OPINION OF THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.
In the November 1968 election to select six representatives in the Honse of Representatives from the Fif[355]*355teenth Representative District, five candidates were clearly-elected without contest. The present case involves a controversy over the sixth seat.
In the final tabulation of the votes, the Republican candidate, Fong, received two more votes than did the Democratic candidate, Akizaki. Akizaki contested the election in the court below and proved that of the ballots counted, at least nineteen were clearly invalid. These were absentee ballots which, because of late postmarks, failed to meet the requirements of HRS § 14-8.1 HRS § 14-8 provides that an absentee ballot received not later than noon on the sixth day following a general election may be counted, but only if it is postmarked not later than the day before the election. Due to a mistake on the part of the election officials, nineteen ballots postmarked too late to be opened and counted were nevertheless opened and counted. In the process they were commingled with valid absentee ballots so that it could not later be determined for whom the invalid ballots had been cast. Since the number of invalid ballots greatly exceeds the margin of victory, it is obvious that their presence could have affected the result. The court below resolved this problem by discarding 174 absentee ballots, among which were the nineteen invalid ones. On the basis of a tabulation without these 174 ballots, the court declared Akizaki to have been the winner of the election. From this determination Fong appeals to this court.
Subsequent to the decision of the court below and pursuant to the recommendation of its credentials committee, the House seated Akizaki. On the basis of the House’s action, Akizaki claims that the controversy has been finally determined; that the case has been [356]*356mooted; and that this court should not rule upon the question, or should simply affirm the judgment of the court below. Fong claims that discarding so many valid absentee ballots is an unwarranted disenfranchisement of many absentee voters whose votes were validly cast. He also claims that because jurisdiction over election contest cases is granted to the courts by the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, Article II, Sec. 7,2 this court may properly review the decision of the court below and reach an appropriate result, notwithstanding the action of the House.
The fundamental interest to be protected here is that of the people of the Fifteenth Representative District in choosing whomever they please to represent them in the House of Representatives. The right to vote is perhaps the most basic and fundamental of all the rights guaranteed by our democratic form of government. Implicit in that right is the right to have one’s vote count and the right to have as nearly perfect an election proceeding as can be provided. The result we reach must be consistent with these principles.
Before deciding the substantive issues raised in this appeal, we must determine the basic underlying constitutional question presented. Counsel for appellees have urged that, since the House has now seated Akizaki, this court may not and should not further consider this election contest. This claim is based upon their reading of Article III, Sec. 13 of the Hawaii Constitution, which says, in part, that “[e]aeh house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.” Appellants, however, argue that the controlling provision is Article II, Sec. 7 of the same document, which states that [357]*357“ [c] ontested elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such manner as shall be provided by law.” We must resolve the apparent conflict between these two provisions before proceeding further. Simply stated, the question is: Should the courts or should the legislative body be the final arbiter of the dispute in the event of an election contest involving a legislative seat? We hold that the courts are required by the Hawaii Constitution to be the forum and the final arbiter in such disputes.
At the outset, it is important to note that the legislature has enacted HRS §§ 12-101 to 12-105 to implement Article II, Sec. 7 of the constitution. These sections provide that suit may be brought in the circuit court to contest an election; that the court, after hearing the case, should determine the winner of the election if possible; and that if, because of a mistake on the part of the election officials, the court cannot ascertain the correct result, it should invalidate the election and a new election should be held.
It is true that Article III, Sec. 13, states that “[e] ach house shall be the judge...;” but in determining what each house is to judge, this provision must be read in context, along with the other provisions of the constitution, including Article II, Sec. 7. In this regard, it is helpful to note the analysis of a similar problem by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The United States Constitution includes language identical with that found in Article III, Sec. 13 of the Hawaii Constitution, that “[e]ach house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.” In Powell, the United States Supreme Court considered the problems raised by this language in regard to judging qualifications. The Court held that Congress was empowered to judge only the qualifications “expressly [358]*358prescribed” in the Constitution itself, Powell, supra at 522 and 548, and not more general qualifications, or qualifications extrinsic to the Constitution. In other words, the Congress’ judicial power with respect to qualifications extended only to investigation and determination of whether the specific membership requirements set out in the Constitution had been met.
Similarly, we hold that under the Hawaii Constitution the House’s function in judging the elections of its members extends only to ascertaining whether the constitution has been complied with; that is, whether the parties have properly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to judge the contest under Article II, Sec. 7 and the statutory implementation of that provision.
This interpretation of the constitution is clearly the correct reading, as well as the most consistent with protection of the electorate. For the framers of our constitution to have entrusted the final determination of such controversies to the legislative body would have been unwise. It would have provided a dangerously effective method of perpetuating the existing majority in office, with no recourse available to the people. While we do not mean to assert that the House in this case had any questionable motives, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the House vote seating Mr. Akizaki was divided strictly along party lines.
The point is that the constitution recognizes that the courts alone are the sort of neutral and disinterested body which ought to consider and to decide election contests.
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OPINION OF THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.
In the November 1968 election to select six representatives in the Honse of Representatives from the Fif[355]*355teenth Representative District, five candidates were clearly-elected without contest. The present case involves a controversy over the sixth seat.
In the final tabulation of the votes, the Republican candidate, Fong, received two more votes than did the Democratic candidate, Akizaki. Akizaki contested the election in the court below and proved that of the ballots counted, at least nineteen were clearly invalid. These were absentee ballots which, because of late postmarks, failed to meet the requirements of HRS § 14-8.1 HRS § 14-8 provides that an absentee ballot received not later than noon on the sixth day following a general election may be counted, but only if it is postmarked not later than the day before the election. Due to a mistake on the part of the election officials, nineteen ballots postmarked too late to be opened and counted were nevertheless opened and counted. In the process they were commingled with valid absentee ballots so that it could not later be determined for whom the invalid ballots had been cast. Since the number of invalid ballots greatly exceeds the margin of victory, it is obvious that their presence could have affected the result. The court below resolved this problem by discarding 174 absentee ballots, among which were the nineteen invalid ones. On the basis of a tabulation without these 174 ballots, the court declared Akizaki to have been the winner of the election. From this determination Fong appeals to this court.
Subsequent to the decision of the court below and pursuant to the recommendation of its credentials committee, the House seated Akizaki. On the basis of the House’s action, Akizaki claims that the controversy has been finally determined; that the case has been [356]*356mooted; and that this court should not rule upon the question, or should simply affirm the judgment of the court below. Fong claims that discarding so many valid absentee ballots is an unwarranted disenfranchisement of many absentee voters whose votes were validly cast. He also claims that because jurisdiction over election contest cases is granted to the courts by the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, Article II, Sec. 7,2 this court may properly review the decision of the court below and reach an appropriate result, notwithstanding the action of the House.
The fundamental interest to be protected here is that of the people of the Fifteenth Representative District in choosing whomever they please to represent them in the House of Representatives. The right to vote is perhaps the most basic and fundamental of all the rights guaranteed by our democratic form of government. Implicit in that right is the right to have one’s vote count and the right to have as nearly perfect an election proceeding as can be provided. The result we reach must be consistent with these principles.
Before deciding the substantive issues raised in this appeal, we must determine the basic underlying constitutional question presented. Counsel for appellees have urged that, since the House has now seated Akizaki, this court may not and should not further consider this election contest. This claim is based upon their reading of Article III, Sec. 13 of the Hawaii Constitution, which says, in part, that “[e]aeh house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.” Appellants, however, argue that the controlling provision is Article II, Sec. 7 of the same document, which states that [357]*357“ [c] ontested elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such manner as shall be provided by law.” We must resolve the apparent conflict between these two provisions before proceeding further. Simply stated, the question is: Should the courts or should the legislative body be the final arbiter of the dispute in the event of an election contest involving a legislative seat? We hold that the courts are required by the Hawaii Constitution to be the forum and the final arbiter in such disputes.
At the outset, it is important to note that the legislature has enacted HRS §§ 12-101 to 12-105 to implement Article II, Sec. 7 of the constitution. These sections provide that suit may be brought in the circuit court to contest an election; that the court, after hearing the case, should determine the winner of the election if possible; and that if, because of a mistake on the part of the election officials, the court cannot ascertain the correct result, it should invalidate the election and a new election should be held.
It is true that Article III, Sec. 13, states that “[e] ach house shall be the judge...;” but in determining what each house is to judge, this provision must be read in context, along with the other provisions of the constitution, including Article II, Sec. 7. In this regard, it is helpful to note the analysis of a similar problem by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The United States Constitution includes language identical with that found in Article III, Sec. 13 of the Hawaii Constitution, that “[e]ach house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.” In Powell, the United States Supreme Court considered the problems raised by this language in regard to judging qualifications. The Court held that Congress was empowered to judge only the qualifications “expressly [358]*358prescribed” in the Constitution itself, Powell, supra at 522 and 548, and not more general qualifications, or qualifications extrinsic to the Constitution. In other words, the Congress’ judicial power with respect to qualifications extended only to investigation and determination of whether the specific membership requirements set out in the Constitution had been met.
Similarly, we hold that under the Hawaii Constitution the House’s function in judging the elections of its members extends only to ascertaining whether the constitution has been complied with; that is, whether the parties have properly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to judge the contest under Article II, Sec. 7 and the statutory implementation of that provision.
This interpretation of the constitution is clearly the correct reading, as well as the most consistent with protection of the electorate. For the framers of our constitution to have entrusted the final determination of such controversies to the legislative body would have been unwise. It would have provided a dangerously effective method of perpetuating the existing majority in office, with no recourse available to the people. While we do not mean to assert that the House in this case had any questionable motives, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the House vote seating Mr. Akizaki was divided strictly along party lines.
The point is that the constitution recognizes that the courts alone are the sort of neutral and disinterested body which ought to consider and to decide election contests.
We note that the legislature has apparently concurred in this recognition by enacting detailed procedures for resolution of these disputes by the judiciary in HES §§ 12-101 to 12-105. To say, therefore, that a house of the legislature could undertake a binding and independent resolution of an election contest would be inconsistent [359]*359with the legislature’s own statutory action, as well as contrary to the requirements of our constitution.
Moreover, we note in this case that it was the demonstrated intent of the House to give great weight and deference to the decision of the judiciary. We rely for this proposition upon the intent expressed in the reports of the credentials committee. In its first report, dated January 15, 1969, and titled “Special Com. Rep. No. 1,” at p. 3, that committee deferred action on the matter of seating one of the candidates pending the decision of the circuit court. In its second report, dated February 24, 1969, and titled “Special Com. Rep. No. 2,” rendered after the decision of the circuit court but before this court had heard the appeal, the committee recommended the seating of Mr. Akizaki, but again expressed its deference to the decision of the circuit court and noted that it could not appropriately make a decision that might later be in conflict with the resolution of the appeal by this court.3
Appellee Akizaki nevertheless argues that the questions presented are moot; and that even if they are not moot, they are non justiciable because the controversy is basically a political question. In light of our reading of the effect of Article II, Sec. 7 and Article III, Sec. 13 of the constitution, however, these contentions are unavailing.
Clearly the case cannot be made moot by the seating of one of the candidates by the House during the judicial determination of the contest. Such a reading of the constitution would emasculate both the constitutional mandate of Article II, Sec. 7 and the statutory provisions that provide for judicial resolution of election contests. We [360]*360think such an interpretation cannot have been intended by the framers of our constitution.
We think the case does not present a non justiciable political question. The issue is expressly committed to the courts in the constitution. The standards are set out in the statutes written by the legislature and are judicially discoverable and manageable. No lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government is present, since the constitution requires the courts to act when their jurisdiction is properly invoked. In fact, the House has expressed deference to the judgment of the courts at every step of the proceedings.
It remains to be decided whether the result reached by the court below was correct. We hold that it Avas not, and that a new election should have been ordered. Because of the commingling of the valid and invalid absentee ballots, there is simply no way to determine what the actual result of the election was, and Avho should therefore be declared the winner. In such a situation, HRS § 12-103 directs the court to invalidate the election.4
The trial court’s approach was plausible; but to excise the entire absentee vote contained in the 174 ballots excluded by the court, in order to eliminate the nineteen ballots knoAvn to be invalid, inflicts too harsh a result on those absentee voters whose votes were validly cast.
Pursuant to HRS § 12-105, this court may, in election contest cases, enter any judgment the circuit court would have been authorized to enter. Our judgment is, as provided in HRS § 12-103, that the election was invalid for the reason that a correct result cannot be ascertained [361]*361because of the mistake we have noted on the part of the election officials in opening the late-postmarked envelopes and commingling those ballots with ballots validly cast. Therefore, in accordance with HRS § 12-103, and in order to protect the right of the people of the Fifteenth Representative District to choose their representatives, we invalidate the election as between Fong and Akizaki. As set out in HRS § 12-103, a certified copy of our judgment shall be filed with the governor, so that he may call a new election as between Fong and Akizaki as provided by the. statute.
Herbert 7. O. Ghoy (Fong, Miho, Ghoy <£ Robinson of counsel) for defendants-appellants.
Frank D. Padgett (Walter H. Ikeda with him on the brief, Padgett, Greeley, Marumoto & Akinaka of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Morton King and Thomas M. Pieo, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General (Bertram T. Kanbara, Attorney General with them on the brief) for defendant-appellee.
Reversed.