(a)
A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.
(b)
A party, or the trial court on its own motion, may object to the improper use of a peremptory challenge under subdivision (a). After the objection is made, any further discussion shall be conducted outside the presence of the panel. The objection shall be made before the jury is impaneled, unless information becomes known that could not have reasonably been known before the jury was
impaneled.
(c)
Notwithstanding Section 226, upon objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this section, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.
(d)
(1)
The court shall evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation,
or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection. The court shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record. A motion brought under this section shall also be deemed a sufficient presentation of claims asserting the discriminatory exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States and California Constitutions.
(2)
(A)
For purposes of this section, an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.
(B)
For purposes of this section, a “substantial
likelihood” means more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.
(C)
For purposes of this section, “unconscious bias” includes implicit and institutional biases.
(3)
In making its determination, the circumstances the court may consider include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(A)
Whether any of the following circumstances exist:
(i)
The objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the challenged juror.
(ii)
The alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group.
(iii)
Witnesses or the parties are not members of that perceived cognizable group.
(B)
Whether race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, bear on the facts of the case to be tried.
(C)
The number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
(i)
Consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the concerns later stated by the party as the reason for the peremptory challenge pursuant to subdivision (c).
(ii)
Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in cursory questioning of the challenged potential juror.
(iii)
Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to questions asked of other jurors from different perceived cognizable groups about the same topic or whether the party phrased those questions differently.
(D)
Whether other prospective jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, provided similar, but not necessarily identical, answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party.
(E)
Whether a reason might be
disproportionately associated with a race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups.
(F)
Whether the reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge was contrary to or unsupported by the record.
(G)
Whether counsel or counsel’s office, if it is a public entity, exercising the challenge has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, in the present case or in past cases, including whether the counsel or counsel’s office, if it is a public entity, who made the challenge has a history of
prior violations under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, Section 231.5, or this section.
(e)
A peremptory challenge for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case:
(1)
Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal
system.
(2)
Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner.
(3)
Having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.
(4)
A prospective juror’s neighborhood.
(5)
Having a child outside of marriage.
(6)
Receiving state benefits.
(7)
Not being a native English speaker.
(8)
The ability to speak another language.
(9)
Dress, attire, or personal appearance.
(10)
Employment in a field that is disproportionately occupied by members listed in subdivision (a) or that serves a population disproportionately comprised of members of a group or groups listed in subdivision (a).
(11)
Lack of employment or underemployment of the prospective juror or prospective juror’s family member.
(12)
A prospective juror’s apparent friendliness with another prospective juror of the same group as listed in subdivision (a).
(13)
Any justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of
the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party. The unchallenged prospective juror or jurors need not share any other characteristics with the challenged prospective juror for peremptory challenge relying on this justification to be considered presumptively invalid.
(f)
For purposes of subdivision (e), the term “clear and convincing” refers to the degree of certainty the factfinder must have in determining whether the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to the prospective juror’s cognizable group membership, bearing in mind conscious and unconscious bias. To determine that a presumption of invalidity has been overcome, the factfinder shall determine that it is highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a
peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.
(g)
(1)
The following reasons for peremptory challenges have historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection:
(A)
The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact.
(B)
The prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.
(C)
The prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.
(2)
The reasons set forth in paragraph (1) are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.
(h)
Upon a court granting an objection to the improper exercise of a peremptory challenge, the court shall do one or more of the following:
(1)
Quash the jury venire and start jury selection anew. This remedy shall be provided if requested by the objecting party.
(2)
If the motion is granted after the jury has been impaneled, declare a mistrial and select a new jury if requested by the defendant.
(3)
Seat the challenged juror.
(4)
Provide the objecting party additional challenges.
(5)
Provide another remedy as the court deems appropriate.
(i)
This section applies in all jury trials in which jury selection begins on or after January 1, 2022.
(j)
The denial of an objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The appellate court
shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
(k)
(1)
Except as specified
in paragraph (2), this section shall not apply to civil cases.
(2)
This section shall apply in the following civil cases:
(A)
Civil cases involving a civil rights violation, including the following:
(i)
Actions alleging a violation against a protected class enumerated in subdivision (a).
(ii)
Actions alleging a violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Section 52.1 of the Civil Code) or the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Section 51 of the Civil Code).
(iii)
Actions alleging a violation pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
(iv)
Actions alleging a violation of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d, et seq.), the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq.), or the federal Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).
(v)
Actions alleging a violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code), including, but not limited to, actions alleging discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.
(B)
Actions for the civil commitment of a person, including a person who is determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to Article 4 (commencing with Section 6600) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(C)
Civil cases for damages arising from a hate crime.
(l)
For civil cases governed under paragraph (2) of subdivision (k),
the party bringing the claim described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (k) shall notify the court and the other party or parties, after the final status conference, or, if no final status conference is held, at least 15 calendar days before the date of the trial, that the procedures under this section apply.
(m)
It is the intent of the Legislature that enactment of this section shall not, in purpose or effect, lower the standard for judging challenges for cause or expand use of challenges for cause.
(n)
The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.