Ellington, Judge.
These appeals arise from a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of George Bowen and his business, Bowen Tree Surgeons, Inc., in their suit against their insurance agency, Yeomans & Associates Agency, Inc. (‘Yeomans”), and their insurer, Canal Indemnity Company (“Canal”). In Case No. A05A0637, Yeomans contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and erred in instructing the jury. In Case No. A05A0638, Canal challenges the grant of partial summary judgment to Mr. Bowen and Bowen Tree Surgeons, contends it was entitled to a directed verdict, and claims the court abused its discretion in excluding evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.
The record on appeal shows the following relevant facts. On December 18, 2000, Michael S. Black was driving his car when he collided with a car occupied by Joel and Brenda Cowart. Both of the Cowarts were injured as a result of the collision. The Cowarts filed suit in Burke County (hereinafter, “the Cowart suit”) against Black and Black’s employer, Bowen Tree Surgeons. The suit alleged that Black’s negligence caused the collision, that Black was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, and, therefore, Bowen Tree Surgeons was liable for Black’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
At the time of the collision, Mr. Bowen had several personal and business insurance policies through Yeomans, an independent insurance agency which sells different types of insurance from several insurance companies. Bowen Tree Surgeons’ business policies included a motor vehicle policy issued by Auto-Owners that covered its fleet of business vehicles, and a commercial general liability coverage policy issued by Canal (hereinafter, the “Canal policy”). A Yeomans insurance agent, Lisa Bertoch, regularly assisted Mr. Bowen with the [739]*739policies, handling claims and collecting premium payments on behalf of the insurers. According to Bertoch, her duties as an insurance agent included acting as an “outlet” between her clients and the insurers, and she recognized that an insurer might be bound by the acts of an insurance agent. Whenever Mr. Bowen submitted a claim under the Canal policy, Bertoch sent it to a brokerage firm, the. Strickland General Agency, which issued the policy on behalf of Canal. Strickland would, in turn, send the claim to Canal for processing. Bertoch testified that this procedure was the “normal course of action” between the parties and that none of the parties ever objected to the procedure. As part of its employee training, Yeomans instructed its agents that, if they were not sure which insurer would cover a claim, or if there was any doubt as to whether an insurer would cover a claim, the agent should file it with every insurer that might provide coverage. Because Bertoch handled Mr. Bowen’s insurance policies, Mr. Bowen never had any direct contact with Strickland or his insurers about changing or renewing policies, making premium payments, or submitting claims, although a Canal claim representative came to Bowen Tree Surgeons’ office a few times to investigate claims that had been submitted.
When Mr. Bowen received notice of the Cowart suit, he delivered the notice to Bertoch, telling her his business had been sued. Mr. Bowen told Bertoch that, at the time of the Cowart collision, Black was off duty and driving his own car. Bertoch told Mr. Bowen that she would take care of the lawsuit and forward it to the insurer. Bertoch sent the notice of the Cowart suit to Auto-Owners, but did not submit the notice to Canal because she believed Canal would not provide coverage for the collision. In making that decision, Bertoch relied upon her general training and experience as an insurance agent. She did not have a copy of the Canal policy, and there is no evidence that she made any further inquiries or otherwise investigated the nature and extent of Bowen Tree Surgeons’ coverage under the Canal policy.
A few days after receiving notice of the Cowart suit, Auto-Owners sent a letter to Yeomans and Mr. Bowen informing them that there was no coverage under its business vehicle policy and that it would not defend Bowen Tree Surgeons in the suit. The letter stated that Mr. Bowen should contact Black’s insurance carrier to see if it would file an answer on behalf of Bowen Tree Surgeons. Auto-Owners also told Mr. Bowen that, if Black’s carrier refused to file an answer for Bowen Tree Surgeons, he would need to hire an attorney to file an answer in the Cowart suit.
Mr. Bowen did not hire his own lawyer, however, because he had the general liability policy through Canal for lawsuits against his business and thought that Bertoch had forwarded the notice to Canal. Based upon Mr. Bowen’s previous dealings with Bertoch, he knew she [740]*740had always taken care of his claims, he trusted her, and he had never had a problem with his claims. Therefore, because he thought Canal would be defending him, he did not take any action with the Cowart suit. No one from Yeomans told Mr. Bowen that the agency had not sent the notice of the Cowart suit to Canal or that Canal would not provide a defense or insurance coverage for Bowen Tree Surgeons.
Canal failed to file an answer on behalf of Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit. On April 19, 2002, the Burke County court issued a default judgment in the Cowart suit against Black and Bowen Tree Surgeons, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,250,000. After Mr. Bowen learned of the default judgment, Bowen Tree Surgeons filed a motion to set aside the judgment. Mr. Bowen, on behalf of his business, and the Cowarts subsequently agreed on a settlement which, among other things, required it to dismiss its motion to set aside the default judgment. According to the settlement agreement, Mr. Bowen and Bowen Tree Surgeons lacked the funds to satisfy the default judgment and would have been compelled to file bankruptcy if the Cowarts sought to collect on it.
Following the default judgment, but before entering into the settlement agreement with the Cowarts, Mr. Bowen and Bowen Tree Surgeons (hereinafter, “the plaintiffs”) sued Canal and Yeomans1 for the amount of the award on the default judgment, plus attorney fees and bad faith penalties. According to the complaint, Canal received notice of the Cowart suit through its agent, Yeomans, and Canal breached its obligation to the plaintiffs under the Canal policy to provide coverage and a defense in the Cowart suit. The complaint also alleged that both Canal and Yeomans failed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the Cowart suit and that a reasonable investigation, combined with the information Mr. Bowen had provided to Bertoch, would have demonstrated the potential for coverage under the Canal policy and Canal’s obligation to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons.
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and Canal filed a counter motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted Canal’s motion, concluding that there was no evidence that Yeomans was an agent of Canal and, therefore, no evidence that Canal received notice of the Cowart suit. The plaintiffs appealed the order to this Court, and we reversed the grant of summary judgment to Canal, concluding a jury issue existed as to Canal’s “relationship with Yeomans and, specifically, the extent of Yeomans’ ability to accept notice of claims on Canal’s behalf as a [741]*741fiduciary and as a dual agent.” Bowen Tree Surgeons v. Canal Indem. Co., 264 Ga. App. 520, 523 (591 SE2d 415) (2003).
On remand, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of whether Canal was obligated to provide Bowen Tree Surgeons a defense and insurance coverage in the Cowart suit. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the Cowart complaint, combined with Mr. Bowen’s statements to Bertoch when he gave her the lawsuit, set forth a claim for an “occurrence” as defined in the Canal policy and that no policy exclusions applied to the claim. Therefore, the trial court ruled that the Canal policy provided coverage for the claim and that Canal had had a duty to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a special verdict finding that Canal had received constructive notice of the Cowart suit. The jury also awarded the plaintiffs $1,550,000 against Yeomans. Following the court’s entry of judgment on the verdict,2 Canal and Yeomans appeal.
Case No. A05A0638
In this appeal, Canal challenges two rulings of the trial court. Because resolution of the issues raised in this appeal have an impact on certain enumerated errors in the companion case, we will address this appeal first.
1. Canal claims the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs based upon its conclusions that the Canal policy provided coverage for Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit and that Canal had a duty to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons. We disagree.
(a) “An insurance policy is simply a contract, the provisions of which should be construed as any other type of contract. The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hunnicutt v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 611,612 (4) (351 SE2d 638) (1987). “Whether an insurer is obligated to defend an action against its insured is determined by the contract.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled American Veterans, 224 Ga. App. 557, 558 (481 SE2d 850) (1997). As we have previously held, [742]*742“the issue is not whether the insured is actually liable to the plaintiffs; the issue is whether a claim has been asserted which falls within the policy coverage and which the insurer has a duty to defend.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled that an insurer has a “duty to defend its insured against all claims covered under a policy, even those that are groundless, false, or fraudulent.” (Footnote omitted.) Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Dowse, 278 Ga. 674, 676 (1) (605 SE2d 27) (2004). This is because “an insurer’s duty to pay and its duty to defend are separate and independent obligations.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled American Veterans, 224 Ga. App. at 559.
In this case, the Canal policy provided general liability coverage to Bowen Tree Surgeons and included an obligation for Canal to defend the business against any suit seeking damages for bodily injuries “to which this insurance applies.” The policy applied to any “bodily injury” that was caused by an “occurrence,” subject to certain exclusions. The policy defined an “occurrence” as an “accident.” Specifically, the policy excluded coverage for a bodily injury that arose out of the use of an automobile that was owned or operated by any insured. The policy defined an “insured” as including an employee of the named insured if the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the occurrence which caused the injury.
It is undisputed that Bowen Tree Surgeons’ employee, Black, was driving his own car on personal business outside the scope of his employment at the time of the collision with the Cowarts. Therefore, under the unambiguous language of the Canal policy, Black was not an “insured” under the policy, and the exclusion for bodily injuries arising from the use of an automobile by an insured did not apply. The record also shows that no other policy exclusion applied in this case. Further, Bowen Tree Surgeons was a named insured under the Canal policy and the Cowarts sued the business based upon its alleged responsibility for the occurrence. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the Cowarts’ injuries arose from an “occurrence” under the Canal policy.
As noted above, “an insurer’s duty to pay and its duty to defend are separate and independent obligations.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled American Veterans, 224 Ga. App. at 559. We emphasize that the issue of whether Bowen Tree Surgeons was actually liable to the Cowarts for Black’s negligence under respondeat superior is irrelevant to the question of whether Canal was obligated to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit under the plain language of the policy. Clearly, if Canal had defended Bowen Tree Surgeons, Canal would have had the [743]*743opportunity to show that the business was not liable under respondeat superior because Black was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the collision. The fact that Bowen Tree Surgeons may have ultimately prevailed in the Cowart suit, however, did not relieve Canal of its obligation to defend the business. As we have previously held, under these circumstances, “it was [Canal’s] duty to seek that favorable decision on its insureds’ behalf.” Id. at 558-559. Accordingly, Judge Andrews’ conclusion in his dissent that Canal had no duty to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons because the Cowarts would not be able to prevail on their claim against the business is both misguided and contrary to precedent. Moreover, Judge Andrews’ dissent has failed to show why, under the undisputed facts and unambiguous language of the policy, the Cowart collision is not an “occurrence” entitled to a defense.
Judge Blackburn’s dissent is equally misguided. He contends that the Canal policy did not cover the Cowart collision because he believes that such coverage was contrary to the intention of both Canal and Bowen Tree Surgeons. It is well established, however, that “[i]f the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the terms of the agreement are controlling and an appellate court should look no further to determine the intention of the parties.” (Citation omitted.) Terry v. State Farm Fire &c. Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 777, 778-779 (2) (504 SE2d 194) (1998). In this case, none of the parties contend that the contract language is ambiguous; to the contrary, they vigorously argue that the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, and we agree. Accordingly, this Court should not reverse the trial court’s finding that the Cowart collision was an “occurrence” under the plain and unambiguous terms of the policy based upon our belief about what the parties may have intended.
Even if the contract terms are ambiguous, however, such ambiguities must be strictly construed against the insurer as the drafter of the document, especially any exclusions from coverage sought to be invoked by the insurer. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Brock, 222 Ga. App. 294, 296-297 (2) (474 SE2d 46) (1996). Further, to the extent that this Court can even consider what the parties may have intended, Judge Blackburn’s conclusion that Mr. Bowen intended to purchase “seamless, non-duplicative coverage” when he purchased two business insurance policies from Yeomans is mere speculation, without any evidentiary support in the record. In fact, this argument was not raised by any party in the trial court, there is no indication that the trial court even considered it when ruling on the coverage issue, and no party even suggested it on appeal. Instead, in reaching this conclusion, Judge Blackburn relies upon his opinion in Strickland v. [744]*744Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,3 and upon Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pat’s Rentals 4 His reliance on Strickland is misplaced, however, because the insured in that case was a motor common carrier, and there was evidence that it was “common industry practice for motor common carriers ... to obtain two separate policies of insurance to provide seamless coverage for different risks.” Strickland v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 273 Ga. App. at 663. In contrast, there was no evidence in this case of any “common industry practice” regarding liability insurance for tree surgeons. Further, this case is clearly distinguishable from Strickland and Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. on a critical fact: in both cases, the collisions involved vehicles owned by the insureds and, therefore, covered under the insureds’ business vehicle insurance policies. Neither insured intended or desired for its general commercial liability policy to provide additional, overlapping coverage. Here, however, it is undisputed that Black was not driving a vehicle owned by Bowen Tree Surgeons at the time of the collision and, therefore, there was no coverage under the Auto-Owners business vehicle policy. As such, the concern about unintended overlapping coverage is simply not present here.
Ironically, this case is instead clearly analogous to Judge Blackburn’s opinion in Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Brock 5 in which this Court found that a school administrator’s professional liability insurance covered a negligent hiring claim that arose from a school bus collision that was specifically excluded from the policy’s coverage. 222 Ga. App. at 296-297 (2). In later explaining this apparent inconsistency, this Court stated that, if the exclusion had applied in Brock, “the administrator would have had no professional coverage at all . . . which would contravene the very purpose of the professional liability insurance policy.” Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pat’s Rentals, 228 Ga. App. at 855 (a). Similarly, in this case, if this Court construed the unambiguous terms of Bowen Tree Surgeons’ general liability insurance policy in favor of Canal to find that the Cowart collision was not covered, not only would such construction be improper, but Bowen Tree Surgeons would have no coverage under any insurance policy for the Cowarts’ claim that the business was liable for its employee’s negligence. This would clearly contravene Mr. Bowen’s purpose in obtaining a general commercial liability policy for his business.
(b) Canal also argues that it had no duty to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons against the Cowarts’ claims because the Cowart complaint [745]*745alleged that Black was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision and, therefore, the collision fell under the policy exclusion for the use of an automobile by an insured. It is undisputed, however, that when Mr. Bowen notified Bertoch of the Cowart suit, he specifically told her that Black was off duty and driving his own car at the time of the collision. When a complaint on its face shows that there is no coverage, but the insured notifies the insurer or the insurer’s agent of additional facts that would place the claim within the policy coverage, the insurer must consider such facts when deciding whether it has an obligation to defend the claim. Colonial Oil Indus. v. Underwriters &c., 268 Ga. 561, 562 (2) (491 SE2d 337)
(1997) . This requires the insurer to conduct a reasonable investigation into the insured’s contentions to determine the insured’s rights under the insurance contract. Id. Accordingly, Canal cannot rely solely upon the language of the complaint in arguing it had no duty to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons.
We find that, under the circumstances presented, the trial court properly concluded that the Cowart collision was an “occurrence” under the Canal policy and, therefore, that Canal had a duty to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit. Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled American Veterans, 224 Ga. App. at 559.
2. Canal claims that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of whether there was an agency relationship between Canal and Yeomans. This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a directed verdict under the “any evidence” test. Pulte Home Corp. v. Woodland Nursery & Landscapes, 230 Ga. App. 455, 456 (2) (496 SE2d 546)
(1998) . “The question before this [C]ourt is not whether the verdict and the judgment of the trial court were merely authorized, but is whether a contrary judgment was demanded.” Id. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, if this Court finds there is any evidence to support the verdict, it will affirm the denial of a directed verdict. Id.
As noted above, this Court previously reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Canal on the issue of whether Yeomans acted as an agent of Canal such that Yeomans’ notice of the Cowart suit could be attributed to Canal as its principal. Bowen Tree Surgeons v. Canal Indem. Co., 264 Ga. App. at 523. In that opinion, this Court relied upon Byrne v. Reardon, 196 Ga. App. 735, 736 (4) (397 SE2d 22) (1990), which held that, when an insurance agency collects premium payments from the insured and submits notices of claims to the insurer, the insurance agency could be considered a dual agent for the insured and for the insurer. Bowen Tree Surgeons v. Canal Indem. Co., 264 Ga. App. at 522. After noting that there was evidence that ‘Yeomans customarily accepted premiums and notices of claims on Canal’s behalf,” and that there was “no indication . . . [746]*746Canal ever voiced any objection to this [business] custom,” this Court concluded that a jury question existed on whether there was an agency relationship between Canal and Yeomans and the extent of Yeomans’ ability to accept notice of claims on Canal’s behalf as a fiduciary and a dual agent. Id. at 523.
Applying the same analysis to the instant appeal, we find there was evidence presented at trial from which the jury could find that an agency relationship existed between Yeomans and Canal and that Canal received constructive notice of the Cowart suit. Bowen Tree Surgeons v. Canal Indem. Co., 264 Ga. App. at 523; see also Intl. Indem. Co. v. Odom, 174 Ga. App. 6, 7 (2) (329 SE2d 307) (1985) (insurer allowed an insurance agent to collect all of the premium payments and serve as its only contact with the insured; therefore, the agent had the apparent authority to receive notice of a claim on behalf of the insurer, and the insurer was estopped from claiming otherwise). More importantly, contrary to Judge Andrews’ conclusion in his dissent, the evidence presented did not demand a finding as a matter of law that there was no agency relationship between Canal and Yeomans. Therefore, Canal was not entitled to a directed verdict on this issue. Pulte Home Corp. v. Woodland Nursery & Landscapes, 230 Ga. App. at 456 (2).
3. Canal contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the settlement agreement between Bowen Tree Surgeons and the Cowarts in the Cowart suit. Prior to trial in the instant case, the plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the settlement agreement at trial. The trial court granted the motion, finding that such evidence was irrelevant and would be prejudicial to the plaintiffs. The court specifically prohibited Yeomans and Canal from referring to the settlement or from collaterally attacking Mr. Bowen’s handling of Bowen Tree Surgeons’ defense in the Cowart suit.
On appeal, Canal argues that the settlement agreement was relevant to show the jury that Bowen Tree Surgeons violated the terms of the Canal policy by settling with the Cowarts without getting Canal’s consent.6 But Canal has consistently denied that it was ever obligated to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit, and it continues to deny its responsibility in this appeal. See Division 1, supra. Had Canal, in fact, defended Bowen Tree Surgeons, it could have directed the course of that defense and, perhaps, helped the business avoid a default judgment or a judgment on the merits. Following Canal’s failure to defend Bowen Tree Surgeons, however, the business suffered a default judgment for a substantial amount of [747]*747money — enough to force the business into bankruptcy. At that point, Mr. Bowen took steps that he believed to be necessary to protect his business interests.
Under these circumstances, Canal is estopped from arguing that the plaintiffs violated the insurance policy by settling a claim without Canal’s consent, when it was Canal who breached the policy and left Bowen Tree Surgeons unprotected in the Cowart suit. As the Supreme Court of Georgia has held, “an insurer that denies coverage and refuses to defend an action against its insured, when it could have done so with a reservation of its rights as to coverage, waives the provisions of the policy against a settlement by the insured.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Dowse, 278 Ga. at 676 (1).
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the settlement agreement. See Stovall v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 270 Ga. App. 791 (608 SE2d 245) (2004) (the admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent abuse of that discretion).
Case No. A05A0637
In its appeal, Yeomans claims the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the motions in limine and in the admission of certain evidence. It also challenges a jury instruction.
4. Yeomans contends the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the summary judgment order which found, as a matter of law, that the Canal policy provided coverage for Bowen Tree Surgeons in the Cowart suit and that Canal had a duty to defend the company. See Division 1, supra. Yeomans complains that the plaintiffs should not have been able to use the order to suggest to the jury that Bertoch was wrong about whether the Canal policy covered the Cowart collision.
During trial, Bertoch and Mr. Yeomans consistently testified that the Canal policy did not cover the Cowart collision and, therefore, they had no duty to forward the Cowart suit to Canal. Yet, when the plaintiffs offered the summary judgment order into evidence, Yeomans objected on the basis of relevance, arguing that the issue of the Canal policy’s coverage was not before the jury. Later, after Bertoch and Mr. Yeomans were questioned about the summary judgment order by both the plaintiffs and Yeomans,7 Yeomans again objected, [748]*748arguing that a court’s conclusion that the Cowart collision was covered under the Canal policy was not relevant to whether Yeomans breached its duty to Bowen Tree Surgeons three years before the court issued its decision.
Bertoch and Mr. Yeomans, however, did not testify that they simply thought there was no coverage at the time Mr. Bowen brought the Cowart suit to Bertoch. Instead, they testified that Bowen Tree Surgeons was not and never had been covered for the Cowart collision under the Canal policy. This testimony was clearly elicited to contradict the trial court’s ruling that the Cowart collision was covered under the Canal policy and to support Yeomans’ argument that Bertoch had correctly determined that there was no coverage, so that they had no duty to forward the notice of the Cowart suit to Canal. Under these circumstances, we find the trial court’s ruling was relevant to the issues of whether there was coverage under the Canal policy, whether Yeomans owed a duty to Bowen Tree Surgeons to forward the notice of the Cowart suit to Canal, whether Yeomans breached its duty by failing to forward the suit to Canal, and whether that breach caused the plaintiffs’ damages, specifically, the default judgment. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the order. See Stovall v. Daimler Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 Ga. App. at 791 (decisions to admit evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
5. Yeomans contends the trial court erred in failing to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witness. At trial, Yeomans argued that, because the witness had never been an independent insurance agent or licensed as an agent in Georgia, the witness was not qualified to give his opinion about the duties owed to the plaintiffs by Yeomans. On appeal, Yeomans also challenges the weight and credibility of the expert’s testimony, arguing that the expert’s testimony conflicted with that of Yeomans’ witnesses.
An expert witness is anyone who, through training, education, skill, or experience, has peculiar knowledge that the average juror would not possess as to any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions [.] [T]he expert witness may render an expert opinion within the witness’ area of expertise after the qualifications have been proven to the trial court. It is for the trial court to determine, as a matter of law after hearing evidence, whether a witness is competent by way of qualifications to render an opinion within [his [749]*749or her] area of expertise. . . . [Further, t]he possession of a license in Georgia does not go to qualification as an expert witness but may go to the weight and credibility that a jury gives to such expert’s opinion.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of C. W.D., 232 Ga. App. 200, 206-207 (3) (a) (501 SE2d 232) (1998). The question of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is a legal determination for the trial court which will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Dayoub v. Yates-Astro Termite Pest Control Co., 239 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) (521 SE2d 600) (1999).
The record shows that the plaintiffs’ expert witness had worked in the insurance industry for over 32 years as a claim representative, estimator, and manager, and that he had extensive experience in handling claims on behalf of an insurance company. He also had experience training independent insurance agents on how to handle and process claims and lawsuit documents. At trial, the witness testified generally about the relationship between insureds, insurance agents, and insurers; the agent’s role in the processing of claims, the handling of lawsuits and the notification of insurers; the importance of properly handling lawsuits due to their time-sensitive nature; and the agent’s duty to keep insureds informed about the status of pending claims and suits. The witness did not testify specifically about whether Yeomans breached its duty to the plaintiffs by failing to send the Cowart suit to Canal. Yeomans then cross-examined the expert, during which Yeomans elicited the expert’s opinion regarding whether Yeomans had breached its duty to the plaintiffs. This testimony was, predictably, unfavorable to Yeomans. Later, Yeomans had the opportunity to argue the expert’s alleged lack of experience to the jury.
Having reviewed the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the expert’s testimony. Dayoub v. Yates-Astro Termite Pest Control Co., 239 Ga. App. at 579 (1). Further, the weight and credibility of the expert’s testimony was for the jury to determine, not this Court. OCGA § 24-9-80.
6. Yeomans claims the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the settlement agreement in the Cowart suit. Yeomans contends the evidence would have shown that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages by taking steps to set aside the default judgment and that, by mishandling the Cowart suit, the plaintiffs were comparatively negligent. Yeomans failed, however, to cite to any legal authority supporting the admissibility of the settlement agreement to show comparative negligence. This argument is, therefore, [750]*750abandoned. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (an enumeration of error which is not supported by citation to authority may be deemed abandoned).
Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the settlement agreement. Stovall v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 270 Ga. App. at 791. See Division 3, supra (rejecting Canal’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the settlement agreement).
7. Yeomans contends the trial court erred in charging the jury regarding the amount of potential damages for which Yeomans could be responsible. Prior to trial, the court ruled that, if the jury found Yeomans breached a duty to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs could recover the full amount of any damages which the jury concluded was warranted by the evidence, up to and including the full amount of the default judgment, plus interest and costs. At trial, the court instructed the jury as follows: “When an insurance agent breaches his duty to [an] insured, it may be liable to its insured beyond the policy limits to the full amount of the judgment.”
In this case, Bertoch told Mr. Bowen that she would take care of the Cowart suit, but she decided not to send the notice to Canal. The jury was authorized to find that, in failing to notify Canal, Bertoch breached her duty to Bowen Tree Surgeons and that her negligence caused Bowen Tree Surgeons to suffer a default judgment when Canal failed to provide a defense for the business. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ damages in this case, the amount of the default judgment, were attributable to Bertoch’s negligence, not from the lack of insurance coverage for the claim. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in giving the jury instruction. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. MacLeod, 259 Ga. App. 761, 765 (4) (a) (577 SE2d 799) (2003) (where a jury later found the insured was not negligent, the insured would have suffered no damages if the insurer had provided a timely defense, so the damages were attributable to the insurer’s failure to defend); Atlanta Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardenhire, 248 Ga. App. 42, 44 (2) (545 SE2d 182) (2001) (where an insurer wrongfully fails to offer a defense, “it may be liable to its insured beyond the policy limits to the full amount of the judgment”) (citations omitted); cf. Robinson v. J. Smith Lanier & Co. cfee., 220 Ga. App. 737, 738 (1) (470 SE2d 272) (1996) (an insurance agent failed to secure an insurance policy on behalf of its client, so the client had no insurance for a loss that would have otherwise been covered; in dicta, this Court held that, because the client’s only harm resulting from the agent’s negligence was the lack of insurance to cover the loss, the insurance agent was liable only to the limit of the policy).
Judgment affirmed.
Phipps, Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., dissent.