OPINION
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RABI-NOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE, JJ.
BURKE, Justice.
The dispute in this case centers on whether a bonding company’s interest in earned progress payments qualifies as a security interest subject to the filing and priority provisions of the Alaska Uniform Commercial Code.1
The events leading to this controversy began when Gilman’s Construction, Inc., formerly Gilman’s Excavating, Inc., contracted with the State of Alaska to construct Project No. F-046-l(16) and LSF-046-1(4), commonly known as the Tok Cutoff Project. The contract was executed on September 18,1970. Needing payment and performance bonds, Gilman’s approached appellee General Insurance Company of America (hereinafter the bonding company). The bonding company agreed to write the necessary bonds and acquired collateral against possible losses by requiring Gil-man’s to execute an instrument entitled “General Agreement of Indemnity for Contractors.” Among other things, this agreement, which was executed in July of 1970, assigned to the bonding company Gilman’s right to monies earned under bonded contracts.
The agreement contained a'provision for perfection by the bonding company, under the Uniform Commercial Code, of the alleged security interest granted to it by Gil-man’s.
[The parties] [ajgree that this agreement may at any time be completed and filed by [the bonding company] in such a manner that it will qualify as a financing statement under the applicable provisions of any statute of any state which has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, and that [the bonding company] may add such schedules to this agreement, describing specific items of security covered hereunder as shall be necessary under such statutes.
The bonding company, however, chose not to file the agreement or any other document as a financing statement.2 Subsequently, the bank, in financing Gilman’s operations, acquired security for its loans by inducing Gilman’s to execute on July 23, 1970 a security agreement assigning to the bank, inter alia, all of Gilman’s contract rights. The bank attempted to perfect this security interest by filing a financing statement on August 5, 1970 with the Alaska Department of Administration, as required by the Uniform Commercial Code.
[1364]*1364Gilman’s commenced work on the Tok Cutoff job. On or about September 8,1971, however, Gilman Watts, the principal of Gilman’s, presented himself at the offices of the bonding company in Seattle and acknowledged that he could not complete his contract. Gilman’s had at that tim.e fully earned a progress payment.of $169,895.00, but the money had not, as yet, been disbursed by the State. Thereafter, representatives of the bonding company attended a meeting in Anchorage with officers of the bank. The meeting resulted in the establishment of a trust account at the bank for use by the bonding company in connection with the Tok Cutoff job.
In mid-September the State was informed by telegram and letter from the bonding company and Gilman, respectively, that Gilman’s was in default; had suspended work on the project; was unable to complete the contract with the State; and was unable to pay its laborers, materialmen and suppliers. The State was further informed that the bonding company was completing the project. Nine days later, on September 29, the State issued a check in the amount of $169,895.00 payable to the bonding company. The check was sent to the bank where it was deposited in the trust account without signature and collected. On October 11, 1971, a cashier’s check in the amount of $169,895.00 was sent by the bank to the bonding company. When subsequent investigation revealed that the bonding company had failed to perfect its alleged security interest in the earned progress payment, the bank commenced this action.
The respective positions of the parties can be summarized as follows:
The bonding company argues that when a contractor defaults and a bonding company steps in to complete the job and pay laborers and materialmen, it is subrogated to the rights of the owner, the contractor, the laborers, and the materialmen. Since the owner could have used funds still in its hands to complete the job, there would have been no sums available for the contractor and, therefore, for the contractor’s secured creditor who stands in the contractor’s shoes. Under this view the bonding company has first rights to the progress payment, although it may have been fully earned by the contractor’s prior performance.
The bank argues that progress payments are contract rights and that the bonding company’s subrogation theory merely purports to impose on them a hidden lien. The bank urges that both it and the bonding company had the power to take advantage of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and perfect their respective security interests. Under this view, the bank had prior rights since it utilized the U.C.C. while the bonding company did not.
Judge Eben Lewis, in a Memorandum Decision handed down on February 10, 1975, accepted the bonding company’s view. He utilized as his standard the “Fifth Circuit Doctrine” which holds that only when the bank’s money can be shown to have gone into a project to earn an undisbursed progress payment does the bank have a superior equitable claim since it relieved the bonding company of a burden that it would otherwise have had to bear.
Judgment was entered for the bonding company on cross motions for summary judgment when Judge Lewis found that the bank had failed to establish that its money was traceable to the Tok Cutoff job.
The first major issue that confronts this court is whether the lower court erred in finding that the unperfected assignment by Gilman’s to its bonding company, of earned progress payments, was a security interest governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Alaska.
The bank urges the court that this “classic dispute” between bank and bonding company should be resolved under the Uniform Commercial Code. It cites various cases3 decided by this court in an attempt [1365]*1365to buttress its argument that the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code reflects a legislative judgment to apply U.C.C. principles even where the U.C.C. by its terms is not applicable.4 Even though the U.C.C. does not specifically deal with the case at bar, the bank argues that the policy of the U.C.C. is to draw distinctions based on functional rather than formal lines. According to the bank, both it and the bonding company initially had an interest in a “contract right;” that is, “a right to payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper.”5 It should be noted that the Indemnity Agreement assigns to the bonding company:
Monies due or to become due Contractor on any Contract, including all monies earned or unearned which are unpaid at the time of notification by [the bonding company] to the Obligee of [the bonding company’s] rights hereunder.
It follows, the bank stresses, that the bonding company has by assignment intended to enter a transaction 6 creating an interest in personal property that secures payment or performance of an obligation7 subject to8 the filing9
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OPINION
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RABI-NOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE, JJ.
BURKE, Justice.
The dispute in this case centers on whether a bonding company’s interest in earned progress payments qualifies as a security interest subject to the filing and priority provisions of the Alaska Uniform Commercial Code.1
The events leading to this controversy began when Gilman’s Construction, Inc., formerly Gilman’s Excavating, Inc., contracted with the State of Alaska to construct Project No. F-046-l(16) and LSF-046-1(4), commonly known as the Tok Cutoff Project. The contract was executed on September 18,1970. Needing payment and performance bonds, Gilman’s approached appellee General Insurance Company of America (hereinafter the bonding company). The bonding company agreed to write the necessary bonds and acquired collateral against possible losses by requiring Gil-man’s to execute an instrument entitled “General Agreement of Indemnity for Contractors.” Among other things, this agreement, which was executed in July of 1970, assigned to the bonding company Gilman’s right to monies earned under bonded contracts.
The agreement contained a'provision for perfection by the bonding company, under the Uniform Commercial Code, of the alleged security interest granted to it by Gil-man’s.
[The parties] [ajgree that this agreement may at any time be completed and filed by [the bonding company] in such a manner that it will qualify as a financing statement under the applicable provisions of any statute of any state which has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, and that [the bonding company] may add such schedules to this agreement, describing specific items of security covered hereunder as shall be necessary under such statutes.
The bonding company, however, chose not to file the agreement or any other document as a financing statement.2 Subsequently, the bank, in financing Gilman’s operations, acquired security for its loans by inducing Gilman’s to execute on July 23, 1970 a security agreement assigning to the bank, inter alia, all of Gilman’s contract rights. The bank attempted to perfect this security interest by filing a financing statement on August 5, 1970 with the Alaska Department of Administration, as required by the Uniform Commercial Code.
[1364]*1364Gilman’s commenced work on the Tok Cutoff job. On or about September 8,1971, however, Gilman Watts, the principal of Gilman’s, presented himself at the offices of the bonding company in Seattle and acknowledged that he could not complete his contract. Gilman’s had at that tim.e fully earned a progress payment.of $169,895.00, but the money had not, as yet, been disbursed by the State. Thereafter, representatives of the bonding company attended a meeting in Anchorage with officers of the bank. The meeting resulted in the establishment of a trust account at the bank for use by the bonding company in connection with the Tok Cutoff job.
In mid-September the State was informed by telegram and letter from the bonding company and Gilman, respectively, that Gilman’s was in default; had suspended work on the project; was unable to complete the contract with the State; and was unable to pay its laborers, materialmen and suppliers. The State was further informed that the bonding company was completing the project. Nine days later, on September 29, the State issued a check in the amount of $169,895.00 payable to the bonding company. The check was sent to the bank where it was deposited in the trust account without signature and collected. On October 11, 1971, a cashier’s check in the amount of $169,895.00 was sent by the bank to the bonding company. When subsequent investigation revealed that the bonding company had failed to perfect its alleged security interest in the earned progress payment, the bank commenced this action.
The respective positions of the parties can be summarized as follows:
The bonding company argues that when a contractor defaults and a bonding company steps in to complete the job and pay laborers and materialmen, it is subrogated to the rights of the owner, the contractor, the laborers, and the materialmen. Since the owner could have used funds still in its hands to complete the job, there would have been no sums available for the contractor and, therefore, for the contractor’s secured creditor who stands in the contractor’s shoes. Under this view the bonding company has first rights to the progress payment, although it may have been fully earned by the contractor’s prior performance.
The bank argues that progress payments are contract rights and that the bonding company’s subrogation theory merely purports to impose on them a hidden lien. The bank urges that both it and the bonding company had the power to take advantage of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and perfect their respective security interests. Under this view, the bank had prior rights since it utilized the U.C.C. while the bonding company did not.
Judge Eben Lewis, in a Memorandum Decision handed down on February 10, 1975, accepted the bonding company’s view. He utilized as his standard the “Fifth Circuit Doctrine” which holds that only when the bank’s money can be shown to have gone into a project to earn an undisbursed progress payment does the bank have a superior equitable claim since it relieved the bonding company of a burden that it would otherwise have had to bear.
Judgment was entered for the bonding company on cross motions for summary judgment when Judge Lewis found that the bank had failed to establish that its money was traceable to the Tok Cutoff job.
The first major issue that confronts this court is whether the lower court erred in finding that the unperfected assignment by Gilman’s to its bonding company, of earned progress payments, was a security interest governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Alaska.
The bank urges the court that this “classic dispute” between bank and bonding company should be resolved under the Uniform Commercial Code. It cites various cases3 decided by this court in an attempt [1365]*1365to buttress its argument that the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code reflects a legislative judgment to apply U.C.C. principles even where the U.C.C. by its terms is not applicable.4 Even though the U.C.C. does not specifically deal with the case at bar, the bank argues that the policy of the U.C.C. is to draw distinctions based on functional rather than formal lines. According to the bank, both it and the bonding company initially had an interest in a “contract right;” that is, “a right to payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper.”5 It should be noted that the Indemnity Agreement assigns to the bonding company:
Monies due or to become due Contractor on any Contract, including all monies earned or unearned which are unpaid at the time of notification by [the bonding company] to the Obligee of [the bonding company’s] rights hereunder.
It follows, the bank stresses, that the bonding company has by assignment intended to enter a transaction 6 creating an interest in personal property that secures payment or performance of an obligation7 subject to8 the filing9 and priority10 provisions of the U.C.C. When this position is coupled with the fact that there is no mention of this type of agreement in the U.C.C. provisions excluding certain transactions,11 the Bank proposes that the U.C.C. scheme is applica[1366]*1366ble and that the lower court was in error. Yet the bank offers no direct case authority to support its position.
The bonding company counters that the equitable principle of subrogation should control and that the court properly found that a surety’s right of subrogation is not a security interest governed by the U.C.C.
As one court has stated:
Our effort will be to see what subrogation means in the transaction before us, to see what extent Article 9 [of the U.C.C.] is devised to deal with such a transaction, and to apply relevant case law. Subrogation is an old term, rooted in equity, and semantically stemming from words meaning ‘ask under’. Today we use the parallel phrase, ‘stand in the shoes of’. The equitable principle is that when one, pursuant to obligation — not a volunteer, fulfills the duties of another, he is entitled to assert the rights of that other against third persons.12
In attempting to address the problem presented we find that the majority of American jurisdictions which have considered the question have accepted the theory of equitable subrogation as the rule in situations such as the one before us.
In National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,13 Anderson Bros., Inc., a general contractor, entered into three construction contracts with the United States Air Force for work at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts and Dow Air Force Base in Maine. As Required by the Miller Act,14 Anderson Bros., Inc. applied to a surety for payment and performance bonds. Contained in the application for the bonds was an assignment to the surety of “earned monies that may be due or become due under the contract.” This assignment to the surety was not recorded under the U.C.C.15 The contractor thereafter defaulted.
[1367]*1367In holding that the surety was subrogat-ed to the government’s right to apply to the cost of completion the earned but unpaid progress payments in its hands at time of default the court allowed recovery of such payments although the bank had previously filed a financing statement.16 The court based this result on several factors.
(1) The Code’s definition of a security interest as “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation . . . [and which] includes any interest of a buyer of accounts ... or contract rights” does not seem to fit the construction contract surety. The essence of the “security” is the opportunity, on default, to finish the job and apply any available funds against its cost of completion. This was held not to fall within the purview of personal property.17
(2) The term surety does not fit into the definition of a buyer of contract rights. The right to finish a job “is not the kind of independently valuable asset that such synonyms as ‘goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles [and] chattel paper’ suggest.” 18
(3) Section 9-102(2) [AS 45.05.692(b)] requires security interests to be “created by contract.” The real security was “not the assignment of accounts receivable — which could be, failing the completion of performance, set off by the government — but the eventual right to be in the shoes of the government upon job completion. This is not ‘created by contract’ but rather [results from it], inhering in a surety, quite independently of the expressed terms of the contract.”19
(4) The drafters of the U.C.C. rejected a proposed § 9-312(7) to the Code which would have provided that “a security interest which secures an obligation to reimburse a surety * * * secondarily obligated to complete performance is subordinate to” the claim of a later lender with a perfected security interest.20
The view that the right of equitable sub-rogation is not a security interest for the purposes of Article 9 of the U.C.C. has been adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In Re Gleason Co.21 and by the United States Court of Claims in Home Indemnity Company v. United States.22 [1368]*1368The states of Kansas,23 Kentucky,24 Mississippi,25 Pennsylvania,26 New York27 and Massachusetts28 also adhere to this position.
We note that one of the basic policies embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code is a desire to make the law of commercial transactions uniform throughout the various jurisdictions.29 To that end we hold that a surety’s right to earned progress payments does not qualify as an interest in personal property30 subject to the filing provisions of the Alaska Uniform Commercial Code31 since the surety has the right to complete the job it has bonded and apply any earned funds against its costs. This does not secure the payment or performance of an obligation as a “security interest” as that term is defined in AS 45.05.-020(37).32 We note with approval the opinion of the court in National Shawmut Bank that a surety also does not fall into the definition of a buyer of contract rights33 and that a surety’s interest in completing a project is not sufficient to be a security interest “created by contract.”34
The bonding company contended in the lower court that a letter executed by the President of the Bank constituted a waiver of the bank’s right to any earned progress payment. Judge Lewis after hearing testimony on that issue found there had been no waiver. The second major issue presented in this case arises on a cross-appeal and concerns the failure of the lower court to award costs to the bonding company for expenses it incurred in litigating that waiver issue.
The bonding company’s argument that the court abused its discretion in failing to award it its costs on the waiver issue is without merit.
In DeWitt v. Liberty Leasing Company of Alaska, 499 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Alaska 1972) we held:
Under AS 09.60.010 and Civil Rule 54(d), the prevailing party is entitled to costs, including an award for attorney’s fees. The determination of which party prevailed is committed to the discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal only for abuse, (footnotes omitted).
Our opinion in that case quoted Buza v. Columbia Lumber Company, 395 P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska 1964), where we discussed the meaning of the term “prevailing party:”
The dictionary states that ‘Prevailing applies esp. to that which is predominant,’ and it has been established by case law that the prevailing party to a suit is the [1369]*1369one who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not to the extent of the original contention. He is the one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered, (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
Applying the standard of DeWitt,35 it can be seen that the bonding company is the “prevailing party,” and an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate. However, it does not follow that the superior court abused its discretion by declining to award attorney’s fees on each of the contested issues comprising the litigation. The superior court ruled against the bonding company on the waiver question, and it is not “manifestly unreasonable”36 that it should take that factor into consideration in determining what overall amount of attorney’s fees and costs should be awarded to the prevailing party. Such an approach is consistent with the observation we made regarding denial of costs to a prevailing party in Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305 (Alaska 1973). There we said:
[W]e do not believe that this is an appropriate case to authorize a denial of all costs to the prevailing party. . [T]he trial court should determine whether particular items on the cost bill should be disallowed as unnecessary to the litigation, but should award proper items of costs.37
As a second argument the bonding company asserts that Judge Lewis was in error in awarding only $5,000 for its attorney’s fees, refusing to calculate the amount of attorney’s fees according to the schedule contained in Civil Rule 82(a)(1).38 The bonding company urges that Civil Rule 82(a)(1), which provides for a schedule of attorney’s fees when a money judgment is recovered, should have been applicable since the result in this case had the same practical effect as a money judgment in its favor. We find such argument unpersuasive. The [1370]*1370only money judgment in favor of the bonding company was some $1,300 on its counterclaim. On the main issue, there was no such judgment; that is, the financial status quo of the bonding company was preserved. Thus, Judge Lewis correctly ruled that attorney’s fees were to be awarded, under Rule 82(a)(1), “in a reasonable amount,” rather than according to the schedule contained therein.
The determination of attorney’s fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court and reviewable on appeal only for abuse.39 That abuse, is present only where it appears the trial court’s determination was manifestly unreasonable,40 arbitrary41 or designed for a purpose other than justly deserved compensation.42 Our review of the record has led us to conclude that the trial judge properly considered those factors43 which are salient to such a decision on attorney’s fees. Therefore, we find there was no abuse of discretion in the court below.
AFFIRMED.