Hamilton, J.
A rehearing was granted in Young v. Konz, 88 Wn.2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977) (Young I). At issue in the original appeal, as well as the rehearing, is the constitutionality of the state's judicial structure insofar as it permits the utilization of nonlawyer judges in certain courts of limited jurisdiction. These courts exercise jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanor matters which may result in a defendant's loss of liberty.
We held in Young I that our statutory scheme permitting such lay judges did not violate constitutional due process and equal protection guaranties. We reaffirm our conclusion.
Briefly, the background giving rise to Young I and this rehearing is: Respondents Young, Martin, and Jones were charged in Ferry County District Court with a misdemeanor. The judge of that court is not a lawyer and is not statutorily required to be a lawyer since the district has a population of less than 10,000. RCW 3.34.060. Petitioners Munoz, Castro, and Elizondo, among others, were charged in the municipal court of the town of Granger, Yakima County, with a violation of a municipal ordinance. The municipal court judge of Granger (a municipality with a [534]*534population of less than 5,000) is a nonlawyer appointed by the mayor pursuant to RCW 3.50.040.
The Superior Court for Ferry County granted a writ prohibiting the state from proceeding to trial in the district court before the nonlawyer judge. Further action in the Granger Municipal Court was stayed pending consolidation of the two causes and resolution on appeal.
As indicated heretofore, the primary issue decided in Young I and to be decided on rehearing is whether the defendants in the respective causes are denied due process of law under Const, art. 1, § 31 and U.S. Const, amend. 14, if required to go to trial before a nonlawyer judge of a court of limited jurisdiction for a misdemeanor, from which trial a loss of liberty could result. A secondary issue is whether such proceedings would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.
As we noted in Young I, the judicial structure, insofar as here pertinent, constitutionally requires judges of the supreme and superior courts to be admitted to the practice of law. Const, art. 4, § 17. Statutorily, the same requirement applies to judges of the intermediate appellate courts. RCW 2.06.050. The constitution does not expressly specify the qualifications for judges of courts of limited jurisdiction, but, rather, as we will hereafter note, implicitly leaves such up to the legislature. Statutory enactments over the years provide that justices of the peace in cities with a population of 5,000 or more must be attorneys. RCW 3.12-.071. Municipal court judges in municipalities of less than a population of 5,000 need not be lawyers. RCW 3.50.040. District court or "justice court" judges and justices of the peace must, if not attorneys, either have served as a justice of the peace or as a municipal or police court judge. In districts with a population of less than 10,000, they are allowed to serve as judges if they pass an examination pro[535]*535vided by the Supreme Court.2 RCW 3.34.060. Recently, by Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 3, p. 535, the legislature abolished nonattorney judges in certain counties, i.e., second-class counties with populations of 70,000 or more. This abolition was, however, subsequently repealed by Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 197, § 1, p. 654. The effect of the repeal is that any nonattorney who has served as a justice of the peace, municipal court judge, or police court judge prior to 1961 may remain on the bench or refile for the position without taking a qualifying examination.3
De novo review is available to misdemeanor defendants, which review is in the superior court before lawyer judges. RCW 3.50.410; RCW 35.22.560; RCW 35.27.540.
In Young I, we premised our decision upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976). In that case, the high court considered challenges to Kentucky lay judges virtually identical to those advanced here. To illustrate, we quoted the following from North in Young I, at pages 282-83:
Appellant argues that the right to counsel articulated in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, [407 U.S. 25 (1972)] and Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), is meaningless without a lawyer-judge to understand the arguments of counsel. Appellant also argues that the increased complexity of substantive and procedural criminal law requires that all judges now be lawyers in order to be able to rule correctly on the intricate issues lurking even in some simple misdemeanor cases. In the context of the Kentucky procedures, however, it is [536]*536unnecessary to reach the question whether a defendant could be convicted and imprisoned after a proceeding in which the only trial afforded is conducted by a lay judge. In all instances, a defendant in Kentucky facing a criminal sentence is afforded an opportunity to be tried de novo in a court presided over by a lawyer-judge since an appeal automatically vacates the conviction in police court. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.032 (1971); Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 12.06. The trial de novo is available after either a trial or a plea of guilty in the police court; a defendant is entitled to bail while awaiting the trial de novo. 516 S. W. 2d 103 (Ky. 1974).
To avoid the patent impact of North, it is first urged that this state, unlike the Kentucky system considered in North, makes no provision for de novo appeals from pleas of guilty in courts of limited jurisdiction. We do not, however, conceive that the failure to provide such an appeal in all cases significantly or critically distinguishes this state's system from that reviewed in North. Initially, it should be noted that a voluntary plea of guilty normally waives the right of appeal whether entered before a lawyer or nonlawyer judge or whether entered in an inferior or superior court. State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551 (1923); State v. Rose,
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Hamilton, J.
A rehearing was granted in Young v. Konz, 88 Wn.2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977) (Young I). At issue in the original appeal, as well as the rehearing, is the constitutionality of the state's judicial structure insofar as it permits the utilization of nonlawyer judges in certain courts of limited jurisdiction. These courts exercise jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanor matters which may result in a defendant's loss of liberty.
We held in Young I that our statutory scheme permitting such lay judges did not violate constitutional due process and equal protection guaranties. We reaffirm our conclusion.
Briefly, the background giving rise to Young I and this rehearing is: Respondents Young, Martin, and Jones were charged in Ferry County District Court with a misdemeanor. The judge of that court is not a lawyer and is not statutorily required to be a lawyer since the district has a population of less than 10,000. RCW 3.34.060. Petitioners Munoz, Castro, and Elizondo, among others, were charged in the municipal court of the town of Granger, Yakima County, with a violation of a municipal ordinance. The municipal court judge of Granger (a municipality with a [534]*534population of less than 5,000) is a nonlawyer appointed by the mayor pursuant to RCW 3.50.040.
The Superior Court for Ferry County granted a writ prohibiting the state from proceeding to trial in the district court before the nonlawyer judge. Further action in the Granger Municipal Court was stayed pending consolidation of the two causes and resolution on appeal.
As indicated heretofore, the primary issue decided in Young I and to be decided on rehearing is whether the defendants in the respective causes are denied due process of law under Const, art. 1, § 31 and U.S. Const, amend. 14, if required to go to trial before a nonlawyer judge of a court of limited jurisdiction for a misdemeanor, from which trial a loss of liberty could result. A secondary issue is whether such proceedings would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.
As we noted in Young I, the judicial structure, insofar as here pertinent, constitutionally requires judges of the supreme and superior courts to be admitted to the practice of law. Const, art. 4, § 17. Statutorily, the same requirement applies to judges of the intermediate appellate courts. RCW 2.06.050. The constitution does not expressly specify the qualifications for judges of courts of limited jurisdiction, but, rather, as we will hereafter note, implicitly leaves such up to the legislature. Statutory enactments over the years provide that justices of the peace in cities with a population of 5,000 or more must be attorneys. RCW 3.12-.071. Municipal court judges in municipalities of less than a population of 5,000 need not be lawyers. RCW 3.50.040. District court or "justice court" judges and justices of the peace must, if not attorneys, either have served as a justice of the peace or as a municipal or police court judge. In districts with a population of less than 10,000, they are allowed to serve as judges if they pass an examination pro[535]*535vided by the Supreme Court.2 RCW 3.34.060. Recently, by Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 3, p. 535, the legislature abolished nonattorney judges in certain counties, i.e., second-class counties with populations of 70,000 or more. This abolition was, however, subsequently repealed by Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 197, § 1, p. 654. The effect of the repeal is that any nonattorney who has served as a justice of the peace, municipal court judge, or police court judge prior to 1961 may remain on the bench or refile for the position without taking a qualifying examination.3
De novo review is available to misdemeanor defendants, which review is in the superior court before lawyer judges. RCW 3.50.410; RCW 35.22.560; RCW 35.27.540.
In Young I, we premised our decision upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976). In that case, the high court considered challenges to Kentucky lay judges virtually identical to those advanced here. To illustrate, we quoted the following from North in Young I, at pages 282-83:
Appellant argues that the right to counsel articulated in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, [407 U.S. 25 (1972)] and Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), is meaningless without a lawyer-judge to understand the arguments of counsel. Appellant also argues that the increased complexity of substantive and procedural criminal law requires that all judges now be lawyers in order to be able to rule correctly on the intricate issues lurking even in some simple misdemeanor cases. In the context of the Kentucky procedures, however, it is [536]*536unnecessary to reach the question whether a defendant could be convicted and imprisoned after a proceeding in which the only trial afforded is conducted by a lay judge. In all instances, a defendant in Kentucky facing a criminal sentence is afforded an opportunity to be tried de novo in a court presided over by a lawyer-judge since an appeal automatically vacates the conviction in police court. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.032 (1971); Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 12.06. The trial de novo is available after either a trial or a plea of guilty in the police court; a defendant is entitled to bail while awaiting the trial de novo. 516 S. W. 2d 103 (Ky. 1974).
To avoid the patent impact of North, it is first urged that this state, unlike the Kentucky system considered in North, makes no provision for de novo appeals from pleas of guilty in courts of limited jurisdiction. We do not, however, conceive that the failure to provide such an appeal in all cases significantly or critically distinguishes this state's system from that reviewed in North. Initially, it should be noted that a voluntary plea of guilty normally waives the right of appeal whether entered before a lawyer or nonlawyer judge or whether entered in an inferior or superior court. State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551 (1923); State v. Rose, 42 Wn.2d 509, 256 P.2d 493 (1953). Next, it should be observed that this court has outlined proper safeguards to insure that courts of limited jurisdiction accept only truly voluntary pleas of guilty. In re Vensel, 88 Wn.2d 552, 564 P.2d 326 (1977); JCrR 3.06(1); CrR 4.2(d) and (g). Furthermore, in this respect, it has long been recognized that where collateral questions, such as the validity of the statute or ordinance under which a charge is made, the sufficiency of the complaint, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which a guilty plea was made are raised, then appeal and de novo review can follow. State v. Eckert, supra; State v. Alberg, 156 Wash. 397, 287 P. 13 (1930); State v. Haddon, 179 Wash. 669, 38 P.2d 227 (1934); State v. Rose, supra. Finally, it would be a rare instance, indeed, where a defendant would not be afforded release on bail or his own recognizance pending appeal. Given these factors, [537]*537we find no substantive merit to the contention that either the judicial system reviewed or the rationale of North is distinguishable.
In this same vein, it is asserted that the procedure which must be followed in order for a defendant to obtain a trial before a law-trained judge violates due process. It is claimed that before a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo, he must plead not guilty, endure a full trial before a nonlawyer judge, and be convicted in a court of limited jurisdiction. Aside from the fact that some defendants appearing before a nonlawyer judge are acquitted, and others may not desire to appeal, it is simply not an immutable fact that every defendant must endure a full trial to preserve an appeal and secure a second trial. It is not an uncommon practice in courts of limited jurisdiction, be the court manned by a lawyer or nonlawyer judge, for defendants to enter a plea of not guilty and stipulate to the prosecution's case or submit the matter to the court on a mere reading of the arresting officer's written report. These procedures consume a modicum of time, fully preserve appeal rights, and expedite trial de novo. In addition, defendants and their counsel have the benefit of previewing the evidence which will be used against them in superior court should they desire to appeal. Nevertheless, in whatever manner the trial proceeds in the justice or district court, we find no significant due process violation flowing from the double trial theory advocated in support of the proposition that nonlawyer judges in courts of limited jurisdiction should be judicially abolished. As we properly pointed out in Young I, at pages 280-81:
Due process of the law requires a fair trial for each defendant; the fair trial guaranty is protected through the appeals process. It is conceded that a fair trial may in certain cases not be afforded by a nonlawyer judge; but we may properly point out that it is also true that a lawyer judge may commit error and thereby deny a fair trial. The due process safeguard in both cases is appeal, the one critical difference being that a defendant in a court [538]*538of limited jurisdiction has the automatic right to a new trial, irrespective of error in the first trial.
To further elude the import of North, it is next contended that we should accord Const, art. 1, § 3 an interpretation giving rise to a higher standard of due process than that accorded the federal due process clause in North.
As a first step in this argument, support is sought by undertaking to analogize our approach to an equal protection argument in Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973). In Hanson, we awarded strict scrutiny on equal protection grounds to a classification based upon sex. This was a higher standard of scrutiny than then accorded to sex classifications by the United States Supreme Court. However, within the framework of the federal equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, other courts had already begun to give more careful scrutiny to legislative attempts at sexual discrimination. We recognized this in Hanson v. Hutt, supra at 199. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
Further, in Hanson, we noted that four United States Supreme Court justices were convinced classifications based upon sex were suspect. The unconvinced justices felt merely that the court should defer categorizing sex classifications until the fate of the Equal Rights Amendment was determined by the people's will. Hanson v. Hutt, supra at 200. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973). Importantly, we observed that the people of Washington State had expressed their will and adopted an equal rights amendment. Hanson v. Hutt, supra at 200 n.3. Thus, based upon all the foregoing, we defined a standard in excess of the federally required standard. Hanson v. Hutt, supra. Quite clearly, the rationale for Hanson's higher standard was based entirely on developing constitutional analysis revolving about sex classifications. It did not purport to enlarge due process or equal protection standards in unrelated areas.
As we recognized in Young I, the sound approach to this case is to acknowledge and appreciate that Const, art. [539]*5391, § 3 is the same as the federal due process clause, and federal cases, while not necessarily controlling, are entitled to be given great weight. Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wn.2d 144, 459 P.2d 937 (1969); Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101, 258 P. 1039 (1927); Bowman v. Waldt, 9 Wn. App. 562, 513 P.2d 559 (1973); see State v. Moore, 79 Wn.2d 51, 66, 483 P.2d 630 (1971) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
Rather than promulgate an expanded due process standard, we should accept North and, in light of our long followed practice, give that case the weight to which it is entitled and the weight we accorded it in Young I.
Turning to the requisites of fair trial provided under Const, art. 1, § 3, we find no evolution of the concepts basic to fair trial which dictates adoption of a higher standard of due process than that set forth in North. In speaking of due process, we have said:
The essential elements of the constitutional guaranty of due process, in its procedural aspect, are notice and an opportunity to be heard or defend before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case.
In re Hendrickson, 12 Wn.2d 600, 606, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
Our state system, which provides for nonattorney judges in small sparsely populated areas, only in misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor cases, with de novo review from all cases, unless review is voluntarily waived, clearly meets this standard.
Other courts have considered the same question and have found nonattorney judges do not violate due process. See State v. Lynch, 107 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 697 (1971); Treiman v. State ex rel. Miner, 343 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1977); Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969); Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972); State v. Lindgren, 235 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1975); In re Hewitt, 81 Misc. 2d 202, 365 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1975); State v. Duncan, 269 S.C. 510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977); Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976); Thomas v. Justice Court, 538 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1975).
[540]*540Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cited and relied upon by the defendants, is clearly the minority position. Furthermore, Gordon was decided before the North decision and in a state where population and geographic conditions are considerably different, and where vastly more attorneys are available to act as judges, as well as to provide legal counsel to defendants as required under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1975).
In this latter respect, we take note of the observation by the Ferry County Superior Court judge that there were three attorneys at that time practicing in Republic, the county seat of Ferry County. However, reference to the Washington State Bar Association Directory of Attorneys 135 (1977) indicates only two. Be that as it may, given the relative isolation of Republic from other communities in neighboring counties, i.e., Nespelem, Tonasket, and Kettle Falls, the anomaly advocated at once becomes apparent. One of the attorneys no doubt is the prosecuting attorney for Ferry County. If there be two, one, under defendants' theory, would necessarily become the justice court judge, leaving none readily available to act on behalf of a defendant. If there be three, a defendant would have little choice as to who would represent him.
Our attention is further drawn to the increase in membership of the Washington State Bar. Although the number of attorneys presently admitted to practice may appear sufficient to staff the inferior courts, we cannot assume that they will voluntarily locate and commence or continue their practice in sparsely settled urban or rural areas. Attorneys are not pawns to be moved about by judicial fiat. Neither is it a function of this court to "make work" for lawyers. We find no significant merit in this argument.
Under our state constitution, the people have clearly vested the legislature with the sole authority to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers, and implicitly the qualifications, of justices of the peace and such other inferior courts [541]*541as the legislature may establish. The pertinent constitutional provisions read:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.
(Italics ours.) Const, art. 4, § 1.
[The superior court] . . . shall have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law.
(Italics ours.) Const, art. 4, § 6.
The legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected and shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace: Provided, That such jurisdiction granted by the legislature shall not trench upon the jurisdiction of superior or other courts of record, except that justices of the peace may be made police justices of incorporated cities and towns. Justices of the peace shall have original jurisdiction in cases where the demand or value of the property in controversy is less than three hundred dollars or such greater sum, not to exceed one thousand dollars, as shall be prescribed by the legislature. In incorporated cities or towns having more than five thousand inhabitants, the justices of the peace shall receive such salary as may be provided by law, and shall receive no fees for their own use.
(Italics ours.) Const, art. 4, § 10 (amendment 28).
The supreme court and the superior courts shall be courts of record, and the legislature shall have power to provide that any of the courts of this state, excepting justices of the peace, shall be courts of record.
(Italics ours.) Const, art. 4, § 11.
The legislature shall prescribe by law the jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in pursuance of this Constitution.
(Italics ours.) Const, art. 4, § 12.
No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of the supreme court, or judge of a superior court, unless he [542]*542shall have been admitted to practice in the courts of record of this state, or of the Territory of Washington.
Const, art. 4, § 17.
It seems obvious that within the framework of these provisions, the people, through our constitution, have: (1) explicitly recognized and accepted justices of the peace as well as such inferior courts as the legislature may create; (2) vested such courts with the judicial power of the state; (3) authorized only the legislature (aside from the constitutional amendment process) to prescribe the powers, duties and jurisdiction of such courts; (4) established appellate jurisdiction over cases arising from such courts in the superior courts; and (5) provided that admission to practice law shall be a qualification only for judges of the superior and supreme courts.
In this vein, In re Bartz, 47 Wn.2d 161, 287 P.2d 119 (1955), contains pertinent language to our decision here. The issue in Bartz was the power of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for judges of justice courts. In upholding that power, this court, per Rosellini, J., noted:
The authority of the legislature to determine the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of justices of the peace was expressly granted in Art. IV, § 10. Laws governing the qualifications of these officers had been in effect for many years at the time the constitution was adopted. As early as 1899, the legislature prescribed that, in incorporated cities and towns of the first class, justices of the peace should be attorneys at law. Laws of 1899, chapter 85, § 1, p. 135. When Art. IV, § 10 was amended in 1952 (amendment 28), authority was conferred upon the legislature in the same language as that which appears in the original provision. At that time, the power of the legislature to prescribe qualifications had never been questioned in this court. While that power is not expressly granted in the constitution, it must be remembered that a grant is unnecessary, and the enactment of such laws is not in conflict with any express or implied provision. On the contrary, the establishing and altering of qualifications is a function which should naturally follow the right to prescribe the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of an office. The legislature has consistently acted on the [543]*543assumption that it had this power, both before and after the adoption of the constitution.
"Where a particular construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention." 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 144 (1927).
In re Bartz, supra at 167-68.
We are satisfied that if the necessity for innovation in this area of the administration of justice is felt by the citizens of this state, the legislature will respond. The concept of all attorney judges on the inferior court level will not thereby be imbedded in constitutional concrete, unreachable by the legislature or the people short of a constitutional amendment.
Lastly, we find North controlling on the issue of equal protection. The United States Supreme Court in North upheld the right of states to classify areas, establishing one system of courts for populated areas and another for rural areas.
We accordingly quash the writ of prohibition and the stay of proceedings issued in these causes and reaffirm Young v. Konz, 88 Wn.2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977).
Weight, C.J., and Rosellini, Stafford, Brachtenbach, and Hicks, JJ., concur.