Amelio v. Houri

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 7, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00975
StatusUnknown

This text of Amelio v. Houri (Amelio v. Houri) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amelio v. Houri, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

USONUITTEHDE RSTNA DTIESST RDIICSTT ROIFC TN ECWOU YROTR K ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X : CARMINE P. AMELIO and ALFONSO AMELIO, : : Plaintiffs, : : 22 Civ. 975 (JPC) -v- : : ORDER GALIA HOURI and EYAL RONEN, : : Defendants. : : ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X

JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Alfonso Amelio and Carmine Amelio, who allege that they reside “in both New York, NY and New Milford, CT,” filed this pro se action invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4-5. They sue Galia Houri and Eyal Ronen, who Plaintiffs allege are residents of New York, id. ¶¶ 2-3, and seek unspecified relief, id. at 11. Plaintiffs paid the filing fees to bring this action. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but grants Plaintiffs 30 days’ leave to replead their claims in an amended complaint. I. Legal Standard The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Moreover, the court “has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam); see also Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n.3. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal: [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. II. Background Plaintiffs bring this action under the court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, for “breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, property damages, impersonation, tampering with mail, unauthorized access to plaintiffs’ internet account, harassment and negligence.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 1. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Defendants’ rental of Plaintiffs’ home located at 3228 Schley Avenue, Bronx, New York 10465. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants caused damage to Plaintiffs and their property, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 18, 38, 40, 42, and 44, but Plaintiffs fail to detail the total amount of the damages caused by Defendants. III. Discussion The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court’s jurisdiction

is available only when a “federal question” is presented or, when a plaintiff asserts claims under state law under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. As relevant here, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over a matter when the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject- matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”). To establish the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first show that he and the defendant are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381

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Bluebook (online)
Amelio v. Houri, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amelio-v-houri-nysd-2022.