Opinion
MANUEL, J.
James Flesher seeks review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board determining, inter alia, that 50 percent of his permanent disability was attributable to a preexisting back condition.
Flesher was employed as an auto body repairman at a number of different establishments from 1934 through 1973. His most recent employer was Capitol Ford, Inc., where he was employed for less than five years. From 1961 to 1973, he was treated for a number of injuries to his back." In 1973, he injured his back while working at Capitol Ford. He filed two applications for benefits, one for the specific injury suffered in 1973, and the other for a cumulative injury incurred in his work from 1934 to 1973.
After a consolidated hearing on the two applications, the workers’ compensation judge determined that Flesher was permanently disabled, that 50 percent of his disability was attributable to injuries sustained prior to 1968, that 40 percent was attributable to the specific injury in 1973 and 10. percent to the cumulative injury sustained between 1968 and 1973. Flesher petitioned the board for reconsideration and argued alternatively that the judge erred in not attributing all of his disability to the specific injury, or that if the judge was correct in attributing a portion to cumulative injury, he erred in limiting the cumulative injury claim to that suffered since 1968. The board granted reconsideration because of a conflict in the medical evidence, ordered that Flesher be examined by an independent physician and concluded in its opinion and decision after reconsideration that the findings and awards of the workers’ compensation judge must be affirmed. More specifically, the board concluded that the apportionment of 40 percent of Flesher’s permanent disability to the specific injury was. fully supported by the opinion of the independent medical examiner. The board also concluded that the limitation on Flesher’s recovery for only the last five years of his cumulative injury was proper under the provisions of Labor Code section 5500.5.
Flesher contends that the board has misinterpreted the provisions of Labor Code section 5500.5
in concluding that he was only entitled to compensation for the cumulative injury incurred during the five years preceding 1973. We agree. Neither the language of section 5500.5 nor its
legislative history indicates that the five-year limitation on liability is intended to limit the time period for which an employee may recover for a cumulative injury. It is instead intended to limit the employers and insurance carriers who may be held liable for an employee’s recovery for a cumulative injury. (See
Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 197, 201-203 [118 Cal.Rptr. 508]; Assem. Com. on Finance, Insurance and Commerce, Interim Hearings on the Problems of Assuring Payments of Compensation for Cumulative Occupational Injuries (Jan. 12 & 19, 1977) pp. 8-9, hereafter referred to as Assem. Com. Hearings.)
Section 5500.5 is long and complex, but its design is reasonably clear.
It is intended to allow an employee to recover for his entire cumulative
injury from one or more employers of his choosing for whom he worked within the preceding five years, even though a portion of his injury was incurred in prior employments. The employer or employers against whom compensation is awarded are in turn authorized to seek contribution from other employers in the five-year period. Under subdivision (a) of section 5500.5, liability for a cumulative injury is limited to those employers who employed the applicant for a period of five years before the injury or before the last date on which the applicant was employed in the occupation exposing him to the cumulative injury. Subdivision (a) also provides that liability shall not be apportioned to prior years
unless the applicant falls within the exception set forth in subdivision (d) for
having been employed by the same employer for more than five years. Under subdivision (c) the applicant may choose to seek an award against one or more employers for whom he worked during the five-year period. Under subdivision (e) the employer or employers held liable may thereafter institute proceedings to determine apportionment of liability and the right of contribution by other employers within the five-year period.
Nowhere in section 5500.5 is the employee’s recovery for cumulative injury limited to that incurred over a period of five years. Nor is there any indication of a legislative intent to establish such a limitation. Indeed, the history of section 5500.5 is to the contrary.
Section 5500.5 was enacted in 1951 to codify the rule announced in
Colonial Ins. Co.
v.
Industrial Acc. Com.
(1946) 29 Cal.2d 79, 82 [172 P.2d 884], that an employee disabled by a progressive occupational disease may obtain an award for his entire disability against any one or more of his successive employers or insurance carriers and that those held liable have the burden of seeking apportionment. (See
Tidewater Oil Co.
v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 950, 956-957 [137 Cal.Rptr. 36];
Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
44 Cal.App.3d at p. 199; Swezey,
Disease as Industrial Injury in California
(1967) 7 Santa Clara Law. 205, 220-221.) Originally, section 5500.5 was limited by its express language to occupational disease claims, but its procedures were applied by analogy to cumulative injury claims as well. (See
Royal Globe Ins. Co.
v.
Industrial Acc. Com.
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 60, 63 [45 Cal.Rptr. 1, 403 P.2d 129];
Raischell & Cottrell, Inc.
v.
Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.
(1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991, 995 [58 Cal.Rptr. 159]; Swezey,
Repetitive Trauma as Industrial Injury in California
(1970) 21 Hastings L.J. 631, 642.) In 1973, section 55Ó0.5 was amended to expressly cover cumulative injury as well as occupational disease claims. (Stats. 1973, ch. 1024, § 4, p. 2032.) At the same time it was also amended to limit the employers against whom compensation could be sought to those who had employed the applicant during the preceding five-year period.
(Ibid.)
In 1977, section 5500.5 was amended to reduce the five-year period to a one-year period by 1981.
(Stats. 1977, ch. 360, § 1, p. 1334.) The
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Opinion
MANUEL, J.
James Flesher seeks review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board determining, inter alia, that 50 percent of his permanent disability was attributable to a preexisting back condition.
Flesher was employed as an auto body repairman at a number of different establishments from 1934 through 1973. His most recent employer was Capitol Ford, Inc., where he was employed for less than five years. From 1961 to 1973, he was treated for a number of injuries to his back." In 1973, he injured his back while working at Capitol Ford. He filed two applications for benefits, one for the specific injury suffered in 1973, and the other for a cumulative injury incurred in his work from 1934 to 1973.
After a consolidated hearing on the two applications, the workers’ compensation judge determined that Flesher was permanently disabled, that 50 percent of his disability was attributable to injuries sustained prior to 1968, that 40 percent was attributable to the specific injury in 1973 and 10. percent to the cumulative injury sustained between 1968 and 1973. Flesher petitioned the board for reconsideration and argued alternatively that the judge erred in not attributing all of his disability to the specific injury, or that if the judge was correct in attributing a portion to cumulative injury, he erred in limiting the cumulative injury claim to that suffered since 1968. The board granted reconsideration because of a conflict in the medical evidence, ordered that Flesher be examined by an independent physician and concluded in its opinion and decision after reconsideration that the findings and awards of the workers’ compensation judge must be affirmed. More specifically, the board concluded that the apportionment of 40 percent of Flesher’s permanent disability to the specific injury was. fully supported by the opinion of the independent medical examiner. The board also concluded that the limitation on Flesher’s recovery for only the last five years of his cumulative injury was proper under the provisions of Labor Code section 5500.5.
Flesher contends that the board has misinterpreted the provisions of Labor Code section 5500.5
in concluding that he was only entitled to compensation for the cumulative injury incurred during the five years preceding 1973. We agree. Neither the language of section 5500.5 nor its
legislative history indicates that the five-year limitation on liability is intended to limit the time period for which an employee may recover for a cumulative injury. It is instead intended to limit the employers and insurance carriers who may be held liable for an employee’s recovery for a cumulative injury. (See
Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 197, 201-203 [118 Cal.Rptr. 508]; Assem. Com. on Finance, Insurance and Commerce, Interim Hearings on the Problems of Assuring Payments of Compensation for Cumulative Occupational Injuries (Jan. 12 & 19, 1977) pp. 8-9, hereafter referred to as Assem. Com. Hearings.)
Section 5500.5 is long and complex, but its design is reasonably clear.
It is intended to allow an employee to recover for his entire cumulative
injury from one or more employers of his choosing for whom he worked within the preceding five years, even though a portion of his injury was incurred in prior employments. The employer or employers against whom compensation is awarded are in turn authorized to seek contribution from other employers in the five-year period. Under subdivision (a) of section 5500.5, liability for a cumulative injury is limited to those employers who employed the applicant for a period of five years before the injury or before the last date on which the applicant was employed in the occupation exposing him to the cumulative injury. Subdivision (a) also provides that liability shall not be apportioned to prior years
unless the applicant falls within the exception set forth in subdivision (d) for
having been employed by the same employer for more than five years. Under subdivision (c) the applicant may choose to seek an award against one or more employers for whom he worked during the five-year period. Under subdivision (e) the employer or employers held liable may thereafter institute proceedings to determine apportionment of liability and the right of contribution by other employers within the five-year period.
Nowhere in section 5500.5 is the employee’s recovery for cumulative injury limited to that incurred over a period of five years. Nor is there any indication of a legislative intent to establish such a limitation. Indeed, the history of section 5500.5 is to the contrary.
Section 5500.5 was enacted in 1951 to codify the rule announced in
Colonial Ins. Co.
v.
Industrial Acc. Com.
(1946) 29 Cal.2d 79, 82 [172 P.2d 884], that an employee disabled by a progressive occupational disease may obtain an award for his entire disability against any one or more of his successive employers or insurance carriers and that those held liable have the burden of seeking apportionment. (See
Tidewater Oil Co.
v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 950, 956-957 [137 Cal.Rptr. 36];
Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
44 Cal.App.3d at p. 199; Swezey,
Disease as Industrial Injury in California
(1967) 7 Santa Clara Law. 205, 220-221.) Originally, section 5500.5 was limited by its express language to occupational disease claims, but its procedures were applied by analogy to cumulative injury claims as well. (See
Royal Globe Ins. Co.
v.
Industrial Acc. Com.
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 60, 63 [45 Cal.Rptr. 1, 403 P.2d 129];
Raischell & Cottrell, Inc.
v.
Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.
(1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991, 995 [58 Cal.Rptr. 159]; Swezey,
Repetitive Trauma as Industrial Injury in California
(1970) 21 Hastings L.J. 631, 642.) In 1973, section 55Ó0.5 was amended to expressly cover cumulative injury as well as occupational disease claims. (Stats. 1973, ch. 1024, § 4, p. 2032.) At the same time it was also amended to limit the employers against whom compensation could be sought to those who had employed the applicant during the preceding five-year period.
(Ibid.)
In 1977, section 5500.5 was amended to reduce the five-year period to a one-year period by 1981.
(Stats. 1977, ch. 360, § 1, p. 1334.) The
purpose of these amendments was to provide greater certainty to insurers in anticipating costs and necessary reserves, to simplify the proceedings by reducing the number of employers and insurers required to be joined as defendants, and to reduce the burden placed on the entire system by the former procedures.
(Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
44 Cal.App.3d at pp. 200-201; Assem. Com. Hearings, pp. 8-9, 55-56.) The insurance industry favored these amendments and reasoned that the total burdens and benefits upon employers and insurers would more or less even out, for while they might be required to assume a larger liability in some cases, they would also be absolved of liability in other cases.
(Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
44 Cal.App.3d at pp. 203-204; Assem. Com. Hearings, pp. 17-19, 70;
Review of Selected 1977 California Legislation
(1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 687.)
The legislative history of section 5500.5 clearly indicates that the time restrictions on employer liability were never viewed as effecting a reduction in the employee’s recovery; they were concerned only with the streamlining of procedures and with the allocation of costs among employers and insurers. (See Assem. Com. Hearings, pp. 68-69;
Review of Selected 1977 California Legislation, supra, 9
Pacific L.J. 687-690.) The board itself in fact took this position in
Harrison
v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
44 Cal.App.3d 197, where it argued for retroactive application of the 1973 amendment on the ground that it was remedial in nature, that it would not diminish the employee’s right of recovery and that it would not result in an overall greater burden on employers and insurance carriers.
It is clear from the foregoing that the board’s determination was based on an erroneous interpretation of section 5500.5 and that its decision must therefore be annulled. (See
Muznik
v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 622, 632 [124 Cal.Rptr. 407].) In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address Flesher’s alternative argument that had the board been correct in its interpretation of section 5500.5 its determination would not have been supported by substantial evidence.
The decision of the board after reconsideration is annulled in its entirety and the case is remanded to the board for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Clark, J., Richardson, J., and Newman, J., concurred.