United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-2041
JENSEN AROCHO-RODRÍGUEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JULIO ROLDÁN CONCEPCIÓN, Mayor, Municipality of Aguadilla; RUBÉN NIEVES-ROLDÁN, Director, Office of Technologies; MAVIAEL MORALES-NIEVES, Municipality Administrator; MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF AGUADILLA; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE; RICHARD ROE,
Defendants, Appellees,
XAYMARA MESONERO, Director, Human Resources,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge, Hon. Giselle López-Soler, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Thompson, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Israel Roldán-González for appellant. Omar Andino-Figueroa, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, Frank A. Rosado Méndez, Deputy Solicitor General, and Mariola Abreu-Acevedo, Assistant Solicitor General, for appellees Julio Roldán Concepción, Rubén Nieves-Roldán, and Maviael Morales-Nieves. Carlos M. Hernández-López for appellee the Municipality of Aguadilla. May 21, 2026 PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellant Jensen Arocho-Rodríguez
sued various defendants for, among other claims, political
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. When
some -- but not all -- of the defendants moved for summary
judgment, the district court adopted a Report & Recommendation
("R&R"), granted the motion, and dismissed the entire case sua
sponte. Arocho-Rodríguez appealed, and we now reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Arocho-Rodríguez is a member of Puerto Rico's New
Progressive Party ("NPP") and a former System Technician
Coordinator for the Municipality of Aguadilla. In January of 2021,
Aguadilla Mayor Julio Roldán Concepción, a member of the Popular
Democratic Party ("PDP"), took office. He appointed PDP members
Rubén Nieves-Roldán and Maviael Morales-Nieves to the positions of
Director of the Office of Technologies and City Administrator,
respectively. Thereafter, Arocho-Rodríguez alleges that Mayor
Roldán and his appointees retracted Arocho-Rodríguez's server
access (rendering it impossible to complete his work), gave him a
poor employment evaluation, and created such a "humiliating" work
environment that he felt forced to resign, all because of his NPP
membership.
Arocho-Rodríguez then sued Defendant-Appellee the
Municipality of Aguadilla, and individual Defendants-Appellees
Mayor Roldán, Nieves-Roldán, and Morales-Nieves in their official
- 3 - and individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He brought
a political discrimination claim under the First Amendment, an
equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
concomitant claims under Puerto Rico law.1
After motion practice and discovery, the individual
Defendants-Appellees moved for summary judgment on the claims
against them in their individual capacities. They asserted that
Arocho-Rodríguez had not established a prima facie claim of
political discrimination under the First Amendment. They also
asserted a qualified immunity defense. They did not, however,
brief the equal protection, Puerto Rico law, or official capacity
claims. The accompanying statement of facts cited to the Second
Amended Complaint and to Arocho-Rodríguez's deposition, and the
sole exhibit attached to the facts consisted of excerpts from said
deposition. The individual Defendants-Appellees did not submit
any other evidence with their motion. The Municipality did not
move for summary judgment.
In response, Arocho-Rodríguez admitted all of the facts
save one (which does not impact this appeal), but he contended
that factual disputes rendered summary judgment inappropriate. In
making that argument, he did not cite to his deposition testimony
1 Arocho-Rodríguezalso brought a Fifth Amendment claim, which was dismissed with his consent.
- 4 - directly, but he did cite to the individual Defendants-Appellees'
statement of facts, which, as just stated, cited his deposition.
The district court referred the motion to a magistrate
judge for a R&R. On July 2, 2024, the magistrate judge issued the
R&R and recommended that the district court grant the motion for
summary judgment. The R&R first concluded that in opposing the
motion, Arocho-Rodríguez had "failed to develop any legal and
factual argument in support of his claim under the First
Amendment," and that he "merely cited to case law without providing
any explanation or analysis of how these authorities support his
position or support a finding that there is a triable issue of
fact." Then, citing our rule that "undeveloped arguments are
waived," the R&R concluded that summary judgment could be granted
on the ground of waiver "alone." Nevertheless, the R&R also
concluded that Arocho-Rodríguez had failed to establish a prima
facie political discrimination claim because "there [were]
absolutely no facts" or "admissible evidence" that showed Mayor
Roldán knew of Arocho-Rodríguez's NPP affiliation, or that
Nieves-Roldán and Morales-Nieves "participated in the employment
decisions at issue." Given these findings, the R&R did not reach
qualified immunity.
Arocho-Rodríguez filed objections to the R&R, asserting
many of the same arguments he advances on appeal, which we will
discuss below. His objections, however, did not sway the district
- 5 - court. On October 8, 2024, the district court entered a memorandum
opinion adopting the R&R and granting the individual
Defendants-Appellees' motion for summary judgment. The district
court thought Arocho-Rodríguez only supported his arguments with
"allegations and speculation." It thus concluded: "Because
Arocho-Rodríguez has failed to fully develop his arguments or cite
evidence to support his objections, the R&R properly recommended
that summary judgment be granted." The district court then entered
judgment and dismissed the entire case with prejudice. In doing
so, the district court did not address the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim, the Puerto Rico law claims, or the
municipal liability and official capacity claims.
Arocho-Rodríguez timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION2
"We review a district court's grant or denial of summary
judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant and drawing all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor." Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins., 52 F.4th 495, 502-03
(1st Cir. 2022) (citing Murray v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC,
789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015)). It is axiomatic that summary
judgment is only appropriate if the movant shows that "there is no
2 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
- 6 - genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it "is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts
are material if they 'might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.'" Dusel, 52 F.4th at 503 (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In this appeal, Arocho-Rodríguez asserts three claims of
substantive error. As a preliminary matter, however, the
individual Defendants-Appellees encourage us to affirm on waiver
grounds. The R&R concluded that Arocho-Rodríguez waived his First
Amendment claim by "fail[ing] to develop any legal and factual
argument" when opposing the motion for summary judgment. The
district court adopted this conclusion, and the individual
Defendants-Appellees vigorously defend it as an "independent and
dispositive ground for affirmance."
True, Arocho-Rodríguez failed to flesh out his legal
arguments. But his response in opposition was a far cry from the
type of "undeveloped" argument we deemed waived in the case cited
by the R&R. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990) (rejecting the appellant's "cursory" attempt to adopt
his co-defendants' arguments by reference). And more
significantly, the district court had an independent duty "to
consider the motion on its merits, in light of the record as
constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would be
legally appropriate." Aguiar-Carrasquillo v. Agosto-Alicea, 445
- 7 - F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Mullen v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins., 972 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir. 1992)).
That duty arises from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, under which, as stated above, a district court must
grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The corollary to this rule is
that if there is a genuine dispute of material fact, or if the
movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a district
court may not grant summary judgment. That corollary holds true
even where a motion for summary judgment is unopposed. See, e.g.,
Rivera-Aponte v. Gomez Bus Line, Inc., 62 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2023) ("A court confronted with an unopposed summary judgment
motion is still required to test the undisputed facts in the
crucible of the applicable law in order to ascertain whether
summary judgment is warranted." (citation modified)). The R&R, as
adopted by the district court, erred in concluding that the motion
for summary judgment could be granted based on waiver alone.
But this conclusion does not end our waiver analysis,
because the individual Defendants-Appellees also argue that
Arocho-Rodríguez "double[d] down" on his alleged waiver by failing
to object to that part of the R&R, and then waived it again by
failing to raise it as an issue on appeal. We take their point
and are puzzled by Arocho-Rodríguez's failure to challenge the
- 8 - R&R's waiver conclusion. But given the initial oversight by the
district court, it does not make sense to enforce our usual
"raise-it-or-waive-it" rule based on an entirely erroneous
foundation. See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir.
2018) ("Since the application of the so-called raise-or-waive
principle is discretionary and non-jurisdictional, an appellate
court may, under exceptional circumstances, elect to reach
unpreserved issues in order to forestall a miscarriage of
justice."). Hence, we turn to Arocho-Rodríguez's three claims of
substantive error, addressing each seriatim.
Arocho-Rodríguez first challenges the district court's
finding that Nieves-Roldán and Morales-Nieves were not
"involve[d]" in the "harassment and discrimination" that led to
Arocho-Rodríguez's "constructive discharge."
Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for individuals
seeking redress for "the deprivation" of constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
816 (1985). "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); accord Pike v. Budd,
133 F.4th 74, 83 (1st Cir. 2025). Relevant here, defendants may
not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior; rather,
- 9 - a plaintiff must show that "each Government-official defendant,
through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The
R&R concluded there was no evidence that Nieves-Roldán and
Morales-Nieves had any "active involvement" in the constructive
discharge of Arocho-Rodríguez, but we disagree.
In his deposition, Arocho-Rodríguez stated that his
direct supervisor, Nieves-Roldán, (a) knew that Arocho-Rodríguez's
server access was cut off, (b) knew other employees were making
fun of him, and (c) was present when Mayor Roldán gave
Arocho-Rodríguez a low performance evaluation and called him a
liar. He further stated that when he complained about other
employees who were taunting him, Nieves-Roldán told
Arocho-Rodríguez: "Take your case to Yanitsia," the former NPP
mayor. Morales-Nieves, meanwhile, delivered a "reprimand" for
"less than satisfactory" performance, and when Arocho-Rodríguez
said he did not agree with the warning, Morales-Nieves, "in a
taunting manner" and "humiliating way" also told Arocho-Rodríguez
to "take [his] case to Yanitsia Irizarry." Finally,
Arocho-Rodríguez stated that Morales-Nieves scolded him for trying
to "fool" the mayor about his political affiliation.
Thus, Arocho-Rodríguez's deposition testimony -- which
was incorporated into the individual Defendants-Appellees'
statement of facts and is not contravened by any record
- 10 - evidence -- is that both Nieves-Roldán and Morales-Nieves were
present and/or participated in the harassment, negative
performance reviews, and change in working conditions that drove
him to resign. See, e.g., Martinez-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 506
F.3d 32, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2007). We thus reach a conclusion
different to that of the district court.
Next, Arocho-Rodríguez challenges the district court's
finding that there was no evidence Mayor Roldán knew of
Arocho-Rodríguez's affiliation with the NPP. To establish a First
Amendment political discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show
"(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political
affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's
affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and
(4) that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor for the adverse employment action." Méndez-Aponte v.
Bonilla, 645 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández
v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)).
At the second step, the R&R concluded, and the district
court agreed, that there was no evidence the individual
Defendants-Appellees had any knowledge of Arocho-Rodríguez's
affiliation with the NPP, only "allegations and speculation." The
individual Defendants-Appellees urge us to affirm this conclusion,
arguing that the "undisputed record confirms" Arocho-Rodríguez
- 11 - failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination.
We again disagree.
In his deposition, Arocho-Rodríguez stated that Mayor
Roldán instructed Nieves-Roldán to remove Arocho-Rodríguez's
server access "for participating [in] the ratifying assembly for
[the] former [NPP] mayor, Yanitsia Irizarry." He further stated
that Mayor Roldán, "in a taunting and humiliating manner," told
Arocho-Rodríguez "of course" he received a low performance
evaluation because of his participation in that same assembly.
These assertions clearly impute knowledge of Arocho-Rodríguez's
NPP membership to Mayor Roldán, and they are not contradicted
anywhere in the record. Similarly, as discussed above,
Arocho-Rodríguez testified that both Nieves-Roldán and
Morales-Nieves knew of his NPP affiliation. Though the individual
Defendants-Appellees omitted most of this testimony from their
statement of facts, that does not vitiate the testimony's
preclusive impact on the motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
we again disagree with the district court's finding to the
contrary.
Finally, we consider Arocho-Rodríguez's third claim of
error: that the district court should not have dismissed the entire
case with prejudice. He points out that the Municipality and the
individual Defendants-Appellees in their official capacities did
not move for summary judgment, and argues that since the judgment
- 12 - below was "premised on an erroneous reading of the record[,]"
dismissal of the case was error.3 Although the Municipality did
not move for summary judgment below, it proffers numerous arguments
in support of an affirmance, including an argument that there was
no evidence of a policy or custom of political discrimination, as
required to plead a § 1983 municipal liability claim. See Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
A district court has the power to enter summary judgment
sua sponte. P.R. Elec. Power Auth. v. Action Refund, 515 F.3d 57,
64 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by
Portugues-Santana v. Rekomdiv Int'l, 657 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st Cir.
2011). But "in an effort to limit the unfairness lurking in this
approach," we "require[] two conditions" before such action. Id.
(citation modified). First, discovery "must be sufficiently
advanced that the parties have enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to
glean the material facts." Id. (quoting Sánchez v. Triple-S Mgmt.,
Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007)). And "[s]econd, the district
court must provide 'the targeted party appropriate notice and a
chance to present its evidence on the essential elements of the
3 In Arocho-Rodríguez's objections to the R&R below, he also asserted that "it was premature . . . to address [the] political discrimination claims under the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[]," since the individual Defendants-Appellees "did not develop any arguments for summary dismissal" of that claim. He does not reassert that argument on appeal, nor does he address the dismissal of the Puerto Rico law claims.
- 13 - claim or defense.'" Id. at 64-65 (quoting Sánchez, 492 F.3d at
7).
In this case, the first requirement was met because
discovery was complete. As to the second requirement, the district
court did not give Arocho-Rodríguez notice -- formal or
otherwise -- of its intent to dismiss the case entirely. See
Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell, 156 F.4th 29, 41 (1st Cir. 2025)
(noting that notice need not be "formal" or "explicit[]"), petition
for cert. filed, No. 25-1047 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026). This outcome
does not "necessarily" require reversal if it was harmless. P.R.
Elec. Power Auth., 515 F.3d at 65. But if the affected party was
"procedurally prejudiced," i.e., "unable to present evidence in
support of its position as a result of the unfair surprise," then
we must reverse. Id.
Procedural prejudice is present here. While the
Municipality devotes pages of its brief to the argument that
Arocho-Rodríguez cannot prove municipal liability, it failed to
move for summary judgment and advance these arguments in the
district court. Similarly, the individual Defendants-Appellees
moved for summary judgment on the individual capacity claims, but
not on the official capacity claims. And the R&R only recommended
dismissal of the First and Fifth Amendment claims against the
"individual capacity Defendants." However, the district court
dismissed the entirety of the case without notice or explanation.
- 14 - (We can surmise that the dismissal was predicated on the findings
of waiver and lack of evidence, but as discussed above, these
findings cannot stand.) Arocho-Rodríguez thus did not have an
opportunity to marshal his evidence and arguments with respect to
the municipal liability and official capacity claims.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
- 15 -