SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Andrew K. Burt, a Colorado resident at the time this action was filed, brought suit against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and John F. Connolly, Chairman of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at the University. Dr. Burt, a medical doctor, had completed a residency program in orthopedic surgery under Dr. Connolly at the University. Dr. Burt subsequently applied for staff privileges at several Colorado hospitals, which directed inquiries to Dr. Connolly about Dr. Burt’s orthopedic residency and general medical competence. Dr. Connolly responded with a very unfavorable letter and Dr. Burt was denied staff privileges. Dr. Burt filed this suit seeking damages for defamation, breach of contract, interference with prospective advantage, outrageous conduct, and the deprivation of property and liberty interests protected by the United States Constitution. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, ruling that the Board of Regents was immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly. Dr. Burt appeals the jurisdictional issue, and we reverse.1
Dr. Burt alleges in his complaint that the statements by Dr. Connolly were false, willful and wanton, made with malice, and published in Colorado. He further alleges that as a result of these statements he was unable to practice medicine in Colorado. Dr. Burt asserts that the court has personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly pursuant to Colorado’s long-arm statute,2 which provides in pertinent part:
“Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, submits such person, and if a natural person his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from:
The commission of a tortious act within this state____”
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-l-124(l)(b) (1973).
In response, Dr. Connolly filed an affidavit asserting that he is a resident of Nebraska and that he has never done business of any kind in Colorado. Dr. Connolly further states that he owns no property in Colorado and was never physically present in Colorado in connection with the claim asserted by Dr. Burt.
The Colorado long-arm statute was intended to extend the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United- States Constitution. Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Association of America, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir.1984). In this case the district court concluded that the action was technically within the reach of the long-arm statute because the alleged tort of defamation occurred in Colorado.3 [244]*244The court held, however, that personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly was precluded by the requirements of federal due process because he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.
Subsequent to the district court's decision below, the Supreme Court decided Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984), and Calder v. Jones, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). We believe these two cases require us to reverse the district court’s conclusion in this case.
The Court in both Keeton and Calder recognized that “[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” Keeton, 104 S.Ct. at 1478 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)); Calder, 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (same). The plaintiff in Keeton, a New York resident, brought a libel action in New Hampshire against Hustler Magazine, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. The only connection between either the plaintiff or the magazine and New Hampshire was the sale in that state of the allegedly libelous material. In upholding personal jurisdiction, the Court agreed “that the ‘fairness’ of haling respondent into a New Hampshire court depends to some extent on whether respondent’s activities relating to New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate interest in holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activities.” 104 S.Ct. at 1479. The Court then concluded:
“ ‘ “A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory. This is because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to afford protection, by providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable for damages which are the proximate result of his tort.” ’ Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 36, Comment c (1971).
This interest extends to libel actions brought by nonresidents. False statements of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens.”
Id. Under Keeton, Colorado has a significant interest in the present case.
In Calder, a California resident brought a libel suit in California state court against, inter alia, two employees of a national magazine who were residents of Florida and who had prepared the alleged libelous magazine article in Florida. The California Court of Appeals held that personal jurisdiction over the Florida residents was proper. The Supreme Court noted:
“[T]he [California] court concluded that a valid basis for jurisdiction existed on the theory that [the defendants] intended to, and did, cause tortious injury to respondent in California. The fact that the actions causing the effects in California were performed outside the State did not prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects.”
Calder, 104 S.Ct. at 1485-6 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed, approving the “effects” test employed by the California court. See id. at 1486 n. 6. The Court concluded that “[a]n individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California,” id. at 1487, and held that “jurisdiction over [the Florida residents] in California is proper because of their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to [the plaintiff] in California,” id. at 1488.
We believe this analysis is dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in this case. Although the libel in Calder was pursuant to a commercial enterprise, whereas here the alleged defamation resulted from a single letter, we do not find this distinction [245]*245significant in view of the Court’s repeated emphasis in Calder on the intentional nature of the defendants’ conduct and its calculated injurious effect in the forum state. The Court in Calder
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SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Andrew K. Burt, a Colorado resident at the time this action was filed, brought suit against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and John F. Connolly, Chairman of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at the University. Dr. Burt, a medical doctor, had completed a residency program in orthopedic surgery under Dr. Connolly at the University. Dr. Burt subsequently applied for staff privileges at several Colorado hospitals, which directed inquiries to Dr. Connolly about Dr. Burt’s orthopedic residency and general medical competence. Dr. Connolly responded with a very unfavorable letter and Dr. Burt was denied staff privileges. Dr. Burt filed this suit seeking damages for defamation, breach of contract, interference with prospective advantage, outrageous conduct, and the deprivation of property and liberty interests protected by the United States Constitution. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, ruling that the Board of Regents was immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly. Dr. Burt appeals the jurisdictional issue, and we reverse.1
Dr. Burt alleges in his complaint that the statements by Dr. Connolly were false, willful and wanton, made with malice, and published in Colorado. He further alleges that as a result of these statements he was unable to practice medicine in Colorado. Dr. Burt asserts that the court has personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly pursuant to Colorado’s long-arm statute,2 which provides in pertinent part:
“Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, submits such person, and if a natural person his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from:
The commission of a tortious act within this state____”
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-l-124(l)(b) (1973).
In response, Dr. Connolly filed an affidavit asserting that he is a resident of Nebraska and that he has never done business of any kind in Colorado. Dr. Connolly further states that he owns no property in Colorado and was never physically present in Colorado in connection with the claim asserted by Dr. Burt.
The Colorado long-arm statute was intended to extend the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United- States Constitution. Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Association of America, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir.1984). In this case the district court concluded that the action was technically within the reach of the long-arm statute because the alleged tort of defamation occurred in Colorado.3 [244]*244The court held, however, that personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly was precluded by the requirements of federal due process because he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.
Subsequent to the district court's decision below, the Supreme Court decided Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984), and Calder v. Jones, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). We believe these two cases require us to reverse the district court’s conclusion in this case.
The Court in both Keeton and Calder recognized that “[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” Keeton, 104 S.Ct. at 1478 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)); Calder, 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (same). The plaintiff in Keeton, a New York resident, brought a libel action in New Hampshire against Hustler Magazine, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. The only connection between either the plaintiff or the magazine and New Hampshire was the sale in that state of the allegedly libelous material. In upholding personal jurisdiction, the Court agreed “that the ‘fairness’ of haling respondent into a New Hampshire court depends to some extent on whether respondent’s activities relating to New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate interest in holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activities.” 104 S.Ct. at 1479. The Court then concluded:
“ ‘ “A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory. This is because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to afford protection, by providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable for damages which are the proximate result of his tort.” ’ Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 36, Comment c (1971).
This interest extends to libel actions brought by nonresidents. False statements of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens.”
Id. Under Keeton, Colorado has a significant interest in the present case.
In Calder, a California resident brought a libel suit in California state court against, inter alia, two employees of a national magazine who were residents of Florida and who had prepared the alleged libelous magazine article in Florida. The California Court of Appeals held that personal jurisdiction over the Florida residents was proper. The Supreme Court noted:
“[T]he [California] court concluded that a valid basis for jurisdiction existed on the theory that [the defendants] intended to, and did, cause tortious injury to respondent in California. The fact that the actions causing the effects in California were performed outside the State did not prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects.”
Calder, 104 S.Ct. at 1485-6 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed, approving the “effects” test employed by the California court. See id. at 1486 n. 6. The Court concluded that “[a]n individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California,” id. at 1487, and held that “jurisdiction over [the Florida residents] in California is proper because of their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to [the plaintiff] in California,” id. at 1488.
We believe this analysis is dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in this case. Although the libel in Calder was pursuant to a commercial enterprise, whereas here the alleged defamation resulted from a single letter, we do not find this distinction [245]*245significant in view of the Court’s repeated emphasis in Calder on the intentional nature of the defendants’ conduct and its calculated injurious effect in the forum state. The Court in Calder was unpersuaded by the arguments of the defendant reporter and the defendant editor that they personally had no economic stake in their employer’s sales in a distant state.
“[Pjetitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works____”
Id. at 1487.
Nor are we persuaded by Dr. Connolly’s claim that it violates due process to hale him into court in Colorado because the letter was, in effect, solicited by Dr. Burt, who gave Dr. Connolly’s name to the hospitals. Dr. Burt solicited a letter of reference; he did not solicit a malicious falsehood. Taking Dr. Burt’s allegations as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss, we hold that no due process notions of fairness are violated by requiring one who intentionally libels another to answer for the truth of his statements in any state where the libel causes harm to the victim. To the extent that Dr. Connolly’s statements damaged Dr. Burt’s reputation and his ability to practice his profession, the damage occurred in Colorado.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in its determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly. The judgment is reversed on that ground and remanded for further proceedings.