ANGLE v. MONTAG

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 10, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-00252
StatusUnknown

This text of ANGLE v. MONTAG (ANGLE v. MONTAG) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ANGLE v. MONTAG, (W.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ERIE DIVISION

BRYAN ANGLE, II, ) 1:21-cv-00252-RAL )

) Plaintiff, RICHARD A. LANZILLO ) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ) vs. )

) ECF NO. 16 DR. MONTAG ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction Plaintiff Bryan Angle II (Angle) has filed a Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 16) in which he requests that “this Court order Plaintiff to be permitted to be evaluated by an ‘outside’ dentist/non-D.O.C. employed dentist and …that Plaintiff be permitted assistance in the law library.” For the following reasons, Angle’s motion will be denied. II. Background Angle, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), commenced this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County on November 12, 2020. ECF No. 11, p. 1. Angle’s Complaint named a single Defendant, Dr. Montag (Montag). The Complaint alleged that Montag provided Angle with inadequate dental care while he was incarcerated at the DOC’s State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest) in violation of his constitutional rights and state law. ECF No. 1-1. Montag removed the action to this Court based on its original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ECF No. 1. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). See ECF Nos. 10, 12.

Angle filed the instant Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction on December 29, 2021. ECF No. 16. The motion is short, stating in its entirety as follows: 1. Plaintiff is a prisoner at S.C.A. Albion.

2. Plaintiff cannot seek evaluation from a non-DOC employed dentist due to his incarceration.

3. Plaintiff is a non-lawyer and has little knowledge of the law and is computer illiterate.

4. S.C.I. Albion refuses to allow Plaintiff assistance in the Law Library. Wherefore Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court order Plaintiff to be permitted to be evaluated by an “outside” dentist/non D.O.C. employed dentist and order that Plaintiff be permitted assistance in the Law Library in accordance with Johnson v. Avery. Id. III. Discussion Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). In deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, the Court considers four factors: (1) the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits; (2) the extent to which the movant is being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the non-moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) whether granting preliminary injunctive relief will be in the public interest. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010). As the moving party, Angle bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. Acierno v. New

Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. Id.; Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000). In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.’” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Angle’s motion fails for several reasons. First, he seeks relief that is wholly unmoored

from the allegations and claims of his Complaint. The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, so “the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiff’s complaint.” James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017). In other words, “there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010)). A request for injunctive relief must, therefore, be dismissed if “the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41,

43 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). Here, Angle’s motion seeks a mandatory injunction commanding prison officials to provide him with additional resources to prosecute his case against Montag. His claim against Montag seeks compensation based on allegedly inferior dental care and an injunction ordering additional dental care. See ECF No. 1-1, p. 3. These requests are not of the same character. Indeed, Angle’s lawsuit does not include any defendant against whom the Court could order compliance with the injunction he requests.

Second, Angle cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim or irreparable harm based on his lack of an independent expert or assistance in the law library. Although the court has broad discretion to appoint an independent expert under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he policy behind the rule is to promote the jury’s factfinding ability.” Ford v. Mercer Cty. Corr. Ctr., 171 Fed. Appx. 416, 420 (3d Cir.2006). “The most important factor in favor of appointing an expert is that the case involves a complex or esoteric subject beyond the trier-of-fact’s ability

to adequately understand without expert assistance.” Id. (citation omitted). “A trial judge does not abuse his discretion in declining to appoint an independent expert” if the requested expert is “solely to benefit a party who has otherwise failed to gather such evidence as would suffice to” prove his claims. Id.

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Related

Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Florida
122 F.3d 41 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
Stephen Mitchell v. Deb Wydra
377 F. App'x 143 (Third Circuit, 2010)
De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States
325 U.S. 212 (Supreme Court, 1945)
Bounds v. Smith
430 U.S. 817 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella
613 F.3d 102 (Third Circuit, 2010)
Dawn Ball v. Dr. Famiglio
396 F. App'x 836 (Third Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Ivan Nikonorovich Rogalsky
575 F.2d 457 (Third Circuit, 1978)
Frank E. Wetzel v. Ralph Edwards, Etc.
635 F.2d 283 (Fourth Circuit, 1980)
Frank E. Acierno v. New Castle County
40 F.3d 645 (Third Circuit, 1994)
David Adams v. Freedom Forge Corporation
204 F.3d 475 (Third Circuit, 2000)
Ford v. Mercer County Correctional Center
171 F. App'x 416 (Third Circuit, 2006)
Tabron v. Grace
6 F.3d 147 (Third Circuit, 1993)
Rogers v. Scurr
676 F.2d 1211 (Eighth Circuit, 1982)
Boring v. Kozakiewicz
833 F.2d 468 (Third Circuit, 1987)

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ANGLE v. MONTAG, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angle-v-montag-pawd-2022.