Zea Pachao v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2025
• Docket: 25-1307
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 4 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCIA GABRIELA ZEA PACHAO; No. 25-1307 LUIS MIGUEL ALIAGA GRIJALVA; A. Agency Nos. K. A. Z.; M. A. A. Z., A240-412-691 A240-412-690 Petitioners, A240-412-692 A240-412-697 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 1, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON, COLLINS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Marcia Zea Pachao, Luis Grijalva, and their minor children M.Z. and A.Z.

(Petitioners) petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)

decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of the adult Petitioners’

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a). We deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA cites Burbano and also provides its own review of

the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Rudnitskyy

v. Garland, 82 F.4th 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025,

1028 (9th Cir. 2011)). But this does not extend to the parts of the IJ’s decision the

BIA declined to adopt. Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2010). We

review legal questions de novo, and factual findings for substantial evidence. Smith

v. Garland, 103 F.4th 663, 666 (9th Cir. 2024); Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067,

1072 (9th Cir. 2023). Under the latter standard, “administrative findings of fact are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding

of removal on the ground that the adult Petitioners had failed to establish a nexus

between the harms they alleged and the protected statutory grounds. See Umana-

Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2023) (“A nexus between the harm

1 The child Petitioners did not file separate applications for relief, but are instead listed as derivative beneficiaries on their parents’ applications for asylum. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, unlike asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture “may not be derivative”).

2 25-1307 and a protected ground is a necessary element of asylum and withholding of

removal.”). The agency reasonably concluded that the criminals who targeted the

adult Petitioners’ business were motivated only by general criminality. Thus, the

agency permissibly denied asylum and withholding of removal.

The agency likewise reasonably concluded that the adult Petitioners are

ineligible for CAT relief. To support their claim for CAT relief, the adult Petitioners

had to show that, if removed back to Peru, it is more likely than not that they would

be tortured by a public official or that public officials would acquiesce in that torture.

Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2022). The agency

permissibly found that the adult Petitioners had not met this bar and thus could not

make the requisite showing for CAT relief. The adult Petitioners argue that the

Peruvian police failed to resolve their issues within a reasonable timeline, but the

agency reasonably rejected this argument. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d

1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, the agency permissibly concluded that the adult

Petitioners are ineligible for CAT relief.

Finally, Petitioners were not denied the right to counsel. If an applicant for

asylum does not waive his or her right to counsel, an IJ “must provide [the petitioner]

with reasonable time to locate counsel and permit counsel to prepare for the

hearing.” Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original)

(quoting Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2005)). Petitioners’

3 25-1307 first merits hearing took place about 13 months after their first Immigration Court

hearing, giving them adequate time to find counsel. And they were given three

continuances during which time they could have retained counsel. Petitioners must

be diligent in their efforts to retain counsel, and Petitioners have not shown how they

would have been able to secure counsel if given more time. See Contra Usubakunov

v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1299, 1306 (9th Cir. 2021).

PETITION DENIED.

4 25-1307