Davis v. Reynolds

96 So. 2d 368
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 28, 1957
Docket8689
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 96 So. 2d 368 (Davis v. Reynolds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Reynolds, 96 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct. App. 1957).

Opinion

96 So.2d 368 (1957)

Virgil DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
W. E. REYNOLDS, d/b/a Reynolds Lumber Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 8689.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

June 28, 1957.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1957.
Writ of Certiorari Denied October 8, 1957.

*369 Wood & Jackson, Leesville, for appellant.

Gordon B. Golsan, Jr., Mansfield, for appellee.

AYRES, Judge.

By this action plaintiff seeks to recover of his employer compensation as for total and permanent disability allegedly due on account of accidental injuries sustained on August 9, 1954, while performing services for the defendant in connection with his employment at defendant's sawmill located at Pleasant Hill, Sabine Parish, Louisiana. From a judgment of February 21, 1957 awarding plaintiff compensation at the rate of $23.40 per week for a period of twenty-six weeks, less compensation previously paid in the sum of $150, he has appealed. Defendant neither perfected an appeal nor answered plaintiff's appeal.

We are favored by a written opinion of the trial court, the material portion of which we quote as follows:

"Defendant denies that plaintiff received an accidental injury and, if so, that he had been fully paid all compensation due. In the alternative defendant alleges that plaintiff in no event is entitled to recover more than Nineteen and 50/100 ($19.50) Dollars per week.
*370 "In this case we are of the opinion that although plaintiff must have received a slight injury in some way while on the job August 9th, 1952, we do not believe it happened as plaintiff would have the Court believe. We were not impressed with the testimony of plaintiff and do not believe any such occurrence as he described took place. Were it not for the testimony of Mr. Elliott D. Cooper and Preston Johnson that plaintiff made complaint, during a stoppage period in the afternoon, we would reject his claim altogether.
"As to the extent and duration of the injury we are of the opinion that plaintiff had entirely and fully recovered at the time of trial. We observed that plaintiff had the appearance of being unusually agile and spry for a man of his age, and especially so if his vocation had been one of hard manual labor.
"Of the three medical experts who testified for defendant, Dr. Murdock (a doctor of plaintiff's choice) could find nothing wrong with him; Dr. Prothro, as a precautionary measure, referred plaintiff to Dr. Overdyke, an orthopedist, who after three examinations pronounced plaintiff recovered as of August 31st, 1954.
"As to the medical experts for plaintiff: It is our opinion that Drs. Briel, Stephens and Reid, basing their testimony on subjective symptoms, were prone to delve too deep into the realm of speculation to give their testimony much weight. Dr. John Rozier, witness for plaintiff, seemed to be the most practical of the four expert witnesses for plaintiff. His testimony was that an injury of which plaintiff complained usually lasted only about six months.
"Giving the plaintiff the benefit of every doubt as to his receiving an injury in the course and scope of his employment and, if injured, as to its duration, we are of the opinion that a judgment for compensation at the rate of pay alleged in his petition for a period of six months will fully compensate plaintiff."

Primarily for consideration on this appeal are the questions whether plaintiff sustained accidental injuries in the course and scope of his employment and, if so, the extent and duration of such disability. Secondarily, for consideration are the rate of compensation and the fixing of the attorney's fees. These matters will be considered in the order indicated.

As to the occurrence of the accident, the proof appears highly unsatisfactory. Plaintiff claims that while he was loading logs off a skidway onto a dolly car he was injured by a log striking his left hip, the severity of which was insufficient to produce any objective signs or symptoms of an accidental injury such as cuts, bruises or abrasions. No one witnessed the accident, although a number of fellow employees were in close proximity and were in position to have observed an accident should one have occurred. Nevertheless, the trial court very reluctantly concluded that plaintiff did, in some manner, sustain an accidental injury, which conclusion was based on plaintiff's complaints to two fellow employees during a cessation of operations during the afternoon of the alleged accident.

From a consideration of the record as a whole, we are not prepared to conclude there was manifest error in his Honor's finding of fact, and, even should we have reached a contrary conclusion, we would be unauthorized to alter the judgment in defendant's favor under his plea in brief and oral argument for a reversal of the judgment, inasmuch as he neither appealed nor answered plaintiff's appeal. Under such circumstances we are precluded from modifying the judgment in appellee's favor. Code of Practice Article 592. Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35 So.2d 219; Day v. Roberts, La.App., 55 So.2d 316. We, *371 therefore, accept as an established fact that plaintiff did sustain an accident in some manner.

A detailed discussion of the medical evidence appears unnecessary. A brief resume will suffice. It may be appropriate to say at the outset that the medical testimony is most conflicting as between the doctors testifying for defendant and those for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there is conflict between plaintiff's medical witnesses as to plaintiff's condition and the cause thereof. The diagnoses vary from bursitis to an injury to the sciatic nerve and a possible herniated intervertebral disc. It will be noted from the opinion of the trial judge that he refused to accept the evaluation of total disability as claimed by plaintiff and accepted the view of the experts whose testimony limited plaintiff's recovery to a period of time not exceeding six months.

The first medical attention given plaintiff was by Dr. H. M. Prothro, a surgeon and general practitioner of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, on the day following the date of the alleged accident. According to his examination and observation there were no cuts, bruises or abrasions or other evidence of trauma; no complaints were noted except a suggestion of pain or tenderness on pressure to the crest of the ilium of the left side. There were no objective signs or symptoms of an injury. X-rays were negative. The doctor could find no cause for pain or, in fact, anything wrong with plaintiff except an indication of bursitis or rheumatism.

Dr. Prothro referred plaintiff to Dr. D. F. Overdyke, Jr., an orthopedist of Shreveport, Louisiana, who based his conclusions primarily on subjective complaints made by plaintiff and concluded that plaintiff was suffering with traumatic bursitis of the greater trochanter of the left femur. That the condition was of traumatic origin could not be established by any clinical findings. Dr. Overdyke examined plaintiff on three occasions during September, 1954, and on the last occasion, September 30, 1954, tenderness over the affected area was not nearly so marked and had considerably subsided, and the doctor pronounced plaintiff able to return to his employment.

Plaintiff was next examined by Dr. Lloyd H. Murdock, a general practitioner of Zwolle, Louisiana, who examined plaintiff at his own request on September 7, 1954. Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
96 So. 2d 368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-reynolds-lactapp-1957.