Arkin-Medo, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Services, No. 533241 (Jul. 17, 1995)

1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8669, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 472
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 17, 1995
DocketNo. 533241
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8669 (Arkin-Medo, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Services, No. 533241 (Jul. 17, 1995)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arkin-Medo, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Services, No. 533241 (Jul. 17, 1995), 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8669, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 472 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 17, 1995 This case involves resale certificates. Unhappily, it involves many resale certificates. It also involves sales of tangible personal property to consumers who have, at least in a general sense, provided resale certificates. Unhappily, it involves many such sales. More unhappily still, the parties, unable to resolve differences involving thirty-eight resale certificates and a stupefying number of invoice items, have submitted virtually all of these multitudinous matters to the court. Most unhappily of all, the nature of these matters is such that they can be judicially resolved only on a retail, as opposed to a wholesale basis. In this state of affairs, I am called upon to be something of a glorified auditor. This is not an ideal use of judicial resources. It must, however, be accepted as an unavoidable judicial responsibility under the circumstances. With the greatest possible good humor, I don my green eyeshade and go to work.

Arkin-Medo, Inc. ("Arkin-Medo") is a New York corporation that sells prepress commercial products to the graphic arts industry. It sells substantial amounts CT Page 8670 of film, chemicals, and paper, in addition to a wide variety of equipment, including tape and razor blades. Its customers are primarily commercial printers, commercial photographers, and trade shops. Trade shops produce prepress work, such as films and flats, for commercial printers. Some businesses are highly specialized and function only as trade shops. On the other hand, many commercial printers do trade shop work for other commercial printers in addition to the everyday commercial printing that they do for their retail customers. Many commercial printers, when they buy Arkin-Medol's products, do not know whether they will use those products for trade shop work or commercial printing.

Arkin-Medo sells most of its products in New York and New Jersey. Approximately five percent of its sales are made in Connecticut. Its Connecticut sales alone, however, amount to approximately $3.4 million a year. Arkin-Medo contends that virtually all of these sales are for resale. It takes resale certificates from virtually all of its customers, but, as will be seen, this practice does not automatically result in a finding that its sales are, in fact, for resale.

In February 1991, the Connecticut Department of Revenue Services ("DRS") commenced an audit of Arkin-Medo. The period ultimately audited was January 1, 1988, to September 30, 1991. In actually performing the audit, the parties agreed that Arkin-Medo's Connecticut sales during a particular month would be audited in detail. The month mutually selected was August 1990. All of the disputed sales about to be discussed occurred during that month. Although the evidence on this point is unclear, the disputed sales appear to represent about half of Arkin-Medo's total Connecticut sales during the month in question.

The DRS concluded that a substantial number of sales were not, in fact, sales for resale. A deficiency was consequently found. Arkin-Medo filed a timely appeal to this court.

At trial, the parties presented the court with both CT Page 8671 testimony and documentary exhibits pertaining to the disputed sales. The documentary evidence consists primarily of resale certificates and invoices. Forty-eight resale certificates, conveniently numbered as Ex.1-48, were in dispute at the commencement of trial. The status of ten of these certificates (Ex. 7, 8, 18, 20, 26, 27, 28, 35, 40 and 45) has since been resolved by the parties, leaving thirty-eight certificates in dispute. All of these certificates have one or more attached invoices, and each invoice represents one or more purchased items. A summary of these items is contained in Revised Exhibit 51. In two of these cases (Ex. 17 and 22), Arkin-Medo acknowledges that additional invoices are missing and, with respect to these invoices, claims nontaxability based on the resale certificate alone.

Before these documents are examined in detail, certain general principles of taxation involving retail sales and resale certificates must be considered. This inquiry must begin with the governing statutes and regulatory materials. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-408(1) imposes a sales tax on "all retailers" for "the sale of all tangible personal property sold at retail" in Connecticut. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-407(12)(a) defines a "retailer" as a "person engaged in the business of making sales at retail." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-407(3) defines a "sale at retail" as "a sale for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business of tangible personal property."

Prior to August 22, 1991, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-410 provided in relevant part as follows:

(1) Presumption of taxability; resale certificate. For the purpose of the proper administration of this chapter and to prevent evasion of the sales tax it shall be presumed that all gross receipts are subject to the tax until the contrary is established. The burden of proving that a sale of tangible personal property or service is not a sale at retail is upon the person who makes the sale unless he takes from the purchaser a certificate to the effect that the property is purchased for resale. CT Page 8672

(2) Effect of certificate. The certificate relieves the seller from the burden of proof only if taken in good faith from a person who is engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property and who holds the permit provided for in Section 12-409 and who, at the time of purchasing the tangible personal property, intends to sell it in the regular course of business or is unable to ascertain at the time of purchase whether the property will be sold or will be used for some other purpose.

(3) Form of certificate. The certificate shall be signed by and bear the name and address of the purchaser, shall indicate the number of the permit issued to the purchaser and shall indicate the general character of the tangible personal property sold by the purchaser in the regular course of business. The certificate shall be substantially in such form as the commissioner prescribes.

(4) Liability of purchaser. (a) If a purchaser who gives a certificate makes any use of the service or property other than retention, demonstration or display while holding it for sale in the regular course of business, the use shall be deemed a retail sale by the purchaser as of the time the service or property is first used by him, and the cost of the service or property to him shall be deemed the gross receipts from such retail sale.

On August 22, 1991 — within the audit period but after the test month actually used in the audit itself — Subsection (2) was amended by the addition of the following sentence:

A certificate to the effect that property is purchased for resale taken from the purchaser by the seller shall be deemed to be taken in good faith if the tangible personal property purchased is similar to or of the same general character as property which the seller could reasonably assume would be sold by the purchaser in the regular course of business.

1991 Conn. Acts No. 91-3, § 112 (June Spec. Sess.). CT Page 8673

A regulation, promulgated in 1980, also bears on the issue of good faith. It provides that:

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Bluebook (online)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8669, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 472, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arkin-medo-inc-v-commr-of-revenue-services-no-533241-jul-17-1995-connsuperct-1995.