Yhoan Alexander Melendez-Bello v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 YHOAN ALEXANDER MELENDEZ- Case No. 1:26-cv-02053-JLT-CDB (HC) BELLO 12 (A-Number: 249 228 004), FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 13 Petitioner, CORPUS

14 v. (Doc. 1)

15 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 7-Day Objection Period 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Yhoan Alexander Melendez-Bello, a federal immigration detainee proceeding by 19 counsel, initiated this action on March 13, 2026, with the filing of a petition for writ of habeas 20 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is in custody the of Immigration and Customs 21 Enforcement (“ICE”) at the California City Correctional Center. Id. ¶ 1. Respondents are: 22 Christopher Chestnut, Warden of the California City Correctional Center; Markwayne Mullin, 23 Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney 24 General of the United States; Todd M. Lyons, Acting ICE Director; and Sergio Albarran, ICE Field 25 Office Director, San Francisco Field Office.1 See id. 26 At the Court’s direction, Respondents filed a response to the petition on April 14, 2026. 27 1 Todd Blanche is automatically substituted for Pamela Bondi, former United States Attorney 28 General, and Markwayne Mullin for Kristi Noem, former Secretary of DHS. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 1 (Doc. 8). Petitioner filed a traverse on April 16, 2026. (Doc. 9). For the reasons set forth herein, 2 the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted. 3 I. Relevant Background 4 The relevant facts are drawn from the parties’ filings. See (Docs. 1, 8, 9). Petitioner is a 5 native and citizen of Venezuela who unlawfully entered the United States on or about December 6 12, 2023, and was apprehended by Border Patrol; he was issued a Notice to Appear and released 7 on recognizance on December 15, 2023. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 28-31; Doc. 8-2). Petitioner later filed an 8 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations 9 Convention Against Torture. (Doc. 1 ¶ 32). During the approximately two-year period of his 10 release from the custody of immigration authorities, Petitioner was never charged with a crime, 11 established ties to the community, and maintained lawful employment. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 64. On 12 December 13, 2025, his vehicle was pulled over by police in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Petitioner 13 taken into custody. Id. ¶ 33; (Doc. 8-1 at 2). He was charged with “Open Container/Drinking 14 Alcohol in a vehicle”; the charges remain pending. (Doc. 8-1 at 2; Doc. 9 ¶ 4). He was 15 subsequently encountered at the Salt Lake City Metro Jail on December 15, 2025, detained by ICE, 16 and returned to immigration detention. (Doc. 1 ¶ 33; Doc. 8-1 at 2). 17 The Court also takes judicial notice that Petitioner has a master hearing scheduled for June 18 12, 2026.2 19 II. Governing Authority 20 A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United 22 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus 23 shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should 24 not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not 25 2 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited May 28, 2026, using Petitioner’s 26 A-Number and nationality); Daniels-Hall v. National Edu. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made publicly available by government 27 entities ... and neither party disputes the authenticity of the web sites or the accuracy of the information displayed [ ] therein.”); Argueta v. Walgreens Co., 760 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1034 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (taking 28 judicial notice of information on federal government agency’s website). 1 entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 2 Relevant here, “in cases that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus 3 jurisdiction remains in the district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner 4 “challenges his confinement on statutory and constitutional grounds.” Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443 5 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 6 2008) (holding “the district court has jurisdiction over Torres’s habeas petition challenging his 7 detention” in ICE custody). 8 B. Statutory Immigration Framework (8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226) 9 Two statutes govern the detention and removal of inadmissible noncitizens from the United 10 States: 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. Relevant here is the legal background presented by the district 11 court in Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D. Cal. Sept 12, 12 2025), which the undersigned adopts herein: 13 1. Full Removal Proceedings and Discretionary Detention (§ 1226) 14 The “usual removal process” involves an evidentiary hearing before 15 an immigration judge. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1229(a), also known as “full removal,” by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. 17 Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011). Section § 1226 provides that while removal proceedings are pending, a noncitizen “may be arrested and 18 detained” and that the government “may release the alien on ... conditional parole.” § 1226(a)(2); accord Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 19 108 (during removal proceedings, applicant may either be “detained” or “allowed to reside in this country”). When a person is apprehended 20 under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial custody determination. Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) 21 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). A noncitizen will be released if he or she “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 22 would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. 23 § 236.1(c)(8)).

24 “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v. 25 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1)). If, at this hearing, the detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of 26 the evidence that he or she is not “a threat to national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a 27 poor bail risk,” the IJ will order his or his release. Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). 28 1 Once released, the noncitizen’s bond is subject to revocation. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), “the DHS has authority to revoke a noncitizen’s 2 bond or parole ‘at any time,’ even if that individual has previously been released.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 968 (N.D. 3 Cal. 2019). However, if an immigration judge has determined the noncitizen should be released, the DHS may not re-arrest that 4 noncitizen absent a change in circumstance. See Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2021). Where the release 5 decision was made by a DHS officer, not an immigration judge, the Government’s practice has been to require a showing of changed 6 circumstances before re-arrest. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 7 2. Expedited Removal and Mandatory Detention (§ 1225) 8 While “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States,” 9 U.S. immigration law also “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under 10 §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” a process that provides for expedited removal. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (2018). Under § 1225, a 11 noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” is considered “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. 12 § 1225(a)(1). For certain applicants for admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 authorizes “expedited removal.” § 1225(b)(1). § 1225(b)(1) provides 13 that:

14 “If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) 15 who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 16 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7)], the officer shall order the alien 17 removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an 18 intention to apply for asylum under section 208 [8 USCS § 1158] or a fear of persecution.” 19 Sections 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) and 1182(a)(7) respectively refer 20 to noncitizens who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to meet document requirements. Clause (iii) of § 1225(b)(1) 21 allows the Attorney General (who has since delegated the responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security Secretary) to 22 designate for expedited removal noncitizens “who ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who ha[ve] not 23 affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States 24 continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.” 25 § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).

26 To summarize, under § 1225(b)(1), two groups of noncitizens are subject to expedited removal. First, there are “arriving” noncitizens 27 who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to meet document requirements. The implementing agency regulations 28 1 define “arriving alien” as applicants for admission “coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 2 C.F.R. § 1.2. The second group –designated noncitizens –includes noncitizens who meet all of the following criteria: (1) they are 3 inadmissible due to lack of a valid entry document or misrepresentation; (2) they have not “been physically present in the 4 United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (3) they are 5 among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has designated for expedited removal. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 109; § 6 1225(b)(1).

7 “Initially, DHS’s predecessor agency did not make any designation [under (3)], thereby limiting expedited removal only to ‘arriving 8 aliens,’” that is, noncitizens encountered at ports of entry. Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9 169432, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025). In the following years, DHS extended by designation expedited removal to noncitizens who arrive 10 by sea and who have been present for fewer than two years, and to noncitizens apprehended within 100 air miles of any U.S. 11 international land border who entered within the last 14 days. Id. This was the status quo until January 2025, when the Department of 12 Homeland Security revised its § 1225 designation to “apply expedited removal to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” 13 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025). Under this designation, expedited removal applies to 14 noncitizens encountered anywhere within the United States, who have been in the United States for less than two years and are 15 inadmissible for lack of valid documentation or misrepresentation. In short, expedited removal was expanded to apply for the first time to 16 vast numbers of noncitizens present in the interior of the United States. 17 Under the expedited removal statute § 1225(b)(1), if an applicant 18 “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum” or “a fear of persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an 19 interview by an asylum officer.” §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). If the asylum officer determines that the applicant has a “credible fear,” the 20 applicant “receive[s] ‘full consideration’ of his asylum claim in a standard removal hearing.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 110. If the 21 officer determines there is no “credible fear,” the officer “shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or 22 review.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, the officer’s decision may be appealed by the applicant to an immigration judge, who must 23 conduct the review “to the maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date of the 24 determination.” Id. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) is “mandatory” “pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and if 25 found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Id. (citing § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under 26 this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until 27 removed.”)

28 [Section] 1225 also contains a provision that applies to applicants for 1 admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. This provision, 1225(b)(2), states that, subject to statutory 2 exceptions, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking 3 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a [full 4 removal proceedings] of this title.” § 1225(b)(2). In other words, noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited 5 removal but are subject to mandatory detention while their full removal proceedings are pending. This is in contrast to the default 6 detention regime under § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary release and review of detention through a bond hearing. 7 3. The Government’s Recent Change in Position 8 Until this year, the DHS has applied § 1226(a) and its discretionary 9 release and review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without valid documentation. This practice 10 was codified by regulation. The regulations implementing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 11 (“IIRIRA”) state that “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly 12 referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 13 (Mar. 6, 1997). In fact, the government has conceded in other contexts that “DHS’s long-standing interpretation has been that 14 1226(a) [discretionary detention] applies to those who have crossed the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter 15 apprehended.” Dkt. No. 17 (citing Solicitor General, Transcript of Oral Argument at 44:24–45:2, Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 16 (2022) (No. 21-954)) . . .

17 In 2025, however, the Government’s policy changed dramatically. The DHS revised its § 1225 designation to “apply expedited removal 18 to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025) (emphasis 19 added). The Secretary of Homeland Security memorandum directed federal immigration officers to “consider ... whether to apply 20 expedited removal” to “any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable to expedited removal but to whom expedited removal has not been 21 applied.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 33. Officers are encouraged to “take steps to terminate any ongoing removal proceeding and/or any active 22 parole status.” Id. The memorandum states that DHS shall take the actions contemplated by the memorandum “in a manner that takes 23 account of legitimate reliance interests,” but states that “the expedited removal process includes asylum screening, which is 24 sufficient to protect the reliance interests of any alien who has applied for asylum or planned to do so in a timely manner.” Huffman 25 Memorandum (Jan. 23, 2025).

26 Since mid-May of 2025, the Department of Homeland Security has made a practice of appearing at regular removal proceedings in 27 immigration court, moving to dismiss the proceedings, and then re- arresting the individual in order to place them in expedited removal 28 proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 35–40. If the immigration judge does 1 not dismiss the full removal proceedings, ICE still makes an arrest, apparently in reliance on § 1225(b)(2)’s detention provision. 2

3 Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503 at *1-4 (internal footnotes omitted). 4 C. Parole Revocation 5 In Y-Z-H-L v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (D. Or. 2025), the court explained the parole 6 process in immigration cases and noted that before parole may be revoked, the parolee must be 7 given written notice of the impending revocation, which must include a cogent description of the 8 reasons supporting the revocation decision. The court held: 9 Section 1182 . . . has a subsection titled “Temporary admission of nonimmigrants,” which allows noncitizens, even those in required 10 detention, to be “paroled” into the United States. This provision, at issue in this case, states: 11 The Secretary of Homeland Security may, except as 12 provided in subparagraph (B) or in section 1184(f) of this title, in his discretion parole into the United States 13 temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian 14 reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of 15 such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in 16 the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or 17 be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with 18 in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States. 19

20 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 21 Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). Y-Z-H-L determined that under the Administrative Procedure Act, 22 immigration parolees are entitled to determinations related to their parole revocations that are not 23 arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1146-47. An agency acts arbitrarily and 24 capriciously by failing to make a reasoned determination or where the agency fails to “articulate[] 25 a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and 26 the choice made.” Id. at 1144 (footnote and citation omitted). Parole revocations in the context of 27 the INA must occur on a case-by-case basis and may occur “when the purposes of such parole shall, 28 in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith 1 return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled.” Id. at 1133 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 2 § 212.5(e)). 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) requires written notice of the termination of parole except where 3 the immigrant has departed or when the specified period of parole has expired. 4 Applying Y-Z-H-L and § 212.5(e), in Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128 5 (W.D.N.Y. 2025), the court found that the INA requires a case-by-case analysis as to the decision 6 to revoke humanitarian parole: 7 This Court agrees that both common sense and the words of the statute require parole revocation to be analyzed on a case-by-case 8 basis and that a decision to revoke parole “must attend to the reasons an individual [noncitizen] received parole.” See id. There is no 9 indication in the record that the government conducted any such analysis here. On the contrary, the letter Mata Velasquez received 10 merely stated summarily that DHS had “revoked [his] parole.” Docket Item 62-1 at 5. Thus, there is no indication that—as required 11 by the statute and regulations—an official with authority made a determination specific to Mata Velasquez that either “the purpose for 12 which [his] parole was authorized” has been “accomplish[ed]” or that “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants [his] 13 continued presence...in the United States.” See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). As a result, DHS's revocation of Mata Velasquez’s 14 parole violated his rights under the statute and regulations. See Y-Z- L-H, 2025 WL 1898025, at *13. 15 16 Id. at 146. And in Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025), the court reached 17 a similar conclusion relying on the Due Process Clause: 18 . . . even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual 19 is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508, 20 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (“[T]his Court joins other courts of this district facing facts similar to the present 21 case and finds Petitioner raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim that due process requires a hearing before an IJ prior to 22 re-detention.”); Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 783561, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); Ortiz Vargas v. 23 Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (“Just as people on 24 preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too does [a noncitizen released from immigration detention] have a 25 liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”). 26 Id. (emphasis added). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. See Doe v. Becerra, 27 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 28 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The Supreme Court has consistently held that 1 non-punitive detention violates the Constitution unless it is strictly limited, and, typically, 2 accompanied by a prompt individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the 3 imprisonment serves the government’s legitimate goals.”). 4 III. Exhaustion 5 A. Governing Authority 6 “Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 7 filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, requires 9 that, “as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative 10 remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 (citing United 11 States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of exhaustion, ‘no one is 12 entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed ... remedy has been 13 exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)). 14 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it 15 may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.” 16 Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 17 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although 18 courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, this 19 discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion 20 requirement has been satisfied or properly waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v. 21 Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762, n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring 22 exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly 23 to be disregarded.”). 24 B. Analysis 25 Petitioner asserts that “exhaustion would be futile and is not required.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 39). 26 Respondents do not address the exhaustion issue. See (Doc. 8). 27 The Court finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as it would be 28 futile to seek release by administrative means given Respondents’ position that Petitioner is subject 1 to mandatory detention and they do not address exhaustion of administrative remedies in their 2 opposition to the petition. See (Doc. 8 at 2); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 282 (2018) (“§§ 3 1225(b) … do[e]s not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of 4 their detention.”); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Further, the 5 BIA has held that all noncitizens present within the country without admission are seeking 6 admission pursuant to § 1225, rendering any administrative relief futile. See J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, 7 No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“In 8 addition, pursuit of administrative remedies would almost certainly be futile given the BIA’s recent 9 holding that all noncitizens present in the United States without admission are ‘seeking admission’ 10 for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be detained.”) (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 11 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025)). 12 For these reasons and because Respondents do not argue Petitioner should be required to 13 exhaust administrative remedies, the undersigned recommends that the prudential exhaustion 14 requirement be waived for Petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief. See, e.g, Chavez v. Noem, 15 No. 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (waiving 16 prudential exhaustion requirement because the BIA “already applied its expertise in deciding and 17 designating” Hurtado as precedential, pursuant to which detainees are subject to mandatory 18 detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 19 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“The Ninth Circuit has recognized ‘the irreparable harms imposed on anyone 20 subject to immigration detention.’”) (citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 21 2017)); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n.9. 22 IV. Discussion 23 Petitioner asserts three causes of action in his petition: violation of (1) procedural due 24 process and (2) substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and 25 (3) the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Doc. 1 at 9-24). 26 As set forth below, because the undersigned finds that Respondents have violated 27 Petitioner’s constitutional rights to procedural due process, and because Petitioner’s other claims 28 seek the same or similar relief (i.e., for immediate release and to enjoin Respondents from re- 1 detaining Petitioner unless his re-detention is justified at a custody hearing before a neutral arbiter 2 in which the government bears the burden of proof), the undersigned forbears from addressing 3 Petitioner’s other claims. 4 A. Procedural Due Process 5 1. Governing Authority 6 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that ‘[n]o person shall ... be 7 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” United States v. Quintero, 995 8 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V). “The Due Process Clause ‘protects 9 individuals against two types of government action’: violations of substantive due process and 10 procedural due process.” Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). 11 “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 12 individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 13 Fifth … Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “[F]reedom from 14 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 15 the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 16 “Procedural due process requires that, even where a deprivation of liberty survives substantive due 17 process scrutiny, the action ‘be implemented in a fair manner.’” Quintero, 995 F.3d at 1051-52 18 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746). “The ‘right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 19 grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal 20 conviction, is a principle basic to our society.’” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 902 (citation omitted). “The 21 fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in 22 a meaningful manner.’” Id. (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “[D]ue process 23 is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey 24 v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 25 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 26 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 27 U.S. at 693 (citations omitted); see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (“[I]t is well-established that the 28 Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the political branches 1 may exercise their plenary authority.”). “In the context of immigration detention, it is well-settled 2 that ‘due process requires adequate procedural protections to ensure that the government’s asserted 3 justification for physical confinement outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest 4 in avoiding physical restraint.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 5 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)). 6 2. Analysis 7 On Petitioner’s as-applied procedural due process challenge to his continuing detention by 8 immigration authorities, the undersigned considers (1) “whether there exists a protected liberty 9 interest under the Due Process Clause, and …[(2)] the procedures necessary to ensure any 10 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 11 No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky 12 Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). 13 Petitioner has an underlying, continuing liberty interest in being free from re-detention. 14 Specifically, Petitioner was released from custody by ICE approximately two years prior to his re- 15 detention in December 2025. (Doc. 1 ¶ 32). By releasing Petitioner in their discretion, immigration 16 officials necessarily determined that Petitioner did not present a risk of flight or danger to the 17 community. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, 18 in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the 19 conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the 20 satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that 21 the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”); accord Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. 22 The undersigned agrees with other courts and other judges of this Court that noncitizens 23 released from immigration custody on parole, general orders of supervision or on their own 24 recognizance have a liberty interest in their freedom that implicates protections under principles of 25 procedural due process. See Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 26 2025) (“The fact that Petitioner is subject to discretionary conditions of release likewise does not 27 mean he lacks a protectable liberty interest and can be re-detained without process.”); see id. 28 (“[E]ven if immigration detainees must wait months before a periodic re-review of their detention, 1 those already released on immigration bond possess an interest in their continued liberty, which 2 grows over time, and a due process right to a hearing before being re-detained.”); Nak Kim Chhoeun 3 v. Marin, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Accord Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 4 (considering in connection with a petitioner’s procedural due process claim that “[t]he lengthy 5 duration of his conditional release as well as the meaningful connections Petitioner seems to have 6 made with his community during that time create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued 7 liberty”); Ramazan M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01356-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3145562, at *5- 8 6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“Even when a statute allows the government to arrest and detain an 9 individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may entitle the individual to 10 procedural protections not found in the statute”). Cf. Daley v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00922-KES- 11 CDB, 2026 WL 101840, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026) (finding a petitioner mandatorily 12 detained pursuant to § 1226(c) did not have a protectible liberty interest because he had remained 13 in continuous custody and never released on supervision). 14 Respondents assert that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and is “subject to 15 mandatory detention” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Doc. 8 at 2; citing, inter alia, Alonzo v. Noem, 16 No. 1:25-cv-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025)). The petitioners’ 17 circumstances in Alonzo are factually dissimilar from those presented here, as another judge of this 18 Court has explained: Petitioner here was detained by Border Patrol and released, and immigration 19 proceedings have remained pending for a significant period of time. See Garcia v. Chesnut, No. 20 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (“However, unlike 21 here, the petitioners in Valencia and Alonzo had never been encountered, let alone processed, by 22 immigration officials, and had not been released on recognizance pending completion of Section 23 240 removal proceedings.”). 24 Additionally, other judges of this Court, as well as many other courts, have considered and 25 rejected the government’s arguments, finding that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), provides the 26 appropriate framework for noncitizens released following their initial encounter with immigration 27 authorities and have resided in the United States for a significant period, like Petitioner here. See, 28 e.g., H.J.G.G. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01718-JLT-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 3761803, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 1 Dec. 30, 2025) (citing Castillo v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01586-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 3466064, at *8 2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025)); accord Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 935-37 (N.D. 3 Cal. 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7472 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025). Under such circumstances, “the 4 government cannot switch tracks” and subject Petitioner to mandatory detention now under section 5 1225(b)(2) “after it previously released him on his own recognizance under section 1226(a).” 6 Valencia Zapata, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 936; accord Souza v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01597-DJC-JDP, 7 2025 WL 3263897, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2025). 8 Because Petitioner has shown he has a protected liberty interest to remain free from re- 9 detention based on his discretionary release in December 2025, the undersigned must determine 10 what process is due before the government may terminate that liberty interest. To determine this, 11 the undersigned considers the following factors articulated in Mathews: “[(1)] the private interest 12 that will be affected by the official action; [(2)] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 13 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 14 safeguards; and [(3)] the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 15 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 16 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993-94 (applying Mathews test in 17 immigration detention context); id. at 993 (“The appropriateness of the requirement that ICE and 18 IJs consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release is confirmed by the 19 balance of factors under Mathews[.]”). 20 As to the first factor, Petitioner has shown he has a significant private interest in remaining 21 on release from detention. He had been released from immigration custody for two years prior to 22 his re-detention, and during that time, he maintained lawful employment, made connections within 23 his community, and incurred no criminal history. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 32, 44, 64). Petitioner’s continued 24 liberty interest in remaining on release is undermined by his re-detention without a bond hearing. 25 Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093-94 (“Freedom from imprisonment is at the core of the Due Process 26 Clause…. The lengthy duration of his conditional release as well as the meaningful connections 27 [he] seems to have made with his community during that time create a powerful interest for [him] 28 in his continued liberty.”). 1 As to the second factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest 2 is considerable here where he has not received any bond or custody redetermination. Id. at 1094; 3 A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 4 2025). Because there were no procedural safeguards to determine if Petitioner’s re-detention was 5 justified, the probable value of the additional procedural safeguard of a bond hearing to determine 6 whether Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community is high such that this factor weighs 7 in favor of granting a bond hearing. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. at 1094 (“[G]iven that Petitioner was 8 previously found to not be a danger or risk of flight and the unresolved questions about the timing 9 and reliability of the new information, the risk of erroneous deprivation remains high.”); A.E., 2025 10 WL 1424382, at *5; Ramazan, 2025 WL 3145562, at *6. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of 11 granting a bond hearing. 12 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing is low. Doe, 13 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094 (citation omitted); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 14 2019)); Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) 15 (“And, like other Courts in this district, the Court concludes that the government’s interest in re- 16 detaining Petitioner-[] without a hearing is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner[] 17 has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). “The effort and cost to provide Petitioner 18 with [a bond hearing] is minimal[.]” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. 19 Respondents assert Petitioner’s arrest was a violation of his conditions of release. (Doc. 8 20 at 4). The undersigned does not find Respondents’ assertions regarding Petitioner’s purported lack 21 of compliance with any conditions of supervised release relevant to the issue of whether or not 22 Petitioner is entitled to a custody redetermination. Therefore, any additional burden from requiring 23 the government to seek a bond hearing before it may re-detain Petitioner does not outweigh his 24 liberty interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 25 granting a bond hearing. 26 In sum, the undersigned finds that, under Mathews, Respondents have violated Petitioner’s 27 procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution through his arrest 28 in December 2025 and continuing detention thereafter. Accordingly, the undersigned will 1 recommend the Court grant Petitioner’s petition on his claim for violation of procedural due process 2 under the Fifth Amendment and recommend the Court order Respondents to provide Petitioner 3 with a bond hearing as set forth below. 4 B. Remedy 5 The undersigned considers whether Petitioner is entitled to a pre-deprivation or post- 6 deprivation bond hearing, and further, addresses what standards should apply at that hearing. 7 First, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner is entitled only to a post-deprivation bond 8 hearing. As summarized above, Respondents assert that Petitioner’s arrest is a violation of his 9 terms of release. See (Doc. 8). Petitioner asserts that due process requires a pre-deprivation bond 10 hearing. See (Doc. 9 at 7-10). 11 ICE’s reliance upon Petitioner’s recent arrest as a basis to detain him was “not obviously 12 pretex[t]ual.” Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, 13 at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) (“If Respondent’s view of the facts is correct, it is at least arguable 14 that providing Petitioner with notice and a pre-deprivation hearing would have been impracticable 15 and/or would have motivated his flight.”) (citing cases); accord O.A.C.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 16 01652-DAD-CSK (HC), 2025 WL 3485221, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025). 17 Second, Petitioner was released by ICE on his own recognizance following his initial 18 encounter and arrest in December 2023 and prior to his re-detention in December 2025. See (Doc. 19 1). In releasing Petitioner, immigration officials necessarily determined that he did not present a 20 risk of flight or danger to the community. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to 21 issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 22 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the 23 alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger 24 to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”). 25 Nevertheless, Petitioner has not been afforded a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 26 Under these circumstances, even in the light of disputed issues of fact concerning the nature 27 and severity of Petitioner’s alleged violation of terms of his supervised release, the undersigned 28 will recommend the Court find that the government should bear the burden of establishing at the 1 bond hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community 2 or a risk of flight. E.g., Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01543-DCJ-SCR, 2025 WL 3248059, at *6 3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (requiring government to carry burden by clear and convincing evidence, 4 notwithstanding disputed issues of facts involving the petitioner’s alleged violation of release 5 conditions); M.V.I. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01440-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3154403, at *13-14 (E.D. 6 Cal. Nov. 112, 2025) (same). “Doing so is logical” because “the immigrant’s initial release 7 reflected a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community 8 or a flight risk. Since it is the government that initiated re-detention, it follows that the government 9 should be required to bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention.” M.R.R. v. 10 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01517-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3265446, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) 11 (relying on Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, at 1034, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2025)); accord Omer 12 G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025 WL 3254999, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 13 2025). 14 V. Conclusion and Recommendation 15 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 16 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be GRANTED. 17 2. Respondents be ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance 18 with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 14 days of the date of this Order, at which Petitioner’s 19 eligibility for bond must be considered, and where the government must demonstrate 20 by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the 21 community, such that physical custody is legally justified. 22 3. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 23 as required herein, Respondents be ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody 24 immediately and forbear from re-detaining Petitioner unless the government provides 25 notice to Petitioner a minimum of seven (7) days in advance and holds a bond hearing 26 consistent with this order; and 27 4. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor for Petitioner and 28 close this case. ] These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 2 | assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within seven (7) days 3 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections 4 | with the Court. Although this objection period is shorter than provided by Local Rule, such an 5 | adjustment is warranted given the nature of Petitioner’s harm, the finding of a violation of the U.S. 6 | Constitution by Respondents, and the fact that the parties have extensively briefed the issues 7 | involved. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“The court 8 || may require a response within a shorter period if exigencies of the calendar require.”). The 9 | document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” 10 | and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not 11 || consider exhibits attached to the Objections, but a party may refer to exhibits in the record by 12 | CM/ECF document and page number. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be 13 | disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 14 | US.C. § 636(b)()(C). 15 A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of 16 | certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 17 | ITIS SO ORDERED. 'S | Dated: _ May 29, 2026 | Wr bY 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18