Adams v. Brink's Company

372 F. Supp. 2d 854, 35 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10837, 2005 WL 1330682
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJune 3, 2005
Docket2:02CV00044
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 372 F. Supp. 2d 854 (Adams v. Brink's Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. Brink's Company, 372 F. Supp. 2d 854, 35 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10837, 2005 WL 1330682 (W.D. Va. 2005).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SARGENT, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case involves the claims of 123 plaintiffs against their current or former employer, Paramont Coal Corporation, (“Paramont”), its current parent company, the Brink’s Company, (“Brink’s”),- the Brink’s Company Pension-Retirement Plan, (“the Brink’s Plan”), and the- Administrative Committee for Brink’s Company Pension-Retirement Plan, (“the Administrative Committee”). The plaintiffs seek declaratory and equitable relief as well as damages under various claims related to the administration , of the Brink’s Plan. Jurisdiction over this matter is based upon federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The case is before the undersigned magistrate judge by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

Plaintiffs originally filed their Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on December 19, 2001. The Complaint sought recovery based on claims alleging breach of contract, estoppel, the creation of an informal plan, the reduction of accrued benefits and breach of fiduciary duty. In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and a motion to dismiss based upon improper venue, or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to the Western District of Virginia. The court denied both motions to dismiss, but granted the defendants’ motion to transfer.

Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint in the Western District of Virginia on April 4, 2002. (Docket Item No. 23.) On September 6, 2002, the defendants filed a Motion' For Summary Judgment seeking dismissal as a matter of law of all plaintiffs’ claims. (Docket Item No. 36.) By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered November 18, 2003, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment. (Docket Item No. 85.) As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs’ claims alleging breach of- contract, estop-pel, the creation of an informal plan and the reduction of accrued benefits. The court denied the defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty.

By agreed order entered August 20, 2004, the parties consented to the transfer of this case to the undersigned magistrate judge. (Docket Item No. 108.) By agreed order entered October 7, 2004, the parties agreed to sever the claims of five of the 123 plaintiffs to be tried to the court first. (Docket Item No. 112.) The remaining breach of fiduciary claims - of those five plaintiffs, Christopher Brooks Addington, Jack Blanton, Alton Lawson Jr., Ricky D. Meade and Donald Ratliff, were tried to *857 the court February 22 to March 1, 2005. Based on the evidence presented, the court now issues its formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

At trial, the parties submitted a number of stipulated facts to the court. The parties stipulate that The Pittston Company, (“Pittston”), changed its name to The Brink’s Company, and the Pension-Retirement Plan of The Pittston Company and its Subsidiaries changed its name to The Brink’s Company Pension-Retirement Plan in 2003. The parties agree, therefore, that any inferences to “Pittston” and “Brink’s” would be interchangeable and would refer to The Brink’s Company. The parties further agree that any references to the “Brink’s Plan” or the “Pittston Plan” would be interchangeable and would refer to the Brink’s Company Pension-Retirement Plan.

The parties agree that Pyxis Resources, (“Pyxis”), then a subsidiary of Pittston, acquired Paramont on July 7, 1986, and that Pyxis was a Participating Company in the Pittston Plan since before January 1, 1988. The parties further agree that, at the time of its acquisition by Pyxis, Para-mont’s employees all were participants in one of two identical defined-benefit pension plans, the Salaried Employees’ Pension Plan of Paramont Coal Corporation or the Hourly Employees’ Pension Plan of Paramont Coal Corporation, (Exhibits 105 and 106 respectively) (collectively, “the Paramont Plans”). The Paramont Plans did not require any employee contributions and provided a maximum monthly retirement benefit of $350 for 20 years of service with Paramont. Under the Paramont Plans, all Paramont employees, regardless of their salary, earned the same retirement benefit for the same years of service.

The parties have stipulated that Exhibits 496 to 505 contain complete and authentic copies of the Pittston Plan in effect as of the dates indicated. The Pittston Plan also is a defined-benefit plan. Under the Pittston Plan, a Participant’s retirement benefits are calculated based on multiplying a percentage of an Average Salary by the number of years of “Benefit Accrual Service.” Section 4.04 of the December 11, 1987, and the January 1, 1989, Plans, (Exhibits 499 and 500, respectively), states: “Service Prior to Participation. The Board [of Directors] shall determine to what extent Benefit Accrual Service shall be credited to any Participant for service for any Subsidiary or Division pri- or to the date such Subsidiary or Division became a Company.”

On September 9, 1988, Pittston’s Board of Directors amended the 1987 Plan to allow the Administrative Committee to adopt amendments to the Plan. On November 18, 1988, the Administrative Committee amended the 1987 Plan to add Exhibit G. Exhibit G merged the Paramont Plans into the Pittston Plan effective January 1, 1989. Exhibit G is entitled “Special Provisions Applicable to Former Participants in the Pension Plans of Paramont Coal Corporation.” The initial paragraph of Exhibit G states: “In connection with such mergers, the provisions of this Exhibit G shall apply, effective January 1, 1989, notwithstanding any provisions elsewhere in the Plan to the contrary.” Exhibit G further states in part:

(ii) The accrued pension benefit of each Paramont Participant under the Plan in respect of periods of service prior to January 1, 1989 shall be determined solely in accordance with the provisions of the Paramont Plan in which he was a Participant, as in effect immediately prior to January 1, 1989, based solely oh his “Benefit Service” (as defined in such Paramont Plan) on December 31,1988 or any earlier date on which the Paramont Participant ceases to be *858 an employee of Paramont Coal Corporation. ...
(iii) The accrued pension benefit of each Paramont Participant in respect of periods of service as an employee of Paramont from and after January 1, 1989 ... shall be determined solely in accordance with the provisions of the Plan....

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Related

Adams v. The Brink's Company
261 F. App'x 583 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
372 F. Supp. 2d 854, 35 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10837, 2005 WL 1330682, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-brinks-company-vawd-2005.