Zimmerman v. Department of Board Education

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 28, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-05387
StatusUnknown

This text of Zimmerman v. Department of Board Education (Zimmerman v. Department of Board Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zimmerman v. Department of Board Education, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DEBORAH ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff, 24-CV-5387 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, asserts claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297. By order dated July 23, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it

plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this action against the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”). The following allegations are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff, who identifies herself as “Black American,” was employed in some capacity at P.S. 186 in the Bronx. Plaintiff alleges that “two Spanish” employees violated her rights and that nothing was done about it because she is Black. (ECF 1 ¶ III.)

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All capitalization, punctuation, omissions, and grammar are in the original. [Illegible] retaliated against me. I have made several complaints [illegible] other. I was told too to see the medical examiner November 09, 2022 and never was given an explanation why I could not come back to work! (Id. ¶ IV.) Plaintiff further states The defendant’s never was question ? why I could not come back to work. The Department of Board of Education never told me who impersonate in year 2021. I was put out on eriterment illegal. I went to the union November 09, 2022 nothing was done. Ms. Diane Dizney is Spanish she never was question Mr. Won Humalily in the lobby asking me is these handcuff for you. (Id. IVB.) Plaintiff appears to seek reinstatement, a transfer to a different school, and money damages. (Id. at 6-7.) Attached to the complaint is a notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that is dated April 25, 2024. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff timely filed this complaint on July 11, 2024. DISCUSSION A. Title VII Plaintiff invokes Title VII and alleges discrimination and retaliation based on her race. Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII prohibits an employer from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim under Title VII.

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Zimmerman v. Department of Board Education, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zimmerman-v-department-of-board-education-nysd-2024.