NORVELL, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered upon an instructed jury verdict in favor of the defendants, H. D. Storey and T. Brooks Woods, who were operating and conducting a rodeo performance at a “Sports Arena” located in Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. On July 18, 1944-, a Brahman bull, named Hitler, escaped from the arena or stock pens maintained by defendants and ran loose upon the streets of San Antonio until he entered a yard adjoining the residence of Jesus Gallegos at 448 Terry Court. Gregorio Zuniga and his wife, Eduvijes Zuniga, the plaintiffs below and appellants here, were visiting Mrs. Gallegos at the time. Mrs. Zuniga was in the yard when the bull attacked her and inflicted serious bodily injuries.
On an appeal from a judgment based upon a peremptory instruction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed. Under this rule, it is clear that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence against defendants in allowing the bull to escape from the arena and pens or in failing to capture or kill the bull within a reasonable time after he had gained his freedom. While the operators of rodeos and wild west shows are not liable as insurers, they are obligated to use reasonable care in keeping their show animals securely penned and housed so that they will not get loose upon the public streets in a metropolitan area.
[126]*126There is conflict in the testimony as to how the bull effected his escape. Appellee Storey testified that the animal got loose during the “grand entrance” of the evening show and while the rodeo performers were entering the arena. According to other witnesses, four or five cowboys, employed by appellees, were attempting to get the bull into a chute in the north end of the arena prior to the performance when the bull turned and charged them, then ran to a partially open gate which an attendant failed to close in time to prevent' the animal’s escape. The bull went out this gate, burst through another barrier in an alley-way outside the walls of the arena and made his way into the open.
The primary proposition urged in ap-pellees’ brief is that the instructed verdict was proper for the reason that there was no showing that the actions of appellees’ servants in allowing the bull to escape was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Mrs. Zuniga. It is asserted that such injuries or results similar thereto could not be reasonably foreseen. It is also contended that the evidence affords no basis for a finding of negligence.
In support of their contentions, appellees cite Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162; Union Stock Yards v. Peeler, Tex.Com.App., 37 S.W.2d 126; Carson v. Knight, Tex.Com.App., 294 S.W. 539.
The Bigham case was one in which cattle stampeded through a defective gate and ■over the plaintiff ttpon hearing an approaching freight train. It resulted in injuries to the cattle as well as to the owner who was standing near the gate. Chief Justice Gaines achieved an interesting result in that case by holding that the defendant had the duty to confine the cattle and should have foreseen their escape by reason of the defective latch, but, notwithstanding this duty regarding livestock, stated that nothing short of “prophetic ken” could have anticipated the sequence of events resulting in the injury to the plaintiff’s person. The court thereby held that the defendant should anticipate that the cattle upon hearing a freight train, would run ■out the gate, but could not foresee that they ■would run over a person standing in the gate. The court granted damages for injuries to the cattle by reason of the active cause which produced their injury. It was seemingly the same cause which produced the injury to the cattle and the person, yet, in the case of the damages to the person, the court held that, “The active cause which produced the injury was wholly independent of the negligence of the defendant, and wholly disconnected from it.” 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 164. The exact basis for this distinction between injury to the cattle and to the person is not entirely clear, as is pointed out by Prof. Leon Green in his discussion of Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tex.Law Review 629.
Union Stock Yards v. Peeler, Tex.Com.App., 37 S.W.2d 126, also involves a defective gate and follows the holding of the Bigham case.
In Carson v. Knight, Tex.Com.App., 294 S.W. 539, the sole alleged act of negligence considered by the Commission of Appeals was the attempt of an employee of Carson, the plaintiff in error, to “bulldog” a large calf which had escaped while being transported by the employees of plaintiff in error who was engaged in the transfer business. The Commission of Appeals held that the employee was not negligent in attempting to “bulldog” the calf after it had escaped even though the attempt was unsuccessful. This case deals primarily with the issue of negligence, rather than with the element of foreseeability which is included within the definition of proximate cause.
In our opinion, none of the cases cited is in point. Mrs. Zuniga’s injuries did not result from a combination of causes similar to those mentioned in the cases relied upon by appellees. Other than the fact that a member of the bovine species is involved here, there is no similarity between this case and those cited by appellees. Obviously, this is not a case of cattle becoming frightened by some unforeseen event and breaking through a defective barrier, nor is it a case where an unsuccessful attempt was made to bring an animal under control by “bulldogging.” The issue here is whether or not the evidence was sufficient to have supported a jury finding that appel-lees failed to discharge their duty to protect the public from an animal they were [127]*127using for show purposes. Whichever version of the testimony be accepted, it appears that the bull made his escape while under the immediate control of appellees’ servants. Said servants failed to capture or restrain the animal until after he had run wild through the streets of San Antonio and inflicted serious bodily injury upon Mrs. Zuniga, who was two miles away from the place where the bull made his escape. From the evidence a jury could have properly concluded that appellees and their servants were negligent.
In our opinion the question of foreseeability embraced in the issue of proximate cause was likewise for the jury. It is urged that appellants “failed to prove that the bull was of a vicious and dangerous character.” We are directed to the testimony of the appellee Storey where he stated that a Brahman bull usually wants to get away from people and ordinarily is not as vicious as a Jersey or Hereford bull, and that this particular bull had not prior to the occasion involved displayed a ferocious disposition. It may be that a Brahman bull in his natural surroundings is a comparative inoffensive creature. In his native India, he is regarded as a sacred animal, but on July 14, 1944, this particular bull, “Hitler,” much against his will, was acting as a performer in a wild west show and rodeo. He was not being subjected to the treatment ordinarily accorded to domestic animals and we think a distinction may well be made between Blackie, the yard dog and Elsie, the milch cow, on the one hand, and Hitler, the sorely beset and tormented bull, upon the other hand.
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NORVELL, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered upon an instructed jury verdict in favor of the defendants, H. D. Storey and T. Brooks Woods, who were operating and conducting a rodeo performance at a “Sports Arena” located in Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. On July 18, 1944-, a Brahman bull, named Hitler, escaped from the arena or stock pens maintained by defendants and ran loose upon the streets of San Antonio until he entered a yard adjoining the residence of Jesus Gallegos at 448 Terry Court. Gregorio Zuniga and his wife, Eduvijes Zuniga, the plaintiffs below and appellants here, were visiting Mrs. Gallegos at the time. Mrs. Zuniga was in the yard when the bull attacked her and inflicted serious bodily injuries.
On an appeal from a judgment based upon a peremptory instruction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed. Under this rule, it is clear that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence against defendants in allowing the bull to escape from the arena and pens or in failing to capture or kill the bull within a reasonable time after he had gained his freedom. While the operators of rodeos and wild west shows are not liable as insurers, they are obligated to use reasonable care in keeping their show animals securely penned and housed so that they will not get loose upon the public streets in a metropolitan area.
[126]*126There is conflict in the testimony as to how the bull effected his escape. Appellee Storey testified that the animal got loose during the “grand entrance” of the evening show and while the rodeo performers were entering the arena. According to other witnesses, four or five cowboys, employed by appellees, were attempting to get the bull into a chute in the north end of the arena prior to the performance when the bull turned and charged them, then ran to a partially open gate which an attendant failed to close in time to prevent' the animal’s escape. The bull went out this gate, burst through another barrier in an alley-way outside the walls of the arena and made his way into the open.
The primary proposition urged in ap-pellees’ brief is that the instructed verdict was proper for the reason that there was no showing that the actions of appellees’ servants in allowing the bull to escape was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Mrs. Zuniga. It is asserted that such injuries or results similar thereto could not be reasonably foreseen. It is also contended that the evidence affords no basis for a finding of negligence.
In support of their contentions, appellees cite Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162; Union Stock Yards v. Peeler, Tex.Com.App., 37 S.W.2d 126; Carson v. Knight, Tex.Com.App., 294 S.W. 539.
The Bigham case was one in which cattle stampeded through a defective gate and ■over the plaintiff ttpon hearing an approaching freight train. It resulted in injuries to the cattle as well as to the owner who was standing near the gate. Chief Justice Gaines achieved an interesting result in that case by holding that the defendant had the duty to confine the cattle and should have foreseen their escape by reason of the defective latch, but, notwithstanding this duty regarding livestock, stated that nothing short of “prophetic ken” could have anticipated the sequence of events resulting in the injury to the plaintiff’s person. The court thereby held that the defendant should anticipate that the cattle upon hearing a freight train, would run ■out the gate, but could not foresee that they ■would run over a person standing in the gate. The court granted damages for injuries to the cattle by reason of the active cause which produced their injury. It was seemingly the same cause which produced the injury to the cattle and the person, yet, in the case of the damages to the person, the court held that, “The active cause which produced the injury was wholly independent of the negligence of the defendant, and wholly disconnected from it.” 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 164. The exact basis for this distinction between injury to the cattle and to the person is not entirely clear, as is pointed out by Prof. Leon Green in his discussion of Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tex.Law Review 629.
Union Stock Yards v. Peeler, Tex.Com.App., 37 S.W.2d 126, also involves a defective gate and follows the holding of the Bigham case.
In Carson v. Knight, Tex.Com.App., 294 S.W. 539, the sole alleged act of negligence considered by the Commission of Appeals was the attempt of an employee of Carson, the plaintiff in error, to “bulldog” a large calf which had escaped while being transported by the employees of plaintiff in error who was engaged in the transfer business. The Commission of Appeals held that the employee was not negligent in attempting to “bulldog” the calf after it had escaped even though the attempt was unsuccessful. This case deals primarily with the issue of negligence, rather than with the element of foreseeability which is included within the definition of proximate cause.
In our opinion, none of the cases cited is in point. Mrs. Zuniga’s injuries did not result from a combination of causes similar to those mentioned in the cases relied upon by appellees. Other than the fact that a member of the bovine species is involved here, there is no similarity between this case and those cited by appellees. Obviously, this is not a case of cattle becoming frightened by some unforeseen event and breaking through a defective barrier, nor is it a case where an unsuccessful attempt was made to bring an animal under control by “bulldogging.” The issue here is whether or not the evidence was sufficient to have supported a jury finding that appel-lees failed to discharge their duty to protect the public from an animal they were [127]*127using for show purposes. Whichever version of the testimony be accepted, it appears that the bull made his escape while under the immediate control of appellees’ servants. Said servants failed to capture or restrain the animal until after he had run wild through the streets of San Antonio and inflicted serious bodily injury upon Mrs. Zuniga, who was two miles away from the place where the bull made his escape. From the evidence a jury could have properly concluded that appellees and their servants were negligent.
In our opinion the question of foreseeability embraced in the issue of proximate cause was likewise for the jury. It is urged that appellants “failed to prove that the bull was of a vicious and dangerous character.” We are directed to the testimony of the appellee Storey where he stated that a Brahman bull usually wants to get away from people and ordinarily is not as vicious as a Jersey or Hereford bull, and that this particular bull had not prior to the occasion involved displayed a ferocious disposition. It may be that a Brahman bull in his natural surroundings is a comparative inoffensive creature. In his native India, he is regarded as a sacred animal, but on July 14, 1944, this particular bull, “Hitler,” much against his will, was acting as a performer in a wild west show and rodeo. He was not being subjected to the treatment ordinarily accorded to domestic animals and we think a distinction may well be made between Blackie, the yard dog and Elsie, the milch cow, on the one hand, and Hitler, the sorely beset and tormented bull, upon the other hand. Animals subjected to the treatment they receive in rodeo shows become frightened, infuriated and hence dangerous, and appel-lees are charged with knowledge of this fact. If we accept the version of appellants’ witnesses, as we are required to do upon this appeal, it appears that appellees’ servants had actual knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities immediately prior to the time he made his escape. The bull had engaged the efforts of five rodeo cowboys who unsuccessfully tried to drive him into a pen, where all the other bulls had gone without difficulty. The bull at that time could not escape because he was confined and the gate was closed. With the gate securely closed, the bull fought, hooked and charged the cowboys. Because of this behavior, additional cowboys came upon the scene to help drive the unruly bull into the pen. While the bull was “charging at them and kept coming down the center of the ring, and kept getting back to the gate,” one cowboy opened the gate to admit another cowboy. One witness stated that the bull made a dash at a cowboy standing at the gate and while other cowboys were coming through the gate the bull struck the gate and went on •out. Another witness said that when the 'bull ran towards the gate, the man watching it, “just let the gate go.” These things transpired at a time when other gates leading outside the arena were wide open.
We have here a bull on public exhibition and its intractable nature was known to the exhibitors. Immediately before its escape it was securely confined, and was then permitted to escape by the opening of a gate at a time when other gates leading outside were also' open. Whatever may 'have been the natural disposition of the bull or the record of his-ancestry, we feel reasonably safe in saying that a jury could properly find that appellees knew or should have known that the bull, prior to his escape, was dangerous and that it should have been reasonably foreseen that injury and harm would result from his being allowed to escape from the rodeo arena and run charging through the streets.
Issues of negligence and proximate cause were raised by the evidence and should have been submitted to the jury. Collins v. Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co., 110 Tex. 577, 212 S.W. 277, 222 S.W. 156; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Behne, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 354; Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847; Missouri, Kansas, Texas R. Co. of Texas v. McLain, 133 Tex. 484, 126 S.W.2d 474; Sullivan v. Flores, 134 Tex. 55, 132 S.W.2d 110.
For the errors pointed out, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.