NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0555-25
ASHLEY JULIA and RACHEL ANTHONSON,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
INSPIRA MEDICAL CENTERS, INC.,1
Defendant-Appellant,
and
DANIEL TEAGUE,
Defendant. ___________________________
Submitted May 18, 2026 – Decided May 29, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Docket No. L-0578-23.
1 Improperly pleaded as Inspira Health. Archer & Greiner PC, attorneys for appellant (Douglas Diaz, of counsel and on the brief; Kyra G. Bradley, on the brief).
Respondents have not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this unopposed appeal, defendant Inspira Medical Centers, Inc.
challenges an October 10, 2025 order that enforced the parties' settlement
agreement, and which required it to reimburse plaintiffs Ashley Julia and Rachel
Anthonson for the fees and costs associated with filing the enforcement
application. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the October 10th order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiffs sued Inspira alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation
under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. The
parties participated in a formal mediation with a retired judge and reached a
settlement agreement, which plaintiffs signed on August 8th. Prior to receiving
the settlement funds, on August 26th, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal
with prejudice, formally concluding the litigation.
Plaintiffs later moved to enforce the settlement agreement, alleging that
Inspira had not made the required settlement payments within the agreed
timeframe and also requested pre-judgment interest, mediation costs, and
A-0555-25 2 attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion. In its October 10th order,
the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement, and in its
accompanying oral decision explained there was "no excuse at this point while
two months later [plaintiffs] still haven't received a settlement check." It also
directed defendant to pay "attorney's costs and fees associated with [the]
motion," within ten days of receipt of counsel's certification of services.
Before us, Inspira argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement agreement after the case had been dismissed with prejudice,
relying on Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994),
and noting that neither the settlement agreement nor the dismissal order
provided for the court to retain jurisdiction. Inspira further contends that
plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement was thus procedurally improper and
that plaintiffs needed to prosecute any alleged breach of the settlement
agreement in a separate breach of contract action.
Additionally, Inspira maintains, in any event, the court abused its
discretion when it awarded attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs, as there existed
no contractual or legal basis for such an award. Specifically, it notes the
settlement agreement did not explicitly provide for the recovery of fees or costs
in the event of a breach, and plaintiffs otherwise failed to cite any authority
A-0555-25 3 supporting such relief. Inspira distinguishes the authority relied upon in the trial
court by plaintiffs, specifically our Supreme Court’s decision in Litton Indus.,
Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009), and explains unlike the settlement
agreement here, the contract in Litton expressly provided for the recovery of
fees.
We first address the applicable standards of review and relevant
substantive legal principles which guide and inform our decision to remand this
matter.
The settlement of a legal claim between parties constitutes a contract,
subject to the same principles and requirements as any other contract. Nolan v.
Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990). "'[A]bsent a demonstration of fraud or other
compelling circumstances,' a court should enforce a settlement agreement as it
would any other contract." Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 603-04
(App. Div. 2019) (quoting Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App.
Div. 2005)).
"Our review of a motion to enforce settlement is de novo and considers
whether the 'available competent evidence, considered in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, is insufficient to permit the judge . . . to resolve the
disputed factual issues in favor of the non-moving party.'" Gold Tree Spa, Inc.
A-0555-25 4 v. PD Nail Corp., 475 N.J. Super. 240, 245 (App. Div. 2023) (omission in
original) (quoting Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-75 (App.
Div. 1997)). Thus, no special deference is accorded a trial court's interpretation
of an agreement entered into by the parties. Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp.,
405 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 2009).
We acknowledge the general principle, as noted by defendant, that a court,
which has entered a stipulation and order of dismissal with prejudice without
retaining jurisdiction, typically does not have inherent power to subsequently
enforce the terms of any settlement agreement that led to the dismissal.
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380. We note, however, that certain limited
circumstances exist that would permit a court to exercise jurisdiction over such
an application. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 592,
598 (D. Del. 2008) (recognizing courts have "read Kokkonen to permit . . .
jurisdiction even where the previous dismissal was . . . effected . . . by the filing
of a stipulation signed by all parties"); Broadband Eng'g, Inc. v. Quality RF
Servs., Inc., 450 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that
requiring defendant file a second lawsuit due to the court's previous order to
"dismiss[] with prejudice based upon the facts so stipulated to between the
parties herein" would "substantially undermine the policy favoring settlements
A-0555-25 5 and, indeed, would make a mockery of the legal process."); Sawka v. Healtheast,
Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding a district court may exercise
jurisdiction over a petition to enforce a settlement if a settlement is "part of the
record, incorporated into an order of the district court, or the district court has
manifested an intent to retain jurisdiction.").
As to defendant's challenge to the fee award, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing such disputes. Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts,
Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 148, 155 (App. Div. 2016). Where a trial judge correctly
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0555-25
ASHLEY JULIA and RACHEL ANTHONSON,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
INSPIRA MEDICAL CENTERS, INC.,1
Defendant-Appellant,
and
DANIEL TEAGUE,
Defendant. ___________________________
Submitted May 18, 2026 – Decided May 29, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Docket No. L-0578-23.
1 Improperly pleaded as Inspira Health. Archer & Greiner PC, attorneys for appellant (Douglas Diaz, of counsel and on the brief; Kyra G. Bradley, on the brief).
Respondents have not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this unopposed appeal, defendant Inspira Medical Centers, Inc.
challenges an October 10, 2025 order that enforced the parties' settlement
agreement, and which required it to reimburse plaintiffs Ashley Julia and Rachel
Anthonson for the fees and costs associated with filing the enforcement
application. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the October 10th order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiffs sued Inspira alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation
under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. The
parties participated in a formal mediation with a retired judge and reached a
settlement agreement, which plaintiffs signed on August 8th. Prior to receiving
the settlement funds, on August 26th, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal
with prejudice, formally concluding the litigation.
Plaintiffs later moved to enforce the settlement agreement, alleging that
Inspira had not made the required settlement payments within the agreed
timeframe and also requested pre-judgment interest, mediation costs, and
A-0555-25 2 attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion. In its October 10th order,
the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement, and in its
accompanying oral decision explained there was "no excuse at this point while
two months later [plaintiffs] still haven't received a settlement check." It also
directed defendant to pay "attorney's costs and fees associated with [the]
motion," within ten days of receipt of counsel's certification of services.
Before us, Inspira argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement agreement after the case had been dismissed with prejudice,
relying on Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994),
and noting that neither the settlement agreement nor the dismissal order
provided for the court to retain jurisdiction. Inspira further contends that
plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement was thus procedurally improper and
that plaintiffs needed to prosecute any alleged breach of the settlement
agreement in a separate breach of contract action.
Additionally, Inspira maintains, in any event, the court abused its
discretion when it awarded attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs, as there existed
no contractual or legal basis for such an award. Specifically, it notes the
settlement agreement did not explicitly provide for the recovery of fees or costs
in the event of a breach, and plaintiffs otherwise failed to cite any authority
A-0555-25 3 supporting such relief. Inspira distinguishes the authority relied upon in the trial
court by plaintiffs, specifically our Supreme Court’s decision in Litton Indus.,
Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009), and explains unlike the settlement
agreement here, the contract in Litton expressly provided for the recovery of
fees.
We first address the applicable standards of review and relevant
substantive legal principles which guide and inform our decision to remand this
matter.
The settlement of a legal claim between parties constitutes a contract,
subject to the same principles and requirements as any other contract. Nolan v.
Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990). "'[A]bsent a demonstration of fraud or other
compelling circumstances,' a court should enforce a settlement agreement as it
would any other contract." Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 603-04
(App. Div. 2019) (quoting Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App.
Div. 2005)).
"Our review of a motion to enforce settlement is de novo and considers
whether the 'available competent evidence, considered in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, is insufficient to permit the judge . . . to resolve the
disputed factual issues in favor of the non-moving party.'" Gold Tree Spa, Inc.
A-0555-25 4 v. PD Nail Corp., 475 N.J. Super. 240, 245 (App. Div. 2023) (omission in
original) (quoting Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-75 (App.
Div. 1997)). Thus, no special deference is accorded a trial court's interpretation
of an agreement entered into by the parties. Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp.,
405 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 2009).
We acknowledge the general principle, as noted by defendant, that a court,
which has entered a stipulation and order of dismissal with prejudice without
retaining jurisdiction, typically does not have inherent power to subsequently
enforce the terms of any settlement agreement that led to the dismissal.
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380. We note, however, that certain limited
circumstances exist that would permit a court to exercise jurisdiction over such
an application. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 592,
598 (D. Del. 2008) (recognizing courts have "read Kokkonen to permit . . .
jurisdiction even where the previous dismissal was . . . effected . . . by the filing
of a stipulation signed by all parties"); Broadband Eng'g, Inc. v. Quality RF
Servs., Inc., 450 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that
requiring defendant file a second lawsuit due to the court's previous order to
"dismiss[] with prejudice based upon the facts so stipulated to between the
parties herein" would "substantially undermine the policy favoring settlements
A-0555-25 5 and, indeed, would make a mockery of the legal process."); Sawka v. Healtheast,
Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding a district court may exercise
jurisdiction over a petition to enforce a settlement if a settlement is "part of the
record, incorporated into an order of the district court, or the district court has
manifested an intent to retain jurisdiction.").
As to defendant's challenge to the fee award, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing such disputes. Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts,
Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 148, 155 (App. Div. 2016). Where a trial judge correctly
applies the case law, statutes, and court rules governing attorneys' fees, the fee
award is entitled to our deference. See Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 466
(App. Div. 2000).
Substantively, in "civil litigation, New Jersey courts historically follow
the 'American Rule,' which provides litigants must bear the cost of their own
attorneys' fees." Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016).
"However, 'a prevailing party can recover those fees if they are expressly
provided for by statute, court rule, or contract.'" Litton Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. at
385 (quoting Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001)).
Considering these principles, we are convinced that a remand is
appropriate for the court to first determine if the fee issue is moot. If it is still
A-0555-25 6 justiciable, the court shall issue supplemental factual findings under Rule 1:7-4,
to address defendant's jurisdictional argument, and explain the bases for any fee
award.
With respect to our justiciability concerns, the court shall ascertain
whether plaintiffs still seek to obtain the fees and costs related to their
enforcement motion. As we noted above, plaintiffs did not file opposition to the
appeal, and the record suggests that the settlement payment may have been made
as ordered by the court. The court should determine whether any live
controversy remains between the parties before proceeding to address the merits
of the motion and the fee award.
Assuming plaintiffs do, indeed, seek an order reimbursing them for their
recoverable fees and costs, we are convinced the court must provide additional
factual findings and conclusions of law consistent with Rule 1:7-4 because the
court's October 10th order contains no such findings of fact or legal conclusions
addressing the threshold jurisdictional argument raised by defendant—namely,
that the court lacked the express or inherent jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
after the case had been dismissed with prejudice and absent any provision for
retention of jurisdiction in the order or settlement agreement. In addition, the
court also failed to articulate any legal or factual basis for the fee award, despite
A-0555-25 7 defendant's argument that the settlement agreement did not provide for
attorney's fees and that plaintiffs cited no applicable authority supporting such
relief.
Further, our review of the oral decision reveals that the transcript appears
inadvertently truncated, as it cuts off immediately after the court granted the
motion and does not substantively address the merits of the parties' arguments
concerning the jurisdictional issue or the fee award, and specifically does not
reference any statutory, contractual, or equitable basis for departing from the
"American Rule." Instead, the court simply concluded that "the motion is
granted" and that "there's really no excuse at this point while two months later
they still haven't received a settlement check," without any discussion of the
legal or factual basis for its authority to enforce the settlement post-dismissal,
which may depend on the circumstances surrounding the settlement and
dismissal, as noted.
Accordingly, a remand is warranted for the trial court to address the
justiciability issue and, if necessary, make the necessary factual findings and
state its conclusions of law regarding its jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement after dismissal, as well as the bases for any award of attorney's fees
and costs. Finally, any final judgment shall also include the amount of any fee
A-0555-25 8 award and recoverable costs, as the record does not contain a certification of
services from plaintiffs' counsel.
Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0555-25 9