Smith, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Once again we are engaged in the very unpleasant task of disbarring an attorney.
Bar Counsel, acting pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule BV9 on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, filed a petition with us seeking disciplinary action against William H. Pattison, Jr., a member of the bar of this Court since November 13, 1952. Two distinct sets of circumstances were involved, one concerning an estate and the other concerning a patent.
i The estate
Relative to the estate, Bar Counsel alleged a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6); DR 6-101 (A) (1), (2), and (3); DR 9-102 (A) (1) and (2); and DR 9-102 (B) (1), (2), (3), and (4).
The trial judge, to whom we referred
the matter pursuant to Rule BV9 b, found Pattison violated DR 6-101 (A) (1) and (3), and Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.)
Art. 10, § 44(a), rather than finding that Pattison violated DR 9-102 (A). Bar Counsel excepted, contending that the trial judge was clearly in error when he found no violation of DR 9-102 (A). We agree.
Pattison became the personal representative of the estate of Marie Wanamaker on January 22, 1974. The estate was administered under the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County. The trial judge found, "When opened, the Estate contained approximately $30,000.00 in liquid assets, with another $191,000.00 being held in trust in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company.”
Pattison filed several accounts in the office of the Register of Wills of Montgomery County. None of these accounts is a model of proper estate accounting. In fact, they are sadly deficient.
On February 2, 1979, a hearing was held before Judge Joseph M. Mathias in the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County.
The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the estate could be closed and whether Pattison should continue as personal representative. At the time of that hearing, the attorney who pressed for closing the estate expressed a desire to examine bank statements and checks to ascertain whether all of the cash was in the bank. This
examination took place in Judge Mathias’ chambers. Upon the return of Pattison and the attorney to the courtroom, the attorney said:
"I think something has been accomplished. Unfortunately, the primary record which we were interested in, the bank statement, the pass books and bank statements and cancelled checks were not available. They are in--”
Pattison then said:
"I’m sorry, Your Honor, I didn’t realize they were in a safe in my office. My secretary failed to take them out of the safe and put them in the file and I apologize to Mr. Stewart, but I think we have resolved that problem this morning, I hope.”
Judge Mathias then passed an order, pursuant to the understanding of the parties, requiring the estate to be closed within twenty days.
On February 16, 1979, Pattison addressed the following letter to Judge Mathias:
"By Order of the Orphan’s Court dated February 2, 1979, I, as Personal Representative of the above estate, was directed to complete administration of the estate on or before February 23, 1979. I have progressed with the work necessary to complete administration as directed.
"However, I now realize that it would be inappropriate for me to endeavor to prepare the Final Account and conclude administration for the reason that I earlier borrowed money from the estate assets. The fact that the money has been repaid, with interest, does not cure what I feel to be my disqualification to continue as Personal Representative. Certainly, the Register of Wills and C. Van Leuven Stewart will agree.
"Accordingly, it is the purpose of this letter to request that the Orphan’s Court enter such Order as
necessary to remove me as Personal Representative and to appoint a Special Administrator to conclude administration. By this letter I waive requirement of further notice and the right to appear prior to entry of such Order.
"Be assured that I stand ready to cooperate in every possible manner with such Special Administrator as may be appointed.
"A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Register of Wills, C. Van Leuven Stewart, Esquire, and the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.”
Pattison did as he promised. He sent a copy to the Attorney Grievance Commission.
A hearing was held before Judge Mathias on October 15, 1979, in order that Pattison might show cause why he should not be removed as personal representative and, as Judge Mathias put it, "[t]o determine whether or not to hold Mr. Pattison in contempt for his failure to comply with the Court’s Order of February 2, 1979.”
It developed, as Judge Mathias found and as the trial judge in this case found, that Pattison had paid substantial sums of money from the estate account over to himself. A total of $32,474.55 appears to have been deposited in the estate account at the Maryland National Bank in Cambridge. On January 20, 1975, Pattison drew a check to himself in the amount of $2,000.00. He claims this was an advance on commissions. Before Judge Pollitt, who heard this case under Rule BV9, Pattison said in response to the court’s question as to this being an advance against commissions:
"Yes, Your Honor, the first withdrawal I anticipated actually, initially, and erroneously anticipated, substantial commissions in the estate because the estate looked like it would be $225,000/$230, including the trust assets. I anticipated substantial commissions, and the first draw was the basic $2,000 or 10 percent of the first $20,000 allowable commis
sion, intended to represent that as advance payment.”
It developed that the total sum withdrawn by Pattison from the estate was $28,900, being as follows:
1/20/75 $ 2,000
2/28/75 500
4/4/75 500
5/21/75 500
7/3/75 2.500
7/21/75 800
9/5/75 400
9/11/75 500
9/19/75 600
9/19/75 200
12/12/75 400
12/12/75 400
12/12/75 100
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Smith, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Once again we are engaged in the very unpleasant task of disbarring an attorney.
Bar Counsel, acting pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule BV9 on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, filed a petition with us seeking disciplinary action against William H. Pattison, Jr., a member of the bar of this Court since November 13, 1952. Two distinct sets of circumstances were involved, one concerning an estate and the other concerning a patent.
i The estate
Relative to the estate, Bar Counsel alleged a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6); DR 6-101 (A) (1), (2), and (3); DR 9-102 (A) (1) and (2); and DR 9-102 (B) (1), (2), (3), and (4).
The trial judge, to whom we referred
the matter pursuant to Rule BV9 b, found Pattison violated DR 6-101 (A) (1) and (3), and Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.)
Art. 10, § 44(a), rather than finding that Pattison violated DR 9-102 (A). Bar Counsel excepted, contending that the trial judge was clearly in error when he found no violation of DR 9-102 (A). We agree.
Pattison became the personal representative of the estate of Marie Wanamaker on January 22, 1974. The estate was administered under the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County. The trial judge found, "When opened, the Estate contained approximately $30,000.00 in liquid assets, with another $191,000.00 being held in trust in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company.”
Pattison filed several accounts in the office of the Register of Wills of Montgomery County. None of these accounts is a model of proper estate accounting. In fact, they are sadly deficient.
On February 2, 1979, a hearing was held before Judge Joseph M. Mathias in the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County.
The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the estate could be closed and whether Pattison should continue as personal representative. At the time of that hearing, the attorney who pressed for closing the estate expressed a desire to examine bank statements and checks to ascertain whether all of the cash was in the bank. This
examination took place in Judge Mathias’ chambers. Upon the return of Pattison and the attorney to the courtroom, the attorney said:
"I think something has been accomplished. Unfortunately, the primary record which we were interested in, the bank statement, the pass books and bank statements and cancelled checks were not available. They are in--”
Pattison then said:
"I’m sorry, Your Honor, I didn’t realize they were in a safe in my office. My secretary failed to take them out of the safe and put them in the file and I apologize to Mr. Stewart, but I think we have resolved that problem this morning, I hope.”
Judge Mathias then passed an order, pursuant to the understanding of the parties, requiring the estate to be closed within twenty days.
On February 16, 1979, Pattison addressed the following letter to Judge Mathias:
"By Order of the Orphan’s Court dated February 2, 1979, I, as Personal Representative of the above estate, was directed to complete administration of the estate on or before February 23, 1979. I have progressed with the work necessary to complete administration as directed.
"However, I now realize that it would be inappropriate for me to endeavor to prepare the Final Account and conclude administration for the reason that I earlier borrowed money from the estate assets. The fact that the money has been repaid, with interest, does not cure what I feel to be my disqualification to continue as Personal Representative. Certainly, the Register of Wills and C. Van Leuven Stewart will agree.
"Accordingly, it is the purpose of this letter to request that the Orphan’s Court enter such Order as
necessary to remove me as Personal Representative and to appoint a Special Administrator to conclude administration. By this letter I waive requirement of further notice and the right to appear prior to entry of such Order.
"Be assured that I stand ready to cooperate in every possible manner with such Special Administrator as may be appointed.
"A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Register of Wills, C. Van Leuven Stewart, Esquire, and the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.”
Pattison did as he promised. He sent a copy to the Attorney Grievance Commission.
A hearing was held before Judge Mathias on October 15, 1979, in order that Pattison might show cause why he should not be removed as personal representative and, as Judge Mathias put it, "[t]o determine whether or not to hold Mr. Pattison in contempt for his failure to comply with the Court’s Order of February 2, 1979.”
It developed, as Judge Mathias found and as the trial judge in this case found, that Pattison had paid substantial sums of money from the estate account over to himself. A total of $32,474.55 appears to have been deposited in the estate account at the Maryland National Bank in Cambridge. On January 20, 1975, Pattison drew a check to himself in the amount of $2,000.00. He claims this was an advance on commissions. Before Judge Pollitt, who heard this case under Rule BV9, Pattison said in response to the court’s question as to this being an advance against commissions:
"Yes, Your Honor, the first withdrawal I anticipated actually, initially, and erroneously anticipated, substantial commissions in the estate because the estate looked like it would be $225,000/$230, including the trust assets. I anticipated substantial commissions, and the first draw was the basic $2,000 or 10 percent of the first $20,000 allowable commis
sion, intended to represent that as advance payment.”
It developed that the total sum withdrawn by Pattison from the estate was $28,900, being as follows:
1/20/75 $ 2,000
2/28/75 500
4/4/75 500
5/21/75 500
7/3/75 2.500
7/21/75 800
9/5/75 400
9/11/75 500
9/19/75 600
9/19/75 200
12/12/75 400
12/12/75 400
12/12/75 100
12/24/75 500
1/13/76 1,000
1/23/76 1,000
2/23/76 500
3/4/76 1,000
5/12/76 1,000
6/6/76 1,000
9/9/76 1.500
9/28/76 1,000
11/15/76 2,000
12/3/76 2,000
12/17/76 2,000
1/11/77 1.500
4/15/77 1,000
5/6/77 1,000
5/31/77 500
6/16/77 1,000
$ 28,900
The record further reflects that Pattison deposited the sum of $28,404.65 to the account of the estate at The National Bank of Cambridge on February 8, 1979, six days after the hearing before Judge Mathias.
Pattison seems to have contended throughout this matter that these sums were not peculations on his part, but were loans from the estate to him. Of course, he as personal representative would have had no authority to loan estate money to himself. Judge Mathias removed Pattison as personal representative of the Wanamaker estate, but did not hold him in contempt. The trial judge believed Pattison’s statement that he had no intent whatever to deprive the owner permanently of the money involved. He said, "We have not found any 'clear and convincing’ evidence to indicate that Respondent harbored any intent to steal the monies or to reduce them to his sole permanent possession,” although he did find Pattison’s "conduct to be an inexcusable and unjustified breach of his fiduciary obligations to the Estate and a serious invasion of the integrity of the assets of the Estate.”
ii The patent
Pattison is an attorney admitted to practice in the U.S. Patent Office. His activities in the representation of George T. Sendall relative to a patent are the basis for the second set of charges which Bar Counsel brought in the same petition with those charges we have previously discussed. Pattison was alleged to have violated DR 1-102 (A) (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6); DR 6-101 (A) (3), and DR 7-101 (A) (1), (2), and (3).
The
trial judge concluded that Pattison violated DR 6-101 (A) (3) in that he was neglectful.
In that case Pattison was retained to procure a patent for Sendall on what was dubbed the "Mad Baron’s Zoaring Zeppelin,” a type of kite. The Patent Office ultimately regarded the patent application as abandoned for failure to file proper ink drawings. Pattison was responsible for such filing.
There was clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge.
iii Sanction
It is with a heavy heart that one considers the sanction to be imposed upon an attorney who has misused his client’s funds. So often attorneys for one reason or another find themselves in a position where the flow of cash in their practice is insufficient to meet office overhead, family needs, and the like. Then comes the temptation to dip into funds which have been entrusted to the attorney, with the thought that the money soon can and will be paid back and the hope
that no one will be the wiser. Often, as here, the peculations grow and grow. It is fundamental that a fiduciary may not make a loan, secured or unsecured (as was this), unto himself.
When called upon at the hearing before the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County in February 1979 to produce the bank records which would substantiate the fact that the estate’s assets were properly deposited, Pattison attempted to cover up by blaming his secretary for the fact that the records were not in the file, and suggested that she had failed to take them from the safe. Yet, at that very time, he knew that on thirty occasions he had withdrawn money to the point that the estate’s cash assets were nonexistent.
Pattison seeks to distinguish this case from
Bar Ass’n v. Marshall,
269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973). The only difference we see is that Pattison’s case involves much more money. Judge Digges said for the Court in
Marshall:
"The relationship existing between an attorney and his client is one that of necessity requires mutual trust and confidence. It is of prime importance not only to the parties themselves, but also to lawyers as a group as well as to society in general, that there be no lessening of the degree of confidence that the public has in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of members of the profession. It has been immemorially acknowledged that at the very heart of the attorney-client relationship is the trust concept with the attorney acting as a trustee for his client in all of his undertakings for him. This is especially true in the attorney’s handling of moneys of others coming into his hands. So, it is essential that all members of the legal fraternity be strongly and constantly impressed with the truism that in handling moneys and properties belonging to their clients or others that they accept them in trust and are strictly accountable for their conduct in administering that trust, so they dare not appropriate those funds and properties for their personal
use. The misappropriation by an attorney of funds of others entrusted to bis care, be the amount small or large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of professional misconduct.
Balliet v. Balto. Co. Bar Ass’n,
259 Md. 474, 479, 270 A.2d 465 (1970);
In the Matter of Lombard,
242 Md. 202, 218 A.2d 208 (1966);
In Re Williams,
180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7 (1941).” 269 Md. at 518-19.
We have said repeatedly that, absent extenuating circumstances, disbarment is the sanction which should be imposed upon an attorney for converting the funds of his client to his own use. This is because, as was said in
Marshall,
an attorney’s misappropriation of funds entrusted to his care, be the amount small or large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of professional misconduct.
See, e.g., Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Burka,
292 Md. 221, 438 A.2d 514 (1981);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n
v.
Micka,
289 Md. 131, 133, 422 A.2d 383 (1980);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Garson,
287 Md. 502, 503, 413 A.2d 564 (1980);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n
v.
McBurney,
283 Md. 628, 631, 392 A.2d 81 (1978);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n
v.
Andresen,
281 Md. 152, 160, 379 A.2d 159 (1977); and
Bar Ass’n of Balto. City v. Carruth,
271 Md. 720, 727, 319 A.2d 532 (1974). We find no extenuating circumstances here. We have asserted many times that sanctions imposed in disciplinary proceedings against an attorney are not for the purpose of punishing the individual, but are intended as protection to the public.
See, e.g., Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Engerman,
289 Md. 330, 346, 424 A.2d 362 (1981);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kerpelman,
288 Md. 341, 382, 420 A.2d 940 (1980),
cert. denied,
450 U.S. 970 (1981);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Lockhart,
285 Md. 586, 597, 403 A.2d 1241 (1979);
Bar Ass’n of Balto. City v. Posner,
275 Md. 250, 257, 339 A.2d 657,
cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1016 (1975); and
Maryland St. Bar Ass’n
v.
Sugarman,
273 Md. 306, 316, 329 A.2d 1 (1974),
cert. denied,
420 U.S. 974 (1975).
Even if Pattison intended to pay back the estate as the trial judge found, in our view the taking of money over the
period of time involved amounted to a misappropriation warranting disbarment.
We desire that the message go out loud and clear to the Maryland Bar and to the citizens of Maryland that we shall not tolerate attorneys’ misusing their clients’ funds. It follows that the name of William H. Pattison, Jr., shall be stricken from the rolls of those entitled to practice law in this State.
It is so ordered; respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court, including the costs of transcripts, pursuant to Maryland Rule BV15 c for which sum judgment is entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission against William H. Pattison, Jr.