HINES, Presiding Justice.
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Robles v. Yugueros, 335 Ga. App. 324 (779 SE2d 139) (2015), to determine whether that Court was correct in holding that deposition testimony of an organizational representative taken under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) may be admitted into evidence at trial under OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2), without regard to the rules of evidence governing admissibility of expert testimony, see OCGA § 24-7-702. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
Iselda Moreno, wife of Rudy Robles, received liposuction, buttock augmentation, and abdominoplasty surgery performed by Dr. Patricia Yugueros of Artisan Plastic Surgery, LLC (“Artisan”) on June 24, 2009. Suffering abdominal pain, Moreno went to the emergency room at Gwinnett Medical Center (“GMC”), where Dr. Michael Violette ultimately discharged her after determining her abdominal x-ray was unremarkable. A GMC radiologist, Dr. James York, who later saw Moreno’s abdominal x-ray, could not rule out the possibility of “free air” in her abdomen, which could be a normal post-operative condition or could indicate a more serious issue. He recommended a CT scan and posted this opinion in Moreno’s electronic medical record.
Moreno’s pain worsened and Robles contacted Dr. Yugueros on Moreno’s behalf, who directed him to take Moreno to Northside Hospital, where Dr. Yugueros had privileges; there, Dr. Yugueros provided certain treatment, but did not order a CT scan or procure the radiology report from GMC. Dr. Yugueros, in concert with various other medical professionals, ordered other tests, including an abdominal x-ray, which showed evidence of abdominal free air. Several hours later, on June 28, 2009, Moreno died. Robles sued Dr. Yugueros and Artisan, who designated Drs. Violette and York, as well as GMC, as potentially liable non-parties.
[59]*59Robles served Artisan with a notice of deposition to depose a representative of the practice under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6),1 and [60]*60Artisan designated Dr. Diane Alexander as the deponent; Dr. Alex[61]*61ander is Artisan’s founder and co-owner. During Dr. Alexander’s [62]*62deposition, the following occurred:
Q: Do you know who ordered a CT scan?
A: I suspect Dr. Yugueros ordered it.2
Q: Would that, given your understanding, have been part of the standard of care to order a CT scan?
[Counsel for Yugueros and counsel for Artisan each stated: “Object to the form,” and Alexander was told she could answer the question.]
A: If you don’t understand why the patient — why they’re having pain, it would be standard of care to — if you don’t know what’s going on, that would be a — yes. The answer is, yes, a CT scan would be — it would provide more information. And then the other pieces of information that I remember were that she had had the x-ray at the other hospital which showed free air and that that had not been communicated to Dr. Yugueros or — and the emergency room at Northside also was not made aware of that as well. So that’s my recollection and that’s just what Dr. Ashraf told me about the case.
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses.
[63]*63Artisan filed a motion in limine to exclude this testimony, and during a pre-trial hearing, and at trial,3 the defendants argued that Dr. Alexander’s testimony as to the standard of care should be excluded because the requirements of OCGA § 24-7-702,4 which governs the admission of expert testimony in civil cases, had not been met, in part because Dr. Alexander had not been provided all the data [64]*64necessary to form an opinion.5 The trial court agreed and excluded the testimony, and the jury returned a defense verdict.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. In addressing the argument that
a trial court’s decision about whether a witness is qualified to render an expert opinion should be reviewed for abuse of
(g) This Code section shall not be strictly applied in proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 9 of Title 34 or in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 13 of Title 50. [65]*65discretion only, and .. . that Dr. Alexander was not qualified as an expert and that her opinion was not buttressed by sufficient facts or data to be admissible[,]
Robles, supra at 328, the Court of Appeals stated that “this argument misses the mark entirely The evidence was not offered as expert testimony under OCGA § 24-7-702 (b); it was offered as a party’s admission against interest under OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2).”6 Id. However, this statement by the Court of Appeals does not accurately [66]*66reflect the law.
[67]*67Certainly, OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2) states that the deposition of a deponent designated under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) “may be used by an adverse party for any purpose,” but that provision must be read in light of OCGA § 9-11-32 (a)’s overriding requirements that
[a]t the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of eviden ce applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, maybe used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions [.]
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2) is simply one of those “following provisions”; it does not create a rule of evidence that allows any deposition taken under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) to be admitted at trial in its entirety as “an admission against interest,” but provides for the admission of the deposition when that admission is permitted under relevant rules of evidence.
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HINES, Presiding Justice.
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Robles v. Yugueros, 335 Ga. App. 324 (779 SE2d 139) (2015), to determine whether that Court was correct in holding that deposition testimony of an organizational representative taken under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) may be admitted into evidence at trial under OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2), without regard to the rules of evidence governing admissibility of expert testimony, see OCGA § 24-7-702. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
Iselda Moreno, wife of Rudy Robles, received liposuction, buttock augmentation, and abdominoplasty surgery performed by Dr. Patricia Yugueros of Artisan Plastic Surgery, LLC (“Artisan”) on June 24, 2009. Suffering abdominal pain, Moreno went to the emergency room at Gwinnett Medical Center (“GMC”), where Dr. Michael Violette ultimately discharged her after determining her abdominal x-ray was unremarkable. A GMC radiologist, Dr. James York, who later saw Moreno’s abdominal x-ray, could not rule out the possibility of “free air” in her abdomen, which could be a normal post-operative condition or could indicate a more serious issue. He recommended a CT scan and posted this opinion in Moreno’s electronic medical record.
Moreno’s pain worsened and Robles contacted Dr. Yugueros on Moreno’s behalf, who directed him to take Moreno to Northside Hospital, where Dr. Yugueros had privileges; there, Dr. Yugueros provided certain treatment, but did not order a CT scan or procure the radiology report from GMC. Dr. Yugueros, in concert with various other medical professionals, ordered other tests, including an abdominal x-ray, which showed evidence of abdominal free air. Several hours later, on June 28, 2009, Moreno died. Robles sued Dr. Yugueros and Artisan, who designated Drs. Violette and York, as well as GMC, as potentially liable non-parties.
[59]*59Robles served Artisan with a notice of deposition to depose a representative of the practice under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6),1 and [60]*60Artisan designated Dr. Diane Alexander as the deponent; Dr. Alex[61]*61ander is Artisan’s founder and co-owner. During Dr. Alexander’s [62]*62deposition, the following occurred:
Q: Do you know who ordered a CT scan?
A: I suspect Dr. Yugueros ordered it.2
Q: Would that, given your understanding, have been part of the standard of care to order a CT scan?
[Counsel for Yugueros and counsel for Artisan each stated: “Object to the form,” and Alexander was told she could answer the question.]
A: If you don’t understand why the patient — why they’re having pain, it would be standard of care to — if you don’t know what’s going on, that would be a — yes. The answer is, yes, a CT scan would be — it would provide more information. And then the other pieces of information that I remember were that she had had the x-ray at the other hospital which showed free air and that that had not been communicated to Dr. Yugueros or — and the emergency room at Northside also was not made aware of that as well. So that’s my recollection and that’s just what Dr. Ashraf told me about the case.
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses.
[63]*63Artisan filed a motion in limine to exclude this testimony, and during a pre-trial hearing, and at trial,3 the defendants argued that Dr. Alexander’s testimony as to the standard of care should be excluded because the requirements of OCGA § 24-7-702,4 which governs the admission of expert testimony in civil cases, had not been met, in part because Dr. Alexander had not been provided all the data [64]*64necessary to form an opinion.5 The trial court agreed and excluded the testimony, and the jury returned a defense verdict.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. In addressing the argument that
a trial court’s decision about whether a witness is qualified to render an expert opinion should be reviewed for abuse of
(g) This Code section shall not be strictly applied in proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 9 of Title 34 or in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 13 of Title 50. [65]*65discretion only, and .. . that Dr. Alexander was not qualified as an expert and that her opinion was not buttressed by sufficient facts or data to be admissible[,]
Robles, supra at 328, the Court of Appeals stated that “this argument misses the mark entirely The evidence was not offered as expert testimony under OCGA § 24-7-702 (b); it was offered as a party’s admission against interest under OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2).”6 Id. However, this statement by the Court of Appeals does not accurately [66]*66reflect the law.
[67]*67Certainly, OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2) states that the deposition of a deponent designated under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) “may be used by an adverse party for any purpose,” but that provision must be read in light of OCGA § 9-11-32 (a)’s overriding requirements that
[a]t the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of eviden ce applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, maybe used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions [.]
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-32 (a) (2) is simply one of those “following provisions”; it does not create a rule of evidence that allows any deposition taken under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) to be admitted at trial in its entirety as “an admission against interest,” but provides for the admission of the deposition when that admission is permitted under relevant rules of evidence.7 And, when testifying as to the medical standard of care, OCGA § 24-7-702 is a relevant rule of evidence, and an appellate court is to uphold the trial court’s decision on the admission of such evidence, absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 694-695 (749 SE2d 726) (2013).
Under OCGA § 24-7-702, it is the role of the trial court to act as a gatekeeper of expert testimony See HNTB Ga., Inc. v. Hamilton-King, 287 Ga. 641, 645 (2) (697 SE2d 770) (2010). This role is not extinguished simply because deposition testimony, including expert testimony, is secured under OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6). Although Robles argues that the notice of deposition served on Artisan required that Artisan provide and prepare a witness as an expert, that Dr. Alexander possesses qualifications that could establish her as an expert witness, and that there was no proper objection to her qualifications, these matters were not addressed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and are beyond the scope of this Court’s writ of certiorari. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that Court for proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court.
[68]*68Decided October 31, 2016.
Carlock Copeland & Stair, Thomas S. Carlock, WayneD. McGrew III; Huff, Powell & Bailey, Michael S. Bailey, Erica S. Jansen, for appellants.
Isenberg & Hewitt, Brent J. Kaplan, Hilary W. Hunter, for appellees.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.
All the Justices concur.