Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc.

719 P.2d 492, 79 Or. App. 311
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 14, 1986
DocketA8301-00133; CA A32141
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 719 P.2d 492 (Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 719 P.2d 492, 79 Or. App. 311 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions

[313]*313ROSSMAN, J.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the crash of United Air Lines Flight 173 in Portland on December 28,1978. Plaintiff was a passenger on the plane and named United and McBroom, the pilot, as defendants. United admitted liability for compensatory damages on the basis of McBroom’s conceded negligence but contended that plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages. Plaintiff based her claim for punitive damages on the alleged “negligence, flagrant misconduct and deliberate disregard of the rights and safety of others” by the pilot, the flight crew and United ground personnel in connection with the events immediately preceding the crash,1 and by United maintenance personnel in failing to correct defects in the plane’s landing gear that were known to them long before the crash. The jury returned a verdict for $161,275.32 in general and special damages, no punitive damages against McBroom and $750,000 in punitive damages against United. United moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the punitive damages, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals and contends that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could base an award of punitive damages.2 We agree and reverse.

Flight 173 was scheduled to arrive from Denver at the Portland International Airport at 5:13 p.m. The flight was normal until McBroom extended the landing gear. He described the “abnormal extension” as “a heavy to severe jolt-jolt * * *. This was not the normal slow extension, but immediate and was accompanied by a yaw to the right.” Fearing a problem with the landing gear, McBroom advised the Portland control tower at 5:12 p.m. that the landing would be delayed. The tower advised the crew to proceed to an area [314]*314southeast of the airport in which the plane could circle while the crew attended to the situation.

The crew consulted a manual to diagnose the problem. They visually checked a mechanical indicator on the wing, which showed that the landing gear was in a down and locked position. Uncontradicted testimony established that that indicator provides an unerring positive indication that the gear is down and locked. McBroom still did not feel confident about the landing gear’s safety, and at 5:40 p.m. he began consulting with ground personnel in Portland and San Francisco. After relating his situation, McBroom was informed “You’ve done everything you can do.” At 5:42 p.m. McBroom reported that the plane had 7,000 pounds of fuel remaining and that he planned to hold for 15 to 20 minutes while the crew prepared the passengers for an emergency evacuation. The San Francisco dispatcher confirmed a 6:05 p.m. landing with McBroom.

At 5:49 p.m., with the gauges indicating that 5,000 pounds of fuel remained, the low fuel pressure warning lights illuminated. At 5:52 p.m. McBroom confirmed with United personnel in Portland that he would land at 6:05 p.m. with about 4,000 pounds of fuel. At 6:03 p.m. McBroom advised that he would begin his approach in three to five minutes and that the plane had 3,000 pounds of fuel left. At 6:07 p.m. the number four engine flamed out while the plane circled at 5,000 feet. The crew re-started the engine. At 6:13 p.m. two engines flamed out, and McBroom realized that he could not reach the airport. He crash-landed the plane about six miles southeast of the airport at 6:15 p.m.

McBroom testified that at the time of the accident he thought, because of his training, that the fuel gauges were completely accurate unless they were obviously erratic or inoperative. Subsequent to the crash, he learned that there was an allowable tolerance in the fuel supply indicator system, to the extent of 426 pounds for each of the eight fuel tanks, and an additional 1,000 pounds for the totalizer system. That amounts to a total tolerance, or potential inaccuracy, of 4,408 pounds. He testified that, if he had known of those tolerance figures at the time of the accident, he would have taken them into account in deciding how long he could safely stay aloft.

There was evidence that the initial abnormal extension was due to preexisting corrosion in the plane’s landing [315]*315gear. The parts of the landing gear which were corroded and failed when the gear was extended were the threads of an eyebolt and a piston. They were part of a hydraulic system which had the function of slowing the extension of the landing gear. Plaintiffs uncontradicted evidence shows that United employes were aware of the corrosion problem on DC-8’s in general and on the right landing gear of this plane in particular. United had detected the corrosion by means of a gamma ray inspection and had attempted to seal the connection to retard the corrosion. United stopped the gamma ray inspections in 1977, when it installed a “bungee system improvement,” which ostensibly guaranteed that the landing gear would come down and lock in the proper position if the hydraulic system failed. Although, as we will discuss below, United argues that its maintenance of the landing gear provides no basis for the jury’s award of punitive damages, it does not dispute that its personnel were aware of the corrosion in the parts, that the parts were not replaced and that the corrosion was not cured.

Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court’s granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. She argues that there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that United’s employes were guilty of “aggravated” or “wanton” misconduct, warranting the assessment of punitive damages. See n 3, infra. Where, as here, damages are sought against a corporate defendant solely on a vicarious liability theory, based on its employes’ conduct, punitive damages may be imposed on the corporation if such damages could have been imposed on any of the employes personally. Stroud v. Denny’s Restaurant, 271 Or 430, 437, 532 P2d 790 (1975); Abrams v. Mike Salta Pontiac, 51 Or App 495, 625 P2d 1383, rev den 291 Or 151 (1981).

United’s overriding argument is that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that McBroom, the United employes who were not named defendants or any combination of them were guilty of “aggravated misconduct” or “wanton misconduct.”3 It is well-established that whether a [316]*316defendant’s conduct is aggravated or wanton or comes within any of the other characterizations that permit the imposition of punitive damages is for the jury to decide, as long as there is evidence upon which the finding can be based. Friendship Auto v. Bank of Willamette Valley, 300 Or 522, 716 P2d 715 (1986); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or 61, 615 P2d 1268 (1980); 2-D’s Logging v. Weyerhaeuser, 53 Or App 677, 632 P2d 1319, rev den 292 Or 109 (1981). However, as we described in 2-D’s Logging, the Supreme Court and this court have periodically succumbed to the temptation to make an impermissible independent normative evaluation of the aggravatedness of a defendant’s conduct in the guise of reviewing for evidentiary sufficiency. 53 Or App at 686-89. That is essentially what United asks us to do here, and that is essentially what the dissent does. We decline to do so. Our function is to determine whether the evidence and the inferences, taken at their strongest, rationally support the jury’s finding; it is not our function to make our own assessment of how defendants’ conduct should be characterized.

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Related

Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc.
739 P.2d 18 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1987)
Harris v. Wright
724 P.2d 875 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1986)
Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc.
719 P.2d 492 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1986)

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