Hill v. Officer Romanych

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 18, 2025
Docket7:25-cv-04868
StatusUnknown

This text of Hill v. Officer Romanych (Hill v. Officer Romanych) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill v. Officer Romanych, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOE HILL, Plaintiff, 25-CV-4868 (JGLC) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE OFFICER ROMANYCH, et al., Defendants. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Joe Hill, who is currently incarcerated in the Fishkill Correctional Facility, brings this action pro se, asserting claims of federal constitutional violations and other claims, and seeking damages.1 Plaintiff seeks damages, and sues: (1) Westchester County Jail (the “WCJ”) Correction Officer Romanych; (2) WCJ Correction Officer Jones; (3) the WCJ itself; and (4) an unidentified “Correction Officer Booking Search” defendant, who appears to be at least one other unidentified WCJ correction officer. The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law. By order dated June 16, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the WCJ. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to add the County of Westchester as a defendant, under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 21”). The Court also directs service on Romanych, Jones, and the County of Westchester. The Court further directs the Westchester County Attorney to provide to Plaintiff

1 Plaintiff filed his complaint while he was held in the Westchester County Jail. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). and the Court the full identifies, badge numbers, and service addresses of the unidentified defendant and of any other WCJ officials involved with the incident alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought

by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”), which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that 2 the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine

whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. The WCJ The Court understands Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting only claims under Section 1983 against the WCJ. The Court must dismiss these claims. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The WCJ, a jail, however, is not a “person” for the purpose of Section 1983 liability. See Bush v. New York, 24-CV-2359 (CS), 2024 WL 4228175, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024); Blackwood v. Westchester Cnty. Jail, No. 23-CV-

2656 (LTS), 2023 WL 4534145, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2023). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 against the WCJ for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. The County of Westchester Under Rule 21, the Court, on its own motion, “may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 118 F. Supp. 3d 591, 618–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that Rule 21 “afford[s] courts discretion to shape litigation in 3 the interests of efficiency and justice.”). Courts have added, under Rule 21, a municipality as a defendant in an action, though that municipality is not named as a defendant in the complaint, because it was clear that the plaintiff intended to name the municipality as a defendant but mistakenly did not do so. See, e.g., Glover v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 25-CV-1174 (KMK), 2025 WL 756327, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025); Bien-Aime v. DOCCS, No. 24-CV-8797 (JHR)

(BCM), 2025 WL 415771, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2025); Pearson v. O.C.J. Goshen, N.Y., 24- CV-8254 (KMK), 2025 WL 370965, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2025); Ballentine v. NYCPD, No. 24-CV-6121 (MKV), 2024 WL 4556003, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2024); Owens v. Orange Cnty. Jail, 22-CV-6754 (CS), 2022 WL 4449229, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022). That is so because a court may add a party to an action, under Rule 21, when it is clear that the plaintiff intended to name that party as a defendant, but inadvertently failed to do so. See Fullewellen v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-7219 (MKV), 2021 WL 4940984, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021); see also Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co., 82 F. Supp. 576, 578 (S.D.N.Y.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.
118 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co.
82 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. New York, 1949)

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Bluebook (online)
Hill v. Officer Romanych, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-officer-romanych-nysd-2025.