Youngblood v. Gates

200 Cal. App. 3d 1302, 246 Cal. Rptr. 775, 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 403

Opinions

Opinion

ROTHMAN, J.

*

In this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against a number of governmental entities and individuals in their official capacities,¹ plaintiffs allege that persons arrested in the City of Los Angeles are not being arraigned before a magistrate without “unnecessary delay” in violation of constitutional and statutory requirements. They further challenge the conditions of prearraignment confinement in city jails, including deprivation of visitation rights, reading materials, recreational opportunities, and proper hygiene. Finally, the complaint charged the city with inadequate identification and treatment of mentally ill arrestees.

Procedural History

On June 7, 1977, Isaac Youngblood, an indigent being held in prearraignment confinement as a result of arrest by Los Angeles police officers, together with individual taxpayers, filed a class action. Their complaint underwent several amendments. A second class action suit by other individuals raising similar issues was filed November 7, 1980. On February 9, 1981, these two actions were ordered consolidated for the purpose of trial.

A court trial began on October 25, 1982, and concluded on December 10, 1982. The court heard many witnesses, received hundreds of exhibits, and visited jail facilities operated by the City of Los Angeles.

On March 9, 1983, the court filed a 96-page memorandum opinion. This opinion was later revised and became the court’s statement of decision. Judgment was filed on September 6, 1983, and timely notice of appeal by all parties followed.

The appeals from those portions of the judgment affecting the municipal court and the sheriff’s department were later abandoned, as was the appeal taken by respondents, plaintiffs below. The remaining appeal concerns only those portions of the judgment affecting the operations of the Los Angeles Police Department.

Issues on Appeal

The following issues are raised in this appeal:

1. The meaning of the maximum “two day” delay provision of Penal Code section 825;

2. Whether certain practices of the Los Angeles police constitute “unnecessary delay” within the maximum two-day provision;

3. The propriety of certain policies for treatment of prearraignment arrestees in Los Angeles City jails.

Discussion

I. Arraignment Delay

Included in the constitutional right of an accused person to a speedy and public trial (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) is the right of a person in police custody to be promptly brought before a magistrate and formally charged. To this end, article I, section 14 of the California Constitution requires: “A person charged with a felony by complaint . . . shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate. . . .” Further, Penal Code section 849, subdivision (a) provides: “When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private person, the person arrested, if not otherwise released, shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate. . . .”

The right to a speedy appearance before a magistrate is implemented by Penal Code section 825: “The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays; provided, however, that when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, such time shall be extended to include the duration of the next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following.”

The trial court was called upon to rule on two aspects of the right to be brought before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay”: (a) the meaning of the “two day” outer limit established by Penal Code section 825 and, (b) unnecessary delays within the “two day” period.

A. Meaning of the Two-day Rule

The Los Angeles Police Department has established guidelines, referred to as the “due-out schedule,” regarding the maximum two-day period set out in Penal Code section 825. (See exhibit 8 in the trial, which we have reproduced here in the appen. to this opn.) According to appellants, this schedule is used by Los Angeles police officers to determine the maximum time by which an in-custody arrestee must be arraigned, and assumes that the maximum arraignment time under Penal Code section 825 is to be calculated from the precise time of an individual’s arrest, rather than the calendar date of arrest. The city interprets “two days” as “48 hours.”

After careful analysis of all the applicable authorities, the trial court concluded: “the LAPD interpretation is in error. The correct rule is that a defendant arrested at any time on one day must be arraigned on the second court day thereafter.” In essence, the trial court gave a strict construction to the words “two days” in the statute. We agree.

While the distinction might seem minor, the difference between the two interpretations posed in this case can be significant, as illustrated in this example: if the accused is arrested at 11 p.m. on Thursday, under the Los Angeles Police Department “due-out schedule,” he or she is “due out” to court by next Tuesday at 4 p.m. This calculation can be explained as follows:

Thursday: 11 p.m.—arrest.

Friday: 11 p.m. equals 24 hours.

Saturday: This day is excluded as a municipal court “holiday” pursuant to Government Code section 71345.

Sunday: This day is excluded by Penal Code section 825.

Monday: 48 hours expires at 11 p.m. Since court is not in session at 11 p.m., the schedule gives the police until the end of the next court day.

Tuesday: Must be arraigned by the close of court at 4 p.m. during this day.

By contrast, under the trial court’s interpretation of the “two day” rule, the first court day following the arrest would be Friday, and the arrestee would have to be arraigned sometime during the second court day—Monday—rather than Tuesday. The effect of the Los Angeles Police Department guidelines is an expansion of permissible custodial time before arraignment.

This expansion of time is contrary to the clear language of Penal Code section 825. That section expressly requires that an arrestee be arraigned within “two days” and not “48 hours.” This is not simply a legislative oversight as the Legislature has used the term “48 hours” rather than “two days” when it wished to do so.² In addition, when the Legislature amended Penal Code section 825 in 1961, instead of then changing the language to “48 hours,” it reused the words “two days” in the amendment. “It is assumed that the Legislature has in mind existing laws when it passes a statute. [Citations.] ‘The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.’ [Citations.]” (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837-838 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874]; Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977 [140 Cal.Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394].)

For this court to replace the words “two days” in Penal Code section 825 with the words “48 hours” would amount to a “judicial amendment” where the Legislature has not so amended this statute. This is not our function. “In the absence of compelling countervailing considerations, we must assume that the Legislature ‘knew what it was saying and meant what it said.’ [Citation.]” (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764 [150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227].)

There are no “compelling countervailing considerations” in the instant case, and, in light of settled case authority on the subject of prearraignment delay, Penal Code section 825 must be interpreted to avoid expansion of custodial time. In People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 60 [59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137], the Supreme Court held that: “The principal purposes of the requirement of prompt arraignment are to prevent secret police interrogation, to place the issue of probable cause for the arrest before a judicial officer, to provide the defendant with full advice as to his rights and an opportunity to have counsel appointed, and to enable him to apply for bail or for habeas corpus when necessary.”

The right to be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay is fundamental. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said for the court in McNabb v. United States (1943) 318 U.S. 332, 343 [87 L.Ed. 819, 825-826, 63 S.Ct. 608]: “The purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement [requiring arrested persons to be promptly taken before a committing authority] of criminal procedure is plain. A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. . . . Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary.”

Moreover, in previous cases, the California Supreme Court has expressly applied a two-calendar-day rule in computing the permissible time before arraignment under Penal Code section 825. In one example, People v. Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d 32, the defendant was arrested shortly after 1:10 a.m. on a Sunday and was arraigned the following Wednesday. Under appellants’ interpretation of Penal Code section 825, this would have been within the 48 hour arraignment limit. The Supreme Court, however, followed a strict two-day rule, and said: “. . . Powell and Smith were arrested on Sunday, March 10, 1963, but were not taken before a magistrate and arraigned until Wednesday, March 13. Even if the Sunday is not included in the computation, these defendants were therefore held by the police for three days before they were arraigned, advised of their rights and furnished with counsel as the law requires. [Citation.] That delay ‘violates a fundamental right of the arrested person and is in disobedience of the law.’ [Citation.] We have characterized such conduct by the police as ‘patently illegal,’ and have rejected the argument that its illegality is somehow lessened by the fact that ‘similar conduct is not unusual’ or ‘makes the work of the police and the district attorney easier.’ [Citation.] Indeed, we have further stressed that section 825 does not authorize even a two-day detention in all cases, ‘but, instead, places a limit upon what may be considered a necessary delay, and a detention of less that two days, if unreasonable under the circumstances, is in violation of the statute.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 59.)

Appellants argue, however, that the above statement in Powell is “dictum” since the court did not base its ultimate ruling in the case on the “unnecessary delay” issue, but rather reversed the conviction because the police obtained incriminating statements without warning the defendants of their constitutional rights as required by Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]. It is true that the determinations in Powell on the meaning of Penal Code section 825 were not the ratio decidendi of the case, i.e., “the principle or rule which constitutes the ground of the decision, and it is this principle or rule which has the effect of a precedent.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 783, p. 753.) This does not, however, mean that the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on this subject, even though in the form of dictum, is to be ignored.

The Powell case was not the first time the Supreme Court gave this interpretation to the two-day rule. In People v. Hall (1964) 62 Cal.2d 104 [41 Cal.Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700], the defendant was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on a Sunday. He was arraigned the following Wednesday. In a footnote to the opinion, the Supreme Court commented: “By failing to take the defendant before a magistrate ‘within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays’ (Pen. Code, § 825), the officers exceeded the maximum period during which a defendant may be lawfully detained.” (People v. Hall, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 108, fn. 6.)

The Supreme Court subsequently, and emphatically adhered to Powell in People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 243 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108]: “Over a decade ago we firmly condemned police violations of the letter and spirit of these laws [including Pen. Code, § 825] in the case of People v. Powell [supra] 67 Cal.2d [at pages] 58-60. There the defendants were held in police custody for some three days prior to arraignment, during which time they were repeatedly questioned and made self-incriminating statements. We ruled the statements inadmissible because obtained in violation of the then-governing standards of custodial interrogation (Escobedo v. Illinois [supra] 378 U.S. 478; People v. Dorado [supra] 62 Cal.2d 338); .... But our admonitions in Powell on the subject of unnecessary delay in arraignment remain pertinent today—and in view of the police practices shown by the record herein, they bear repeating. That delay, we said, ‘ “violates a fundamental right of the arrested person and is in disobedience of the law.” [Citation.] We have characterized such conduct by the police as “patently illegal,” and have rejected the argument that its illegality is somehow lessened by the fact that “similar conduct is not unusual” or “makes the work of the police and the district attorney easier.” [Citation.] Indeed, we have further stressed that section 825 does not authorize even a two-day detention in all cases, “but, instead, places a limit upon what may be considered a necessary delay, and a detention of less than two days, if unreasonable under the circumstances, is in violation of the statute.” [Citation.]’ ”

If the language of Powell is dictum, it is a compelling policy of the Supreme Court which should not be ignored, and in view of Pettingill cannot be ignored. (See Jaramillo v. State of California (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 968, 971 [146 Cal.Rptr. 823].)

Powell and Hall were correctly applied by the trial court, and we adopt its holding: “[T]he emphasis in interpretation of section 825 is on ‘days,’ not hours. An in-custody defendant, in this court’s opinion, must be ar- raigned on the second court day following his arrest, whatever the time of day or night of the arrest. Thus, a defendant arrested any time Monday must at the outside be arraigned on Wednesday. A defendant arrested at any time on a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday must, at the outside, be arraigned on a Tuesday. A defendant arrested at any time on a Thursday must be arraigned at the outside on Monday. If a holiday intervenes on a day other than a Saturday or Sunday, the outside limit is extended one day.”

None of the arguments advanced by appellants diminish the correctness of the trial court’s ruling. First, appellants argue that this construction of Penal Code section 825 would render the language added to the section by the Legislature in 1961 a nullity, and therefore they urge that the interpretation by the trial court cannot be correct under the maxim of legislative construction: “Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized, . . . internally ... to the extent possible. [Citations.] Interpretive constructions which render some words surplusage, . . . are to be avoided.” (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) In 1961, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 825 by adding this parenthetical language in the first paragraph: “. . . provided, however, that when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, such time shall be extended to include the duration of the next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following.” Appellants say that since the first half of this paragraph already excludes “Sundays and holidays,” the amendment would be a nullity unless it was intended to make clear that “two days” means “48 hours.” The argument fails because the additional language added in 1961 is not surplusage under the interpretation we have adopted. A magistrate might not be sitting for reasons other than the existence of a holiday or a Sunday. For example a magistrate in a district which has only one judge or justice, or magistrate “on call” under Penal Code section 810, might be unexpectedly ill, or absent for some reason.

Appellants cite the court to “legislative history” that they contend supports the view that the two-day rule was intended to be a 48-hour rule.³ But “[[judges may not construe a statute to ascertain the legislative intent behind the statute unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty on the face of the statute. [Citation.]” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. (1985) 192 Cal.App.3d 1530, 1538 [243 Cal.Rptr. 505].) Since we find no ambiguity or uncertainty, it would be inappropriate to examine legislative intent. In any event, the only item of significance submitted on the subject of legislative history is a letter from the author of the bill, which merely offers one legislator’s statements as to his understanding of the bill. These statements are not admissible to construe the statute because they are not a “reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption” of the legislation. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 900 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; see California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].) The declaration of individual legislator’s motives and views “is the weakest and most unreliable kind of indicator as to what the Legislature as a whole intended.” (Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 379 [155 Cal.Rptr. 213].)⁴

As we have already pointed out, this is not a case of first impression after the amendment of Penal Code section 825 in 1961. Since the Supreme Court, following the enactment of the amendment, wrote in Hall and Powell on this subject, we are not free to ignore its expression.

Finally, appellants direct us to three intermediate appellate decisions to support their interpretation of Penal Code section 825, all of which are distinguishable or inapposite.

In People v. Ross (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 364, 367-368 [46 Cal.Rptr. 41], defendants were arrested in the early morning hours on a Friday and arraigned in the afternoon of Monday. The court held that “defendants were taken before a magistrate and arraigned on the afternoon of the next regular court session on the second legal business day following the day of their arrest. Excluding Saturday and Sunday, the 48-hour statutory minimum would have expired at 3:30 a.m. on Tuesday, May 12, 1964; thus, defendants were brought before a magistrate ‘within two days after [their] arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays.”’ Although the court used “48-hour” language, the defendants were arraigned well within the statutory time regardless of how the court explained its calculation. The additional comment of the court—that the time expired the next day—was unnecessary to the decision.

In People v. Chambers (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 89, 103 [80 Cal.Rptr. 672], the defendant was arrested “shortly before midnight on Thursday,” and was arraigned on Tuesday afternoon. The court held that since “Saturday and Sunday are municipal court holidays, the 48-hour time limit prescribed by section 825 of the Penal Code expired just before 12 midnight on Monday, June 12. Because. court was not then in session, they were properly arraigned on Tuesday afternoon.” Although the court cited Powell, it attempted no analysis of the conflict we face here.

In People v. Lee (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 514, 521 [83 Cal.Rptr. 715], the defendant was arrested on a Saturday, but not arraigned until Wednesday. The issue in that case was whether a statement taken from the defendant on Monday and Tuesday afternoons were obtained beyond the two-day period for arraignment. Lee argued that he should have been arraigned on Monday morning. Although the court, relying on Chambers and Ross, stated that a Wednesday arraignment was proper, this was unnecessary to the opinion, since under any interpretation of Penal Code section 825 the statements were taken within the two-day period.

These and other cases⁵ use inconsistent language to describe the statutory two-day period. However, none of the cases using “48 hour” terminology analyze or explain the problems posed in the instant case. As we have noted, under these circumstances the strong guidance of the Supreme Court must take precedence over the language of intermediate appellate decisions.

B. Unnecessary Delays Within the Two Days

The trial court also made a number of rulings regarding alleged unreasonable delays within the two-day maximum time for arraignment. We summarize here the facts relevant to our discussion addressing those of the court’s rulings which are contested on appeal.⁶

The trial court found that men arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department are taken to one of the jails located at the police department’s divisional headquarters, while women are brought to either the Van Nuys divisional headquarters of Los Angeles Police Department or the Sybil Brand Institute, a county facility.

Persons arrested only for misdemeanors and who have not posted bail or been released are generally taken to court on the day of their arrest or, at the latest, the next morning. Once the arrestee reaches the holding facility of the municipal court, a prosecutor in the city attorney’s office reviews the police reports and decides what charges, if any, to file. The arrestee is then arraigned on the resulting misdemeanor complaint or released if no charges are filed. Respondents did not contend that this procedure results in unnecessary delays. The trial court found that there were no unnecessary delays in regard to arraignment of misdemeanor arrestees, and, accordingly, made no orders affecting misdemeanor prosecutions.

Unlike the procedure for misdemeanor arrestees, persons arrested for felony offenses are not automatically taken to court by the next morning. Instead, the case is first assigned to a detective to conduct a “follow-up investigation.” About 400 officers were assigned to detective positions at the time of trial. They typically work Monday through Friday during normal working hours. Past experiments with “split shifts” (having detectives work evenings and weekends) were abandoned when they proved to be inefficient. Thus, if an arrest occurs in the daytime a detective might receive the case the same day, but arrests made at night or on the weekends are not assigned to a detective until the following weekday morning. Detectives give priority to cases in which the arrestee is in custody. Nearly half of the felony arrestees are either released on bail or released due to insufficient evidence to prosecute.

A typical follow-up investigation, which is required both by Los Angeles Police Department policy and the district attorney’s case filing guidelines, includes interviewing of potential witnesses to confirm the information in the police reports and determine the witnesses’ credibility and availability. Further investigation may be conducted at the crime scene, and detectives also determine the existence of an arrestee’s prior criminal record. The suspect normally will be interviewed at the jail and, if the suspect chooses to speak, any statement given must be checked for accuracy and any exculpatory information investigated.

The detective prepares a written report and, with the approval of a supervisor, personally presents the case to a prosecutor in the district attorney’s office. Follow-up investigations usually are completed the same day the case is assigned to a detective, who then presents the case to the prosecutor the next morning. The prosecutor may require that further follow-up investigation be conducted. Detectives sometimes wait to accumulate completed cases to avoid multiple trips to various branches of the district attorney’s office.

Once any additional investigation is completed, the prosecutor either files felony charges, refers the matter to the city attorney’s office for misdemean- or prosecution, or rejects the case. If a felony charge is filed, the detective arranges to have the arrestee transported to court. The Los Angeles Police Department has contracted with the Sheriff’s Department to provide such transportation. The sheriff’s buses make two runs; the first set of buses typically leaves the police department jails as early as 5:30 a.m. and arrives at the various courts at approximately 9 a.m. A second set of buses leaves the jails around 9 a.m. and arrives at court before noon. Even if a felony case is filed in the morning, because of this limited bus schedule, it is usually too late for transportation to take place until the next court day.

Thus, in the typical case, while a filing may be made the morning after the detective is assigned the case, the in-custody arrestee is not transported to the arraignment court until the second court day following the assignment of the case to the detective. The sheriff’s bus schedules are such that an arrestee must be ready for transportation by early or midmorning in order to be transported to court.

The Los Angeles Police Department issues to each detective a document, the “due-out” schedule already mentioned above (see appen. to opn.), which was based on the advice of the city attorney’s office concerning the method of calculating the “two-day” maximum period during which an arrestee must be brought before a magistrate in accordance with Penal Code section 825.

Department of Justice statistics for 1981 show that the Los Angeles Police Department made approximately 33,000 felony arrests in 1981. Approximately 15 percent were released without a complaint being sought. Approximately 35 percent of the felony arrestees were transported to the arraignment court. The approximately 84 percent of felony arrests where a complaint was sought were resolved as follows: 23 percent are rejected by all prosecuting agencies; 34 percent are filed as misdemeanors; and 27 percent are filed as felonies.

Statistics concerning one of the downtown felony arraignment courts showed that over a period of several months, 87 percent of felony arraignments took place on the “due-out date” as calculated by the Los Angeles Police Department’s schedule. Four percent took place after expiration of this period, and nine percent prior to the last day of the maximum period. Arraignment courts in West Los Angeles and Van Nuys respectively average 83 percent and 76 percent of their felony arraignments on the Los Angeles Police Department “due-out date.”

The cases interpreting both article I, section 14 of the California Constitution (which mandates that persons accused by felony complaint “be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate”) and the provisions of Penal Code section 825 (which also mandates the taking before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay”) make clear that the two-day period set forth in Penal Code section 825 is only a limitation on “necessary” delay. Thus, no unnecessary delay is permissible between the time of arrest and presentation to a magistrate, even if that presentation takes place within two days. Accordingly, in People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 329 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883], the court held: “The critical factor is the necessity for any delay in arraignment. These provisions do not authorize a two-day detention in all cases. Instead, ‘a limit [is placed] upon what may be considered a necessary delay, and a detention of less than two days, if unreasonable under the circumstances, is in violation of the statute and of the Constitution. (See Dragna v. White (1955) 45 Cal.2d 469, 473 [289 P.2d 428]; People v. Stroble (1951) 36 Cal.2d 615, 624-626 [226 P.2d 330].) In determining which delays are necessary under the statute, this court has rejected arguments that the delay was ‘not unusual’ or made ‘the work of the police and the district attorney easier.’ [Citation.] As the Court of Appeal recently observed, ‘[t]here is no authority to delay for the purpose of investigating the case. Subject to obvious health considerations the only permissible delay between the time of arrest and bringing the accused before a magistrate is the time necessary: to complete the arrest; to book the accused; to transport the accused to court; for the district attorney to evaluate the evidence for the limited purpose of determining what charge, if any, is to be filed; and to complete the necessary clerical and administrative tasks to prepare a formal pleading. [Citations.]’ (People v. Williams (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 36, 43, fn. omitted [137 Cal.Rptr. 70].)”

With these general guidelines in mind, we turn to the contentions that the trial court erred in a number of the findings and orders referred to at the outset of this section.

1. Follow-up Investigations

The court order required that in “[fjelony follow-up investigation when [the] suspect remains in custody pending filing of a complaint: A detective receiving a case involving an in-custody felony arrestee shall immediately initiate a follow-up investigation. The follow-up shall be completed no later than the first court day after arrest.” Appellants argue that the court erred in making this order.

Both People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 329 and People v. Williams, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at page 43 found that: “There is no authority to delay for the purpose of investigating the case,” but do permit some delay to “evaluate” a case.

Appellants contend that the time necessary for a follow-up investigation is not an unnecessary delay.

Although several cases seem to allow investigations as “evaluation” (see below), we cannot say, in light of Thompson and Williams, that follow-up investigations do not constitute unnecessary delay. Respondents have not asked us to review the trial court’s limited authorization of follow-up investigations, so that we need not address the larger issue of whether the trial court erred in permitting any arraignment delay for follow-up investigation.

The cases relied upon by appellants authorize what appears to be some follow-up investigation under the particular facts in each cases. None of them, of course, deals with the broad questions with which we are confronted.

In People v. King, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at pages 822-823, the court found that delay was appropriate “to make certain that ground exists to support a criminal complaint,” citing as an example the evaluation of a case involving multiple suspects. In King, the court believed that some delay was warranted as necessary to “untangling a skein of circumstantial evidence which implicated five suspects in varying degrees.”

People v. Haney (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 810, 815-816 [58 Cal.Rptr. 36], held that a detention of the accused for “a period of additional interrogation and investigation prior to his arraignment” was justified. We question the viability of this decision in light of Thompson and Williams on the question of investigations, and in light of People v. Stroble, supra, 36 Cal.2d at page 625, and People v. Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d 32, which clearly hold that delay for interrogation is “unnecessary.”

Appellants also point to three other cases to support their view that follow-up investigation is permissible delay. In People v. Lee, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at page 522, the court found prearraignment investigative activities to be necessary under the circumstances of that case. In Stanley v. Justice Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 244, 250 [127 Cal.Rptr. 532], the court stated that “brief investigation” could be proper on the ground it might exonerate the accused. And in People v. Johnson, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at page 689, the court found that: “A delay which is occasioned by the conscientious performance of police and which is utilized for the purposes of clerical and administrative needs and not used solely for the purpose of eliciting damaging statements from the accused is not an unreasonable delay.”

It is not appropriate to conclude from these cases that “follow-up” investigative authority is warranted, especially anything beyond that designated by the trial court.

2. Delays in Processing and Transporting Arrestees

The court found to be “unnecessary,” delays “to facilitate the accumulation of cases by detectives, so as to reduce the number of trips to prosecuting agencys’ offices to allow the completion of investigations in other cases, but causing a delay of more than a few hours or to the next court day in the arraignment of an in-custody arrestee in an already completed case.” The court also found “unnecessary” a delay in arraignment “to the next court day, when there remains time for arraignment on the same court day as the prosecuting agency’s decision to charge is made.”

To correct these practices, the court ordered that “[a]n arrestee ordinarily must be arraigned on the same court day that a criminal complaint is issued by the prosecuting District or City Attorney, if reasonalbe [szc] time is available for presenting the defendant in court before the ‘cut-off time expires for in-custody arraignments.” The court also ordered that in “[f]elony follow-up investigation when suspect remains in custody pending filing of a complaint: [fl] ... . [fl] If the District Attorney refers the complaint to the City Attorney for possible misdemeanor filing [Penal Code § 17(b)(4)], the concerned detective shall notify the Sheriff’s Department to arrange bus transportation from the Criminal Courts Building to the misdemeanor arraignment courts, 429 Bauchet Street. Notification shall be made early enough to allow for the prisoner to be transported on the noon bus. If the notification to the Sheriff’s Department is not made early enough for the arrestee to be placed on the noon bus to Bauchet Street, the concerned detective shall transport the arrestee. NOTE: This provision applies only in the central metropolitan area.”

Appellants contend that these rulings are neither required by law nor appropriate. They argue that the trial court failed to take into account the “administrative needs” of the police department reflecting “legitimate systemic necessities” which, under certain cases, authorize delay as reasonable to accomplish them. “A bus transportation plan [they argue] which awaits some degree of certainty before it moves large numbers of persons around a large geographic area such as Los Angeles cannot be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law. The occasional accumulation of cases within the statutory maximum is similarly not unreasonable where the alternative unduly burdens already overburdened police resources in the investigation of other cases and potentially defers the release of other arrestees similarly situated.” Appellants assert that individualized transportation will be necessary to meet the court’s requirements, and will create an unworkable system of “perpetual motion.”

These assertions greatly minimize the extent of delay found by the trial court to exist in the present system of processing and transporting of arrestees, and their argument greatly exaggerates the consequences of the court’s order. For example, nothing in the trial court’s findings supports appellants’ claim that the practice of accumulating cases is “occasional.” We conclude that the trial court correctly examined the procedures in practice by appellants, and correctly concluded that the rights of arrestees to prompt arraignment outweighed the burden placed on appellants in these areas. In our society, the “administrative needs” of the police department must yield to, and be brought into conformity with the law, not the obverse.

In People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 329, as we have already noted, the court found no authority for certain delays, and emphasized that: “The right to a prompt arraignment is ‘ “a fundamental right of the arrested person.” ’ (People v. Powell [supra] 67 Cal.2d [at p.] 59.)”

Appellants cite Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 303 [110 Cal.Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273], as support for their argument that courts have deferred to the administrative needs of the criminal justice system, even when concerned with constitutional rights. One question under review in Mills was whether the requirements for waiver of constitutional rights in taking misdemeanor pleas ought to be the same as waivers in felony cases. The court allowed that collective waivers, as well as waivers through counsel, were proper in misdemeanor cases. We find nothing in Mills that holds that the extent of constitutionally protected rights can be modified because of the factors involved in the instant case, however, which apparently stem from financial or accommodational limits of the law enforcement budget of the second largest city in the United States.

In both People v. Glover (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1012 [115 Cal.Rptr. 714], and Kaikas v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 86, 90 [95 Cal.Rptr. 596],⁷ it is true that the court took into account an “officer’s heavy workload,” to permit delays under the particular facts of those cases. That is a far cry from what the appellants propose to this court. Here we are not addressing the circumstances of a single arrestee’s claim of a violation of his right to a speedy trial. In the instant case, the trial court was concerned with an overall policy affecting 33,000 felony arrestees in 1981. Appellants ask us to approve an official policy of prearraignment delays because of inadequate police resources available for prompt arraignment of arrestees. We affirm the trial court’s opposite conclusion.

In regard to each matter dealt with by the trial court herein, the court’s conclusions are supported by the record before it, and are compelled by the court’s conclusion that the particular delay in issue was not reasonable as a matter of on-going policy. It is settled that: “Inadequate resources of finances can never be an excuse for depriving detainees of their constitutional rights. [Citations.]” (Detainees of Brooklyn H. of Det. for Men v. Malcolm (1975) 520 F.2d 392, 399; Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 920-921 [132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565].) Every one of appellants’ concerns relate to a need to delay because of inadequate resources. To the extent possible, the trial court took those concerns into account.

Under appellants’ contention because the city provides no transportation after noon, it becomes “necessary” for an arrestee to spend another night in jail if the filing decision is not made before noon. Appellants speculate that the court’s order will result in endless buses in “perpetual motion” to deal with individualized treatment of thousands of prisoners. Nothing in the record supports these fears. Nowhere did the trial judge order individualized transportation. The trial court’s orders may be inconvenient, may require more detectives, may require more deputy district attorneys, and may require more cooperative efforts between police and prosecutors. There are undoubtedly many solutions to the difficulties which the trial court’s orders entail. But, appellants’ proposed solution to the problems presented by the facts of this case—holding thousands of unarraigned arrestees for an extra day—is not constitutionally acceptable. No authority sanctions such massive deprivation of constitutional rights and none is warranted.

II

Treatment of Arrestees in City Jails

The trial court made certain rulings concerning conditions of confinement in city jail facilities, which appellants contend were not required by law. Based on Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601, subdivisions (c) and (d), together with settled case authority, the trial court required appellants to provide city jail inmates the opportunity for brief daily visits, daily newspapers and board games, daily showers and shaves, access to sanitary materials, an opportunity to brush their teeth, habitable and sanitary conditions in the jail, and diagnosis and treatment of mentally ill prisoners. Each of the court’s rulings will be discussed below, following an initial discussion of the general rules applicable to treatment of inmates.

Penal Code section 2600 provides: “A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may, during any such period of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public.” Penal Code section 2601, subdivision (c) gives prisoners the right to receive newspapers, and subdivision (d) provides for personal visits.

In De Lancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865, 872 [183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142], the Supreme Court held that pretrial county jail “detainees retain rights at least equivalent to those guaranteed state prisoners under [Pen. Code] sections 2600 and 2601,” based on both equal protection grounds and a legislative intent to restore rights not only to state prison inmates, but all detainees. The court added in a footnote: “We do not imply that county jails must follow exactly the same procedures as are followed in state prisons. Whether a measure is essential to institutional security will depend upon many factors, and thus may vary from one facility to the next. We hold only that the detainees’ status as inmates in a county jail instead of state prison in itself is no reason to deny them rights afforded prison inmates.” (Id., at p. 872, fn. 6.)

In Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 531-533 [60 L.Ed.2d 447, 463-465, 99 S.Ct. 1861], the United States Supreme Court confirmed that pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protection as that afforded to postconviction defendants, though concluding that the courts should generally defer to the policies adopted by prison administrators “that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 547; fn. omitted [60 L.Ed.2d at p. 474].)

Appellants do not dispute this body of law. Excepting most of the trial court’s ruling related to hygiene, appellants contend “that the trial court should have relied upon the standards for City jails established by the Board of Corrections pursuant to Penal Code §§ 6030 and 6031.” Among other things, Penal Code section 6030 requires the Board of Corrections to “establish minimum standards for local detention facilities” which are to include “health and sanitary conditions, fire and life safety, security, rehabilitation programs, recreation, treatment of persons confined in local detention facilities, and personnel training.” The “minimum standards” have been looked to by courts in review of local jail conditions (see In re Gallego (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 75, 86 [183 Cal.Rptr. 715]), but there is no authority to which we have been directed or which our research has disclosed that the trial court was obliged to accept these standards as a guide to the appropriateness of the conditions at Los Angeles Police Department jails. Certainly the courts may consider these guidelines, but the courts are not bound by them in determination of the scope of statutory and constitutional requirements for treatment of prisoners.

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the trial court’s specific rulings on the city’s treatment of inmates.

A. Visitation Standards

The judgment below held that: “All prisoners shall be provided notice of and reasonable opportunities for visitation on each weekday, Saturday, Sunday and holiday, restricted as to time and duration as required by the administrative and security considerations of the jail facility and personnel, including visitation by minor children of the arrestee in the company of a responsible adult.” The judgment went on to provide that access to prisoners by attorneys, bondsmen and physicians would not be limited. The court approved a plan submitted by appellants to comply with the decision, which included a limit of two visits per day of 15 minutes each between 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.

The court’s statement of decision described the jail facilities operated by appellants. The jails at Parker Center and in Van Nuys “have a limited number of small visitors’ rooms. At present, these visitors’ rooms are used only for interviews between prisoners and attorneys, bail bondsmen, and detectives. It was apparently the theory, when the jails were designed and constructed, that the defendants would be in jail for only a very short period and that outside visitation would not be required. Accordingly, secure visitation rooms are available for only three or four inmates at a time at the larger jails.” The court found that “[a]s to visitation, LAPD policy is that misdemeanor prisoners are not allowed visitors (with rare emergency exceptions) and felony prisoners are allowed visitors only with the approval of the detective in charge of the case, an approval which is rarely forthcoming. The result is that, for all practical purposes, except for bail bondsmen and attorneys, LAPD prisoners may not receive visitors. Jail division supervisory personnel justified the policy on lack of facilities for visitation and the lack of personnel to appropriately supervise visitation in a manner consonant with jail security.”

Appellants argue that the Board of Corrections standards under title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 1062⁸ considered visitation for prisoners in such short term facilities as “unnecessary.” They reason that since the time in a city jail facility is so brief, that “each city prisoner will only be deprived of family relationships for short periods.” They contend that visitation is impractical and that in jails outside Los Angeles, it is common to deny prearraignment visits, but cite the court to no authority other than title 15, and fail to point to anything in the record, to demonstrate that the trial court erred in either its findings or conclusions.

The trial court correctly concluded that Penal Code section 2601, subdivision (d) requires that the jail provide the inmate the opportunity: “To have personal visits; provided that the department may provide such restrictions as are necessary for the reasonable security of the institution.” Appellants’ solution to the need for “reasonable security” is to eliminate visits altogether. Nothing in Penal Code section 2601, subdivision (d) contemplates that all visitation for all detainees in a given category can be eliminated. Moreover, contrary to appellants’ assertion, nowhere in title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 1062 is there a provision that visits in short term facilities are not necessary. Title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 1062 simply does not deal with the matter of visitation needs for prearraignment detainees in such facilities. Were the Board of Corrections to determine that no visits are necessary in a prearraignment short term facilities, it would be contrary to Penal Code section 2601.

It is difficult to understand appellants’ assertion that a short deprivation of family relations is of no significance. It is certainly based on nothing in the record, nor is it based on one’s common sense of humanity or the importance of family in our culture. It should not be hard to realize that for many persons arrested, the terrible experience of incarceration is new and the break in family contact, even for a brief period, debilitating.

The trial court noted that the jail supervisors’ justification for depriving arrestees of visits was “lack of facilities for visitation and the lack of personnel to appropriately supervise visitation.” We have already pointed out that: “Inadequate resources of finances can never be an excuse for depriving detainees of their constitutional rights. [Citations.]” (Detainees of Brooklyn H. of Det. for Men v. Malcolm, supra, 520 F.2d at p. 399, and see Payne v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 920-921.)

The trial court’s rulings in regard to visitation are balanced and reasonable, and adequately take into account the legitimate needs of the appellants.

B. Reading and Recreational Standards

The judgment of the trial court directed appellants to provide all prisoners “reasonable access to appropriate reading matter, and to appropriate recreational opportunities, restricted as to type and time by the administrative and security considerations of the jail facility and personnel.” The court ordered appellants to “provide daily newspapers in general circulation in the City of Los Angeles, including a Spanish language publication. A sufficient number of newspapers will be provided to ensure reasonable access by interested prisoners, [fl] The Department will provide checkers, checkerboards, and dominoes, in sufficient quantities to ensure access to such games by interested prisoners, [fl] Every prisoner shall have access to such reading and recreational materials between 1000 and 2130 hours, daily.”

The court, in its decision, found that “[ajside from telephones, no recreation, reading, or other amenities are provided in any of the LAPD jails. There are no libraries, mobile or otherwise, there are no newspaper racks, . . .” The only exception to this state of affairs is the existence of candy machines at the Parker Center jail, located outside the cells, which the detainees can use by pooling money one or more times a day, and sending one of their number out of the cell to make purchases. The court found that all the jails are operated by a “paucity of jail personnel.” Furthermore, all reading matter is “entirely prohibited” at city jails, and none is allowed to be sent in from the outside, nor are inmates even allowed to retain reading matter in their possession when booked. Jail personnel explained the ban on reading matter on the ground that “toilets were frequently clogged by prisoners with various materials available.”

Toilet clogging is a significant problem in the jail. The court found that clogging takes place without reading materials. Indeed, almost any object can and is used for that purpose. The court found that while clogged toilets are a problem, “the testimony did not indicate that the availability of reading matter would increase the problem over and above what it is now.”

The trial court also found that no recreational opportunities of any sort are provided at city jail, this includes indoor or outdoor recreation, television, radio and “[t]here are no games or cards, and prisoners have no way to pass the time but wait until the time comes for them to go to court or be released.”

In the face of the trial court’s very modest order for newspapers and limited recreation (cards and table games), appellants ask us to find some error, citing title 15, California Code of Regulations, sections 1065-1066, which they claim provides that the Board of Corrections determined that these amenities are not required. We have examined the two sections. It is true that they make no provisions for recreation or reading matter in type I facilities. It is, however, a distortion for appellants to interpret this lack as a “determination” on the subject. Appellants can point to no legitimate governmental interest served by the total ban on reading and recreational materials. Such an unsupported ban is unconstitutional. (See Procunier v. Martinez (1974) 416 U.S. 396, 407-409 [40 L.Ed.2d 224, 236-238, 94 S.Ct. 1800]; Daniels v. McKinney (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 47-48 [193 Cal.Rptr. 842].) As noted in the trial court’s opinion, “[t]he court finds that the total denial of all recreational activities is not required by the ‘legitimate governmental interest’ rational applicable to the LAPD jails under the Bell [Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. 520] case.”

C. Sanitation and Hygiene Standards

The trial court, in its judgment, required that “[prisoners shall be provided reasonably habitable and sanitary conditions in all booking, holding and housing areas and shall be afforded reasonable opportunities and facilities to shower and shave,” with appropriate security limitations. A plan was appended to the judgment on this matter. In essence, the plan provided for hygienic supplies for men and women, and the opportunity for a shower, shave and tooth brushing to an arrestee in custody longer than the morning following arrest.

Judge Hupp’s factual findings indicated that there are limited shower and sink facilities at city jails. The court found that “misdemeanor prisoners are normally not given the opportunity to shower or shave. The exception occurs when a misdemeanor prisoner on arrest is exceptionally dirty. Felony prisoners are normally given the opportunity to take a shower shortly after booking, but thereafter have no opportunity to shower or shave. . . . The lack of opportunity to shower was plainly evident on a view of the Parker Center jail; one of the two shower rooms containing three showers was apparently used for the storage of towels and other linens and the jailer did not know how to turn showers on without considerable fumbling with the controls. It is apparent to the court that even the existing shower facilities are not used to capacity and that the reason is the lack of jailers to supervise the operation.”

Appellants’ concede that the “privileges” of a shave and a shower ought to be made available, citing title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 1266, but argue that on return to the trial court they will ask the court to implement title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 1266 which requires showering “at least every other day or more often if possible.” It is apparent that even were this section binding on the trial court, the order given herein is certainly in conformity with such a standard. The standard referred to by appellants recognizes that the “every other day” rule is the least that should be done. We also note that showering is not the only issue encompassed in the court order. In light of appellants’ concession, no further comment is needed.

D. Mental Health Standards

The judgment of the trial court provides that arrestees “shall be afforded reasonably prompt diagnostic screening by appropriately trained medical personnel whenever said prisoner’s behavior may be indicative of acute psychoses [sz'c] or other severe mental illness, followed where medically indicated by either suitable intervention and treatment by medically trained personnel or transfer to other appropriate facilities for such treatment.” The details of implementing this order were left by the court to further proceedings which resulted in a supplemental judgment filed February 17, 1984. This supplement contained a detailed order for the “Identification and Custodial Disposition of Mentally 111 Arrestees.” Since it appears that appellants’ argue that the court should have made no order on this subject, there is no need to discuss the details of the supplemental judgment.

The court’s decision dealt in great detail with the mentally ill in city jails. Jail personnel, including medical personnel assigned to the jails, have inadequate psychiatric experience to distinguish between arrestees enraged at their plight, inmates undergoing drug reactions, and those who are psychotic or mentally ill. The court required appellants to develop a plan “to attempt diagnosis of those prisoners whose behavior indicates psychotic reactions from mental illness and thereafter a plan to treat those so diagnosed in recognized ways.” The court found that violent prisoners who may be suffering from mental illness, “receive no treatment at the LAPD jails.” Doctors assigned to the jail care only for physical medical problems and not psychiatric problems. The court found that “[djealing with violent or suicidal inmates is a significant problem for the jail. The jail receives a significant number of inmates with either psychiatric problems or drug-induced psychotic states. Violent prisoners under the influence of PCP are frequent. The jailers place such prisoners in padded cells until the drug-induced psychosis has dissipated to the point where the prisoner can be returned to the main jail population.”

In the face of substantial clear authority to the contrary, appellants insist that the court’s orders were unwarranted. They seem to believe that the court’s judgment requires treatment where not “medically necessary.” The trial court’s order simply requires that “[ejvery arrestee whose behavior indicates the possibility of severe mental illness shall be afforded reasonably prompt diagnostic screening by appropriately trained medical personnel, followed where medically indicated by either suitable intervention and treatment by medically trained personnel or transfer to other appropriate facilities for such treatment.” (Italics added.)

The trial court correctly and appropriately followed the law in this regard. In Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 [50 L.Ed.2d 251, 260, 97 S.Ct. 285], the United States Supreme Court held: “We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ [citation] proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” (Fns. omitted.) The court decision below does not impose a requirement for care of the mentally ill without “medical” necessity. Of course, “medical” in this context encompasses both physical and mental health. The trial court’s order properly follows the criteria for treatment set out in Bowring v. Godwin (1977) 551 F.2d 44, 47. That case holds that an inmate “is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial.” Appellants have directed this court to nothing in the supplemental judgment inconsistent with the law.

The judgment is affirmed.

McClosky, J., concurred.

1 The defendants include, among others, the Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Municipal Court.

Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

2 See Penal Code section 824 which uses “48 hours” in reference to arraignment of an adult misrepresenting himself or herself to be a minor.

3 Appellants’ request that the court take judicial notice of certain items of legislative history was granted on July 23, 1987, without objection.

4 Reference is made in the dissent to a transcript of the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure hearings in February of 1960. This was not one of the matters of legislative history for which respondents sought judicial notice. These hearings were conducted almost a year before the introduction of Senate Bill No. 550, which amended Penal Code section 825. The subject of that amendment was not the subject of the 1960 interim hearings. They were for the purpose of hearing testimony on how changes made in the law of arrest in 1957 were working and whether any changes in those laws were warranted. The references by witnesses and legislators to “48 hours” in those hearings are not appropriate matters to show legislative intent on a bill introduced a year later, or on statutes enacted years earlier. To the extent F & P Growers Assn. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 678 [214 Cal.Rptr. 355], Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 634 [153 Cal.Rptr. 511], and Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at page 379, permit consideration of remarks at hearings by legislators as “legislative history,” such remarks would certainly have to be focused on the history of a particular statute.

5 In People v. Vick (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1067, 1071 [90 Cal.Rptr. 236], defendant was arrested at 6:05 a.m. on Wednesday and arraigned at about 9:30 a.m. on Friday. The court calculated that there was a 52-hour delay from arrest to arraignment. The court did not resolve the issue, holding that the delay in arraignment did not prejudice the defendant nor prevent him from having the opportunity for a fair trial. In People v. Santos (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 [102 Cal.Rptr. 678], defendant was arrested sometime during Saturday night, and arraigned on Wednesday morning. The issue on appeal was the admissibility of a statement made on Tuesday morning while he was in custody. “Since Saturday and Sunday are judicial holidays, the two-day period did not commence with respect to defendant until Monday and did not expire until midnight Tuesday. Since court was not then in session, defendant’s arraignment Wednesday morning was entirely proper. [Citation.]” The court cited People v. Lee, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 514. In People v. Johnson (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 684, 688-689 [149 Cal.Rptr. 661], defendant was arrested Thursday at 7:30 a.m. and arraigned on Monday. The court stated that: “At bench the statutory two days did not expire until the end of Monday, May 23. Saturday and Sunday are excluded in calculating the time. [Citation.]” The court then went on to find that Penal Code section 825 “allows 48 hours within which to take the arrested person before the magistrate.” In People v. Mitchell (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 312, 320 [26 Cal.Rptr. 89], defendant was arrested at midnight between a Saturday and Sunday. He was arraigned on Tuesday. The court found no unreasonable delay. In People v. Taylor (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 367, 371 [58 Cal.Rptr. 269], defendant was hospitalized until Friday and was arraigned on Tuesday. The court found no unreasonable delay. In People v. King (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 817, 822-823 [76 Cal.Rptr. 145], defendant was arrested in the early morning hours of Friday, November 11, and was arraigned on Tuesday before noon. He made an oral statement to police officers on Monday at about 5 p.m. and signed a written statement Tuesday morning before being arraigned. The court found a reasonable delay “not in excess of two working days,” noting that Friday, Saturday and Sunday were holidays.

6 Appellants and respondents treated an unsigned and unfiled document appearing in the record in front of the judgment, entitled “Statement of Decision,” as the statement of decision in the case. The judgment of September 8, 1983, indicates that the court “signed and caused to be filed a revised Memorandum Opinion which shall constitute this Court’s Statement of Decision herein.” Since the parties rely on this unsigned statement of decision, we will assume that the document they rely on correctly reflects the “revised Memorandum Opinion” referred to by the court in the judgment. Neither party on appeal disputes the accuracy of the findings of the trial court.

7 Both of these cases dealt with alleged unreasonable delay between the filing of charges and the arrest of the accused.

8 Title 15, California Code of Regulations, section 1062 provides: “The facility administrator or the facility manager shall develop and implement an inmate visiting plan. Such plan shall provide for as many visits and visitors as facility schedules, space, and number of personnel will allow. For sentenced inmates in Type I facilities and all inmates in Type II facilities there shall be allowed no fewer than two visits totaling at least one hour per inmate each week.” A Type I facility “means a local detention facility used for the detention of persons usually pending arraignment for not more than 48 hours excluding holidays and weekends after booking.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 1006, subd. (b)(3).)