Yu v. Apple Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: March 24, 2020
• Docket: 3:18-cv-06181
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 Case No. 3:18-cv-06181-JD YANBIN YU, et al., 8 Plaintiffs, 9 ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS v. AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 Re: Dkt. No. 68 11 APPLE INC., 12 Defendant.

13 YANBIN YU, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-06339-JD 14 Re: Dkt. No. 64 Plaintiffs, 15

v. 16

17 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD, et 18 al. 19 Defendants. 20 21 In these related actions, Yanbin Yu and Zhongxuan Zhang (“Yu”) allege Apple and 22 Samsung cell phones with dual-lens cameras infringe U.S. Patent No. 6,611,289, “Digital Cameras 23 Using Multiple Sensors with Multiple Lenses” (the “’289 patent”).1 The Court dismissed the 24 original complaints under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Section 101”) and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank 25 International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Yu v. Apple Inc., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Yu 26 filed first amended complaints (“FACs”). Dkt. No. 66 in Case No. 18-cv-06181; Dkt. No. 61 in 27 1 Case No. 18-cv-6339. Apple and Samsung filed a joint motion to dismiss for lack of patentability. 2 Dkt. No. 68 in Case No. 18-cv-6181; Dkt. No. 64 in Case No. 18-cv-6339. Samsung also seeks to 3 dismiss Yu’s willful and induced infringement claims. Dkt. No. 63 in Case No. 18-cv-6339. 4 The Court finds the motion suitable for decision on the papers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 5 7-1(b). The FACs are dismissed, and all remaining motions, including Samsung’s separate motion 6 to dismiss, are terminated as moot. 7 BACKGROUND 8 Before turning to the merits, an observation is warranted. Yu characterizes the prior 9 dismissal order as making no less than 21 distinct “factual findings” and not properly crediting the 10 allegations in the complaints. Dkt. No. 64 at 3-8. Yu appears to believe that every allegation in a 11 complaint must be taken as true, and that any departure from this purported rule is in effect a 12 finding of fact. That is not the law. On a motion to dismiss, “the tenet that a court must accept as 13 true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft 14 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 15 And specifically in a patent case, “a court need not accept as true allegations that contradict 16 matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit, such as the claims and the patent 17 specification.” Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, 873 F.3d 905, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 18 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Yu’s original complaint failed under the application of 19 these well-established principles, as informed by the Court’s “judicial experience and common 20 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To suggest otherwise, as Yu does, is to fundamentally 21 misunderstand the Court’s order and our federal motion to dismiss practice. 22 Yu’s comments about the prior order are also at odds with the rule “that patent eligibility 23 can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, 24 Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 25 1369, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (same). Yu is perfectly free to try to establish a material issue of 26 fact that might forestall a motion to dismiss, but he cannot simply declare that such disputes exist 27 without any support in the record, or make them up out of whole cloth in a motion brief. 1 With respect to the merits, the salient facts are not meaningfully disputed and are detailed 2 in the prior dismissal order. In summary, the ’289 patent was issued to Yu on August 26, 2003, 3 and expired on January 15, 2019. Dkt. No. 66-1. Yu alleges Apple and Samsung have infringed 4 “at least Claims 1, 2, and 4” of the ’289 patent. Dkt. No. 66 ¶¶ 38, 49 in Case No. 18-cv-6181; 5 Dkt. No. 61 ¶¶ 36, 47 in Case No. 18-cv-6339. No other claims are asserted. 6 Neither party has disagreed with treating claim 1 as the representative independent claim, 7 as the Court did in the prior order, or suggested another approach. Yu, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 1101 8 (citing Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also 9 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Court will again use claim 1 as 10 representative. 11 Claim 1 recites: 12 1. An improved digital camera comprising: 13 a first and a second image sensor closely positioned with respect to a common plane, said second image sensor sensitive to a full region of 14 visible color spectrum;

15 two lenses, each being mounted in front of one of said two image sensors; 16 said first image sensor producing a first image and said second image 17 sensor producing a second image;

18 an analog-to-digital converting circuitry coupled to said first and said second image sensor and digitizing said first and said second intensity 19 images to produce correspondingly a first digital image and a second digital image; 20 an image memory, coupled to said analog-to-digital converting 21 circuitry, for storing said first digital image and said second digital image; and 22 a digital image processor, coupled to said image memory and 23 receiving said first digital image and said second digital image, producing a resultant digital image from said first digital image 24 enhanced with said second digital image. 25 26 Dkt. No. 66-1 at 10:38-58. Claims 2 and 4 are dependent on claim 1. Id. at 10:59-11:6. 27 The parties have not called for claim construction as part of the eligibility inquiry, and as 1 briefs. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1125 (citing Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1373). Yu makes a cursory 2 reference to the Federal Circuit’s decision in ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 3 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2019), for the proposition that the Alice inquiry “may require claim 4 construction,” Dkt. No. 70 at 10, but makes no effort to show how that might apply here. 5 Consequently, the Court need not wait on claim construction for resolution of the Section 101 6 inquiry. 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. LEGAL STANDARDS 9 The prior dismissal order discussed in detail the standards governing review of a Rule 10 12(b)(6) motion and patentability under Section 101. Yu, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 1101-04. The parties 11 do not challenge that discussion, or point to any intervening change in law that might warrant a 12 different approach here. 13 To recap, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to 14 provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A 15 plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 16 550 U.S. at 570. This calls for enough “factual content that allows the court to draw the 17 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 18 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 19 A patentee cannot avoid dismissal of ineligible claims purely on the basis of conclusory or 20 generalized factual allegations. See id. In addition, allegations about inventiveness that are 21 “wholly divorced from the claims or the specification” will not defeat a motion to dismiss on 22 Section 101 grounds. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 23 The scope of patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful process, machine, 24 manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. 25 § 101. The “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are “specific exceptions to 26 § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (citation 27 omitted). 1 In Alice, the Supreme Court set out the now-familiar test of patent-eligibility under Section 2 101. First, the Court “determine[s] whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible 3 concept” such as an abstract idea. Id. at 218. The “purely functional nature of the claim confirms 4 [whether it] is directed to an abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea.” Affinity 5 Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “For an application 6 of an abstract idea to satisfy step one, the claim’s focus must be something other than the abstract 7 idea itself.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 8 Oversimplifying the claims should be avoided because “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . . 9 embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’” 10 Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 11 If a patent is directed to an ineligible subject matter, the second step in Alice is to look for 12 an “‘inventive concept’ -- i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure 13 that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] 14 itself.” Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). This step 15 asks, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 16 Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78 (2012). As in step 1, the answer must include something 17 “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself. BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290. It is also “well- 18 settled that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent 19 eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea. Rather, the components must involve more than 20 performance of ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies] previously known to the 21 industry.’” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration 22 in original) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). 23 II. THE CLAIMED INVENTION IS NOT PATENTABLE 24 A. Claim 1 Is Directed to an Abstract Idea 25 Courts “have crafted various tools to analyze whether a claim is ‘directed to’ ineligible 26 subject matter.” ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 766. The patent specification may be considered in 27 this inquiry, but “reliance on the specification must always yield to the claim language in 1 The plain language of claim 1 of the ’289 patent establishes that it is directed to a patent- 2 ineligible concept, namely the abstract idea of taking two pictures and using those pictures to 3 enhance each other in some way. It claims “[a]n improved digital camera” with elements like 4 “image sensor[s],” “lenses,” “analog-to-digital converting circuitry,” “image memory,” and “a 5 digital image processor.” Dkt. No. 66-1 at 10:38-58. These components are described as 6 performing their normal functions. Each lens is “mounted in front of” an image sensor. The 7 image sensors “produc[e]” images. The analog-to-digital converting circuitry “digitize[es]” the 8 images. Image memory “stor[es]” those digital images. The digital image processor “produc[es]” 9 an “enhanced” final digital image. 10 In effect, claim 1 claims a digital camera with basic digital camera parts, performing their 11 basic functions, except that the final digital image is produced “from said first digital image 12 enhanced with said second digital image.” Id. at 10:57-58. The whole point of the claim is to 13 provide two digital images so that a generic “digital image processor” can enhance one with the 14 other. That is an abstract idea. 15 While this is enough to answer step 1 under Alice, a useful cross-check is to look for 16 “fundamental [and] long prevalent” implementations or practices of the same basic concept. See 17 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 18 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219). The Court’s prior order noted that photographers had been using multiple 19 pictures to enhance each other for over a century and concluded claim 1 was directed to that 20 abstract idea. Yu, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 1104-05. Plaintiffs do not challenge that comparison in any 21 way here. Dkt. No. 70 at 3-4, 11. They try to sidestep it as an unwarranted factual conclusion, but 22 the Federal Circuit has expressly determined that “taking note of fundamental . . . concepts” on a 23 motion to dismiss is not the equivalent of “making factual findings.” Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 24 1270. 25 Yu suggests that the patent is not directed to an abstract idea because claim 1 recites 26 camera architecture elements. The point is not well taken. In the similar context of a patent for 27 “taking, transmitting, and organizing digital images” on cell phones, the Federal Circuit held that 1 disturb the conclusion that the claim at issue was “drawn to the concept of classifying an image 2 and storing the image based on its classification.” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litigation, 823 3 F.3d at 609, 611. So too, here. 4 Yu also says that the architecture in claim 1 is a specific improvement to a technical 5 problem, and so not an abstract idea under step 1. Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 15. But Yu presents this point 6 only as a conclusory allegation, with no facts alleged in support. In addition, the critical question 7 is “whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer 8 capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers 9 are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 10 2016). The answer goes against Yu. The FAC says that the “problems that are described in the 11 specification, and that were addressed by the ’289 Patent, demonstrate that the focus of the 12 claimed invention is an improvement in the functionality of digital cameras.” Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 14. 13 But the specification makes clear that the focus of the patent is on “improving image qualities.” 14 Dkt. No. 66-1 at 2:31-35. While this goal may be shaped by a desire to avoid “incurring 15 substantial costs” in digital cameras, id., “the need [for better images] is not a unique technical 16 problem.” Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1316. 17 The “essentially result-focused functional character of claim language” amply establishes 18 that claim 1 does not propose a specific solution to a technical problem. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. 19 Neapco Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “To be patent- 20 eligible, the claims must recite a specific means or method that solves a problem in an existing 21 technological process.” Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143, 1150 22 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The ’289 patent expressly disclaims such specificity in favor of “a generic 23 solution that makes digital cameras capable of producing high resolution images.” Dkt. No. 66-1 24 at 2:4-5. No particular or special equipment is required. Id. at 4:67-5:4. The “analog-to-digital 25 converting circuitry” digitizes, the “image memory” stores, and the “digital image processor” 26 produces images. There is no description of how the claimed invention achieves these results, and 27 this wide-open space leaves room to claim “all solutions for achieving a desired result” of the 1 A “look at the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art” also shows that “the claim’s 2 character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Koninklijke, 942 F.3d at 1150 3 (citation omitted). All the claimed advances in the patent are attributable to the use of “an 4 additional image sensor . . . to modify image qualities of the original image sensor.” Dkt. No. 66- 5 1 at 7:41-43; see also id. at 9:19-27; id. at 10:1-5. This further demonstrates that claim 1 is not 6 directed to an improvement in computer functionality, as was true for the digital image patent in In 7 re TLI. See 823 F.3d at 611-13. 8 Other allegations in the FAC buttress this conclusion. The only arguably special 9 component Yu identifies for the Apple or Samsung cameras is the processor required “to perform 10 the complex computations necessary to take advantage of the dual-lens camera.” Dkt. No. 66 11 ¶¶ 26-31 in Case No. 18-cv-6181; Dkt. No. 61 ¶¶ 27-29 in Case No. 18-cv-6339. As in SAP 12 America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (Fed. Cir. 2018), “it is clear, from the 13 claims themselves and the specification, that [the] limitations require no improved computer 14 resources [Yu] claims to have invented, just already available computers, with their already 15 available basic functions, to use as tools in executing the claimed process.” 16 “[T]he extent to which the claim would preempt building blocks of science and 17 technology” is properly considered at Alice step 1. ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 768. Yu says that, 18 because the patent does “not cover a system that includes only red, green, and blue 19 monochromatic image sensors,” Dkt. No. 70 at 13, preemption is not a concern. But the Federal 20 Circuit has rejected similar efforts to evaluate preemption in such all-or-nothing terms. “While 21 preemption may signal patent-ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does 22 not demonstrate patent eligibility. [Plaintiffs’] attempt to limit the breadth of the claims by 23 showing alternative[s] . . . outside of the scope of the claims does not change the conclusion that 24 the claims are directed to patent ineligible subject matter.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, 25 Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 26 Yu himself takes a very broad reading of the scope of the ’289 patent. The specification 27 describes how the claimed invention increases the resolution of photographs from digital cameras 1 at 7:3-7. But Yu has sued Apple and Samsung for cell phone cameras with a better zoom and 2 portrait mode, neither of which were actually mentioned in the patent. Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 25 in Case 3 No. 18-cv-6181; Dkt. No. 61 ¶¶ 22-23 in Case No. 18-cv-6339. 4 B. Claim 1 Lacks an Inventive Concept 5 Under the second step of Alice, Yu has not shown that claim 1 embodies an “‘inventive 6 concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 7 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The presence of an inventive concept ensures 8 a patent contains “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the 9 patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.’” 10 Id. at 217-218 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The “inventive concept must be evident in the 11 claims” themselves. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 12 2017). 13 No individual “additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible 14 application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The FACs focus on the patent’s use of “at least one image 15 sensor that is sensitive to a full region of visible color spectrum” and “making the image sensors 16 closely positioned with respect to a common plane.” Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 10. But Yu offers no evidence 17 or good argument that these elements individually were not “well-understood, routine, 18 conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. In any event, 19 the question is readily “answered adversely to the patentee based on the sources properly 20 considered on a motion to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and materials subject to 21 judicial notice.” Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1128. The whole purpose of the patent was to create better 22 images without “incurring the cost of photosensitive chips with multimillion photocells.” Dkt. 23 No. 66-1 at 2:6-7. There is no suggestion by Yu that image sensors “sensitive to a full region of 24 visible color spectrum” were not well-known. 25 The allegations in the FACs also undermine any claim that close positioning of image 26 sensors was unconventional. Both prior art patents discussed in the FACs exhibited that feature, 27 and one placed sensors “closely positioned with respect to a common plane.” Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 17. 1 understood, routine, and conventional,” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369, in the complete absence of 2 any facts showing that these elements were not well-known, routine, and conventional, the close 3 positioning of image sensors cannot supply the necessary inventive concept in this case. 4 Nor does an inventive concept emerge from viewing the elements as an ordered 5 combination. Yu has not demonstrated that the application of the abstract idea of taking two 6 pictures and using those pictures to enhance each other in some way might be unconventional. 7 The decision in Cellspin highlights this deficiency. Cellspin involved a series of patents for 8 “connecting a data capture device, e.g., a digital camera, to a mobile device so that a user can 9 automatically publish content from the data capture device to a website.” Cellspin, 927 F.3d 10 at 1309. The Federal Circuit reversed a dismissal on Alice grounds because “Cellspin’s 11 allegations identify several ways in which its application of capturing, transferring, and publishing 12 data was unconventional.” Id. at 1316. “Cellspin alleged that it was unconventional to separate 13 the steps of capturing and publishing data so that each step would be performed by a different 14 device linked via a wireless, paired connection. This two-step, two-device structure is discussed 15 throughout the shared specification. Cellspin also alleged that this structure provided various 16 benefits over prior art systems.” Id. at 1316-17. 17 Yu did not make similar allegations here, and has not otherwise shown that the ’289 patent 18 entails an unconventional application of any sort. The patent requires only a generic “digital 19 image processor . . . producing a resultant digital image from said first digital image enhanced 20 with said second digital image.” Dkt. No. 66-1 at 10:54-58. The specification recognizes that 21 image sensors being closely positioned does not fundamentally transform this process, noting that 22 images “from image sensors even very closed [sic] positioned, are not in registration” and that 23 “[t]he pixel registration process based on each pixel is very computationally extensive and 24 therefore preferably carried in predefined blocks. Pixels in registered blocks are then further 25 registered in pixel bases using linear interpolation that is known in mathematical books.” Id. 26 at 7:67-8:1; 8:50-55. The FACs’ allegation that prior art registration issues were resolved by 27 lenses being “closely positioned with respect to a common plane” Dkt. No. 66-1 ¶ 10, is 1 interpolation that is known in mathematical books.” Yu has not plausibly alleged that the use of 2 closely positioned sensors “is a technical improvement over prior art,” and so that cannot help 3 claim 1 pass step 2 under Alice. See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 4 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 5 So too for the use of an image sensor “sensitive to a full region of visible color spectrum,” 6 which also does not provide the necessary inventive concept. According to the specification, it is 7 not a particular image sensor, but rather the use of “images independently [obtained] from 8 multiple sensors with multiple lenses . . . [that makes] complementary expansions of the respective 9 dynamic ranges become possible.” Dkt. No. 66-1 at 9:49-51. The patent describes how images 10 from only limited-range “color sensors” can be combined to increase dynamic range if each is 11 “separately controlled with different exposure time and other system parameters.” Id. at 9:44-45. 12 The specification notes that “images from a single image sensor with a single lens can be hardly 13 enhanced for a larger dynamic range without sacrificing one end or the other of the dynamic 14 range.” Id. at 9:46-49. This makes clear that it is the use of multiple images, not that one image 15 sensor is sensitive to the full color spectrum, which provides for the benefits of the claimed 16 invention, like increased dynamic range. See also id. at 9:53-10:5 (same for increased resolution). 17 Consequently, “the alleged ‘inventive concept’ that solves problems identified in the field 18 is that [digital images are combined]. But [combining images] is the abstract idea itself, and a 19 claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the 20 inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” 21 ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 774. 22 The allegations in the FACs from the ’289 patent’s prosecution history do not lead to a 23 different conclusion. The FACs say that the “prosecution history of the ’289 Patent makes clear 24 that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) considered the claimed invention 25 to include an unconventional camera architecture.” Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 17. But for step 2, “[t]he 26 appropriate question is not whether the entire claim as a whole was well-understood, routine and 27 conventional to a skilled artisan (i.e., whether it lacks novelty).” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. 1 demonstrates only that the patent examiner found the use of “image sensors being sensitive to a 2 || full visible color spectrum in combination with other limitations” had not been disclosed in the 3 || prior art and was patentable for that reason. Dkt No. 66 | 17. That is not the “inventiveness” 4 || required under Alice at step 2. 5 Plaintiffs try to make a final stand against dismissal on the contention that defendants’ 6 || motions are “disingenuous in view of their own attempts to patent very similar technology.” □□□□ 7 No. 70 at 14. How this argument fits into the Section 101 inquiry is not at all clear, and Yu makes 8 || no effort to explain that. It is no bar to the motions. 9 CONCLUSION 10 The FACs against Apple in Case No. 18-cv-6181 and Samsung in Case No. 18-cv-6339 11 are dismissed. In the prior dismissal order, the Court expressed doubt that plaintiffs could amend 12 || around Alice “[i]n light of the plain language of the claims in the patent.” Yu, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 13 1108. The FACs did not succeed in that effort, and the Court’s “discretion to deny leave to amend 14 || is particularly broad where the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” S.F. Herring 15 || Assoc. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 946 F.3d 564, 582 (9th Cir. 2019). Consequently, the cases are a 16 || dismissed with prejudice. All other pending motions are terminated. IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 |] Dated: March 24, 2020 19 20 JA ONATO 21 Unitef States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28