NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-2647 CHANGYONG ZHOU; X. Z., Agency Nos. Petitioners, A246-445-969 A246-445-970 v.
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 30, 2026**
Before: RAWLINSON, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges; Concurrence by Judge Rawlinson; Dissent by Judge Desai.
Petitioners Changyong Zhou and his minor daughter are natives and citizens
of China. They petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of Zhou’s applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
When the BIA “conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than
adopting the [Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”)] decision, our ‘review is limited to the
BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.’”
Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hosseini v.
Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)). “We review factual findings,
including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Garcia v.
Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). Following this standard, we uphold the
IJ’s and the BIA’s findings “if supported by ‘reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record.’” Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). “To prevail, Petitioner
must show that the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that
these findings and decisions are erroneous.” Id.
“[O]nly the most extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an
adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Under the REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility determination may be made after
considering “the totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors.” Id. at 1040
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). This may include consideration of “the
2 consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “[A]ny inconsistency” may be considered, and
inconsistencies need not “go to the heart” of a petitioner’s claim to form the basis
of an adverse credibility determination. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Here, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination
based on (1) the inconsistency in Zhou’s testimony regarding the sequence of
events following his 2014 arrest, (2) the omission in his testimony regarding the
conditions following his release from custody after his 2022 arrest, and (3) Zhou’s
testimony that he did not know the reason for one of the protests he participated in.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). It was not unreasonable for the agency to treat
Zhou’s inability to consistently describe events as an important factor in making its
adverse credibility determination. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1047. Nor was it
unreasonable for the agency to doubt the sincerity of Zhou’s political beliefs.
However, we do not believe that Zhou’s testimony regarding the origins of
the White Paper Movement or the difference between a district station and a police
station undermine his credibility. Zhou’s belief that the use of white pieces of
paper as a symbol of protest began in the Soviet Union does not actually contradict
evidence in the record indicating that a building file inspired the White Paper
Movement to spread throughout China. Nor did Zhou create any actual
3 inconsistency when he discussed district stations and police stations. Zhou
explained that while the two are technically distinct entities, the designations are
used interchangeably because both entities carry out policing functions. Indeed, at
a separate point during his testimony, Zhou described an interrogation at “the
district police station.” See Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1145 (9th Cir.
2022) (holding that there was no actual inconsistency where the government
“manufacture[d] a discrepancy by characterizing the factual situation as an
‘either/or’ situation”).
We also emphasize that “not all omissions deserve the same weight or
support an adverse credibility finding.” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th
Cir. 2020). “Omissions are probative of credibility to the extent that later
disclosures, if credited, would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum
application.” Id. at 1068. Put another way, where an applicant is not introducing
new information to bolster their asylum application, but has instead omitted
information that was previously disclosed, that omission does not bear on the
applicant’s veracity. Id. So the fact that Zhou disclosed certain details—
concerning the extent of the harm he suffered following his 2019 arrest—in his
declaration but omitted them during his hearing did not support an adverse
credibility determination. However, considering the totality of the circumstances,
4 we conclude that the agency’s determination was supported by substantial
evidence.
Petitioners’ sole contention before the BIA was that the IJ clearly erred in
finding that Zhou was not credible. They do not raise any other claims before us
on appeal.
PETITION DENIED.1
1 The stay of removal (Dkt. 2) will remain in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. 5 FILED Zhou v. Blanche, Case No. 25-2647 MAY 19 2026 Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS I concur in the result but not in the reasoning.
1 FILED Zhou v. Blanche, Case No. 25-2647 MAY 19 2026 MOLLY C.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-2647 CHANGYONG ZHOU; X. Z., Agency Nos. Petitioners, A246-445-969 A246-445-970 v.
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 30, 2026**
Before: RAWLINSON, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges; Concurrence by Judge Rawlinson; Dissent by Judge Desai.
Petitioners Changyong Zhou and his minor daughter are natives and citizens
of China. They petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of Zhou’s applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
When the BIA “conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than
adopting the [Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”)] decision, our ‘review is limited to the
BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.’”
Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hosseini v.
Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)). “We review factual findings,
including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Garcia v.
Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). Following this standard, we uphold the
IJ’s and the BIA’s findings “if supported by ‘reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record.’” Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). “To prevail, Petitioner
must show that the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that
these findings and decisions are erroneous.” Id.
“[O]nly the most extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an
adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Under the REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility determination may be made after
considering “the totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors.” Id. at 1040
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). This may include consideration of “the
2 consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “[A]ny inconsistency” may be considered, and
inconsistencies need not “go to the heart” of a petitioner’s claim to form the basis
of an adverse credibility determination. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Here, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination
based on (1) the inconsistency in Zhou’s testimony regarding the sequence of
events following his 2014 arrest, (2) the omission in his testimony regarding the
conditions following his release from custody after his 2022 arrest, and (3) Zhou’s
testimony that he did not know the reason for one of the protests he participated in.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). It was not unreasonable for the agency to treat
Zhou’s inability to consistently describe events as an important factor in making its
adverse credibility determination. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1047. Nor was it
unreasonable for the agency to doubt the sincerity of Zhou’s political beliefs.
However, we do not believe that Zhou’s testimony regarding the origins of
the White Paper Movement or the difference between a district station and a police
station undermine his credibility. Zhou’s belief that the use of white pieces of
paper as a symbol of protest began in the Soviet Union does not actually contradict
evidence in the record indicating that a building file inspired the White Paper
Movement to spread throughout China. Nor did Zhou create any actual
3 inconsistency when he discussed district stations and police stations. Zhou
explained that while the two are technically distinct entities, the designations are
used interchangeably because both entities carry out policing functions. Indeed, at
a separate point during his testimony, Zhou described an interrogation at “the
district police station.” See Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1145 (9th Cir.
2022) (holding that there was no actual inconsistency where the government
“manufacture[d] a discrepancy by characterizing the factual situation as an
‘either/or’ situation”).
We also emphasize that “not all omissions deserve the same weight or
support an adverse credibility finding.” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th
Cir. 2020). “Omissions are probative of credibility to the extent that later
disclosures, if credited, would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum
application.” Id. at 1068. Put another way, where an applicant is not introducing
new information to bolster their asylum application, but has instead omitted
information that was previously disclosed, that omission does not bear on the
applicant’s veracity. Id. So the fact that Zhou disclosed certain details—
concerning the extent of the harm he suffered following his 2019 arrest—in his
declaration but omitted them during his hearing did not support an adverse
credibility determination. However, considering the totality of the circumstances,
4 we conclude that the agency’s determination was supported by substantial
evidence.
Petitioners’ sole contention before the BIA was that the IJ clearly erred in
finding that Zhou was not credible. They do not raise any other claims before us
on appeal.
PETITION DENIED.1
1 The stay of removal (Dkt. 2) will remain in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. 5 FILED Zhou v. Blanche, Case No. 25-2647 MAY 19 2026 Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS I concur in the result but not in the reasoning.
1 FILED Zhou v. Blanche, Case No. 25-2647 MAY 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK DESAI, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I agree with Judge Mendoza’s conclusion that at least half of the agency’s
findings do not support its adverse credibility determination, but do not agree that
the agency’s remaining reasons justify an adverse credibility determination. Because
the agency should reweigh the evidence in light of its erroneous findings and
consider in the first instance whether the remaining reasons justify an adverse
credibility determination, I would grant Zhou’s petition for review. I thus
respectfully dissent.
Established principles of administrative law leave to the agency the question
that the disposition answers in the first instance. A federal court “generally goes
astray if it decides a question” that the agency “has not first had a chance to address.”
Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 488 (2019). It is the agency that must “bring its
expertise to bear upon [a] matter . . . evaluate the evidence . . . [and] make an initial
determination . . . through informed discussion and analysis.” I.N.S. v. Orlando
Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002). These principles have “obvious importance in the
immigration context.” Id. at 16–17. The BIA has “experience with the sort of facts
that recur in immigration cases,” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 367 (2021),
and a “legally mandated role” to consider the “highly complex and sensitive” issues
that arise. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17. Therefore, “the proper course, except in
1 rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.” Id. at 16 (citation modified).
The same settled principles apply here even under the deferential standard of
review that governs this case. As Judge Mendoza explains, at least half of the BIA’s
findings do not withstand our substantial evidence standard. See Gutierrez-Alm v.
Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2023). Whether Zhou’s testimony should be
discredited based on the remaining findings is better left to the agency under the
totality of circumstances. See Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021)
(en banc). Indeed, we have refused to uphold an adverse credibility determination
even when some reason remains to support it but many of the agency’s purported
inconsistencies are illusory. See, e.g., Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1151 (9th
Cir. 2021); Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2022).1 This
practice permits the BIA “to determine in the first instance whether the remaining
factors—considered on their own—suffice to support an adverse credibility
determination,” Kumar, 18 F.4th at 1156, and protects the agency’s “legally
1 Other circuits do the same. “Even with the deference we owe to credibility findings,” we must remand when the agency’s repeated errors call its “overall analysis into question.” Cojocari v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “because we cannot confidently predict that the IJ would have adhered to her determination absent the other errors we have identified, remand is warranted”); Jabri v. Holder, 675 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2012) (remanding to the agency to determine “whether any remaining inconsistencies are sufficient to discredit the petitioner’s claim in its entirety”). 2 mandated role” as the factfinder of first instance. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17.
Because I would grant Zhou’s petition for review and remand to the BIA, I dissent.