Yiannias v. Commission of Internal Revenue

180 F.2d 115, 38 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1484, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 4261
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 14, 1950
Docket14057_1
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 180 F.2d 115 (Yiannias v. Commission of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yiannias v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 180 F.2d 115, 38 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1484, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 4261 (8th Cir. 1950).

Opinions

GARDNER, Chief Judge.

Petitioner seeks review of the decision of the Tax Court determining a deficiency in his income "taxes for • the calendar year 1943. The basic tacts out of which this controversy arose, as found by the Tax Court, may be briefly stated.

Petitioner filed a joint return with his wife, Stella, for the year 1942, but filed a separate return for 1943. He 'held a lease on a theater building in Dubque, Iowa, known as the Avon Theater: On September 1, 1937, as lessee, he joined in an agreement with the lessee of .the Singer-Dubuque Corporation and the owner of Grand Opera House, Inc., by the terms of which the owners and operators of these theaters agreed to operate four theaters at Dubque, Iowa, under joint management for a period of six years commencing September 4, 1937, under the trade name of Associated Theaters. The agreement provided that a salary of $125.00 per month should be paid petitioner and a salary of $75.00 per week should be paid to John H. Maclay, these expenditures to be considered as operating expenses of the joint operation and that the net profits were to be divided as 'follows: petitioner, 28 per cent; . SingerDubuque Corporation, 20 per cent; Grand Opera House, Inc., 52 per cent. T-he respective parties were to pay the rentals called for in their lease, and Grand Opera House, Inc., was to furnish the Grand and Strand Theaters free of rent. The management was to be 'in the hands of representatives of the contracting . parties and unanimous consent of these three was required to establish a policy in relation to the management- of the theaters. The agreement was extended for an additional five year period commencing September 4, 1943. Petitioner performed services for Associated Theaters and was paid the salary agreed upon.

On December 15, 1942, petitioner and 'his wife executed a document referred to in the record as an assignment, by the terms of which petitioner in form assigned to his wife, Stella, the leasehold which he held on the theater building known as the Avon Theater, “together with all rights of the lessee or tenant granted in said lease except the right to payment of the deposit of $5,000 and the interest thereon, which right he reserves to himself.” Petitioner’s wife covenanted not to assign or underlet the lease and “to employ the said James Yiannias as general manager of the Theater until the termination of said leasehold * * *.”■ The lessor of the premises leased by petitioner gave his consent in writing to the assignment, with the proviso that “this license and consent is restricted to this particular assignment and save as [117]*117aforesaid the covenant in said lease against assigning and subletting shall remain in full force and effect. It is understood that the said James Yiannias is in no manner released from his obligation as lessee and tenant under the said lease.” On December 31, 1942, petitioner and his wife gave written notice to Singer-Dubuquc Corporation and Grand Opera House, Inc., of his transfer and assignment to his wife, Stella.

During the period from September 1, 1937 to December 31, 1942, the agreement as to joint operation was carried out except that no service or representative in the operation of Associated Theaters was furnished by Singcr-Dubuque Corporation. After December 31, 1942, and during the year 1943, the theaters were operated and managed in substantially the same manner as before. Petitioner’s duties were substantially the same except that the income which previously had been distributed to him was thereafter credited to the account of his wife, Stella. His wife performed no services for the enterprise prior to 1943. She contributed no capital, nor did she perform any vital services for the business during the year 1943, but the business was carried on as in prior years. She did not maintain an office but stayed at home with her small children.

In 1943 Maclay was secretary of Grand Opera House, Inc., and a salaried employee of Associated Theaters. Petitioner consulted him with reference to withdrawing from the Associated Theaters and Maclay, on behalf of Grand Opera House, Inc., consented. No new agreement was entered into when petitioner made the assignment and Maclay was not concerned about petitioner substituting Stella as a participant in the pool arrangement because it was agreed before Maclay consented thereto that petitioner had no intention of ceasing to give his services to Associated Theaters. Maclay was petitioner’s superior in 1943 and petitioner took advice and instructions from him. Petitioner continued in the same capacity, performing substantially the same services as before 1943 so far as the group of theaters was concerned.

Petitioner had had numerous stays in hospitals and sick spells at home and had been rejected for life insurance for physical reasons four or five times.

Prom these basic facts 'the court concluded that for tax purposes Mrs. Yiannias should not be recognized as being a partner of Associated Theaters, but that the income arising from the operation of these theaters was that of petitioner. The correctness of this conclusion is challenged by petitioner in his petition to review the Tax Court’s decision.

A taxpayer has the right to avoid or decrease the amount of his income taxes by any means which the law permits. If, however, the motive is to avoid or decrease the tax the transaction should be carefully scrutinized., Morsman v. Commissioner, 8 Cir., 90 F.2d 18, 113 A.L.R. 441. The court may look at actualities and if the transaction is found to be a subterfuge it may be disregarded for taxation purposes 'as substance rather than form must prevail. If the arrangement or transaction is in fact an attempt to shift income from the taxpayer to a near relative without any significant economic change in taxpayer’s business it can not be permitted to stand. In examining such transactions the issue to be determined is “who earned the income.” Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532, 537, 90 L.Ed. 670, 164 A.L.R. 1135. It is, however, contended in this case that the reason for the formal transfer of the petitioner’s lease to his wife was his failing health. This contention seems not seriously to have impressed the Tax Court but the contention is here renewed. We have examined the testimony and think the finding of the court on this issue can not be said to be clearly erroneous. It appears that petitioner has not been incapacitated by ill health 'at any time since December, 1942. The evidence as to when he was incapacitated is very, indefinite as it covers a period from 1939 to 1942. We think the court was warranted on the record in finding and believing that the motive for this transfer was to decrease petitioner’s income tax and hence the transaction must be carefully scrutinized.

The income was. that earned by the Associated Theaters. It was confessedly, up to the time of the execution of this assign[118]*118ment, the income of petitioner. The property from the operation of which the income resulted was contributed by petitioner. The Association had a special property right in his lease because in the agreement between the picture show houses he was not at liberty to transfer it, at least without the consent of his associates, and neither was he at liberty to transfer without the consent of the lessor.

It is important, we think, to consider what changes were effected by the assignment of this lease.

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Yiannias v. Commission of Internal Revenue
180 F.2d 115 (Eighth Circuit, 1950)

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Bluebook (online)
180 F.2d 115, 38 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1484, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 4261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yiannias-v-commission-of-internal-revenue-ca8-1950.