Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MILLS
delivered the opinion of the court:
Teachers’ strike case.
To all teachers who would sign an affidavit that they would have taught if it had not been for the strike, the school board paid salaries for the four days of the strike.
Proper?
Yes — we affirm.
On August 21, 1977, the Danville Education Association and the Illinois Education Association voted to strike the Danville school system beginning on August 22,1977. Upon being notified of the strike vote, the superintendent of schools made a public announcement closing the schools. The schools remained closed on August 22, 23, 24, and 25. Although some teachers attempted to come to school during this time, they were not permitted to do so, and no teachers performed any work on these days. On August 26, pursuant to a court order, the teachers resumed their duties and taught the balance of the school year.
Upon their return to work, the teachers resumed negotiations with the board. In a meeting held September 22, 1977, a committee from the school district met with a negotiating committee from the teachers’ association. At that meeting, the district informed the teachers that it was the desire of the district to compensate those teachers who would have worked during the strike period but who were unable to do so because of the closure of the schools. The district did not wish to pay those teachers who had participated in the strike. To implement this salary classification, the district offered to pay those teachers who would sign an affidavit stating that they would have taught if the schools had not been closed and if there had been no strike. The teachers’ representatives accepted this proposal and the agreement was signed by both negotiating teams.
The proposal was ultimately manifested in the following form:
“E. An affidavit to be signed and notarized by certified employees verifying that they would have worked August 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1977, if there had been no strike, the certificate to verify that the said individual did not participate in the strike. All affidavits— except for emergencies — shall be returned to the director of personnel by 5 p.m. Friday, September 30, 1977. The affidavit will cover the strike action only of August 22, 23, 24, 25 of 1977.”
The plaintiffs in this action are teachers who did not receive payment from the board. They filed their complaint which alleged a violation by the board of rights which are guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 1, 2, 4, and 24 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered judgment on behalf of the board and the plaintiff teachers appeal. (No issue has been raised in this court concerning whether the board has fulfilled its obligations under the contract.)
On appeal, the plaintiff teachers argue that the board’s failure to pay them for the four days of the strike violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Illinois and the United States constitutions. Each argument will be examined separately.
Due Process
The term “due process of law” is not susceptible of exact or comprehensive definition. (16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §567 (1956).) There have evolved, however, certain general guidelines to which we can look for guidance. The due process clause imposes its procedural safeguards to protect certain vital interests — life, liberty, and property. (Lipp v. Board of Education (7th Cir. 1972), 470 F.2d 802.) Substantive due process has been erected by the Supreme Court as the essential bulwark against arbitrary governmental action. (Schwartz, Constitutional Law, 165 (MacMillan 1972).) Arbitrary action, in the due process sense, means action that is wilful and unreasonable — depending on the will alone and not done according to reason or judgment. (Schwartz.) Arbitrary action is synonymous with unreasonableness and thus due process becomes a test of reasonableness. Schwartz, at 166.
Having defined the standards by which we are guided, we narrow our inquiry to whether the plaintiffs have shown an arbitrary or unreasonable governmental action which has deprived them of a guaranteed property interest. We hold that no such showing has been made. We need not address the questions of whether the board’s actions in this case constituted a State action) or whether plaintiffs had a vested property right in being paid for the days they did not teach, because we find that the board’s actions in this case were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
It is manifestly reasonable that the board would not want to penalize those teachers who did not participate in the strike but were precluded from fulfilling their duties and receiving compensation due to the strike. Had the schools remained open and these same teachers crossed the picket lines and taught, there would be no question that it would have been reasonable to pay these teachers and not pay those who honored the strike and did not teach.
Wholly apart from this, there is the question of the agreement. While we do not hold that the teachers are precluded from raising the question of reasonableness due to the agreement, we find it particularly persuasive that the affidavit of procedure was agreed to by the teachers’ associations.
We are not persuaded by the cases which the plaintiffs have drawn to our attention. In Littrell v. Board of Education (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 690, 360 N.E.2d 102, the plaintiffs were tenured teachers who brought a declaratory judgment action against the school board. The evidence established that the plaintiffs had refused to sign contracts which were presented to them on the first day of the school term. Relying solely upon section 24 — 11 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 24— 11), the court found that the board’s actions in paying plaintiffs less than other tenured teachers of like experience and education for performing like duties simply because they did not execute the written contracts was arbitrary and based upon an unreasonable classification.
We find the Littrell case distinguishable from the case at bench. First, the present case is not governed by section 24 — 11 nor its intended legislative purpose of protecting tenured teachers. Second, all the teachers here — striking and nonstriking — worked 176 days and all of them were fully paid for this work. Beyond this, the defendant agreed to pay any teacher for the four days which the schools were closed if that teacher would sign the specified affidavit. The school board was not legally obligated to pay the teachers for the four unworked days just as the teachers were not legally obligated to disavow their strike activity via the affidavit. Thus, unlike the parties in Littrell, both sides performed acts which constituted legal consideration.
We also find inapplicable the case of Olshock v. Village of Skokie (7th Cir. 1975),
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Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MILLS
delivered the opinion of the court:
Teachers’ strike case.
To all teachers who would sign an affidavit that they would have taught if it had not been for the strike, the school board paid salaries for the four days of the strike.
Proper?
Yes — we affirm.
On August 21, 1977, the Danville Education Association and the Illinois Education Association voted to strike the Danville school system beginning on August 22,1977. Upon being notified of the strike vote, the superintendent of schools made a public announcement closing the schools. The schools remained closed on August 22, 23, 24, and 25. Although some teachers attempted to come to school during this time, they were not permitted to do so, and no teachers performed any work on these days. On August 26, pursuant to a court order, the teachers resumed their duties and taught the balance of the school year.
Upon their return to work, the teachers resumed negotiations with the board. In a meeting held September 22, 1977, a committee from the school district met with a negotiating committee from the teachers’ association. At that meeting, the district informed the teachers that it was the desire of the district to compensate those teachers who would have worked during the strike period but who were unable to do so because of the closure of the schools. The district did not wish to pay those teachers who had participated in the strike. To implement this salary classification, the district offered to pay those teachers who would sign an affidavit stating that they would have taught if the schools had not been closed and if there had been no strike. The teachers’ representatives accepted this proposal and the agreement was signed by both negotiating teams.
The proposal was ultimately manifested in the following form:
“E. An affidavit to be signed and notarized by certified employees verifying that they would have worked August 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1977, if there had been no strike, the certificate to verify that the said individual did not participate in the strike. All affidavits— except for emergencies — shall be returned to the director of personnel by 5 p.m. Friday, September 30, 1977. The affidavit will cover the strike action only of August 22, 23, 24, 25 of 1977.”
The plaintiffs in this action are teachers who did not receive payment from the board. They filed their complaint which alleged a violation by the board of rights which are guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 1, 2, 4, and 24 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered judgment on behalf of the board and the plaintiff teachers appeal. (No issue has been raised in this court concerning whether the board has fulfilled its obligations under the contract.)
On appeal, the plaintiff teachers argue that the board’s failure to pay them for the four days of the strike violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Illinois and the United States constitutions. Each argument will be examined separately.
Due Process
The term “due process of law” is not susceptible of exact or comprehensive definition. (16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §567 (1956).) There have evolved, however, certain general guidelines to which we can look for guidance. The due process clause imposes its procedural safeguards to protect certain vital interests — life, liberty, and property. (Lipp v. Board of Education (7th Cir. 1972), 470 F.2d 802.) Substantive due process has been erected by the Supreme Court as the essential bulwark against arbitrary governmental action. (Schwartz, Constitutional Law, 165 (MacMillan 1972).) Arbitrary action, in the due process sense, means action that is wilful and unreasonable — depending on the will alone and not done according to reason or judgment. (Schwartz.) Arbitrary action is synonymous with unreasonableness and thus due process becomes a test of reasonableness. Schwartz, at 166.
Having defined the standards by which we are guided, we narrow our inquiry to whether the plaintiffs have shown an arbitrary or unreasonable governmental action which has deprived them of a guaranteed property interest. We hold that no such showing has been made. We need not address the questions of whether the board’s actions in this case constituted a State action) or whether plaintiffs had a vested property right in being paid for the days they did not teach, because we find that the board’s actions in this case were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
It is manifestly reasonable that the board would not want to penalize those teachers who did not participate in the strike but were precluded from fulfilling their duties and receiving compensation due to the strike. Had the schools remained open and these same teachers crossed the picket lines and taught, there would be no question that it would have been reasonable to pay these teachers and not pay those who honored the strike and did not teach.
Wholly apart from this, there is the question of the agreement. While we do not hold that the teachers are precluded from raising the question of reasonableness due to the agreement, we find it particularly persuasive that the affidavit of procedure was agreed to by the teachers’ associations.
We are not persuaded by the cases which the plaintiffs have drawn to our attention. In Littrell v. Board of Education (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 690, 360 N.E.2d 102, the plaintiffs were tenured teachers who brought a declaratory judgment action against the school board. The evidence established that the plaintiffs had refused to sign contracts which were presented to them on the first day of the school term. Relying solely upon section 24 — 11 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 24— 11), the court found that the board’s actions in paying plaintiffs less than other tenured teachers of like experience and education for performing like duties simply because they did not execute the written contracts was arbitrary and based upon an unreasonable classification.
We find the Littrell case distinguishable from the case at bench. First, the present case is not governed by section 24 — 11 nor its intended legislative purpose of protecting tenured teachers. Second, all the teachers here — striking and nonstriking — worked 176 days and all of them were fully paid for this work. Beyond this, the defendant agreed to pay any teacher for the four days which the schools were closed if that teacher would sign the specified affidavit. The school board was not legally obligated to pay the teachers for the four unworked days just as the teachers were not legally obligated to disavow their strike activity via the affidavit. Thus, unlike the parties in Littrell, both sides performed acts which constituted legal consideration.
We also find inapplicable the case of Olshock v. Village of Skokie (7th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1254, which the plaintiffs claim is “strikingly similar” to the case at bar. There, police officers for the village engaged in a “uniform protest” which consisted of coming to work out of uniform. This protest was in direct violation of police department rules and regulations and 59 protesters were put on no-pay status after failing to don their uniforms when ordered to do so. Of the 59 protesters, 2 resigned, 2 were never charged with any regulations violation, 1 was found not guilty, 20 were suspended for various amounts of time, and 34 were discharged. Thirty-two of the 34 discharged officers brought suit alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights. After finding that the only distinction between those officers who were discharged and those who were merely suspended was the fact that the latter group was represented by legal counsel at the hearings, the court found that the distinction violated both due process and equal protection.
Unlike Olshock, the division in the instant case was not made between parties in similar circumstances. The instant distinction was based upon those who would have worked the four days in question and those who would not. Plaintiffs’ due process rights have not been violated.
Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, both declare that no person shall be denied the “equal protection of the laws.” This equality of right is fundamental and the equal protection clause forbids unequal governmental action that arbitrarily discriminates against some and favors others in like circumstances. (Schwartz, at 285-86.) The clause guarantees that similar individuals will be dealt with in a similar manner by the government. T. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young, Constitutional Law, 519 (West 1978).
The initial step in an equal-protection analysis is to determine the proper standard of review. The United States Supreme Court has enunciated at least two standards: The rational basis test wherein classifications are constitutional if they bear a ratipnal relationship to a permissible State interest (Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 471,25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 90 S. Ct. 1153), and the strict scrutiny standard wherein classifications are constitutional only if they are necessary to promote a compelling State interest (Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 995). The latter test is applied when reviewing State-created classifications which interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or a suspect classification. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278; see also Gault v. Garrison (7th Cir. 1977), 569 F.2d 993.
The classification in this case is to be measured by the rational basis test. The instant classification was not a suspect one calling for stricter scrutiny since it was based on economic and policy considerations and was totally unrelated to the types of personal traits and stereotyped grouped characteristics which have formed the basis for classification which has been found to be suspect. Harper v. Wood (5th Cir. 1977), 560 F.2d 202; see also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 96 S. Ct. 2562.
The clear purpose of the instant classification was to compensate all teachers for the time they either worked, or would have worked. The distinction drawn in this case was reasonably related to this legitimate purpose.
The distinction in the instant case is consistent with the public policy advanced in Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47, that striking teachers should not be allowed to profit from their illegal strike activity. There, the supreme court found an arbitration agreement to violate this policy when it benefited striking teachers to the detriment of those not participating in the strike. By the same token, a salary classification based on whether or not a teacher has engaged in such a strike is consistent with this public policy principle.
We therefore hold that the salary classification is not violative of the State and Federal constitutions.
As a final note, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Craven, with its intricate mathematical analysis, runs far afield of the issues which were presented to this court. The dissent deals with straw men. We were not asked to pass upon the wisdom of the agreement between the teachers and the board. Nor were we asked to decide whether it is “illegal” for public employees to strike. And — finally—we were not asked to determine whether the school district has faithfully performed its portion of the agreement. Not having been asked these questions, we are without authority to provide the answers.
The dissent simply distends beyond the pale of our judicial functions.
Affirmed.
TRAPP, J., concurs.