Calhoun v. Yonkers Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 18, 2025
Docket7:25-cv-04789
StatusUnknown

This text of Calhoun v. Yonkers Police Department (Calhoun v. Yonkers Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Calhoun v. Yonkers Police Department, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LETROY CALHOUN, Plaintiff, 25-CV-4789 (JGLC) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE YONKERS POLICE DEPT., et al., Defendants. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Letroy Calhoun, who is currently held in the Westchester County Jail (“WCJ”), brings this action pro se, asserting claims of federal constitutional violations as well as other claims, and seeking damages. He sues: (1) the Yonkers Police Department (the “YPD”); (2) the County of Westchester; and (3) what appear to be multiple unidentified members of the YPD (including “John Doe” defendants). The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as comparable claims under state law. By order dated June 12, 2025, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the following reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the YPD, and directs the Clerk of Court to add the City of Yonkers as a defendant under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 21”). The Court also directs service on the City of Yonkers, and directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of Yonkers to provide to Plaintiff and to the Court the full identities, badge numbers, and service addresses of the unidentified defendants. The Court further drops, under Rule 21, the County of Westchester as a defendant without prejudice.

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”),

which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. The YPD The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the YPD because, as an agency of the

City of Yonkers, it is not a suable entity. See Smith v. Westhab Traverse House, No. 24-CV-4961 (LTS), 2025 WL 26067, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025); see also Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities. The only proper defendant in a lawsuit against an agency of a municipality is the municipality itself, not the agency through which the municipality acted.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality[] do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2025) (“The term ‘municipal corporation,’ as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”); Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336, 354

(2d Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a municipal agency that does not have the capacity to be sued under its municipal charter.” (emphasis in original)). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the YPD. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. The County of Westchester and the City of Yonkers Under Rule 21, the Court, on its own motion, “may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 118 F. Supp. 3d 591, 618–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Rule 21 “afford[s] courts discretion to shape litigation in the interests of efficiency and justice.”). A court can, under Rule 21, drop a defendant from an action when the plaintiff “alleges nothing about [that] named defendant[] and therefore has not stated a claim against [it] or shown that [it is] properly joined to th[e] action.” Ponce-Melendres v. Doe Orange Cnty. Jail Admin. Off., No. 20-CV-7710 (VB), 2020 WL 7343025, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2020); see Tanjucto v. NYLife Secs. LLC, No. 23-CV-4889 (BCM), 2024 WL 1258385, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2024). Other than alleging that the unidentified defendants brought Plaintiff

to the WCJ—a facility owned and operated by the County of Westchester—after they arrested him and that he is currently held there, Plaintiff alleges nothing about the County of Westchester.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange
658 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Hall v. City of White Plains
185 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.
118 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co.
82 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. New York, 1949)

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Calhoun v. Yonkers Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/calhoun-v-yonkers-police-department-nysd-2025.