Yost v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 14, 2002
DocketNo. 01CA667.
StatusUnpublished

This text of Yost v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002) (Yost v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yost v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002), (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Bob Yost appeals the decision of the Environmental Review Appeals Commission ("ERAC") upholding the Director of Environmental Protection's dismissal of his complaint. He raises the following assignment of error for our review:

WHETHER THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW APPEALS COMMISSION ERRORED (SIC) IN GRANTING THE DIRECTOR'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE CONDUCT COMPLAINED OF IN HIS VERIFIED COMPLAINT.

We find appellant's argument to be meritless and affirm the decision of the ERAC.

Appellant is an environmental consultant specializing in manure management systems. He resides in Mansfield, Richland County, Ohio. In May and June, 2000, appellant filed verified complaints with the director of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, citing violations of environmental law at the Pork Champ, LLC facility located in Waverly, Pike County, Ohio.1 In January, 2001, after visiting the Pork Champ facility, the director dismissed the complaint, stating that there were no current violations of environmental law at the facility. The director also stated that, while there had been a previous violation by Pork Champ, the violation was not now occurring and was not likely to occur in the future. Appellant appealed the director's dismissal to the ERAC. In March, 2001, the director filed a motion to dismiss based on appellant's lack of standing. The ERAC held a hearing on the motion and later granted the director's motion to dismiss. In its order, the commission found that appellant had not offered "a single way in which he had been aggrieved or adversely affected by the alleged violations." Accordingly, the ERAC concluded that he lacked standing and dismissed his appeal. Appellant then filed this appeal with the clerk of the Pike County Court of Appeals.

Appeals from the decisions of administrative agencies are largely controlled by legislative provisions. R.C. 3745.06, which involves environmental proceedings, states:

Any party adversely affected by an order of the environmental review appeals commission may appeal to the court of appeals of Franklin county, or, if the appeal arises from an alleged violation of a law or regulation, to the court of appeals of the district in which the violation was alleged to have occurred. Id.

Because the alleged conduct took place in Pike County, Ohio, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Under R.C. 3745.06, our standard of review requires us to affirm an order of the ERAC if it is "supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law." Ashland Chemical Co. v. Jones (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 234, 238,749 N.E.2d 744, 747; R.C. 3745.06.

Appellant argues that dismissal was improper because he was adversely affected by the conduct of Pork Champ, LLC, and thus, has standing to bring an appeal. Under R.C. 3745.08, any person who is "aggrieved or adversely affected" may file a complaint with the director of environmental protection. Likewise, R.C. 3745.06 requires the appellant to have been "adversely affected by an order" of the commission. Thus, we must determine whether appellant was "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" by the alleged conduct and could properly appeal the director's decision. We are guided in this case by traditional standing principles. See Franklin Cty. Solid Waste Mgt. Auth. v. Schregardus (1992),84 Ohio App.3d 591, 599, 617 N.E.2d 761.

In order to establish standing, a party must show that the challenged action has caused, or will cause, the party an injury in fact, be it economic or otherwise. A party must also establish that the interest being asserted is within the scope of interests regulated or protected by the statutory provision or constitutional right at issue. State ex rel.Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 459,351 N.E.2d 127, 129; Franklin Cty. Regional Solid Waste Mgt. Auth. v.Schregardus (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 591, 599, 617 N.E.2d 761. The alleged injury must be definite, not abstract or speculative; the appellant must show that he has suffered or will suffer a specific injury from the challenged inaction, and that the injury will be redressed if the court invalidates the inaction. Woods v. Oak Hill Community Med. Ctr. (1999),134 Ohio App.3d 261, 268-269, 730 N.E.2d 1037, 1042; State ex rel.Consumers League of Ohio v. Ratchford (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 420, 424,457 N.E.2d 878, 883. The injury must be actual and immediate or threatened. See State ex rel. Connors v. Ohio Dept. of Trans. (1982),8 Ohio App.3d 44, 46-47, 455 N.E.2d 1331, 1334.

At the hearing before the ERAC, the commissioners asked appellant several times how he was aggrieved or adversely affected by the alleged environmental infractions. Yost concedes that he does not live near the Pork Champ facility, which is located almost 120 miles away from his home. His only claim appears to be that he is a citizen of the state and has an obligation to see that the environmental laws are being enforced. Appellant stated at the hearing: "I feel it's very — it's a very large detriment to our environment by letting some of the things happen that have happened." When asked at the hearing how he would be affected personally, Yost replied, "Because personally I — I live here in the state. I've actually seen birds feeding on these dead carcasses." Furthermore, in his own brief, appellant cited his testimony:

When I see actual birds and waterfowl swimming in manure that's being discharged illegally, that impacts me, because I have a great love for wildlife and like that.

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Related

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)
State, Ex Rel. Consumers League v. Ratchford
457 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1982)
State Ex Rel. Connors v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation
455 N.E.2d 1331 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1982)
Woods v. Oak Hill Community Med. Ctr., Inc.
730 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1999)
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips
351 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1976)
Ashland Chemical Co. v. Jones
749 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Yost v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yost-v-jones-unpublished-decision-1-14-2002-ohioctapp-2002.