Am. Air Filter Co. v. Price

2017 NCBC 9
North Carolina Business Court·Decided February 3, 2017·No. 16-CVS-13610·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Am. Air Filter Co. v. Price, 2017 NCBC 9.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

COUNTY OF WAKE 16 CVS 13610

AMERICAN AIR FILTER COMPANY, ) INC. d/b/a AAF INTERNATIONAL, )

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER ON MOTION FOR v. ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION )

SAMUEL C. PRICE, JR. and CAMFIL ) USA, INC. d/b/a CAMFIL AMERICAS, )

Defendant. )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”).

THE COURT, having considered the Motion, the briefs in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the record evidence filed by the parties, and other appropriate matters of record, FINDS and CONCLUDES, in its discretion, that the Motion should be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, for the reasons set forth below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 1. Plaintiff American Air Filter Company, Inc. (Plaintiff or “AAF”) is a global manufacturer of clean air products and equipment. AAF offers a wide range of products such as air filters, dust collection equipment, and other filters and equipment for commercial buildings, data centers, healthcare facilities, food and

1 The Court’s factual findings are for purposes of deciding the Motion only, and are not binding in any subsequent proceedings. Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. Kirkhart, 148 N.C. App. 572, 578, 561 S.E.2d 276, 282 (2002) (quoting Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 111 N.C. App. 1, 16, 431 S.E.2d 828, 835 (1993)).

beverage establishments, and schools. AAF is headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky, and does business in North Carolina, including Wake County.

2. Defendant Camfil USA, Inc. (“Camfil”) is a direct competitor of AAF.

Camfil also does business in North Carolina, including Wake County.

3. Defendant Samuel C. Price, Jr. (“Price”)2 is a resident of Johnston County. AAF hired Price in the position of Branch Manager on or around December 11, 1989. (VFAC ¶ 28.)3 Price was assigned to AAF’s Raleigh, North Carolina branch. AAF later moved Price to the position of District Manager, but returned him to the position of Raleigh Branch Manager in 2001. Price was responsible for sales in various counties in the State of North Carolina, and after his return to the Branch Manager, for three national accounts based in South Carolina.

4. AAF’s “business is driven by relationships with its customers.” (Id. ¶ 8.)

AAF has made “significant investment[s] in developing and enhancing relationships” with its customers, and in “obtaining and compiling a substantial body of confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets . . . critical to its ability to serve existing and prospective” customers. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.)

5. AAF maintains web-based tools called “Sales Playbook” and “Salesforce.com” in which it compiles confidential and proprietary information used in its sales efforts. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16, 18.) Sales Playbook and Salesforce.com are password

2 Price and Camfil are referred to collectively as “Defendants.”

3 References to the allegations contained in the Verified First Amended Complaint, filed by Plaintiff on December 5, 2016, are denoted “VFAC.”

protected. As an additional security measure, Sales Playbook cannot be downloaded or printed.

6. AAF also has a proprietary program called Total Cost of Ownership Diagnostics (“TCOD”). TCOD “provides technical data about AAF products and competitors’ products based on AAF’s internal and third-party testing and performance studies.” (VFAC ¶ 17.). TCOD also calculates the costs of ownership of AAF’s products as compared to competitors’ products. TCOD is password protected.

7. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he specific trade secrets accessible through these programs include,” inter alia: “secret and highly sensitive company-wide prices that AAF corporate officers negotiated on behalf of AAF with its national accounts”; “quoting tools that use proprietary algorithms to create custom quotes that incorporate prices AAF negotiated with national accounts, AAF’s custom discounts, and customer-specific needs”; “audit reports created by AAF sales professionals at the physical location of customer facilities which include identification of customers’ current air filtration products, sizes, specifications, and customer-specific issues or talking points developed by AAF sales professionals”; “information on the costs of goods sold that could allow calculation of AAF profit margins”; “technical specifications and data that resulted from extensive internal and third-party product testing and performance studies”; and “detailed drawings and product specifications created by AAF for new customer construction projects.” (Id. ¶ 18.)

8. “AAF developed its trade secrets through decades of data collection, research, and business development.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

9. AAF disables employee access to its systems and trade secrets immediately upon an employee’s notice of resignation or termination, or if the employee notifies AAF that they are going to work for a competitor.

10. Price “had access to and regularly relied on” AAF’s trade secrets, and AAF provided Price with information available only to AAF “insiders.” (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.)

11. At the time AAF hired Price, and through 2006, AAF and Price executed several employment agreements. On November 13, 2006, AAF and Price executed a written “Sales Representative Employment Agreement” (“2006 Agreement”). (VFAC ¶ 43, Ex. B.) The 2006 Agreement expressly stated that it superseded the previous agreements. Plaintiff contends that in exchange for Price’s commitments in the 2006 Agreement, AAF provided Price a 3.5% increase in salary and a “Sales Quota and Contribution Margin Target” that were “materially different” from Price’s Sales Quota and Contribution Margin Target for 2005. (Id. ¶ 46.) Price contends that the salary increase was not provided as part of the 2006 Agreement, but instead was a “standard cost of living/merit increase” provided to all AAF employees. (Price 1st Aff. ¶ 20.) Price also claims he received no increased opportunity to earn commissions for 2007, and that he earned less compensation in 2007 than he had in 2006. Additionally, Defendants contend that any consideration provided to Price for the 2006 Agreement was illusory because the 2006 Agreement expressly reserved to AAF the right to unilaterally change the salary and commissions at any time.

12. The 2006 Agreement contained a non-competition clause that provided as follows:

If the Employee terminates this Agreement or Company terminates this Agreement for cause, then in either event, for a period of one (1) year after such termination, Employee will not either on Employee’s own behalf or on behalf of any other person, firm, corporation or other entity, either directly or indirectly, (a) contact, for the purpose of diverting, any of Company’s customers or the Accounts; (b) solicit the trade of, or trade with any of Company’s customers or the Accounts/Territory; (c) engage in any Competitive Business with the Accounts/Territory;

(d) seek to cause any person, firm or corporation with whom the Employee came in contact as a representative or Company to refrain from doing business in whole or in part with or through Company; or (e) solicit or induce any employee, current or future, of Company, to leave Company or to work for another individual.

(VFAC ¶ 49; 2006 Agreement § 6.1.)

13. The 2006 Agreement was the final written employment agreement entered into between AAF and Price. Plaintiff alleges that the 2006 Agreement “automatically renewed for successive one-year periods” thereafter. (Id. ¶ 50.)

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