government provide an 5 immigration detainee a bond hearing “under the Due Process Clause,” which required “the 6 government to show by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee presents a flight risk or a 7 danger to the community at the time of the bond hearing.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 8 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)). 9 10 V. CONCLUSION 11 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Petitioner’s Amended Petition for 12 a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Petitioner’s (ECF No. 14) Motion for a Temporary 14 Restraining Order is DENIED as moot. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents IMMEDIATELY RELEASE 16 Petitioner subject to the prior conditions of his parole status. In any event, Petitioner must be 17 released BY NO LATER than 12:00 p.m. on May 15, 2026. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents must inform Petitioner’s counsel of the 19 date, time, and location of Petitioner’s release at least two hours in advance of said release. 20 Respondents must further RETURN Petitioner’s personal property, including his employment 21 authorization documents and any personal identification document, upon his release. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED 23 from detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents may not re-detain Petitioner during the 25 pendency of his current removal proceedings until after an immigration court hearing is held, with 26 adequate notice, to determine whether detention is appropriate under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its 27 implementing regulations. At this hearing, the government must bear the burden of establishing 28 that detention is appropriate by clear and convincing evidence. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties shall file a JOINT STATUS REPORT by 2| May 18, 2026 confirming Petitioner’s release and Respondents’ compliance with this Order. 3 The Clerk of Court is kindly instructed to: 4 (1) AMEND the case caption and docket to reflect: 5 a. Petitioner’s name: Augusto Cesar Reyes Campos. 6 b. The Respondents as named in the (ECF No. 6) First Amended Petition: (1) John 7 Mattos, Michael Bernacke, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mulin, and Todd Blanche. 8 (2) ENTER judgment accordingly close this case. 9 The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce its order and judgment. Petitioner may move to 10 | reopen this case to enforce the judgment without filing a separate case. The Court also retains 11 | jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s request for fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 12 | Petitioner may file an application for fees and costs consistent with the deadlines and requirements 13 | set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and this Court’s Local Rules of Practice 54-1 and 54-14 14 DATED: May 15, 2026.
16 7 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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