ALMA WILSON, Justice.
¶ 1 This appeal arises out of a post-judgment proceeding in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, initiated by Aircraft Equipment Company, appellee (Aircraft), to satisfy a money judgment entered by the Oklahoma County District Court against The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, appellant (Tribe). The dispositive question is whether the state district court may enforce its money judgment against the Tribe. Pursuant to the universal rule that the power to render a judgment includes the power to enforce the judgment, we answer in the affirmative.
¶2 The underlying money judgment in favor of Aircraft and against the Tribe was entered in a contract action and affirmed in Aircraft Equipment Company v. The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 921 P.2d 359 (Okla.1996) (Aircraft I). Aircraft initiated a separate post-judgment proceeding seeking equitable relief in the nature of a creditor’s bill during the pendency of the appeal in Aircraft I.1 Aircraft contends that equitable relief will avoid the cost and time burdens of multiple garnishments. The Tribe does not challenge the propriety of the equitable remedy, rather it contends that enforcement of the money judgment is contrary to federal law.
¶ 3 Through the creditor’s bill, Aircraft sought to satisfy its judgment from funds in the possession of the Tribe’s contracted tax collector, Watson Management Group, Inc., and the taxpayers, appellee oil and gas entities.2 In response, the defending oil and gas entities made requests to interplead the funds into the district court, for attorney fees and costs of the interpleader, and to restrain the Tribe from enforcing its tax liens against them.' By its Journal Entry of Judgment filed October 13, 1995, the district court granted Aircraft’s request to satisfy its money judgment out of the tax due from the oil and gas entities; directed that the funds be paid into the court; allowed costs and attorney fees as deductions from the funds in amounts to be determined at a later hearing; and restrained the Tribe from enforcing its tax liens against the appellee oil and gas entities.
¶4 The Tribe asks this Court to reverse and vacate the money judgment in Aircraft I and to direct district court dismissal of the petition for a creditor’s bill. The Tribe contends that in the absence of its consent to suit or its waiver of sovereign immunity, Oklahoma lacks judicial power to enter or enforce a money judgment against the Tribe. The Tribe argues that Aircraft I is based upon two Oklahoma cases that are inconsistent with federal law, Lewis v. The Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, 896 P.2d 503 (Okla.1994), cert. denied — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 476, 133 L.Ed.2d 405 (1995), and Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Okla[1146]*1146homa, 909 P.2d 59 (Okla.1995), cert. denied — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 1675, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996). The Tribe asserts that Lewis and Hoover failed to recognize that tribal sovereignty is presumed intact, Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987), and that absolute immunity to damage suits is a significant aspect of tribal sovereignty, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991).
¶ 5 In Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, supra, an insurer sought declaratory judgment that its liability contract, insuring an on-reservation commercial enterprise, did not impose a duty to defend in the tribal court against a claim to recover for personal injury occurring on the reservation. The LaPlante Court concluded that the tribal court should determine its jurisdiction and any tribal court remedy should be exhausted, as a matter of comity rather than jurisdiction, before the federal district court considers the declaratory judgment claim. La-Plante does not stand for the proposition that a presumption of sovereignty bars the exercise of state judicial power over a controversy arising out of an Indian tribe’s commercial activity outside of Indian country as presented in Aircraft I.
¶ 6 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, supra, the state assessed the Potawatomi Tribe for taxes which the Tribe had failed to pay on cigarettes sold to tribal members and nonmembers at the Tribe’s convenience store on Indian country land. The Court concluded that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity protects the Potawatomi Tribe from suit by the state to collect its assessment for delinquent taxes. Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the Court recognized that the state’s taxing power may reach inside of Indian country and that the immunity doctrine does not shield an Indian tribe from all state-law obligations to assist in the collection of state taxes. Concluding that the immunity doctrine prevented the state from collecting its delinquent taxes directly from the tribe, the Citizen Band Pota-watomi opinion observes that the doctrine does not prevent collection of taxes from individual tribal agents and officers, nor individual Indians dealing with non-Indians within Indian country, or non-Indians dealing with the Tribe outside Indian country.3 In his concurring opinion in the Citizen Band Potawatomi case, Justice Stevens viewed the foundation of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as an anachronistic fiction. Recognizing that an Indian tribe is immune from an action for damages absent its consent and citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940), Justice Stevens expressed doubt that the immunity extends to cases arising from a tribe’s conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory.4 [1147]*1147Neither the opinion, nor the concurring opinion, in the Citizen Band Potawatomi case teaches that a federally recognized Indian tribe is absolutely immune from suit for money judgment as we allowed and affirmed in Aircraft I. We expressly reject the Tribe’s argument that the doctrine of tribal immunity has a greater reach than that of the state or federal governments.5
¶7 The dissent would declare, as urged by the Tribe, that Oklahoma’s judicial power can only be extended over her Indian tribes upon express tribal or congressional consent. In State ex reí May v. Senecctr-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 85 (1985), we rejected the concept that Oklahoma’s judicial authority does not reach Indian tribes within the state’s borders, unless Congress or the Tribe has expressly provided otherwise. Our
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ALMA WILSON, Justice.
¶ 1 This appeal arises out of a post-judgment proceeding in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, initiated by Aircraft Equipment Company, appellee (Aircraft), to satisfy a money judgment entered by the Oklahoma County District Court against The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, appellant (Tribe). The dispositive question is whether the state district court may enforce its money judgment against the Tribe. Pursuant to the universal rule that the power to render a judgment includes the power to enforce the judgment, we answer in the affirmative.
¶2 The underlying money judgment in favor of Aircraft and against the Tribe was entered in a contract action and affirmed in Aircraft Equipment Company v. The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 921 P.2d 359 (Okla.1996) (Aircraft I). Aircraft initiated a separate post-judgment proceeding seeking equitable relief in the nature of a creditor’s bill during the pendency of the appeal in Aircraft I.1 Aircraft contends that equitable relief will avoid the cost and time burdens of multiple garnishments. The Tribe does not challenge the propriety of the equitable remedy, rather it contends that enforcement of the money judgment is contrary to federal law.
¶ 3 Through the creditor’s bill, Aircraft sought to satisfy its judgment from funds in the possession of the Tribe’s contracted tax collector, Watson Management Group, Inc., and the taxpayers, appellee oil and gas entities.2 In response, the defending oil and gas entities made requests to interplead the funds into the district court, for attorney fees and costs of the interpleader, and to restrain the Tribe from enforcing its tax liens against them.' By its Journal Entry of Judgment filed October 13, 1995, the district court granted Aircraft’s request to satisfy its money judgment out of the tax due from the oil and gas entities; directed that the funds be paid into the court; allowed costs and attorney fees as deductions from the funds in amounts to be determined at a later hearing; and restrained the Tribe from enforcing its tax liens against the appellee oil and gas entities.
¶4 The Tribe asks this Court to reverse and vacate the money judgment in Aircraft I and to direct district court dismissal of the petition for a creditor’s bill. The Tribe contends that in the absence of its consent to suit or its waiver of sovereign immunity, Oklahoma lacks judicial power to enter or enforce a money judgment against the Tribe. The Tribe argues that Aircraft I is based upon two Oklahoma cases that are inconsistent with federal law, Lewis v. The Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, 896 P.2d 503 (Okla.1994), cert. denied — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 476, 133 L.Ed.2d 405 (1995), and Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Okla[1146]*1146homa, 909 P.2d 59 (Okla.1995), cert. denied — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 1675, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996). The Tribe asserts that Lewis and Hoover failed to recognize that tribal sovereignty is presumed intact, Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987), and that absolute immunity to damage suits is a significant aspect of tribal sovereignty, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991).
¶ 5 In Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, supra, an insurer sought declaratory judgment that its liability contract, insuring an on-reservation commercial enterprise, did not impose a duty to defend in the tribal court against a claim to recover for personal injury occurring on the reservation. The LaPlante Court concluded that the tribal court should determine its jurisdiction and any tribal court remedy should be exhausted, as a matter of comity rather than jurisdiction, before the federal district court considers the declaratory judgment claim. La-Plante does not stand for the proposition that a presumption of sovereignty bars the exercise of state judicial power over a controversy arising out of an Indian tribe’s commercial activity outside of Indian country as presented in Aircraft I.
¶ 6 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, supra, the state assessed the Potawatomi Tribe for taxes which the Tribe had failed to pay on cigarettes sold to tribal members and nonmembers at the Tribe’s convenience store on Indian country land. The Court concluded that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity protects the Potawatomi Tribe from suit by the state to collect its assessment for delinquent taxes. Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the Court recognized that the state’s taxing power may reach inside of Indian country and that the immunity doctrine does not shield an Indian tribe from all state-law obligations to assist in the collection of state taxes. Concluding that the immunity doctrine prevented the state from collecting its delinquent taxes directly from the tribe, the Citizen Band Pota-watomi opinion observes that the doctrine does not prevent collection of taxes from individual tribal agents and officers, nor individual Indians dealing with non-Indians within Indian country, or non-Indians dealing with the Tribe outside Indian country.3 In his concurring opinion in the Citizen Band Potawatomi case, Justice Stevens viewed the foundation of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as an anachronistic fiction. Recognizing that an Indian tribe is immune from an action for damages absent its consent and citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940), Justice Stevens expressed doubt that the immunity extends to cases arising from a tribe’s conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory.4 [1147]*1147Neither the opinion, nor the concurring opinion, in the Citizen Band Potawatomi case teaches that a federally recognized Indian tribe is absolutely immune from suit for money judgment as we allowed and affirmed in Aircraft I. We expressly reject the Tribe’s argument that the doctrine of tribal immunity has a greater reach than that of the state or federal governments.5
¶7 The dissent would declare, as urged by the Tribe, that Oklahoma’s judicial power can only be extended over her Indian tribes upon express tribal or congressional consent. In State ex reí May v. Senecctr-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 85 (1985), we rejected the concept that Oklahoma’s judicial authority does not reach Indian tribes within the state’s borders, unless Congress or the Tribe has expressly provided otherwise. Our Seneca-Cayuga holding was grounded in the early congressional enactments surrounding statehood.6 Similar to the Citizen Band Po-tawatomi case, the Senecctr-Cayuga case recognized that a state generally has authority over non-Indians within Indian country and Indians and their activities outside of Indian country. As to the activities of the tribe and its members within Indian country, our Seneca-Cayuga opinion concluded that, through the years, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has been displaced by the principles of federal preemption and infringement on tribal self-government. Following the Senecar-Cayuga reasoning, Lewis v. The Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, supra, held that Oklahoma courts have constitutionally-invested cognizance, concurrent with federal courts, to entertain [1148]*1148any federal-law claim not explicitly withdrawn from their authority by some congressional enactment, so long as state judicature does not infringe upon tribal self-government. Lewis involved a contractual dispute between an Indian home buyer and an Indian housing authority arising out of the housing authority’s promise to convey its interests in real property. And applying Lewis, Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, supra, held that a contract between an Indian tribe and a non-Indian executed outside of Indian country is enforceable in state court. Hoover involved a contractual dispute between the Kiowa Tribe and a private individual arising out of the Tribe’s promise to pay for 5,000 shares of common stock in the Clinton-Sherman Aviation, Inc. We find no merit to the Tribe’s argument that Lewis, Hoover, and Aircraft I are contrary to federal law.
¶ 8 We adhere to the long-standing, well-established rule that if a court has the power to render a judgment, it has the power to enforce its judgment and give it effect through the proper processes. Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S.(6 Wall.) 166, 18 L.Ed. 768 (1868). We determined in Aircraft I that the district court sitting in Oklahoma County had the power to render a money judgment against the Tribe for its failure to perform a contract executed outside of Indian country and we affirmed the summary judgment entered in favor of Aircraft and against the Tribe. Aircraft, as a judgment creditor, sought to enforce its judgment against the Tribe, as the judgment debtor, through an authorized equitable remedy.7 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court in Oklahoma County had the power to enforce its money judgment affirmed in Aircraft I through the equitable remedy in the nature of a creditor’s bill.
¶ 9 The Tribe asserted before the district court and asserts in this appeal that exercise of state judicial power to seize tribal tax revenues impermissibly infringes upon the Tribe’s federally protected sovereign rights. Citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982), the Tribe contends that the power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereign rights. Without citation of authority, the Tribe argues that the power to tax is meaningless if the state has the power to seize the fruits of the taxing power or restrain tax enforcement. Our independent research reveals no authority holding that satisfaction of a valid, enforceable money judgment against a taxing entity out of its tax revenues renders the power to tax meaningless or otherwise diminishes or surrenders the power to tax.
¶ 10 The Tribe also argues that enforcement of the money judgment infringes upon tribal self-government contrary to Lewis v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, supra. Enforcement of a money judgment against an Indian tribe in a court of competent jurisdiction is obviously a burden upon the Tribe. However, Lewis does not suggest that the district court must make inquiry as to whether a state-court, post-judgment enforcement proceeding burdens the Tribe. Lewis requires a preliminary inquiry to test the outer limits of state-court cognizance to render judgment on the Indian interests in the initial controversy, the contract controversy in Aircraft I. We view the burden of enforcement of the money judgment in favor of Aircraft and against the Tribe as legally permissible where the Tribe ventured outside its Indian country, engaged in commercial activity for economic gain, and created a contract controversy which was ultimately settled in a court of competent jurisdiction by the money judgment sought to be enforced.8 Any other view would render the state court judgment meaningless and deny Aircraft a peaceful means of satisfying its money judgment.
¶ 11 That the Tribe had the opportunity to challenge Aircraft’s right to pursue a creditor’s bill is not an issue. In response to Aircraft’s summary judgment motion, the Tribe elected to reiterate its challenge to the [1149]*1149power of the court to render the money judgment in the first instance and to enforce the judgment. The Tribe did not, however, challenge the availability or propriety of the equitable remedy. Below and on appeal, the parties represent that there is no dispute as to any fact material to this post-judgment controversy. Under these circumstances, summary judgment granting the petition for a creditor’s bill was proper.
¶ 12 Aircraft, in its cross-appeal, challenges the interpleader. Aircraft contends the district court abused its power in ordering payment of the Tribe’s funds in the possession of the oil and gas entities into the court. An order for holding funds in the court is within the discretion of that court9 and will not be disturbed by the appellate court except upon a showing of clear abuse. It is undisputed that both Aircraft and the Tribe claim entitlement to the funds ordered to be paid into the court. Title 12 O.S.1991, § 2022 provides that a defendant who is exposed to double or multiple liability may obtain interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. This is precisely the situation confronting the oil and gas entities in the court below. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s order for payment of the funds into the court.
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE and OP ALA, JJ, concur.
SIMMS and WATT, JJ., concur in result.
KAUGER, C.J., and SUMMERS, V.C.J., dissent.