ASM America, Inc. v. Genus, Inc.

260 F. Supp. 2d 827, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26273, 2002 WL 32089217
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedNovember 14, 2002
DocketC-01-2190 EDL
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 260 F. Supp. 2d 827 (ASM America, Inc. v. Genus, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ASM America, Inc. v. Genus, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 827, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26273, 2002 WL 32089217 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

Opinion

ORDER RE: CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 4,798,165

LAPORTE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Currently before the Court is the parties’ dispute over the proper construction of United States Patent No. 4,798,165 (“the ’165 patent”).

I. Background

Plaintiffs ASM America, Inc. and Arthur Sherman (collectively, “ASM”) have filed suit against defendant Genus, Inc. (“Genus”) for patent infringement. According to the complaint, ASM invents, manufactures, and sells equipment for use in making integrated circuits. ASM’s products include atomic layer chemical vapor deposition (“ALCVD”) machines, which are used to form exceptionally thin layers of insulating material, conducting material, and semi-conducting material using a technique generally known as Atomic Layer Deposition (“ALD”) or Atomic Layer Epitaxy (“ALE”). Genus allegedly manufactures, offers for sale, and sells ALD process and equipment in competition with ASM’s ALCVD process and equipment.

ASM contends that Genus is infringing three patents: United States Patents Nos. 6,015,590 (“the ’590 patent”), 5,916,365 (“the ’365 patent”), and the ’165 patent. ASM alleges that it owns the ’590 and ’165 patents, and has enforceable rights in the ’365 patent. Plaintiff Arthur Sherman is alleged to be the inventor and owner of the ’365 patent. ASM alleges that Genus *831 is infringing claims 1 through 10 of the ’590 patent, claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 16, and 17 of the ’365 patent, and claims 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 of the ’165 patent.

Genus has counterclaimed and alleges, among other things, that ASM is infringing one of its patents, United States Patent No. 5,294,568 (“the ’568 patent”).

The Court has previously construed the disputed language of the ’590, ’365, and ’568 patents. The claim construction hearing for the T65 patent was held on September 26, 2002.

II. DISCUSSION

The construction of a patent claim is a matter of law for the Court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). As the claim language defines the scope of the claim, the claim construction analysis always begins with the words of the claim. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2002). The words used in the claim are interpreted in light of the intrinsic evidence, i.e., the rest of the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Id.; CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002). The intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). Courts may also use extrinsic evidence (e.g., expert testimony, treatises) to resolve the scope and meaning of a claim. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366.

There is a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (citing CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366). “The subjective intent of the inventor when he used a particular term is of little or no probative weight in determining the scope of a claim (except as documented in the prosecution history).” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, Markman, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577; Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). “Rather the focus is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.” Id. at 986. Dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning, as long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. “A technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention, unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning.” Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems, Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1996).

An accused infringer may overcome the heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning, but he cannot do so simply by pointing to the preferred embodiment or other structures or steps disclosed in the specification or prosecution history. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. Neither the specification nor the title of the patent can be used to import limitations into the claims that are not found in the claims themselves. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1312. While the claims must be read in view of the specification, limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326.

The ordinary meaning of a claim term may be overcome in at least four ways. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. First, the claim term will not receive -its *832 ordinary meaning if the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history. Id.

Second, a claim term will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention. Id. at 1366-67. The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.Cir. 1985)).

In contrast, when claim changes or arguments are made in order to more particularly point out the applicant's invention, the purpose is to impart precision, not to overcome prior art. Such prosecution is not presumed to raise an estoppel, but is reviewed on its facts, with the guidance of precedent.

Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211

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Bluebook (online)
260 F. Supp. 2d 827, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26273, 2002 WL 32089217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/asm-america-inc-v-genus-inc-cand-2002.