RAKER, Judge.
The Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), through Bar Counsel, charged Rena Vaughn Atkinson, Respondent, with several violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, arising out of her failure to pay federal and state income taxes for the years 1986 through 1996. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(b), we referred the charges to Judge E. Allen Shepherd, of the Circuit Court for Princes George’s County, to conduct a hearing and make findings of fact and proposed [648]*648conclusions of law. After hearing evidence, Judge Shepherd filed a memorandum opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. He concluded that Respondent had violated Maryland Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d). Rule 8.4 Misconduct reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
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(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice....
Respondent filed exceptions to Judge Shepherd’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, all of which we shall overrule.
t — i
Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Shepherd, being persuaded by the clear and convincing evidence presented at the hearing, filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Respondent is a member of the bar in both the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia. She is a 1983 graduate of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, where she took courses in income tax law.
After she was admitted to the bar of Maryland in 1984, Respondent worked as an associate with the law firm Deckelbaum, Ogens, and Fisher. While employed with the firm, Respondent filed her tax returns1 and paid any tax [649]*649liability which exceeded the amount the firm had already withheld on her behalf.
Respondent left the firm in 1988, and has been a sole practitioner ever since. Her practice consists mostly of estate and probate work. Her principal office is in the District of Columbia, however, she sometimes works out of her home in Hyattsville, Maryland. She has no employees.
From 1988 to 1996, Atkinson failed to file joint federal and state income tax returns for herself and her husband. With each passing year, Respondent’s tax arrearages grew until they had a “snowballing” effect. Respondent knew that she could not afford to pay the back taxes, and therefore did not file the returns. Instead, Respondent allowed the arrearages to mount, and simply avoided the situation. At all times, Respondent was aware that she had a legal obligation to file tax returns.
In 1994, Respondent and her husband went to the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) Office in Largo, Maryland. They received several forms pamphlets from the I.R.S. help desk assistant, but they did not speak with an agent. Nor did Respondent make any other arrangements to meet with an agent at a later date.
Instead, it was the I.R.S. that brought this matter to light. In early 1997, I.R.S. Agent Bill Rush contacted Respondent. Upon Rush’s request, Respondent attempted to gather information so that she could prepare tax returns for the years 1988 through 1996. As she went through her papers, Respondent discovered tax returns for the years 1986 and 1987 that had been prepared, but never mailed. In April of 1997, Rush notified the Attorney Grievance Commission of Respondent’s failure to file returns and pay taxes. Respondent has since filed [a] return for each year from 1986 through to the present, except for 1988. Respondent was unable to find sufficient documentation to file her return for that year.
The I.R.S. has determined that Respondent owes approximately $93,000 in back taxes and penalties. Respondent has made one payment of $15,546.61 toward that balance. [650]*650Respondent has made no other payments toward her federal or state tax arrearages.
During the years in which she failed to file tax returns, Respondent earned as much as $61,000 a year. Due to the nature of her probate and estate practice, however, Respondent’s cash flow was irregular. While evidence showed that Respondent has two mortgages on her home and is the primary bread-winner for her family of four, there was no evidence presented that Respondent suffered any extraordinary financial hardship during the years in question. Nor was there any evidence that Respondent suffered from any debilitating physical or mental illnesses or conditions that would have affected her ability to file tax returns or make payments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court finds that Respondent willfully, knowingly, and purposely failed to file income tax returns from 1986 to 1996. The willful failure to file timely income tax returns is a crime. The Court need not find that Respondent actually intended to defraud the government; willful failure is sufficient to constitute a crime. Additionally, willful failure to file income tax returns adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. Therefore, Respondent clearly violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
The willful failure to file timely income tax returns also violates Rule 8.4(c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. The rule states that an attorney cannot engage in any conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In the case at bar, Respondent knew that she had failed to file tax returns when she went to the I.R.S. office in Largo in 1994. She received information on how to handle the situation, and then again failed to act. Her failure to contact an I.R.S. agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest. Had she been more forthcoming, the “snowballing” effect could have been avoided, or at the very least diminished. The Court finds that Respondent’s [651]*651inaction violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Finally, the Court finds that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent’s -willful failure to file her federal and state tax returns was prejudicial to the administration of justice. [All footnotes but first omitted.]
II.
Bar Counsel took no exceptions to Judge Shepherd’s findings of fact or conclusions of law, offering only a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed. Bar Counsel recommends that Respondent be suspended for a period of three years.
Respondent excepts to two of the hearing court’s conclusions of law, specifically that her failure to file and pay income taxes violated both subsections (b) and (c) of Rule 8.4.2 [652]*652Respondent concedes that failure to file is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and, therefore, that she violated Rule 8.4(d). Respondent maintains, however, that the hearing court incorrectly found that she violated Rule 8.4(b) merely because , she failed to file income tax returns. In this regard, she relies primarily on our decision in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 710 A.2d 935 (1998). As we shall explain, we find Post to be significantly distinguishable from the present case.
We first point out that this Court, by Order dated April 15, 1986, adopted the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1987, along with the comment to each Rule. With respect to failure to file an income tax return, the Comment to Rule 8.4 begins:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return.
[653]*653Moreover, this Court had previously held, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walman, 280 Md. 458, 374 A.2d 354 (1977),
That the crime of which respondent stands convicted [— wilfully and knowingly failing to file his federal income tax return for the year 19683 — ] represents conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and, under the particular circumstances of this case, reflects upon his fitness to practice law is beyond debate.
Id. at 463, 374 A.2d at 360 (citations omitted). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Baldwin, 308 Md. 397, 407, 519 A.2d 1291, 1296-97 (1987) (noting existence of tax cases involving failure to file that reveal type of disorganized behavior with regard to continuing responsibilities that would alarm any client whose affairs demanded systematic attention).
Turning to our decision in Post, the attorney’s misconduct there was that he had failed to file withholding income tax returns in a timely manner, to remit the taxes withheld, and to hold the withheld taxes in trust, resulting in his being charged with a violation of Rule 8.4(b). The hearing court, having noted that it did not believe, and that Bar Counsel did not contend, that Post intended to defraud the State Comptroller or the federal authorities, and being unconvinced that Post’s conduct adversely reflected on his honesty or trustworthiness, nevertheless concluded that the conduct reflected adversely on his fitness as an attorney, in violation of Rule 8.4(b). Post, 350 Md. at 94, 710 A.2d at 939. This Court sustained Post’s exception to this conclusion by the lower court. Distinguishing the facts in Post from the circumstances in Walman, we found it significant that the hearing court found Post’s actions not to have compromised his honesty or trustworthiness, instead identifying the attorney’s problem as involving office [654]*654management skills rather than his performance or abilities as a lawyer. We explained:
We do not believe that, under the circumstances of this case, that the respondent’s conduct “reflects adversely on his fitness as a lawyer.” The only basis for the court’s conclusion that it does reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer is that failure to practice what one preaches undermines one’s credibility as a provider of legal counsel. But that is simply another way of saying that the administration of justice may be prejudiced. The court was specific in rejecting any suggestion that, by his actions, the respondent’s honesty or trustworthiness was compromised, the conclusion that one could most logically be expected to draw. Moreover, the court also diagnosed the problem as one involving the respondent’s office management skills rather than “his performance or abilities as an attorney.”
Id. at 99, 710 A.2d at 942 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
What could be said for Post, however, cannot be said for Atkinson. While frequently failing to pay the withholding taxes due, Post nonetheless had not steered himself completely clear of the taxing authorities. Post continued to withhold taxes from employee wages, kept the necessary records, filed withholding tax returns intermittently, and at times submitted the withheld taxes. Atkinson, on the other hand, purposefully avoided almost all contact with both the state and federal income taxing authorities and at no point exhibited, over a period of eleven years, any real intention to fulfill her duties of filing the required returns and paying the taxes due, until the authorities discovered her delinquency and contacted her.
Secondly, contrary to “the conclusion that one could most logically be expected to draw,” id., 710 A.2d at 942, the hearing judge in Post’s case concluded that Post’s misconduct did not represent any lack of honesty or trustworthiness on his part. In stark contrast, both the hearing judge and the inquiry panel which initially reviewed the present case drew that most logically expected conclusion: Atkinson’s misconduct did in fact exhibit a dishonest character. Judge Shepherd [655]*655concluded that “[Atkinson’s] failure to contact an I.R.S. agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest.” Likewise, the inquiry panel determined that Atkinson’s conduct “constitutes a criminal act and given the length of time over which this conduct occurred it reflects adversely upon the respondent’s honesty, and trustworthiness.” Report and Recommendation of Inquiry Panel, March 19, 1998 at 4. While the hearing court did not make a finding that Respondent intended to defraud the taxing authorities, Judge Shepherd found that she “willfully, knowingly, and purposefully failed to file income tax returns from 1986 to 1996,” again the willful failure to file being a crime that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law. See Walman, 280 Md. at 463, 374 A.2d at 360. Accordingly, Respondent’s exception to the hearing court’s conclusion that she violated Rule 8.4(b) is overruled.
Respondent also excepts to the conclusion drawn by the hearing court that her failure to file income tax returns violated Rule 8.4(c). To arrive at that conclusion, the court relied upon the fact that Respondent, having already failed to file income tax returns for a period of several years, obtained information as to how to correct the situation, but then failed to act on that information. Again, as the hearing judge summed up, “[Respondent’s] failure to contact an I.R.S. agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest.” In contrast, Respondent contends that a mere failure to file tax returns is not enough to trigger the application of subsection (c); rather, an actual dishonest or fraudulent intent on the part of the deficient taxpayer must be shown. We need not address Respondent’s specific contention as to whether such intent need be shown. We think the hearing court correct in characterizing Respondent’s particular misconduct as dishonest, if only because of the substantial duration in time over which she failed to pay both state and federal income taxes. The repeated failure to file tax returns — particularly when it spans an uninterrupted period of over ten years — is not a minor criminal offense, is a dishonest act, and reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law. A conviction for tax evasion is not a necessary predicate to [656]*656support a finding of dishonesty. We conclude that the hearing court correctly determined that Respondent’s failure to fulfill her income tax duties constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(c).
Because we conclude that Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d), we shall overrule her exceptions.
IV.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed in this case. Bar Counsel recommends an indefinite suspension vrith the right to reapply after three years. Respondent counters that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction. In mitigation, her counsel presents the following:
[S]he has been forthcoming and honest during all stages of this investigation and proceedings, showing her respect for the courts. Although her conduct does reflect poorly on the profession, she is committed to resolving her difficulties and continuing her diligent efforts to maintain her growing practice. A suspension of her license will only serve to impair her ability to repay her debts to the federal and state governments.
If, on the other hand, this Court deems a suspension to be appropriate, Respondent suggests that it be “a short finite, or indefinite suspension, with the right to reapply for reinstatement upon settling and paying her tax liabilities.”
We are mindful that the purpose of sanctions is to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999). The appropriate severity of a sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kandel, 317 Md. 274, 281, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (1989). In addition to the facts underlying the misconduct, the attorney’s prior grievance history, as well any mitigating factors, are part of the equation. An important consideration in fashioning a sanction for failure to file income tax returns is the intention and motive of the attorney. Attorney Grievance [657]*657Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 601, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995).
There is little, if any, mitigating evidence in this record. Judge Shepherd found that during the years in which Respondent failed to file state and federal tax returns, she earned $61,000 in at least one year. At the time of oral argument before this Court, she apparently still owed the I.R.S. tens of thousands of dollars in back taxes and penalties. And, although she may have been the family breadwinner during the majority if not the entire period of her tax delinquency, the hearing judge found that she did not suffer from any debilitating physical or mental illnesses or condition that would have affected her ability to file tax returns or to make payments.
Respondent’s practice consisted mostly of estate and probate matters, a practice heavily weighted to taxes. We note that Respondent did not file state or federal tax returns for eleven years. By our calculation, considering the requirement of filing quarterly returns, she failed to file over one hundred returns. During this entire period of time, Respondent was aware of the obligation to pay her taxes, but she ignored it. Although the hearing court observed that perhaps one of the reasons Respondent allowed the situation to fester was her knowledge that she could not pay the taxes that were due, such knowledge, while perhaps negating a fraudulent intent, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 462, 374 A.2d 354, 360 (1977), is hardly a legitimate excuse or mitigation. Nor does it diminish the seriousness of the conduct. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 480, 408 A.2d 719, 723 (1979). As we noted earlier, “ ‘By willfully failing to file his tax returns, a lawyer appears to the public to be placing himself above [the] law.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Baldwin, 308 Md. 397, 408, 519 A.2d 1291, 1297 (1987) (quoting Walman, 280 Md. at 465, 374 A.2d at 361).
As mitigation, Respondent points to her cooperation with the I.R.S. to settle the amount due and to reach a payment [658]*658plan to discharge the obligation. While we have said that an offending attorney’s after-the-fact cooperation with authorities is commendable, nonetheless we have consistently refused to treat such cooperation as a mitigation of the underlying conduct. See Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 557, 318 A.2d 809, 810 (1974); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Casalino, 335 Md. 446, 452, 644 A.2d 43, 46 (1994). In Casalino, we reaffirmed the principle “that a lawyer’s cooperation with the authorities subsequent to his criminal activity, and then only because it was detected, would not ‘serve to palliate the evil of his [or her] offense.’ ” Id., 644 A.2d at 46 (quoting Callanan, 271 Md. at 557, 318 A.2d at 810). As it stands, Respondent and her husband went to the I.R.S. in 1994 and picked up forms, yet she did nothing to rectify the problem and, indeed, never went to the tax authorities voluntarily.
Under the circumstances, we reject Respondent’s request that she be reprimanded, believing instead that a period of suspension is required. We also find Bar Counsel’s recommendation based on Walman inappropriate because we find Walman to be distinguishable. Walman had two prior disciplinary actions against him, as well as a criminal prosecution and conviction for the charges underlying the attorney grievance action. Along similar lines, we stated in Baldwin the following as our rationale in imposing an eighteen month suspension:
Although Baldwin’s flouting of the law with respect to withholding did not result in a criminal prosecution, it does involve six years within a period of seven consecutive years. Moreover, Judge Fader found that there were no extenuating circumstances in Baldwin’s case. For example, Baldwin’s alcoholism did not cause him to fail to file returns and pay taxes.
In Walman’s case there was a criminal conviction, the failure to file, involving three years, [which] was not fraudulent, and there were no mitigating circumstances. We suspended Walman for three years. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gilland, 293 Md. 316, 443 A.2d 603 (1982), [659]*659the attorney was convicted of failing to file federal income tax returns for three years for which he was sentenced to two months imprisonment, a one year suspended sentence, and a fíne of $10,000. Gilland had no fraudulent intent but it was found that he had violated DR 1-1Q2(A)(5). There were mitigating circumstances. We suspended Gilland for two years. If the failure to file is accompanied by an intention to cheat the government and fellow citizens by avoiding the payment of substantial taxes justly due, and absent extenuating circumstances, the proper sanction is disbarment. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Woodward, 299 Md. 429, 474 A.2d 208 (1984) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 408 A.2d 719 (1979).
Baldwin, 808 Md. at 408, 519 A.2d at 1297. In contrast, this proceeding is Respondent’s first disciplinary action, and Respondent was not charged in a criminal prosecution.
Weighing all of these factors, we conclude that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after the expiration of one year, accounting from thirty days from the filing of this opinion. Atkinson shall stand suspended beyond that date unless and until all costs incurred in connection with this proceeding are paid in full.
IT IS SO ORDERED. RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715(c), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST RENA VAUGHN ATKINSON RESPONDENT’S SUSPENSION SHALL COMMENCE THIRTY DAYS FROM THE FILING OF THIS OPINION.