Young v. Hunt

507 F. Supp. 785, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11939
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedFebruary 10, 1981
DocketS80-359
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 507 F. Supp. 785 (Young v. Hunt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Hunt, 507 F. Supp. 785, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11939 (N.D. Ind. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Omer Young, Jr., was a prisoner confined at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana at the time he filed this complaint. He was subsequently transferred to the Westville Correctional Center and has been released on parole. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming Norman J. Hunt, Director of Classification and Treatment of the Indiana Department of Corrections, and Harold Roddy, Director of the Division of Work Release, as defendants and seeks both damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when these defendants denied his work release application. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated because the defendants may have used false information in making their determination, that they failed to follow their own regulations in the processing of his work release application, and that the decision to deny him work release was arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiff also alleges that his right to equal protection of the law was violated because other inmates with offenses of an assaultive nature and repeated parole violations have been and are now in the work release program.

The plaintiff became eligible for work release consideration in early 1979 and did apply for it. His application was disapproved on May 24, 1979 by Harold Roddy. The stated reasons for this denial were a history of repeated parole violations and the assaultive nature of plaintiff’s offense. Plaintiff appealed this denial in conformity with the procedural regulations to defendant Hunt who affirmed the denial on November 26, 1979.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on or about December 12,1979. The Honorable William E. Steckler transferred this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, within whose venue the Indiana State Prison at Michigan City, Indiana lies. The statute governing work release at the time this action was filed was Indiana Code (hereinafter I.C.) 11-7-9-1 et seq., particularly I.C. 11-7-9-2. The administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to this statute and I.C. 11-1-1.1-10 are found at 210 Indiana Administrative Code (hereinafter I.A.C.) 1-2-2. These regulations are further disseminated through the Department of Corrections Manual 15- *787 04, Policies and Procedures for Work Release and the Inmate Handbook. These documents have all been incorporated into this record and have been thoroughly reviewed in light of these allegations. Finally, it must be noted that the statutory authorization for the work release program has been modified pursuant to I.C. 11-7-9-4, effective October 1, 1980. However, the statute in effect at the time of the challenged conduct is the one which must be examined. The new statute would have no effect on the outcome of this case, particularly in light of I.C. 11-8-2-10 which continues in effect the previously existing regulations. The new statute, I.C. 11-7-9-4 will be found in the appendix of this opinion.

The plaintiff’s central argument is that the State of Indiana by I.C. 11-7-9-1 et seq. and by promulgating regulations for its administration created on behalf of eligible inmates a protectible “liberty” interest in work release participation. Therefore, plaintiff alleges that the procedural processing of any work release application should be accompanied by some degree of the due process protections enunciated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

The threshold question then becomes whether the denial of work release status infringed a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Following the decision in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), this Circuit has held that a prisoner is not constitutionally entitled to procedural protections unless “.. . he has some justifiable expectation rooted in state law that the challenged action will not be taken absent the occurrence of a specified factual predicate.” Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 45 (7th Cir. 1978); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1980). In Meachum, supra, 427 U.S. at 229, 96 S.Ct. at 2540, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state could create a liberty interest “by statute, by rule, or regulation.” This Circuit has recognized that a prisoner may have a due process right as a result of entitlements created by prison regulations and by official policies and practices. Stringer, supra, at 996; Arsbury, supra, at 47; Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff argues that by virtue of the statutes and regulations at issue, there was created a justifiable expectation that he would be granted work release when he became eligible. Therefore, plaintiff argues he is entitled to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that those state-created rights are not arbitrarily abrogated. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly recognized the similar issues involved in the revocation of work release status and the revocation of parole. Durso, supra. The core values of unqualified liberty not enjoyed by those inmates continually incarcerated are identical. Likewise, the similarity between the discretionary grant of work release and the discretionary grant of parole has been recognized. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. en banc 1980), cert. den. Anderson v. Winsett, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 891, 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (White, J. and Rehnquist, J. dissent as to denial); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1979); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979). The question of whether the Indiana work release statute creates a legitimate claim of entitlement rising to a “liberty” interest requiring due process protections has not been previously decided.

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Bluebook (online)
507 F. Supp. 785, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11939, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-hunt-innd-1981.