NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1400-14T1
ANDRE de GARMEAUX and PAULA KUGLER, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents, December 20, 2016
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
DNV CONCEPTS, INC. t/a THE BRIGHT ACRE,
Defendant-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant,
and
PROFESSIONAL FIREPLACE SERVICES, JAMES RISA, and ROBERT ROCCO individually and trading as D's HANDS TO SERVE,
Defendants. ______________________________________
Argued September 14, 2016 – Decided December 20, 2016
Before Judges Alvarez, Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L- 5513-11.
Susan E. DiMaria argued the cause for appellants/cross-respondents (O'Malley, Surman & Michelini, attorneys; Ms. DiMaria, on the briefs).
Ronald L. Lueddeke argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Lueddeke Law Firm, attorneys; Mr. Lueddeke, of counsel, Karri Lueddeke, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MANAHAN, J.A.D.
In this case of first impression, we are called upon to
determine, among other arguments, whether prevailing plaintiffs
in a Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) action are entitled to attorney's
fees incurred in defense of a counterclaim. As we conclude that
the defense of the counterclaim was inextricably intertwined with
the defense of the CFA claim, consideration by the trial court of
the attorney's fees incurred by plaintiffs for that purpose was
proper.
Andre de Garmeaux and Paula Kugler (collectively plaintiffs)
appeal from a September 30, 2014 order reducing the award of
attorney's fees in their successful prosecution of a CFA claim
from $70,911.12 to $20,000. On December 11, 2014, defendant DNV
Concepts Inc., t/a The Bright Acre (Bright Acre), cross-appealed
the trial court's denial of a judgment notwithstanding a verdict
and the entire award of attorney's fees. For the reasons stated
below, we reverse the trial court's decision on the quantum of the
counsel fee award and affirm the decision on the denial of
defendant's judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
We discern the following facts culled from the trial record,
as essential to our determination. Plaintiffs visited Bright Acre 2 A-1400-14T1 in early 2010 for the purpose of replacing their gas fireplace
which had been damaged in a storm. Bright Acre's store manager,
Patricia Van Ness, agreed to assist plaintiffs with the process
of replacing the fireplace and submitting an insurance claim.
Plaintiffs testified that during one of several visits, Van Ness
introduced defendant James Risa as "your installer Jim." Risa was
employed by Bright Acre as an operations manager, and had worked
at Bright Acre for approximately twenty years. Additionally, Risa
owned and operated an independent company, Professional Fireplace
Services. According to Bright Acre's owner, Darryl Dworkin,
installation work was referred to its own employees who owned
installation service companies, giving a customer one installer's
name per purchase. During the timeframe plaintiffs purchased
their fireplace, Risa received most, if not all, of the
installation referrals from Bright Acre.
On March 31, 2010, Risa emailed plaintiffs a $3700 estimate
for installation services. Plaintiffs agreed to the price and on
June 4, 2010, Van Ness submitted approximately four fireplace
estimates to the insurance company. A sales order in the amount
of $2450 was placed on August 24, 2010. Plaintiffs wrote a check
to Bright Acre for that amount that same day.
In September 2010, plaintiffs wrote a check to Professional
Fireplace Services for the first installment on the $3700
3 A-1400-14T1 installation cost. On October 26, 2010, a construction permit was
issued for the installation, and the new fireplace was delivered
shortly thereafter. Risa dismantled the existing fireplace and
stored the new fireplace in plaintiffs' family room.
Plaintiffs became dissatisfied with Risa, noting he kept an
unpredictable schedule, working a couple of hours at a time mixed
with stretches of days of complete absence. Plaintiffs contacted
Van Ness, in her capacity as Risa's boss, about Risa's schedule
and requested she speak with Risa about completing the job.
Additionally, Risa's workmanship was unsatisfactory to
plaintiffs. Specifically, the grout around the stone mantel was
sloppy, some bricks were uneven, and metal wiring was exposed.
Risa attempted to correct the work, however, the installation did
not meet plaintiffs' standards. In December 2010, plaintiffs
alleged they became aware that Risa was not directly working for
Bright Acre, rather he was working in the capacity as owner of
Professional Fireplace Services. Plaintiffs contacted Bright Acre
to resolve the installation issues. After receiving no response
from Bright Acre, plaintiffs hired another contractor to complete
the installation.
In November 2011, plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against
Bright Acre. The seven-count complaint alleged several causes of
action, among them, a violation of the New Jersey CFA, N.J.S.A.
4 A-1400-14T1 56:8-1 to 198. Bright Acre filed an answer and thereafter, an
amended answer which included a counterclaim. The counterclaim
sought damages from plaintiffs for fraudulent concealment or
alteration of evidence, for defamation, and for filing a frivolous
lawsuit.
The predicate for the fraudulent concealment or alteration
of evidence claim was the disparity in the form of the installation
quote from Risa to plaintiffs relating to the existence of a
masthead. In the form provided by plaintiffs in discovery, the
quote did not reference a business masthead. During de Garmeaux's
deposition, Bright Acre's counsel produced an email dated March
31, 2010, which attached a form of the Risa quote that referenced
"Professional Fireplace Services" in its masthead. This invoice
was acknowledged by de Garmeaux as received from Risa. Kugler
also acknowledged receipt of this invoice during her trial
testimony. Notwithstanding their acknowledgment, both de Garmeaux
and Kugler denied altering the document.
The trial was conducted over five days before a jury. At the
conclusion of the proofs by the parties, Bright Acre moved for a
directed verdict on plaintiffs' CFA claim and its fraudulent
alteration claim. Both motions were denied.
Prior to deliberations, due to the number of claims and
parties, the trial court provided jurors with a verdict sheet
5 A-1400-14T1 which instructed them to respond to the questions on the sheet
sequentially. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs.
Specifically, the jury found that Bright Acre, Professional
Fireplace Services, and Risa were negligent and were the proximate
cause of plaintiffs' damages. Additionally, the jury found that
Bright Acre, Professional Fireplace Services, and Risa committed
an act of omission of consumer fraud that proximately led to
plaintiffs' damages. Professional Fireplace Services, Risa, Robert
Rocco, and D's Hands to Serve were found to have violated
provisions of the New Jersey Home Improvement Practices Act (Home
Improvement Act).1 Plaintiffs were awarded $4790 on the negligence
claim, holding Bright Acre 30% liable, and Risa, together with
Professional Fireplace Services, 70% liable. Plaintiffs were
awarded $1500 on the CFA and Home Improvement Act claims; $500
attributable to Bright Acre and $1000 attributable to Risa and
Professional Fireplace Services. The jury found no cause for
action on the counterclaim.
As a result of the verdict, plaintiffs' counsel filed an
"Affidavit of Attorney Services" along with a form of judgment.
Thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel filed a supplemental certification
relating to the counsel fee request which sought the payment of
1 Defendants Risa, Professional Fireplace Services, Rocco, and D's Hands to Serve defaulted and did not participate in the trial. 6 A-1400-14T1 $70,911.12. Without hearing argument on the issue, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, awarding $20,000
to plaintiffs' counsel as reasonable attorney's fees.
The trial court attached a statement of reasons to the
September 30, 2014 order. In reaching the determination of the
fees, the trial court included fees generated in defense of the
counterclaim; finding the counterclaim related to "the transaction
that gave rise to plaintiffs' affirmative claims." The trial
court also provided the bases for the quantum award.
On November 17, 2014, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.
On December 11, 2014, Bright Acre filed a notice of cross-appeal.
Plaintiffs raise the following points on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUCING THE ATTORNEY[']S FEES TO A FLAT AMOUNT BASED IN PART ON THE AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES AWARDED ON THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT CLAIM AS THERE IS NO PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENT BETWEEN THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT OF THE FEES.
POINT II
THE FEE AWARD DID NOT COMPORT WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 [to -198], TO GIVE CONSUMERS ACCESS TO THE COURT SYSTEM, ENCOURAGE COUNSEL TO TAKE ON CONSUMER FRAUD CLAIMS AND PUNISH DEFENDANTS WHO HAVE DEFRAUDED CONSUMERS.
A reviewing court should not set aside an award of attorneys'
fees except "on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a 7 A-1400-14T1 clear abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317
(1995). Where the lower court's determination of fees was based
on irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear
error in judgment, the reviewing court should intervene. Masone
v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Flagg
v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
Fee shifting is permitted statutorily by the CFA. N.J.S.A.
56:8-19. Our Supreme Court has noted that the CFA's fee-shifting
provision advances the statute's policy of ensuring that
plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to
represent them and encourages counsel to take on private cases
involving an infringement of statutory rights. Coleman v. Fiore
Bros., Inc., 113 N.J. 594, 598 (1989).
However, where a party presents "distinctly different claims
for relief" in one lawsuit, work on those non-CFA claims are not
counted against a defendant. Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267
N.J. Super. 546, 556 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L. Ed. 2d
40, 51 (1983)). A court may shift fees on the CFA claim or claims
that involve the common core of CFA-related facts. See ibid. Such
a suit should not be viewed as a series of discrete claims, rather
the attorneys' fees related to the common core of CFA-related work
8 A-1400-14T1 may be considered by a court when calculating the award. See
ibid.
We are informed in our analysis by a decision reached in
another jurisdiction which allowed for an award of counsel fees
incurred in the defense of counterclaims relative to Wisconsin's
unfair trade statute. See Benkoski v. Flood, 626 N.W.2d 851, 862
(Wis. Ct. App. 2001); See also Benkoski v. Flood, 599 N.W.2d 885
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999). That state's unfair trade statute, like the
CFA, is remedial in nature, and provides for fee shifting to a
successful litigant. Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) (2016). In Benkoski,
supra, 626 N.W.2d at 862, the Wisconsin Appeals Court held that a
trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding a
plaintiff attorneys' fees incurred in defense of defendant's
counterclaims. We recite the factual and procedural history of
Benkoski relevant to our analysis.
Benkoski arose from a dispute over a commercial lease.
Benkoski, supra, 599 N.W.2d at 886. Defendant, Flood, leased lots
in a mobile home park to Benkoski who, in turn, leased the mobile
homes he owned on the lots to third parties. Id. at 887. The
lease provided that Benkoski could not sublet the sites unless
prior approval had been granted by Flood. Ibid. Flood later
added an additional condition requiring that any purchaser of a
mobile home owned by Benkoski would have to remove the home at the
9 A-1400-14T1 end of the lease. Ibid. When Benkoski attempted to sell one of
the mobile homes, Flood refused to approve the application for
tenancy because Benkoski would not agree to the removal condition.
In his complaint, Benkoski alleged that Flood's conduct
violated Wisconsin's Unfair Trade Practices Act (the Act). Wis.
Stat. § 100.20 (2016); Wis. Stat. § 710.15 (2016); Wis. Admin.
Code ATCP § 125.06 (2016); Benkoski, supra, 599 N.W.2d at 887.
Flood filed a counterclaim, premised on Benkoski's agreement to
discontinue subletting and to remove the mobile homes as they
became vacant. Benkoski, supra, 599 N.W.2d at 887. Benkoski
moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim.
Ibid. Flood cross-moved for dismissal of the complaint for failure
to state a claim. Ibid. The trial court granted Benkoski's motion
and dismissed the counterclaim. Ibid. The court denied outright
dismissal of the complaint, holding that Benkoski as an operator,
not a resident, could seek an injunction, but could not claim
money damages under the Act. Id. at 888. Benkoski appealed and
Flood cross-appealed. Ibid.
The appeals court held Benkoski was both a resident and a
tenant, was entitled to relief under the Act, and that Flood
violated the Act entitling Benkoski to damages. Benkoski, supra,
599 N.W.2d at 893. The matter was remanded for further proceedings
10 A-1400-14T1 to determine the amount of damages. Ibid. Subsequent to the
remand, the trial court awarded pecuniary damages, as well as
counsel fees and costs incurred by Benkoski in defense of the
counterclaim. Benkoski, supra, 626 N.W.2d at 854. Flood appealed.
The appeals court found as to the award of counsel fees and
costs that the relief sought by the counterclaim was the "very
crux" of Benkoski's claims of an unfair trade practice by Flood
and that the competing claims were "inextricably caught up with
each other." Id. at 862. As such, the appeals court concluded
that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion
in awarding Benkoski his counsel fees incurred in defense of
Flood's counterclaim. Ibid.
Here, in reaching its determination to award counsel fees,
the trial court held:
In determining that $20,000 is a reasonable award of attorney fees, the [c]ourt was guided by R. 4:42-9 which references factors enumerated under [Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a)]. The attorney principally responsible for the handling of the matter on behalf of [p]laintiffs, Susan DiMaria, was admitted to the bar in 1987, and, thus, brought over twenty[-]five years' experience to this matter. The [c]ourt viewed Ms. DiMaria's hourly rate of $200 per hour as reasonable given her level of experience. The gravamen of [p]laintiffs' claim sounded in consumer fraud involving multiple parties; and while consumer fraud is hardly a novel issue, its successful prosecution generally requires 11 A-1400-14T1 a heightened level of skill and attention especially where, as here, a vigorous defense was marshalled against the claim by experienced counsel for the defense. The [c]ourt acknowledges that its $20,000 award substantially discounts the requested amount of $70,911.12. However, the [c]ourt, having reviewed the invoices, determined to exclude from its calculation the many entries reflecting intra-office consultation and communications with other attorneys in the firm as well as what the [c]ourt deemed to be excessive time spent on reviewing and responding to correspondence. The [c]ourt also factored into its award the amount the jury ultimately awarded [p]laintiffs, particularly as to their consumer fraud claim.
Plaintiffs' CFA claim was premised on a fraudulent omission.
Plaintiffs averred they were never advised by Bright Acre that the
installation performed by Risa would be in his capacity as owner
of Professional Fireplace Services; not as its employee. In
defending this claim and in prosecuting its counterclaim, Bright
Acre proffered the two invoices; one with and one without the
Professional Fireplace Services masthead. These "conflicting"
invoices were the lynchpin of Bright Acre's defense intended to
demonstrate that plaintiffs were aware of Risa's employment
capacity for purpose of the installation. Bright Acre's fraudulent
alteration counterclaim was premised upon an alleged alteration
by plaintiffs of the same invoice.
The CFA is a remedial statute which encourages its use by,
among other things, reasonably compensating those who prevail
12 A-1400-14T1 through fee shifting. Coleman, supra, at 552. Consistent with
the CFA's intent and in adopting the analysis of Benkoski, we hold
that Bright Acre's utilization of the invoices for the dual purpose
of both shield and sword rendered counsel fees incurred by
plaintiffs in response thereto compensable as both "inextricably
caught up with" and related to the common core of the CFA claim.
Silva, supra, 267 N.J. Super. at 556; Benkoski, supra, 626 N.W.2d
at 862.
Having reached this determination, we next turn to the quantum
of the fees awarded; which both parties argue was in error. New
Jersey generally follows the "American Rule," which requires that
each party pay its own legal costs. Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at
322. Fees may be shifted when permitted by statute, court rule,
or contract. Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427,
440 (2001). Regardless of the source authorizing fee shifting,
the same reasonableness test governs. Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO
Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009).
When fee shifting is permissible, a court must ascertain the
"lodestar"; that is, the "number of hours reasonably expended by
the successful party's counsel in the litigation, multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate." Id. (citing Furst v. Einstein Moomjy,
Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 22 (2004)). To compute the lodestar, the trial
court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates
13 A-1400-14T1 charged by the successful party's attorney in comparison to rates
"for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation" in the community. Rendine, supra, 141
N.J. at 337 (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183
(3d Cir. 1990)). After evaluating the hourly rate, the trial
court must then determine the reasonableness of the hours expended
on the case. Furst, supra, 182 N.J. at 22. "Whether the hours
the prevailing attorney devoted to any part of a case are excessive
ultimately requires a consideration of what is reasonable under
the circumstances" and should be informed by the degree of success
achieved by the prevailing party. Id. at 22-23. The award need
not be proportionate to the damages recovered. Id. at 23.
Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.5(a), requires that
"[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable in all cases, not just fee-
shifting cases[.]" Id. at 21-22. In determining reasonableness,
RPC 1.5(a) requires courts to consider:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 14 A-1400-14T1 (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
In reviewing the trial court's methodology for an award of
fees, we are guided by our Supreme Court's declaration that "there
is no precise formula . . . [and that t]he ultimate goal is to
approve a reasonable attorney's fee that is not excessive."
Litton, supra, 200 N.J. at 388.
The issue of reasonableness of counsel fees has been the
subject of numerous decisions. Our Supreme Court has provided
direction to trial courts faced with determining the amount of an
award a litigant is entitled to receive.
[I]t is incumbent on the trial court to "analyze the [relevant] factors in determining an award of reasonable counsel fees and then must state its reasons on the record for awarding a particular fee."
[R.M. v. Supreme Court of N.J., 190 N.J. 1, 12 (2007) (quoting Furst, supra, 182 N.J. at 21) (alteration in original).
The Court has also noted that when considering the
reasonableness of counsel fees in conjunction with a fee-shifting
statute, the trial court's obligation to carefully review the 15 A-1400-14T1 lodestar fee request is heightened. Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med.
Ctr. Inc., 141 N.J. 346, 366 (1995). The trial court's evaluation
must include "not only the damages prospectively recoverable and
actually recovered, but also the interest to be vindicated . . .
as well as any circumstances incidental to the litigation that
directly or indirectly affected the extent of counsel's efforts."
Id. at 366-67.
Here, the trial court employed proportionality as a factor
in arriving at the counsel fee award. In Szczepanski, our Supreme
Court explicitly rejected a proportionality requirement between
damages recovered and the attorney fee award, although noting the
degree of success obtained remains an important factor. Id. at
366. We add that the level of success achieved should also be
measured, in appropriate circumstances, by other means; such as
here by plaintiffs' attainment of a favorable outcome in defending
the counterclaim. Other than what was a proper consideration by
the trial court of counsel fees incurred in defending the
counterclaim, the trial court did not employ that "success" in
determining an appropriate fee award.2
Further, since it was not referenced in the statement of
reasons, we are unable to conclude that the trial court considered
2 We intend no criticism of the trial court as, by our decision, we have addressed an additional factor in crafting an appropriate fee award. 16 A-1400-14T1 the public policy of the CFA for fee-shifting; deterrence of
fraudulent conduct, and encouragement of counsel to undertake
representation of plaintiffs. Furst, supra,182 N.J. at 21. When
fee-shifting is permitted, the public policy of the enabling
statute is a relevant factor to be considered in conjunction with
the factors enumerated in RPC 1.5(a) in determining the award. In
addition to the "interests to be vindicated," a trial court must
further determine whether the time expended in pursuit of those
interests along with the "underlying statutory objectives" and
recoverable damages is equivalent to the time "competent counsel
reasonably would have expended to achieve a comparable
result. . . ." Id. at 22 (citing Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at
336). Because the trial court neither specifically addressed the
CFA's public policy nor considered plaintiffs' full "measure of
success" as factors in the award, we are constrained to remand for
reconsideration of the counsel fee award.
In reaching our determination, we recognize that a trial
court's determination of an appropriate counsel fee award in CFA
fee-shifting cases is premised upon fact-sensitive scenarios. We
also recognize that there is no "precise formula" that uniformly
produces a reasonable counsel fee award. Litton, supra, 200 N.J.
at 388. There is, however, ample guidance for the determination
provided by the public policy providing for fee-shifting, by
17 A-1400-14T1 precedential case law and by the RPC. Through the trial court's
resort to that guidance, it is likely that the resultant award
will serve the CFA's legislative policy of access to the courts,
even in the face of an aggressively litigated counterclaim which
might otherwise deter CFA litigants and their lawyers from pursuing
a statutory remedy, while offering the prevailing litigant only
those counsel fees reasonably expended to obtain the result.
Finally, we address the arguments raised by Bright Acre on
its cross-appeal:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON ITS FRAUDULENT ALTERATION CLAIM.
[A.] THE TRIAL COURT'S SOLE BASIS FOR DENYING [BRIGHT ACRE'S] MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AT TRIAL WAS PAULA KUGLER'S PERJURED TESTIMONY.
[B.] THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD BE VACATED AS IT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF'S PERJURED TESTIMONY.
[C.] PLAINTIFFS' OWN PRIOR CERTIFIED STATEMENTS IN THIS ACTION INDICATE THAT PLAINTIFFS PERJURED THEMSELVES DURING THE TRIAL.
DEFENDANT [BRIGHT ACRE] IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE EXTREME BREVITY OF THE JURY DELIBERATION.
18 A-1400-14T1 POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT [BRIGHT ACRE] ON PLAINTIFFS' CFA CLAIM BY ACTS OF OMISSION.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT [BRIGHT ACRE] IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL[']S SUMMATION. (POINT NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S LEGAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF[S'] APPEAL.
A. LEGAL STANDARD TO BE APPLIED TO THE INSTANT FEE APPLICATION.
B. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD OF $20,000 SHOULD BE DECREASED OR NEGATED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and
controlling principles of law and have determined, with the
exception of that addressed below, they are without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
The standard for reviewing a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is whether the evidence, together with
the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in
favor of the party opposing the motion. Sons of Thunder v. Borden,
Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 415 (1997). In other words, if, accepting as
true all the evidence which supports the position of the nonmoving
19 A-1400-14T1 party, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.
Ibid. This standard applies to any reviewing tribunal, and ensures
the appellate court does not overstep its bounds by usurping the
jury's task of assessing witness credibility. Ibid. This standard
ensures that the jury's factual determinations will only be
disturbed if that jury could not have reasonably used the evidence
to reach its verdict. Ibid.
Bright Acre argues that the denial of its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was erroneous. Its argument is
premised upon the contention that Kugler committed perjury by her
testimony relating to the alteration of the invoices. Bright Acre
raised this argument during the trial. Counsel for Bright Acre
made Kugler's lack of credibility a prominent and recurring theme
during his cross-examination of her as well as in his opening and
closing arguments. Further, the facially disparate invoices were
admitted in evidence and presumably considered by the jury in its
deliberations.3
The plain conclusion to be drawn by the jury's verdict was
that it rejected Bright Acre's lack of credibility argument and
found Kugler to be credible. Given the above, the court's
3 Bright Acre has not raised the jury instructions as a point of error. Notwithstanding, from our review of the instructions contained in the record, we are satisfied the jury was properly instructed by the court regarding credibility. 20 A-1400-14T1 determination to deny the motion was firmly grounded in the record
and was not erroneous.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with our decision. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
21 A-1400-14T1