Young v. Barelli

125 So. 258, 169 La. 319, 1929 La. LEXIS 1986
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedOctober 8, 1929
DocketNo. 29443.
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 125 So. 258 (Young v. Barelli) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Barelli, 125 So. 258, 169 La. 319, 1929 La. LEXIS 1986 (La. 1929).

Opinion

ROGERS, J.

This is a concursus proceeding growing out of the construction in the town of Covington of a large brick building to be used as a sanatorium for the treatment of mental and nervous diseases. The owner and contractee impleaded the contractor, the surety on his bond, and four alleged lienors. Plaintiff’s demand against the contractor and his surety was for $8,900, the estimated cost of alleged defective work; and his demand against the lienors was for the cancellation of their liens and a limitation of his liability to $617.26, the amount of the balance due by him on the contract, which he deposited in the registry of the court.

The contractor and his surety denied that the work was defective, and averred that the contractor had performed all work on the building that he was called upon or obligated to do. The contractor claimed $3,725.37, by way of reeonvention, for extra work and time lost.

Judgment was rendered by the court below in favor of plaintiff against the contractor and his surety, in solido, for the sum of $8,-709, with interest, and for an additional amount of $1,000 as attorney’s fees. Also in favor of two of the lienors — G. W. Alexius for $1,070, with interest, and Gibbens & Gordon, Inc., for $257.38, with interest — against the contractor’s surety. The reeonventional demand of the contractor was rejected at his cost. From this judgment the contractor and his surety are prosecuting the present appeal.

The claim of O. W. Alexius, on which he obtained judgment against the American Employers’ Insurance Company, the surety on the contractor’s bond, for $1,070, was for money lent the contractor partly to pay his workmen and partly to use generally. In neither case, however, is the contractor’s surety responsible for the debt.

The contract between the parties is governed by Act No. 139 of 1922, as amended by Act No. 230 of 1924, both of which statutes have since been. repealed by Act No. 298 of 1926. No question is made of the subrogation of the claimant to the claims of the laborers for the payment of whom he advanced the money to the contractor. Neither of the controlling statutes grants a privilege to the furnisher of money used in paying the laborers therein referred to. Central Lumber Co. v. Schroeder, 164 La. 759, 114 So. 644. Nor is the claim asserted by the claimant one of those covered by the bond, which is statutory, conditioned for the payment only of the subcontractors, journeymen, cartmen, truckmen, workmen, laborers, mechanics, and furnish-ers of material jointly as their interest may arise. Section 2, Act. No. 139 of 1922.

The only item of the claim of Gibbens & Gordon, Inc., that is disputed by the appellant surety company is one of $27 for ventilators. These ventilators, 18 in number, were placed in the walls of the foundation of the building. They were not .provided for in the original building contract, but were ordered by the architect at the suggestion of the contractor after he had noticed a bulge in the floor of the main entrance hall. The bulge in the floor was caused by the dampness under the building, and the ventilators were purchased and placed to remedy the condition.

While the ventilators were not specified in the contract nor ordered by the contractor, they were, nevertheless, used by him in the construction of the building. Furthermore, he considered and claimed that he was entitled to be compensated as extra work for furnish *327 ing ($27) and setting ($2.75) the ventilators. Vide, item No. 19 of the reconventional demand. And under a written agreement entered into on May 31,1926, between the owner and the contractor, approved by the representative of the surety company, which agreement is herein attacked by the contractor, in consideration of the cancellation by the owner of all claims for credits and demurrage, the'contractor waived all his claims for extra work. Thus, both-the contractor and his surety expressly recognized that- the former was entitled to be compensated for extra work, 'including, necessarily, the furnishing and setting of the ventilators, and the fact that they chose to waive this claim, among others, against the owner for such work, cannot relieve them of the obligation of paying for the ventilators. The court below was correct in allowing the claim of Gibbens & Gordon, Inc., in full.

The demand of the owner for ,a large moneyed judgment against the contractor and his surety was vigorously contested in the court below. On the trial of that issue much testimony, oral and documentary, was adduced on behalf of the parties litigant. Among the written evidence offered on behalf of the owner is a list prepared by the architect setting forth the items of alleged defective and uncompleted work. The items are- numbered from 1 to 36, but there are no defects nor uncompleted work listed under the numbers 28 and 29, so that actually there are 34 items in dispute.

The owner employed two experts to examine the building and estimate the cost of remedying the alleged defects and completing the work. The contractor and his surety employed one expert for the same purpose. The three experts testified on behalf of their respective employers, and their estimates of ithe cost of remedying the defects differ so widely that there is no possibility of reconciling them. The court must therefore accept as correct either the estimates of the owner’s experts or the estimate of the expert for the contractor and his surety. Witnesses are not counted but weighed. In determining the value of this testimony as proof of the facts, the mere circumstance that two experts were introduced by plaintiff and only one expert was .introduced by defendants is not controlling. Conceding the truthfulness of the witnesses, there are many other factors to be considered in determining their competency to judge of the matters about which they testified. Among these factors may be mentioned, by way of illustration, their general intelligence, their scientific education, their practical experience,. and their manner and means of observation.

One of plaintiff’s witnesses (Wikle) has been in the contracting business for 21 years, of which 3 years were on his own account. Plaintiff’s other witness (Burkes) has been in the contracting-business for 27 years, of which 20 years were on his own account. He was assisted in making his estimate by one of his employees (McEadden), a civil engineer and estimator, with 3 years’ experience, of building construction. The defendants’ witness (Neville) is professionally a civil and construction engineer, holding two degrees as such from Cornell University, from which' institution of learning he was graduated in 1899 and 1900. He also served for short periods as instructor of construction engineering at Cornell University and at the University of Iowa. In addition to his collegiate training and teaching experience, the witness has been engaged in construction work, both as a contractor for his own account, and as an estimator for other contractors. At the present time he confines his business solely to that of construction engineering, making estimates *329 on a fee or commission basis for some of the prominent contractors and important commercial firms of the city of New Orleans.

The record discloses that plaintiff’s experts were together when they made their examination of the building.

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Bluebook (online)
125 So. 258, 169 La. 319, 1929 La. LEXIS 1986, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-barelli-la-1929.