Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.

306 F.R.D. 134, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, 2015 WL 935454
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 3, 2015
DocketNo. 09 Civ. 0118(VM)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 306 F.R.D. 134 (Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 306 F.R.D. 134, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, 2015 WL 935454 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

By Decision and Order dated February 22, 2013 (“2013 Decision,” Dkt. No. 1052), the Court certified a class comprised of “all shareholders/limited partners in Fairfield Sentry Limited, Fairfield Sigma Limited, Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners L.P. (the ‘Funds’) as of December 10, 2008 who suffered a net loss of principal invested in the Funds.”1 Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y.2013). Defendants The Citco Group Ltd., Citco Fund Services (Europe) B.V., Citco (Canada), Inc., Citco Global Custody N.V., Citco Bank Nederland N.V. Dublin Branch, and Citco Fund Services (Bermuda) Ltd. (collectively, the “Cit-co Defendants”); and PricewaterhouseCoop-ers, LLP, and PrieewaterhouseCoopers Netherlands Accountants N.V. (collectively, the “PwC Defendants”) appealed to the Second Circuit. The Citco and PwC Defendants challenged the Court’s certification of a class of investors in the Funds created and managed by the Fairfield Greenwich Group (“FGG”). Specifically, the Citco Defendants argued that Plaintiffs could not prove reliance by common evidence and, therefore, could not satisfy the predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) (“Rule 23(b)(3)”); further, the Citco Defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement with respect to their holder claims. The PwC Defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) because individual issues predominated with respect to the duty of care PwC owed to class members and those members’ reliance on PwC audits.

By Summary Order dated June 19, 2014, the Second Circuit vacated the 2013 Decision insofar as it applied to the Citco and PwC Defendants and remanded for consideration of certain questions set forth in the discussion section below. See St. Stephen’S Sch. v. PrieewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 Fed.Appx. 37, 39-40 (2d Cir.2014). In so holding, the Second Circuit found that the 2013 Decision “focused primarily on the claims asserted against FGG”—claims which were the subject of a settlement agreement that had the Court’s preliminary approval and was thereafter formally approved. Id. at 39.

[137]*137On remand, the Court has reviewed the record of the Citco and PwC Defendants and finds the requirements of Rule 23(b) are satisfied. Therefore, the Court certifies the Proposed Class, subject to the modification excluding certain foreign investments.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Lead plaintiffs AXA Private Management, Pacific West Health Medical Center Employees Retirement Trust, Harel Insurance Company Ltd., Martin and Shirley Bach Family Trust, Natalia Hatgis, Securities & Investment Company Bahrain, Dawson Bypass Trust, and St. Stephen’s School (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought this class action on behalf of individuals and entities who invested large sums of money in the Funds created and operated by FGG. The overwhelming majority of Plaintiffs’ money was in turn invested by FGG in the Ponzi scheme operated by Bernard Madoff (“Madoff’) under the auspices of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, Inc. (“BLMIS”), and for which Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison following his guilty plea. See United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Cr. 0213 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009).

Plaintiffs are suing a number of FGG entities, executives, and other professional service providers, including the Citco and PwC Defendants, who audited, administered, or served as custodians of the Funds.

B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint (the “SCAC”), filed September 29, 2009, Plaintiffs allege violations of federal securities law and common law tort, breach of contract and quasi-contract causes of action against FGG and associated entities and individuals (the “Fairfield Defendants”),2 Glo-beOp Financial Services, LLC (“GlobeOp”), and the Citco and PwC Defendants. Plaintiffs’ allegations are detailed more fully in this Court’s prior opinions in this action, Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F.Supp.2d 354 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Anwar I”) and Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F.Supp.2d 372 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Anwar II”). For purposes of this decision, the Court will focus on the allegations and discovery per-taming to the Citco and PwC Defendants.

As alleged in the SCAC, Citco served as administrator, custodian, bank, and depository for the Funds. (SCAC ¶¶ 327, 330.) Additionally, through its Fund Services division, Citco provided financial services to its fund clients, including independent pricing of funds portfolio, independent portfolio verification, and compliance monitoring. (Id. ¶326.) According to the SCAC, however, Citco “undertook responsibilities beyond that of a typical Fund administrator”—including “reconciliation of cash and other balances at brokers,” “independent reconciliation of the Fund’s portfolio holdings,” and “calculation of the Net Asset Value and the Net Asset Value per Share on a monthly basis in accordance with the Fund Documents.” (Id. ¶ 327.) Additionally, according to the SCAC, Citco was “specifically responsible for communications with investors,” including receiving subscription documents from and sending investment confirmations to investors. (Id. ¶ 328.) Citco allegedly “undertook additional discretionary responsibilities” as custodian, bank, and depository for Fairfield Sentry and Fairfield Sigma. (Id. ¶ 330.) Those responsibilities allegedly included taking “due care ... in the selection and ongoing appropriate level of monitoring of any. subcustodian” appointed by the Fund, and agreeing that securities held by any subcustodian, like BMIS, “shall be recorded in and ascertainable from the books and/or ledgers of the Custodian.” (Id. ¶ 330.)

Plaintiffs argue that in providing these financial services, Citco was a fiduciary to Plaintiffs, and that because Citco was aware that investors knew and relied on these ser[138]*138vices, Citco owed Plaintiffs a duty of care. (Id. ¶¶ 332-33.) For example, the SCAC alleges that, “[t]he NAV, which was to be independently calculated and reported by Citco, was fundamental to Plaintiffs’ initial investment decisions, decisions to invest additional funds, and decisions to maintain the investments over time.” (Id. f 335.) But, according to the SCAC, Citco was grossly deficient in fulfilling its duties to Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, failing to take reasonable steps to calculate the Funds’ NAY, to independently reconcile the Funds’ portfolio holdings with Madoff, and to reconcile information provided by Madoff as the Funds’ prime broker with information provided by the Investment Manager. (Id. ¶ 337.)

Further, the SCAC alleges that Citco knowingly provided substantial assistance to the Fairfield Defendants in the fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty to investors, as well as collected unearned fees calculated on the basis of fictitious profits reported by Madoff. (Id. ¶ 341-43.)

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Bluebook (online)
306 F.R.D. 134, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, 2015 WL 935454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anwar-v-fairfield-greenwich-ltd-nysd-2015.