Abdulaziz Yokubov v. Warden of the Golden State Annex ICE Detention Facility, et al.

Opinion

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7

8 ABDULAZIZ YOKUBOV, Case No. 1:25-cv-01068-EPG-HC

9 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING 10 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING PETITIONER’S 11 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al., COUNSEL, DENYING PETITIONER’S 12 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY Respondents. RESTRAINING ORDER AS MOOT, 13 DIRECTING RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING 14 BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE, AND DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 15 CLOSE CASE

16 (ECF Nos. 1, 15, 20, 21) 17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a 19 United States magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 11, 12, 14.) 20 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny Respondents’ motion to dismiss, 21 grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and order that Respondents provide Petitioner with 22 an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the government must 23 justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. 24 I. 25 BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner is a citizen of Uzbekistan who applied for admission to the United States at 27 Otay Mesa, California on January 15, 2025, without valid documents to enter the United States. (ECF No. 16 at 2, 6.) Petitioner was initially placed into expedited removal proceedings. (Id. at 1 3, 7, 9–10.) Petitioner was detained on January 15, 2025, the date he entered the United States, 2 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. (ECF No. 16 at 2–3.) On 3 January 27, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to the Golden State Annex. (Id. at 3.) 4 As Petitioner claimed a fear of returning to his native country of Uzbekistan, he was 5 interviewed by an asylum officer who made a negative credible fear determination. (ECF No. 16 6 at 3, 13–18.) On March 5, 2025, Petitioner sought review by an immigration judge (“IJ”) of the 7 negative credible fear determination, and the IJ vacated the negative credible fear determination. 8 (Id. at 3, 20–26.) On or about April 2, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 9 issued a Notice to Appear, which placed Petitioner into regular removal proceedings. (Id. at 3, 10 28–31.) No removal decision has been made yet. (Id. at 3.) 11 On August 25, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, 12 asserting that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his right to procedural due 13 process. (ECF No. 1.) On October 24, 2025, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss and response 14 to the petition. (ECF No. 15.) As Respondents served the motion to dismiss on Petitioner at his 15 former facility, on December 5, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to re-serve the motion on 16 Petitioner at his current address.1 (ECF No. 17.) On December 8, 2025, Respondents re-served 17 the motion to dismiss Petitioner at his current address. (ECF No. 18.) To date, no opposition to 18 the motion to dismiss has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 19 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion 20 for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) On February 24, 2026, 21 Respondents filed an opposition to the motion for TRO. (ECF No. 22.) 22 II. 23 DISCUSSION 24 A. Motion to Dismiss 25 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens 26 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an 27 1 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 2 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 3 necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 Here, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which 5 the Supreme Court has described as follows: 6 Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but 7 “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by 8 immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3). 9 As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two 10 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially 11 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (citing 12 §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion. 13 See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(2) is broader. It serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not 14 covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here). See §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), (B). 15 Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the detention of 16 certain aliens. Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to 17 an expedited removal process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if a § 1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for 18 asylum ... or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is referred for an asylum interview. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer 19 determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration 20 of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens who are instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a 21 different process. Those aliens “shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding” if an immigration officer “determines that [they are] 22 not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the country. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 23 Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their 24 detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public 25 benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017). Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an 26 admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has been served, “the alien shall forthwith 27 return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same 1 manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Ibid. 2 3 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018). 4 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to 5 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the 6 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could 7 not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United 8 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 9 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not 10 authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 11 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 12 U.S. at 689. Thus, after a presumptively reasonable detention period of six months, a noncitizen 13 was entitled to release if “it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal 14 in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. 15 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to 16 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The Supreme Court upheld its “longstanding 17 view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period 18 necessary for their removal proceedings.” Id. at 526. The Supreme Court distinguished Zadvydas 19 by emphasizing that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination point” and 20 “in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days . . . considered presumptively valid in 21 Zadvydas.” Id. at 529. However, Justice Kennedy specifically noted that “a lawful permanent 22 resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his 23 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” 24 Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 25 “In a series of decisions, the [Ninth Circuit] . . . grappled in piece-meal fashion with 26 whether the various immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged 27 detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). This culminated in Rodriguez v. 1 Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the Ninth Circuit held that for 2 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must 3 provide periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their 4 continued detention as ‘the period of . . . confinement grows.’” 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf 5 v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit 6 applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret these immigration detention provisions 7 as providing a statutory right to a bond hearing once detention become prolonged. See Rodriguez 8 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022). 9 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the 10 constitutional avoidance canon to find that “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) contain an implicit 6– 11 month limit on the length of detention” and “[o]nce that 6–month period elapses, respondents 12 contend, aliens previously detained under those provisions must instead be detained under the 13 authority of § 1226(a), which allows for bond hearings in certain circumstances.” 583 U.S. at 14 297–98. Jennings also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of a statutory right under 8 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General 16 must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” 17 Id. at 306. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the] constitutional 18 arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit likewise remanded the case to the 19 district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance but observed that it had 20 “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process 21 is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the 22 arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255, 23 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 24 There has been a dearth of guidance regarding the point at which an immigration 25 detainee’s continued mandatory detention becomes unconstitutional. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 26 F.4th at 1203 (noting that both the Ninth Circuit “and the Supreme Court have repeatedly 27 declined to decide constitutional challenges to bond hearing procedures in the immigration 1 a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but it has recognized that 2 “district courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings 3 for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that 4 “[a]ccording to one such court order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal 5 proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” 6 Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other 7 grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). 8 Respondent contends that “both constitutionally and as a matter of statute, Petitioner’s 9 continued mandatory civil detention is warranted,” relying on Jennings and Demore. (ECF No. 10 15 at 5.) As noted above, Jennings held the Ninth Circuit erred in finding a statutory right to 11 periodic bond hearings under § 1225(b) and § 1226(a). However, Jennings did not address the 12 constitutional arguments. Therefore, Respondent’s reliance on Jennings to dismiss Petitioner’s 13 constitutional claim is not persuasive. 14 In upholding mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore, the Supreme 15 Court made repeated references to the “brief” and “limited” timeframe at issue. See Demore, 538 16 U.S. at 513 (“brief period”); id. at 523 ((“brief period”); id. at 526 (“limited period”); id. at 529 17 n.12 (“[t]he very limited time of the detention at stake under § 1226(c)”); id. at 531 (“limited 18 period”). Demore specifically noted that “the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a 19 month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in 20 the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal,” relying on statistics from the 21 Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). 538 U.S. at 530. However, “[t]hirteen years 22 after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, 23 and which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors,’” and for the years 1999– 24 2001, the “average length of detention in cases where the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a 25 little more than a year.” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-CV-04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 26 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citing Letter from Acting Solicitor General Ian H. Gershengorn to Hon. 27 Scott S. Harris (Aug. 26, 2016), at 2, 3, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491)). 1 subclass were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual 2 detention periods exceeding four years.” Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citing Joint 3 Appendix (Table 20) (Aug. 26, 2016), Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (No. 15- 4 1204)). The Government Accountability Office conducted a study and “found that as of 2015, 5 the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450 6 days.” Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citing United States Government Accountability 7 Office, Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long- 8 Standing Management and Operational Challenges 33 (2017), 9 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf). 10 As noted above, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention 11 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (“Respondent . . . filed a 12 habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . challenging the constitutionality of 13 § 1226(c) itself.” (emphasis added)); Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149 n.22 (2d Cir. 2024) 14 (“Demore ruled on a due process challenge to the facial constitutionality of section 1226(c)[.]”). 15 In Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court expressly preserved the right to 16 bring an as-applied challenge: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision 17 [§ 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to 18 applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. See Black, 103 F.4th 19 at 149 (Demore “said nothing about whether due process may eventually require a hearing. If 20 Demore had, in fact, foreclosed the due process challenge now before us, the Jennings Court 21 would have had no reason to remand to the Ninth Circuit ‘to consider ... in the first instance’ the 22 detainees’ argument that ‘[a]bsent ... a bond-hearing requirement, ... [section 1226(c)] would 23 violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 24 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 291, 312)). Moreover, Demore does not directly address the issue 25 presented here: whether § 1225(b) as applied to Petitioner is unconstitutional. 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s as-applied constitutional 27 challenge is not foreclosed, and thus, dismissal of the petition is not warranted. 1 B. Due Process Analysis 2 Petitioner contends that “[d]etention without a bond hearing is unconstitutional when it 3 exceeds six months,” and even absent a bright-line six-month standard, his “detention, without 4 any individualized review, is unreasonable under the Mathews v. Eldridge due process test” or 5 alternatively, “under the multi-factor reasonableness test the Third Circuit adopted in German 6 Santos v. Warden Pike Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020).” (ECF No. 1 at 7 7, 8.) Respondents note that “this Court has repeatedly refused to identify a specific time period 8 after which a noncitizen’s detention will be considered presumptively violative of due process,” 9 and the “use of a multi-factor balancing test to analyze Petitioner’s statutorily compelled 10 detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings is unsupported by Supreme Court 11 authority.” (ECF No. 15 at 5, 7.) Respondents argue that this “Court should decline to engage in 12 any of the various multi-factor balancing tests applied by some courts in the Ninth Circuit in 13 analyzing a noncitizen’s procedural due process rights,” but “even if the Court applied a multi- 14 factor balancing test to Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing, neither of the most 15 common tests would favor the Petitioner.” (ECF No. 15 at 8.) 16 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have taken a variety of approaches to determine whether due 17 process requires a bond hearing in a particular immigration detention case. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 18 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (applying bright-line rule that “detention becomes prolonged after six 19 months and entitles [the petitioner] to a bond hearing” in § 1226(c) context); Banda v. 20 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (considering six factors, which 21 include: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) 22 the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 23 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the 24 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez v. 25 Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) 26 (considering, in addition to six factors set forth above, “whether the detention will exceed the 27 time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the 1 adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2021); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 2 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (considering “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of 3 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the 4 government” in § 1226(c) context). 5 There are also some courts that apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 6 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 7 1862254, at *3–4 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 8 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020). In Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen 9 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional 10 because under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond 11 hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,” 12 the panel majority “assume[d] without deciding” that the Mathews test applied, noting that the 13 Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal 14 proceedings,” and finding “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the 15 heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 16 F.4th at 1193, 1206. Similarly, the dissent “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v. 17 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework 18 to determine whether there was a due process violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219 19 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See also Black, 103 F.4th at 147 (“conclud[ing] that due process 20 challenges to prolonged detention under section 1226(c) should also be reviewed under 21 Mathews”); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. 22 May 16, 2025) (applying Mathews test to determine whether due process entitled petitioner to a 23 bond hearing in § 1225(b) context), findings and recommendations adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 24 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025). 25 Petitioner applies the six-month bright-line rule and the Mathews test in the petition, 26 (ECF No. 1 at 7–11), while Respondents apply the Mathews and Lopez tests, (ECF No. 15 at 8– 27 12). Given that the Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to 1 in addition to addressing the bright-line rule. 2 1. Bright-Line Rule 3 The First, Second, and Third Circuits have “reject[ed] a bright-line constitutional rule 4 requiring a bond hearing after six months of detention—or after any fixed period of detention— 5 in the context of a Congressional mandate, in the immigration context, to detain.” Black, 103 6 F.4th at 150 (citing Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7–9 (1st Cir. 2021); German Santos v. Warden 7 Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020)). The Court finds such authority 8 persuasive and declines to adopt a bright-line rule that detention without a bond hearing is 9 presumptively unconstitutional when it exceeds six months. 10 2. Mathews Test 11 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 12 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 13 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 14 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 15 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 16 requirements would entail. 17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 18 a. Private Interest 19 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue here is 20 fundamental. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 21 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause 22 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit has held that it “is beyond dispute” an 23 immigration detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from 24 imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. 25 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 26 (1992)). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an 27 individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably 1 under Mathews.” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor 2 weighs in favor of Petitioner. 3 b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 4 With respect to the second factor, the Court considers the risk of erroneous deprivation of 5 Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. “In 6 evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation in the context of noncitizen detention, the Ninth 7 Circuit has looked to whether the detainee has a statutory right to procedural protections, such as 8 individualized custody determinations and the right to seek additional bond hearings throughout 9 detention.” Jensen v. Garland, No. 5:21-cv-01195-CAS (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522, at *6 (C.D. 10 Cal. May 3, 2023) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1209–10 (finding a small risk of erroneous 11 deprivation where petitioner was detained under § 1226(a) and thus received numerous 12 procedural protections, including individualized custody determinations and right to seek 13 additional bond hearings)). 14 Although the Supreme Court has rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 15 constitutional avoidance canon and its statutory interpretation of § 1225(b), the Court finds 16 Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), informative regarding the 17 constitutional issues before this Court. The Ninth Circuit “note[d] that the discretionary parole 18 system available to § 1225(b) detainees is not sufficient to overcome the constitutional concerns 19 raised by prolonged mandatory detention” because the “parole process is purely discretionary 20 and its results are unreviewable by IJs” and “release decisions are based on humanitarian 21 considerations and the public interest.” Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1144. See Padilla v. U.S. 22 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (finding Plaintiffs 23 “allege[d] a viable due process claim” because “the parole process available to them under 8 24 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for a bond hearing 25 particularly since it does not test the necessity of detention,” “does not afford the noncitizen an 26 in-person adversarial hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may present 27 witness testimony or evidence,” does not require “the ICE detention officer [to] make any factual 1 Petitioner has been detained since January 15, 2025, (ECF No. 1 at 9), a period of thirteen 2 months, and has not received any bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker with authority to 3 grant bond. Accordingly, the Court finds that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s 4 liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards is high. See Jimenez v. 5 Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he risk of an 6 erroneous deprivation of Landeros Jimenez’s liberty interest is high. He has not received any 7 bond or custody redetermination hearing during his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value 8 of additional procedural safeguards—a bond hearing—is high, because Respondents have 9 provided virtually no procedural safeguards at all.”). Therefore, the second Mathews factor 10 weighs in favor of Petitioner. 11 c. Government’s Interest 12 With respect to the third and final factor, the Court recognizes that “the government 13 clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in the United States in 14 violation of our law’” and “has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous 15 criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 518, 515). The 16 Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]hese are interests of the highest order that only increase with the 17 passage of time,” noting that “[t]he longer detention lasts and the longer the challenges to an IJ’s 18 order of removal take, the more resources the government devotes to securing an alien’s ultimate 19 removal” and “[t]he risk of a detainee absconding also inevitably escalates as the time for 20 removal becomes more imminent.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. 21 However, it is important to stress that the “government interest at stake here is not the 22 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond 23 hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7. See Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 24 Servs., 955 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the question [under the third Mathews 25 factor] is not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement” “in general” (emphasis 26 added)); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 27 June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration 1 Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized bond hearing 2 is low.”). 3 Courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively 4 minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this Court demonstrating that providing 5 Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome. See Marroquin 6 Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in context of a § 1226(a) 7 detention, the parties did not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine 8 whether the continued detention of Petitioner is justified, is minimal”); Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 9 Supp. 3d 1005, 1021 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of § 1226(a) detention that “[t]he 10 government has not offered any indication that a [ ] bond hearing would have outside effects on 11 its coffers”). Accordingly, the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 12 In sum, each of the Mathews factors weighs in favor of Petitioner. Accordingly, 13 Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. 14 C. Remedy 15 Petitioner requests this Court to hold a hearing to determine whether Petitioner’s 16 detention is warranted. (ECF No. 1 at 17.) “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings 17 cases, that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 18 F. Supp. 3d at 882. The Court now turns to the burden of proof at the bond hearing and which 19 party should bear such burden. 20 Having “previously applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret . . . 21 immigration provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c), and 1231(a)(6)—as providing a statutory 22 right to a bond hearing once detention becomes prolonged,” the Ninth Circuit in Singh 23 “concluded that for these hearings to comply with due process, the government had to bear the 24 burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the alien poses a flight risk or a danger 25 to the community.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203–05). 26 Although Rodriguez Diaz may have declined to impose the standard articulated in Singh, the 27 panel majority specifically stated that it was not “decid[ing] whether Singh remains good law in 1 principles of procedural due process, reasoning that a detained person’s liberty interest is 2 substantial.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202 n.4, 1199. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has 3 suggested post-Jennings that Singh remains good law in Martinez v. Clark, which took “no 4 position” on “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing for aliens detained under 5 § 1226(c),” but did address “the scope of federal court review of those bond determinations” and 6 found with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c) that “the BIA 7 properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing 8 evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community.” Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223, 1231. On 9 remand, and after Rodriguez Diaz was decided, the Martinez panel reconfirmed “that the 10 government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a 11 danger to the community” and “that the BIA applied the correct burden of proof.” Martinez v. 12 Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785, 786 (9th Cir. 2024). 13 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the government must justify Petitioner’s 14 continued confinement under § 1225(b) by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a 15 flight risk or a danger to the community. See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO 16 (HC), 2025 WL 1808676, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025) (directing respondent “to schedule a 17 bond hearing before an immigration judge . . . wherein respondent must justify petitioner’s 18 continued detention by clear and convincing evidence” in § 1225(b) context); Sanchez-Rivera v. 19 Matuszewski, No. 22-cv-1357-MMA (JLB), 2023 WL 139801, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) 20 (following “an overwhelming majority of courts that have held that the government must justify 21 the continued confinement of a non-citizen detainee under § 1226(c) by clear and convincing 22 evidence that the non-citizen is a flight risk or a danger to the community”). 23 Further, in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the community and not 24 to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond, the IJ should consider 25 Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release. See Hernandez v. 26 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their challenge 27 under the Due Process Clause to the government’s policy of allowing ICE and IJs to set 1 | alternative conditions of release.”); Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The district court “correctly directed 2 | the immigration judge (‘IJ’), in setting his bond and establishing appropriate terms for his 3 | potential release, to consider his ability to pay and alternative means of assuring appearance.”). 4 Hil. 5 ORDER 6 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 7 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 15) is DENIED; 8 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED; 9 3. Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 20) is DENIED; 10 4. Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 21) is DENIED as moot; 11 5. Respondents SHALL provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge 12 to be held within THIRTY (30) days that complies with the requirements set forth in 13 Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), at which 14 a. “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is 15 a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” Singh, 638 16 F.3d at 1203, and 17 b. the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative 18 conditions of release in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the 19 community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without 20 bond; and 21 6. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE the case. 22 73 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24) Dated: _ February 26, 2026 [sl Fey 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28