Ziemba v. Lackawanna County Sheriff's Department

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 24, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01586
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EUGENE ZIEMBA, III,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-01586

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

LACKAWANNA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM The plaintiff initiated this case by way of a writ of summons filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County on August 9, 2024. (Doc. 1). On September 13, 2024, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, and on September 19, 2024, the defendants filed a notice of removal to this court. ( ). On September 27, 2024, the defendants then filed a partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 4) which is before us for disposition. The matter has been briefed by all parties. (Doc. 5; Doc. 13; Doc. 16). For the reasons set forth herein, we will grant the motion. I. Background1

On or about August 13, 2022, the plaintiff attended an event called Froggy Fest 2022 at Montage Mountain, Moosic, Lackawanna County. Before entering the concert venue, the plaintiff was involved in

a physical altercation with an unidentified individual. The plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries to his nose and right shoulder. The plaintiff then presented himself to the medical tent at the concert venue

for an examination of his injuries. The working emergency medical personnel informed the plaintiff that he should either allow an ambulance to transport him to a hospital or transport himself because

there was nothing they could do from a medical standpoint. The plaintiff then called his parents to take him to the hospital. While waiting, the plaintiff conversed with Lackawanna County Deputy

Sheriff John Ehnot about the previous physical altercation. Deputy Sheriff Ehnot then proceeded to leave the tent. The plaintiff attempted to leave the medical tent to reengage Deputy Sheriff Ehnot, or another

sheriff, concerning the earlier altercation in the parking lot. Medical

1 Unless indicated otherwise, all facts are taken from the plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 1-1). personnel tried to prevent the plaintiff from leaving the medical tent, at

which point Deputy Sheriff Ehnot reentered the medical tent and subdued the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the Deputy Sheriff “delivered a closed palm strike to Plaintiff’s shoulder knowing it to be a

potentially injured region of the Plaintiff’s body,” “tackled [the plaintiff] to the ground and mounted Plaintiff,” and “held this position for an extended time before shifting his weight toward Plaintiff’s neck.” (Doc.

1-1, ¶¶ 34–36). The plaintiff additionally alleges that he was “injected in the buttock with a needle containing some sort of substance, presumably for the purpose of sedating him.” ( , ¶ 38). The plaintiff

was then detained and transported to the hospital. The plaintiff has alleged that he sustained a right shoulder injury which required surgery, suffered mental and emotional injuries, and incurred medical

bills and expenses. Moreover, he alleges that he lost profits and wages for which he seeks damages. The plaintiff additionally seeks an award for attorney’s fees and punitive damages.

II. Legal Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial

plausibility.” , 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” , 551 U.S.

308, 322 (2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting , 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by

indisputably authentic documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public records of which we may take judicial notice. , 741 Fed. App’x 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018); , 246 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa.

2017); , 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588–89 (W.D. Pa. 2008). III. Discussion

The defendants have moved for partial dismissal of the complaint. First, the defendants contend that the Lackawanna County Sheriff’s Department is not a proper defendant and all counts against it should

be dismissed. Second, the defendants argue that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be dismissed against Lackawanna County for failure to state a plausible claim for

relief. Third, the defendants allege that claims brought against Deputy Sheriff Ehnot in his official capacity should be dismissed due to the redundancy of the claims asserted against Lackawanna County. Fourth,

the defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to state plausible claims for relief concerning his §§ 1983 and 1985 claims for conspiracy. Finally, the defendants additionally argue the plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible claim for relief concerning liability. We will analyze each argument individually. A. The Lackawanna County Sheriff’s Department

We need not analyze the defendants’ contention that the Lackawanna County Sheriff’s Department is an improper defendant. The plaintiff does not object to the dismissal of the Sheriff’s Department

from the instant action. (Doc. 13, at 4). Therefore, Counts II, IV, VI, and IX will be dismissed. B. Claims brought against Deputy Sheriff Ehnot in his Official Capacity

The defendants additionally move to dismiss all claims under § 1983 against Deputy Sheriff Ehnot in his official capacity. The “Supreme Court has stated that a suit under section 1983 against a municipal officer in his or her official capacity is, in actuality, a suit

against the municipality that the officer represents; an official capacity suit is essentially treated as a suit against the entity itself.” , 166 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing

, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). These types of claims against a municipal officer in his or her official capacity are often dismissed. , 12 F. Supp. 2d 423, 432

(E.D. Pa. 1998) (dismissing claims against officials in their official capacities); , 108 F. Supp. 3d 279, 289 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing state officials’ official capacity

claims after relevant claims were dismissed against the municipal entity); , No. 16-3377, 2017 WL 3310676, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2017) (dismissing official capacity claims against the

municipality because the claims were duplicative). Indeed, the plaintiff does not dispute this assertion, as his cited case, , 502 U.S. 21 (1991), acknowledges that official

capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” , 502 U.S. at 25 (citing , 473 U.S. at 165). In other words, “[s]uits against

state officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State.” (quoting , 473 U.S. at 166). The plaintiff, however, attempts to use this case to assert his ability to sue

Deputy Sheriff Ehnot in his personal capacity, rather than his official capacity. (Doc. 13). Nonetheless, the defendants do not dispute this claim; they merely argue the Deputy Sheriff’s official capacity claims

are barred. Therefore, we will dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Deputy Sheriff Ehnot in his official capacity. C. Conspiracy Claims Under §§ 1983 and 1985 The defendants further move to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims

against Deputy Sheriff Ehnot and Lackawanna County for failure to state plausible claims for relief under §§ 1983 and 1985. We will analyze § 1983 and § 1985 separately.

A plaintiff must prove that “persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional rights” to prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983.

, 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting , 398 U.S. 144, 150–52 (1970)). “[T]he rule is clear” that plaintiffs “must provide some factual basis to support the existence of

the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” (quoting , 588 F.3d 180, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2009)). A § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate federally-protected

rights must be pleaded with particularity. , 135 F. Supp. 3d 255, 281 (M.D. Pa. 2015). A plaintiff must plead an actual agreement between the parties,

, 436 F. App’x 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011), as “[m]ere conclusory allegations that a conspiracy existed will not survive a motion to dismiss.” , 816 F. Supp. 308, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1993). “As ‘the linchpin for conspiracy is agreement,’

concerted action, without more, cannot suffice to state a conspiracy claim.” , 436 F. App’x at 137 (citations omitted). “[O]nly allegations which are particularized, such as those addressing the

period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, will be deemed sufficient.” , 250 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In the absence of direct

proof, a “meeting of the minds” or “understanding or agreement to conspire” can be “infer[red] from” circumstantial evidence. , 904 F.3d at 295 (quoting , 533 F.3d 183,

205 (3d Cir. 2008)). In the context of conspiracy among police officers, circumstantial evidence may manifest as “‘conversations’ between officers about the incident, ‘allegedly distorted’ stories that ‘emerged,’ an

‘awareness of conflicting stories’ and ‘irregularities in the series of official investigations’ into the incident.” (quoting , 600 F.2d 600, 627–28 (7th Cir. 1979),

, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). Here, we find that the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts outside of conclusory statements that can infer a conspiratorial agreement, either directly or through circumstantial evidence. The

plaintiff has failed to provide any direct proof of an agreement, and moreover, any evidence that may indirectly suggest an agreement. The plaintiff argues that defendant Ehnot’s actions were “implicitly

endorsed” by the County, therefore satisfying the necessary “meeting of the minds” requirement for a § 1983 conspiracy claim. (Doc. 13, at 9). The complaint alleges that Ehnot, the Sheriff’s Department, and the

County all acted in concert under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 142-143). However, these allegations simply reflect conclusory statements that a conspiracy

existed, and “[s]tating that the defendants ‘conspired’ and ‘acted in concert’ is not equivalent to pleading a conspiracy with sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.”

, 577 F. App’x 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); , 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (“Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest

conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”). Therefore, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiff, we find that the

plaintiff has failed to state plausible § 1983 conspiracy claims against defendant Ehnot and the County. We find the plaintiff’s conspiracy claims under § 1985(3) fail for

similar reasons. In order to plead a conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff’s complaint must plausibly allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons equal protection under

the law or equal privileges and immunities under the law; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) injury to the plaintiff’s property or his person, or deprivation of a right or privilege of a U.S. citizen.”

, 588 F. App’x 118, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing , 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971)). Nevertheless, as we held with the plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claims, the plaintiff has failed to

“set forth facts from which a conspiratorial agreement between the defendants can be inferred.” , 200 F. App’x 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The plaintiff has both failed to provide

direct evidence of a conspiracy or circumstantial evidence that infer a “meeting of the minds” or “understanding or agreement to conspire.”2

, 904 F.3d at 295. As stated above, simply alleging that defendants may have conspired is not equivalent to pleading a “conspiracy with sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim

upon which relief can be granted.” , 577 F. App’x at 143. Therefore, we find that the plaintiff has additionally failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the first element of a § 1985(3) claim, and

thus, we will dismiss both § 1985(3) claims against the defendants. D. Liability The plaintiff alleges a liability claim against the County.

“On its face, § 1983 makes liable ‘every person’ who deprives another of civil rights under color of state law.” , 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991). In 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

the Supreme Court of the United States established that municipalities and other local governmental units are included among those “persons” subject to liability under § 1983. at 690. Lackawanna County is such

2 “‘conversations’ between officers about the incident, ‘allegedly distorted’ stories that ‘emerged,’ an ‘awareness of conflicting stories’ and ‘irregularities in the series of official investigations’ into the incident.” . (citations omitted). a municipality subject to liability as a “person” under § 1983. at

694; , 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013). But “[u]nder , a municipality cannot be subjected to liability solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or

employees.” , 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, a municipality can only be liable under § 1983 if the alleged unconstitutional conduct either “implements or executes a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” or is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received

formal approval through the body’s official decision-making channels.” , 436 U.S. at 690–91. “[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” , 503 F.3d at 249. “A plaintiff must identify the challenged

policy, attribute it to the [municipality] itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” , 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). When looking at the record before us, the plaintiff has failed to

adequately allege a policy or custom that resulted in the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. The plaintiff contends that his complaint is “fortified by detailed allegations of an established policy or custom of

permitting excessive force” (Doc. 13, at 11), and yet, our review of the complaint reflects that the plaintiff has not alleged the specific written policies or customs which he alleges the County failed to follow. We

cannot accept the plaintiff’s allegations that “[t]he County established and/or approved written policies and training programs governing its officers’ conduct” as anything more than general conclusory allegations.

(Doc. 1-1, ¶ 107); , 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that plaintiff failed to allege a policy or custom when his rights were violated “due to the City’s policy of ignoring First

Amendment right[s]”); , 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling “vague assertions” of policy or customs cannot support a claim); No. CV 20-1296, 2021

WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (finding no factual support for a claim as it fails to “plausibly allege a policy, custom, or practice.”). Indeed, the plaintiff’s argument can be better categorized as one attempting to hold the County liable for a failure to train, monitor,

or supervise its officers under liability,3 as the plaintiff has additionally claimed in Count VII.4 The defendants have not, however,

3 This type of liability stems from , 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989), where the Court held that a policy or custom may exist for purposes of liability where “the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the agents of the government ‘is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” , 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (quoting , 489 U.S. at 417–18). We find that many of the plaintiff’s allegations fit into this category. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 111) (alleging that the “[t]he County failed to take proper measures to ensure the safety of arrestees and/or detainees by its officers…”); ( , ¶ 113) (listing eight failures of the County’s policies and training programs, such as the failure to “[p]rovide supervision and/or training in handling a detainee and/or arrestee.”). 4 While the plaintiff has asserted claims for both liability and liability, we must note that liability is merely a subsection of liability. Nonetheless, the plaintiff separates these two claims in his complaint against the defendants, and thus we will analyze the two independently for purposes of the underlying action. Therefore, we will treat the plaintiff’s claim as one necessitating that a plaintiff prove that their injury was caused by “action pursuant to official municipal policy,” , 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), including the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law. The plaintiff’s liability claim will, in turn, be treated as one where the defendants’ failure to train must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained moved to dismiss this count in their motion to dismiss. Therefore, we

need not address the plaintiff’s liability claim in this memorandum. E. Excessive Force Claim in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Lackawanna County in Count III. While the plaintiff attempts to argue otherwise, we agree with the defendants’ categorization that the plaintiff argues for liability against the County

under a theory of .5 The Supreme Court has, however, consistently rejected the notion that a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employes a tortfeasor.

employees] come into contact.” , 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting , 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). We hold that claims additionally include any absence of policy for purposes of the underlying lawsuit. , No. 4:21-CV-1866, 2022 WL 3973819, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2022) (finding the lack of appropriate policies became so “wide-spread and pervasive” that it constituted a custom); , 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the failure to promulgate policies can lead to liability). 5 (Doc. 101, ¶ 81, 82) (“At the time Plaintiff encountered Ehnot … Ehnot was within the scope of his employment with the County. Therefore, when Plaintiff encountered Ehnot, … Ehnot was acting under color of state law for the County.”). , 520 U.S. 397, 403;

, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); , 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986); , 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). Therefore, we

must reject the plaintiff’s argument in Count III of the underlying motion. We will dismiss this claim. IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we will grant the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in its entirety. (Doc. 4).

The following claims are dismissed: (1) Counts II, IV, VI, and IX against the Lackawanna County Sherriff’s Department; (2) Count I against Deputy Sheriff John P. Ehnot in his official capacity; (3) Count

VIII against Deputy Sheriff John P. Ehnot; and (4) Counts V and X against Lackawanna County. We will grant leave to file an amended complaint on Counts V, VIII, and X.

The following claims remain: (1) Count I against Deputy Sheriff John P. Ehnot in his personal capacity; (2) Count III against Lackawanna County; and (3) Count VII against Lackawanna County. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: February 24, 2025 JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. United States District Judge