Anderson v. Peek

102 So. 2d 776
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 22, 1958
Docket8792
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 102 So. 2d 776 (Anderson v. Peek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Peek, 102 So. 2d 776 (La. Ct. App. 1958).

Opinion

102 So.2d 776 (1958)

Burley ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert PEEK, d/b/a Peek's Auto Service, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 8792.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

April 22, 1958.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1958.
Writ of Certiorari Denied June 27, 1958.

Thomas W. Davenport, Monroe, for appellants.

Dhu & Lea S. Thompson, Monroe, for appellee.

GLADNEY, Judge.

This action is for the recovery of workmen's compensation and arises from an employment accident which occurred on June 8, 1957. Payment of compensation at the rate of $32.50 per week was voluntarily made to the plaintiff, Burley Anderson, by his employer, Robert Peek, and the insurer, *777 American Hardware Mutual Insurance Company, until August 24, 1957. At that time such payments were discontinued on medical advice the employee was able to fully resume his employment. Alleging himself to be totally and permanently disabled this suit was instituted by Anderson and resulted in the rendition of a judgment awarding compensation as claimed. The defendants have appealed from the decree and appellee has answered the appeal praying the fees of his medical experts be increased from $25 to $50 each.

Admitting to the accident and initial entitlement to compensation, appellants seriously urge the only issue presented herein is whether plaintiff has established his case by showing through a preponderance of the medical testimony disability has persisted after August 24, 1957.

Anderson was employed as a common laborer and mechanical helper at the garage of Robert Peek in West Monroe, where, while shoveling some gravel his foot slipped and he fell backward and suffered an injury to his back. The accident was promptly reported to his employer who sent Anderson to Dr. Ben B. Cobb for treatment. The employee was also treated by Dr. Faheam Cannon, orthopedic surgeon, and he was examined by Drs. J. E. Walsworth and Irving J. Wolff, general practitioners selected by the plaintiff.

The opinions of Drs. Cobb and Cannon hold plaintiff was fully able to perform the duties of his employment after August 24, 1957, and the opinions of Drs. Walsworth and Wolff are to the contrary, it being their expressed belief plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled.

In the reasons for judgment given by the trial court, our brother on the lower bench noted plaintiff had been employed by the defendant, Robert Peek, for more than a year and his conduct subsequent to the accident appeared free of deception. It is our impression, however, that the only attack upon plaintiff's credibility is with reference to inconsistent complaints made to Drs. Cobb and Cannon. The judge found from the testimony of Drs. Wolff and Walsworth plaintiff was disabled and unable to work as of the date of trial, which testimony together with that of plaintiff was, in his opinion, sufficient to entitle plaintiff to a continuance of compensation. The question, however, really is whether or not the testimony of Drs. Walsworth and Wolff has established by a preponderance of the evidence plaintiff was disabled after August 24, 1957. The testimony of Drs. Cobb and Cannon, coupled with the fact Dr. Cannon was the only orthopedist who testified concerning an injury which lies within his chosen field, we think, presents a serious question as to whether plaintiff has made out his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

The rule, as repeatedly held by this and other appellate courts of this state, is that plaintiff in a workmen's compensation suit has the burden of establishing his case to a legal certainty, and conjecture, possibility, or even unsupported probability, are not sufficient to sustain recovery. Beard v. Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc., La.App.1936, 168 So. 730; Roberts v. M. S. Carroll Company, Inc., La.App.1953, 68 So.2d 689; Mouton v. Gulf States Utilities Company, La.App.1953, 69 So.2d 147; Driggers v. Coal Operators Casualty Company, La.App.1954, 73 So.2d 602; Robbins v. Chicago, Mill & Lumber Company, La.App.1954, 76 So.2d 635; Sanders v. Sabine Lumber Company, Inc., La.App.1956, 90 So.2d 472; Bailey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, La.App.1957, 94 So.2d 576; Davis v. Reynolds, La.App. 1957, 96 So.2d 368; Gillespie v. American Bakeries Company, La.App.1957, 98 So.2d 104; Wyatt v. Consolidated Underwriters, La.App. 1957, 98 So.2d 537; Washington v. Swanner, La.App. 1957, 98 So.2d 913; Taylor v. Sam Grimmett, Inc., La.App. 1957, 99 So.2d 365.

It is therefore, the duty of plaintiff in this case to show disability continued after August 24th. In considering whether or not plaintiff has borne this *778 burden, certain legal principles have been enunciated. Thus, the testimony of the attending physician should ordinarily be accorded more weight than that of a physician who has not examined for purposes of treatment. Walker v. Monroe, La.App. 1953, 62 So.2d 676; Roy v. Guillot, La.App.1955, 84 So.2d 469, certiorari denied 1956, Richmond v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, La.App.1956, 85 So.2d 717. And, where the injury of which complained, falls within a particular field of medicine, the testimony of a specialist in that field is entitled to more weight than that of the general practitioner. Rider v. R. P. Farnsworth Company, Inc., La.App. 1952, 61 So.2d 204; Walker v. Monroe, supra; Green v. A. C. Campbell Construction Company, La.App.1955, 78 So.2d 54; Roy v. Guillot, supra; Gaspard v. The Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, La.App. 1956, 89 So.2d 445.

The foregoing legal rules seem to have application in the instant case for it must be conceded that neither Dr. Walsworth nor Dr. Wolff made any serious effort to treat Anderson, nor was either a specialist in the field of orthopedics. On the contrary, both Drs. Cobb and Cannon prescribed treatment although Cobb was under the impression the patient was exaggerating his complaints. Dr. Cannon, it should be also noted, is well qualified as an orthopedic surgeon. But, even more significant for resolving the issue, is the extensiveness of the examinations made by the several experts for the purpose of evaluating plaintiff's disability.

Anderson was examined by Dr. Walsworth during the latter part of June and on December 10, 1957, which latter date was the day before trial. The doctor described the examination made as being general in character and stated his findings were referred to the injured areas "which was the lumbosacral area of the right side of the back and to the right hip, and it was suggestive of a sprain of the muscles of that region, the right spinalis muscle and of those fascial planes of the back with injury to the lumbar vertebra, possibly the intervertebral discs there. It was very suggestive of a rupture of the intervertebral disc which in correlation gives you a definite sciatic pain which was referred to the right side. In other words, his complaints were logical for an individual who had suffered a traumatic sprain of the lumbosacral muscles with a ruptured intervertebral disc and associated with the right sciatic pain, the results of which are physically incapacitating for all types of labor, and exercise."

He further testified that upon his examination of December 10th he found the right spinalis muscle definitely rigid which was indicative of deep-seated irritation "which may be caused by trauma, as I felt it was in this case." Upon the examination made in June, treatment was prescribed but the doctor stated such was not successful and when Anderson returned a week later he sent him to Dr. Wolff for examination and treatment. He did not see the patient again until the examination on December 10th.

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Bluebook (online)
102 So. 2d 776, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-peek-lactapp-1958.