UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Abdigani Faisal Hussein
v. Civil No. 18-cv-273-JL Opinion No. 2018 DNH 101
Strafford County Department of Corrections Superintendent Christopher Brackett and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Boston Field Office Director Chris M. Cronen
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over this action
depends on whether the petitioner has made a colorable claim
that certain provisions of the Real ID Act, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
violate the United States Constitution’s Suspension Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, by divesting this court of
jurisdiction to hear his habeas petition. The court denies the
respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition. While the court
does not conclude in this preliminary procedural posture that
the Real ID Act’s jurisdiction-divesting provisions violate the
Suspension Clause, the habeas petitioner’s colorable argument to
that effect makes a jurisdiction-based dismissal inappropriate
at this time.
Abdigani Faisal Hussein filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to stay his removal to his native Somalia until the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) has decided his recently-filed motion to reopen his
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). The federal
respondents moved to dismiss Hussein’s petition and complaint,
arguing that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Although the respondents convincingly argue that § 1252
divests the court of jurisdiction over issues of law and fact
arising from final removal orders such as Hussein’s, the court
retains jurisdiction to adjudicate Hussein’s distinct claim that
§ 1252 impermissibly violates the Suspension Clause as applied
to him under these circumstances. Accordingly, the court denies
the respondents’ motion to dismiss Hussein’s petition.
Applicable legal standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They
possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994)) (formatting altered). “Without jurisdiction
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
2 and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
Invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the
respondents move to dismiss Hussein’s petition and complaint for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The burden to prove
jurisdiction rests with the petitioner. See Acosta–Ramirez v.
Banco Popular de P.R., 712 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). In
resolving a motion to dismiss on those grounds, the court draws
the facts from the petition and complaint, “credit[ing] the
[petitioner’s] well-pled factual allegations and draw[ing] all
reasonable inferences in the [petitioner’s] favor.” Merlonghi
v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010). In doing so,
the “court may also ‘consider whatever evidence has been
submitted, such as the depositions and exhibits submitted.’”
Id. (quoting Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st
Cir. 1996)).
Background
The following factual summary takes that approach.
Hussein, a native of Somalia, is a member of the Tunni ethnic
group and a non-practicing Muslim. He fled Somalia in January
1991, after members of the United Somali Congress, a major rebel
organization, shot at him seven times and shot and killed his
mother. After living in Kenya for five years, he entered the
3 United States as a 23-year-old refugee in 1996 and became a
lawful permanent resident in 1997. He has lived and worked in
and around Portland, Maine, since 2001. He married his wife, a
United States citizen, in 2004. They have three children, all
of whom are United States citizens.
In 2003, Hussein was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
of possession with intent to distribute khat, a plant which
contains cathinone, a Schedule I controlled substance, rendering
him subject to removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). His
conviction was affirmed on appeal. He then petitioned for
asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied
those petitions in August 2006, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and Third Circuit Court of Appeals in turn
affirmed that decision. Hussein v. Attorney General of the
United States, 273 F. App’x 147, 148 (3d Cir. 2008). Hussein
was not removed at the time. Instead, he was granted an order
of supervision, which allowed him to remain in the United States
as long as he complied with certain requirements, including
periodic “check-ins.” See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5.
Following a change in national immigration enforcement
policy, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
sought to deport Hussein in late 2017. In March 2018, he was
detained by ICE in Portland, and then transferred from the
4 Cumberland County Jail in Portland to the Strafford County House
of Corrections in Dover, New Hampshire, in preparation for
removal.
On March 28, 2018, while in custody, Hussein filed a motion
to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7), seeking deferral of removal to Somalia under the
CAT because, he contends, the country conditions in Somalia have
changed since his hearing before an immigration law judge in
2006. To qualify under the CAT, he must show that “it is more
likely than not that [he] would be tortured if removed to”
Somalia. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(C)(2). Specifically, he contends
that al-Shabaab, a fundamentalist group allied with Al-Quaeda
and that came to power beginning in late 2006 (after that
hearing), would torture and/or kill him because: (1) al-Shabaab
targets people with extensive Western backgrounds, which Hussein
has, having lived in the United States since 1996; (2) it
targets non-practicing Muslims, which Hussein is; (3) al-
Shabaab’s leadership are members of the Hawiye ethnic group,
other members of which targeted and killed other members of
Hussein’s family in 1991; (4) his father helped prosecute the
father of al-Shabaab’s current spokesman; and (5) his family
owns property in Mogadishu now occupied by members of the Hawiye
ethnic group, such that his return will cause them to feel
threatened.
5 A week later, on April 4, 2018, Hussein filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief in this court.1 At the same time, he moved for
a temporary restraining order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65,
preventing ICE from removing him until the BIA ruled on his
motion to reopen.2 The court initially granted a 14-day
temporary restraining order.3 It did not renew that temporary
restraining order when it expired, having been informed by the
United States Attorney’s Office during a hearing that its order
had the effect of delaying the BIA’s consideration of Hussein’s
emergency motion to stay his removal.4
Analysis
A. The Real ID Act’s jurisdiction-divesting provisions
“A federal district court may not consider a claim for
relief unless Congress has given the court jurisdiction to act.”
1 Document no. 1. 2 Document no. 2. 3 Document no. 3. 4 See Order (doc. no. 15). The court may have misunderstood the respondents’ counsel’s representations on this issue during the hearing. At a later hearing on their motion to dismiss, the respondents’ counsel explained that it was actually Magistrate Judge Johnstone’s previous order requiring respondents to “provide this court with at least 48 hours advance notice of any scheduled removal of Petitioner . . . .”, see Order (doc. no. 6) at 2, that had this dilatory effect. See infra Part III.C. at n.6.
6 Filippi v. President of United States, 2017 DNH 221, 4
(Barbadoro, J.) (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,
547–548 (1989)). A federal district court generally has
jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and petitions for writs of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a). Such jurisdiction can, however, “be precluded by
another, more specific statute.” Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v.
Maine Cent. R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 200 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000).
Three provisions of the Real ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, work
together to do just that, divesting this court of jurisdiction
over claims arising from a removal order.
First, the Real ID Act divested all courts of “jurisdiction
to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this Act,” except as otherwise provided in
§ 1252. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). It then invested exclusive
jurisdiction “for judicial review of an order of removal” in the
Courts of Appeals. Id. § 1252(a)(5). Both of these provisions
operate “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory
or nonstatutory), including [28 U.S.C. § 2241] or any other
habeas corpus provision . . . .” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5),
1252(g).
7 Finally, the Real ID act requires a “final order,” issued
under § 1252, as a prerequisite for any “[j]udicial review of
all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien
from the United States . . . .” Id. § 1252(b)(9). This
circuit’s Court of Appeals acknowledges that this section “was
designed to consolidate and channel review of all legal and
factual questions that arise from the removal of an alien into
the administrative process, with judicial review of those
decisions vested exclusively in the courts of appeals.” Aguilar
v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).
These three provisions together “channel[ ] federal court
jurisdiction over ‘such questions of law and fact’ to the courts
of appeals and explicitly bars all other methods of judicial
review, including habeas.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)).
The statute allows as exceptions only “claims that are
independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process.
Among others, claims that cannot effectively be handled through
the available administrative process fall within that purview.”
Id. at 11. As explained below, while Hussein’s claims do not
fall into that category, his constitutional challenge to § 1252
does.
8 B. Jurisdiction over Hussein’s claims
Hussein asks the court to prevent ICE from executing his
existing removal order until the BIA has either granted or
denied his motion to reopen removal proceedings. He brings
three claims in an effort to achieve this end. As explained
below, all three arise from “action[s] taken or proceeding[s]
brought to remove him from the United States,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9), and, more specifically, from the removal order
that he asks this court to stay.
First, Hussein seeks relief under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act’s (INA) prohibition of removal to a country
where “the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened . . .
because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). He contends, as discussed above, that his life
or freedom would be threatened on one or more of those bases if
he returned to Somalia. This claim arises directly from the
removal order because Hussein alleges that the INA is violated
only if the removal order is executed. See Filippi, 2017 DNH
221, 5-6.
Second, Hussein contends that removal before adjudication
of his motion to reopen violates his procedural due process
rights. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No personal shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
9 law . . . .”). Specifically, he invokes his right to file one
motion to reopen his proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)
(“An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this
section.”); Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2153 (2015) (a non-
citizen with a final removal order in place “has a statutory
right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.”), and
his concomitant interest in avoiding deportation to a place
where he is at risk of persecution, torture, or death. His
removal before adjudication of that motion would “constitute a
withdrawal of such motion,” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d),
1003.23(b)(1), which, he alleges, would deprive him of his right
to adjudication of his motion. This claim likewise arises from
Hussein’s removal order. He possesses a right to reopen his
removal proceedings solely because of that order, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a, and contends that this right would be abridged were he
removed before the BIA decides his motion. See Filippi, 2017
DNH 221. 5-6.
Finally, Hussein challenges his detention as unlawful as
violating his due process rights because it lacks a reasonable
relationship to the government’s purpose. “[D]ue process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (applying
10 Jackson’s reasoning to an alien’s detention before removal).
Like his other claims, this one arises directly from his removal
order because he challenges his detention under that order.
Because all of Hussein’s claims arise from a final removal
order issued, but not executed, over ten years ago, this court
would lack jurisdiction to hear them under § 1252. As a result,
Hussein attacks the constitutionality of this jurisdictional bar
as it applies to him. As discussed below, the court retains
jurisdiction to prevent the constitutionally impermissible
deprivation of Hussein’s recognized due process right to a
motion to reopen his removal proceedings where post-removal
adjudication of that motion would be effectively unavailable to
him, constituting an impermissible as-applied suspension of
habeas corpus.
C. Adequacy of the administrative process under the Suspension Clause
Hussein argues that the Real ID Act’s provisions divesting
the district court of jurisdiction to hear his claims violate
the United States Constitution’s Suspension Clause as applied to
him. That clause, an enumerated limitation on Congressional
power, provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2.
11 Though Congress may not suspend the Great Writ except as
provided, it may “without raising any constitutional questions,
provide an adequate substitute through the courts of appeals.”
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001). “[T]he
substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate
nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention
does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
Section 1252 channels “review of all legal and factual
questions that arise from the removal of an alien” into the
BIA’s administrative process. Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 9. Under
that process, a petitioner subject to a final removal order
files a motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Filing the motion does not
automatically stay removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f). A petitioner
who is in custody may also, concurrently, move for an emergency
stay of removal. See BIA Practice Manual §§ 6.4(b), 6.4(d)(i).
Counsel for both parties represented that the BIA’s Emergency
Stay Unit will not act on a motion for an emergency stay until
the petitioner’s removal is “imminent.” Id. § 6.4(d)(1).
Counsel for the respondents also represented that Hussein’s
removal will not become “imminent” until ICE has obtained the
12 necessary deportation documentation.5 It is unclear how the
Emergency Stay Unit learns about an “imminent” removal --
whether from ICE itself, from a petitioner’s counsel, or through
some other channel.
Under normal circumstances, removal does not bar a
petitioner from filing a post-removal motion to reopen removal
proceedings from outside the United States. See Santana v.
Holder, 731 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he postdeparture
bar [8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)] cannot be used to abrogate a
noncitizen’s statutory right to file a motion to reopen.”).
Thus, the administrative proceedings -- and specifically the
ability to file a motion to reopen after being removed --
typically constitutes “a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a habeas corpus challenge to a removal order in most cases.”6
5 The court has only counsel’s representations to rely on for that information; the respondents offered no affidavit, handbook, or regulation detailing the administrative process in connection with their motion. It previously declined to renew or extend the temporary restraining order in light of counsel’s previous representation that that order had the practical effect of preventing the BIA from evaluating Hussein’s emergency motion to stay removal. See Order (doc. no. 15). At oral argument, respondents’ counsel further represented that, despite the absence of a TRO, the BIA will not address the emergency stay motion due to this court’s previous order requiring 48 hours’ notice before petitioner’s removal. See Order (Johnstone, M.J.) (doc. no. 6) at 2. 6 Hussein is detained and thus in “custody” for habeas purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
13 Higgins v. Strafford Cty. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 DNH 050, 3-4
(Barbadoro, J.) (citing Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir.
2011)); see also Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 293 (D.
Mass. 2018) (Saris, J.) (collecting cases from the Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Courts of Appeals).
Several courts have recently concluded that the motion to
reopen process is not, however, an adequate substitute under a
specific set of circumstances similar to Hussein’s. Sied v.
Nielson, No. 17-cv-06785, 2018 WL 1142202, at *31-67 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2018); Devitri, 289 F. Supp. 3d 294; Ibrahim v. Acosta,
No. 17-cv-24574, 2018 WL 582520, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26,
2018); Hamama v. Adducci, 261 F. Supp. 3d 820, 828-33 (E.D.
Mich. 2017). Specifically, the motion to reopen process may not
constitute an adequate substitute where the petitioner (1) could
be removed before the motion is adjudicated, and (2) has a
credible fear of persecution or torture in the country of
removal, such that he may not have an opportunity to file or
have adjudicated a post-removal motion to reopen. The
respondents agreed at oral argument that, where a post-removal
motion to reopen is foreclosed as a practical matter due to a
showing of a real threat to the petitioner’s life, the
14 petitioner has demonstrated an as-applied violation of the
Suspension Clause.7
Under the facts of this case, Hussein has raised a
colorable argument that the administrative motion to reopen
process does not adequately substitute for a habeas corpus
challenge. Like petitioners in Devitri and Hamama, Hussein has
raised a colorable argument that, if he is removed to Somalia,
his life and freedom would be threatened before the BIA
adjudicates his motion to reopen. He has submitted evidence
that he is a member of a religious group (non-practicing
Muslims) that have been targeted by al-Shabaab, a recognized
terrorist group in power in Somalia. He has further submitted
evidence that al-Shabaab has targeted Somalians who have spent
significant time in the United States, which Hussein has, and
Hussein’s own family.8
He has also demonstrated that ICE could remove him before
the BIA resolves his motion to reopen proceedings. While
7 Hearing Tr. (doc. no. 17) at 49 (“It is an as applied suspension clause violation if there is a showing of real threat to your life.”), 54 (confirming the same). 8 At oral argument, the respondents dismissed this evidence on the grounds that Hussein’s claims that he fears persecution were addressed through his withholding of removal petition in 2006. That ignores the very basis of Hussein’s motion to reopen -- his argument that country conditions have changed since 2006 through at least al-Shabaab’s appearance and rise to power.
15 Hussein has filed an emergency motion to stay his removal with
the BIA, the court lacks objectively verifiable information on
the procedures surrounding the timing of that motion’s
resolution. Counsel have represented that the BIA’s Emergency
Stay Unit will only act on Hussein’s motion once it has been
informed that Hussein’s removal is “imminent.” As discussed
supra, it appears to rely on either ICE or petitioner’s counsel
to voluntarily inform it of the imminence of a petitioner’s
removal. Absent such information, it appears that a petitioner
like Hussein may be removed before even his motion for an
emergency stay is adjudicated.9
Hussein also faces the possibility of removal prior to
adjudication of his motion to reopen if his emergency motion to
stay removal is considered, but denied. In that event, the
Court of Appeals would lack jurisdiction to afford Hussein
relief. As counsel for both parties agreed at oral argument,10 a
9 This possibility is not so far-fetched in this case where ICE, despite receiving notice that Hussein was represented by counsel, met privately with him (without counsel present) and asked him to sign an affidavit to the effect that he wished to be removed to Somalia as soon as possible. Respondents’ counsel’s response -- that the visit was routine and more benign than represented by the petitioner, and that, in any event, “ICE is way too busy to engage things like that” -- cuts in petitioner’s favor on this point. See Hearing Tr. (doc. no. 17) at 57-58. 10Hearing Tr. (doc. no. 17) at 23, 61. At oral argument, respondents represented that the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s appeal in Filippi v. President of the
16 denial of Hussein’s motion for an emergency stay would not
constitute a final order, a necessary prerequisite to that
court’s jurisdiction. See Gando–Coello v. I.N.S., 857 F.2d 25,
26 (1st Cir. 1988) (BIA’s denial of stay pending disposition of
motion to reopen is not a final administrative order reviewable
by Court of Appeals). His removal would operate to withdraw his
motion to reopen, thus preventing him from obtaining the benefit
of a ruling on the motion he has already filed. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1). Even assuming that Hussein’s right
to file one such motion under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) would not
be exhausted by the withdrawal of his already-filed motion to
reopen,11 a threat of torture or death would operate to prevent
him from refiling from his country of removal -- even assuming
that he would not already have exhausted his right to one motion
to reopen.
United States, No. 17-2203 (1st Cir. filed Dec. 8, 2017), for lack of jurisdiction absent a final BIA order. See Hearing Tr. (doc. no. 17) at 40. That court had previously dismissed Filippi’s petition for review of a “written entry” by ICE “on his Order of Supervision” directing him to depart the United States for lack of a final order. Filippi v. Session, No. 17- 2083 (1st Cir. filed Oct. 31, 2017). It has not, however, dismissed Filippi’s appeal of Judge Barbadoro’s order, Filippi, 2017 DNH 221, dismissing his action in this court. 11It is unclear to the court whether that withdrawal would be without prejudice to refiling after departure or whether a refiled, post-departure motion would constitute a second (and thus possibly precluded) motion. The parties have offered no authority either way on this issue.
17 In arguing that the motion to reopen process suffices as an
alternative to habeas relief in Hussein’s case, the respondents
take the positions that (1) the court is not allowed to consider
the facts in this case at all in determining its jurisdiction,
and (2) the facts in this case distinguish Hussein’s petition
from those of the petitioners in Sied, Devitri, Ibrahim, and
Hamama. These assertions strike the court as (at least
superficially) inconsistent. That observation aside, as to the
respondents’ first point, in light of the respondents’
concession that foreclosure of post-removal motion to reopen
proceedings amounts to a violation of the Suspension Clause,12
the court necessarily must consider whether Hussein has
sufficiently alleged -- or could demonstrate -- that his post-
removal proceedings would be foreclosed.
And as to the second, the respondents attempted to
distinguish Devitri and Hamama on the basis that the petitioners
in those cases had not yet filed motions to reopen their removal
proceedings with the BIA, whereas Hussein has filed his motion.
While true that the Devitri and Hamama petitioners had not yet
filed their motions to reopen at the time they filed their
etitions, those courts focused their analysis on the
petitioners’ opportunity to have those motions adjudicated, not
12 Hearing Tr. (doc. no. 17) at 49, 54.
18 merely filed. Devitri, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 293-94; Hamama, 261
F. Supp. 3d at 830-31. Nor did those courts conclude that they
would lose jurisdiction once those motions were filed.
Finally, the respondents counter these cases with Judge
Barbadoro’s recent decision in Higgins, 2018 DNH 050.13 In that
case, however, Judge Barbadoro concluded that the petitioner
lacked a credible claim that he would face persecution or
torture in Jamaica. Id. at 4-5. Absent such a claim, the
motion to reopen process afforded Higgins an adequate substitute
for habeas proceedings. Id. Here, as discussed supra, Hussein
has raised a claim of persecution and torture in Somalia.
Conclusion
The court does not, at this juncture, conclude that the
circumstances that Hussein faces amount to a violation of the
Suspension Clause. Nor does it conclude, at this initial stage,
that he does in fact face a fear of persecution, torture, or
death should he return to Somalia. It holds merely that Hussein
has raised a colorable claim that the jurisdiction-divesting
provisions of § 1252 violate the Suspension Clause as applied to
him, and that this court has jurisdiction to resolve that
question.
13 Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 7-1) at 11.
19 Accordingly, the respondents’ motion to dismiss Hussein’s
petition and complaint14 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge
Dated: May 16, 2018
cc: Mark J. Devine, Esq. Benjamin J. Wahrer, Esq. Twain Asher Braden, Esq. Terry L. Ollila, AUSA
14 Document no. 7.