[347]*347DE MUNIZ, J.
Portland police stopped petitioner Yancy for jaywalking. In the course of that contact, the police searched petitioner and discovered less than an ounce of marijuana. The police then issued petitioner a citation that excluded him from two Portland city parks for a period of 30 days. Petitioner timely appealed to the City of Portland Hearings Officer, which affirmed the exclusion. After the exclusion period had run, petitioner sought to challenge the exclusion citation by means of a writ of review in circuit court. The circuit court rejected petitioner’s arguments on the merits. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals observed that the case was moot, because the exclusion period had expired and ordered the circuit court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the matter as moot. Yancy v. Shatzer, 185 Or App 704, 705, 60 P3d 1156 (2003). Petitioner sought review in this court. We allowed review to consider whether Oregon courts have the power to consider disputes that, like the present one, are capable of repetition and yet evade review because they became moot at some point in the proceedings. Having considered the question, we conclude that our judicial power does not include the authority to adjudicate cases in which there is no existing controversy. We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On June 9, 2000, the Portland police stopped petitioner after he left Tom McCall Waterfront Park and proceeded across Front Avenue against a pedestrian “Don’t Walk” signal. During that contact, the police searched petitioner and discovered less than an ounce of marijuana. Based on the discovery of the marijuana, the police issued petitioner a citation that excluded him from Waterfront Park and Ankeny Plaza.1 Under the terms of the exclusion, which took [348]*348effect immediately, petitioner would be subject to arrest for criminal trespass if he were to return to either park within 30 days.
On June 13,2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Code Hearings Officer. By June 21, 2000, the hearing date, almost half of the exclusion period had rim. The hearings officer upheld the exclusion, citing petitioner’s failure to obey the traffic signal.
On July 9, 2000, the exclusion period expired. On August 18,2000, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of review in the circuit court raising various constitutional challenges to the ordinance. See ORS 34.020 (authorizing use of writ by circuit court to review proceedings before inferior tribunal). On September 9, 2000, the City of Portland filed a return to the writ of review, after which the parties briefed and argued the matter. The return addressed petitioner’s constitutional arguments on their merits; it did not mention the fact that the 30-day exclusion period had run. On April 20, 2001, the circuit court issued an opinion in which it rejected petitioner’s constitutional challenges.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because [349]*349the period of exclusion expired on July 9, 2000, the case was moot before the circuit court rendered its judgment. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the matter to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the writ of review. Yancy, 185 Or App at 705. We allowed petitioner’s petition for review.
Since the adoption of the Oregon Constitution in 1857, this court, from time to time, has been required to determine whether a matter before it is one that is appropriate for judicial disposition. Historically, this court has described that undertaking as a determination whether a “justiciable controversy’ exists. In that regard, this court has stated that “[a] controversy is justiciable, as opposed to abstract, where there is an actual and substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests.” Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449, 648 P2d 1289 (1982). Similarly, this court has observed that justiciability contemplates “that the court’s decision in the matter will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.” Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993). Encompassed within the broad question of justiciability are a constellation of related issues, including standing, ripeness, and mootness. For example, this court has recognized that, even if a case is otherwise justiciable, the court will dismiss it as moot if a “decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties.” Id. at 406. This court also has observed that “[mjootness is a species of justiciability, and a court of law exercising the judicial power of the state has authority to decide only justiciable controversies.” First Commerce of America v. Nimbus Center Assoc., 329 Or 199, 206, 986 P2d 556 (1999).
Petitioner acknowledges the foregoing authorities, but points out that this court at times has appeared to recognize an exception to the rule against deciding moot cases. For example, in 1947, this court utilized such an exception in Perry v. Oregon Liquor Commission, 180 Or 495, 498-99, 177 P2d 406 (1947). In Perry, the Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) suspended a supper club’s liquor license for 60 days. A circuit court held that the OLCC had overstepped its authority in suspending the license and reinstated it. The OLCC appealed to this court, but the club [350]*350moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that “the question as to the suspension of the license [is] a moot one — and therefore improper to consider” because the period of suspension already had expired. Id. at 498. The court denied the motion, indicating that the court would exercise its discretion to decide a moot question for the guidance of an official administrative agency, if the question involved the public welfare and was likely to arise again in the future. Id. at 498-99. In reaching that conclusion, the court did not examine the text and history of the Oregon Constitution, but relied on cases from other jurisdictions. Id. at 499. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision to lift the suspension of the license. Id. at 500-01. Subsequently, this court has followed Perry on several occasions. See, e.g., Stowe v. School Dist. No. 8-C, 240 Or 526, 528, 402 P2d 740 (1965); Linklater v. Nyberg, 234 Or 117, 120, 380 P2d 631 (1963); Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or 283, 333, 253 P2d 289 (1953); State ex rel. v. Smith et al., 197 Or 96, 126, 252 P2d 550 (1953); State ex rel v. Newbry et al., 196 Or 331, 337, 248 P2d 840 (1952); Oregon State Grange v. McKay, 193 Or 627, 631, 239 P2d 834 (1952) (illustrating proposition). However, none of those cases purported to analyze this court’s statement in Perry beyond citing it.
More recently, however, this court has rejected Perry’s rationale for deciding moot cases. In Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 303 Or 574, 577, 738 P2d 1389 (1987), this court observed that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties when the circuit court entered judgment. Therefore, the court concluded, the case was moot and should have been dismissed. In Mid-County Future Alt. v. Metro. Area LGBC, 304 Or 89, 92, 742 P2d 47 (1987), this court asserted that it would not decide moot, nonjusticiable cases, regardless of claims of public importance, “because of [the court’s] regard for the constitution of this state, which separates the power and functions of the departments of gov-e^ment, Or Const, Art III, § 1, and vests in the courts only ; Judicial power.’ Or Const, Art VII (Amend), § 1.” A few > i later, in Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 189, 895 P2d 7i 1995), this court reaffirmed the observations that it had m j in Mid-County.
[351]*351In summary, Kay, Mid-County, and Barcik indicate, at least in general terms, that the constitutional grant of governmental power to the judiciary is limited by the justiciability requirement. Although the decisions in Mid-County and Barcik express doubts about this court’s constitutional authority to decide moot cases, this court has not undertaken a full constitutional analysis of that subject. This case presents the occasion to do so.
Two constitutional provisions, Article III, section 1, and Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution make reference to the judiciary. Article III, section 1, was adopted as part of Oregon’s original constitution. That provision states:
“The powers of the Government shall be divided into three [separate] departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided.”
The phrase “judicial power” appears in Article VII (Amended), section 1, which provides that “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created by law.” Article VII (Amended), section 1, adopted by the people on November 8,1910, superseded similar text set out in Article VII (Original), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. That former section provided that “[t]he Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a [Supreme] Court, [Circuit] Courts, and County Courts, which shall be Courts of Record having general jurisdiction, to be defined, limited, and regulated by law in accordance with this Constitution.”2
The text of Article III, section 1, prompts an initial observation. The scope of judicial power can be defined in two ways: by what it is and by what it is not. The judicial power is [352]*352distinct from the executive power and the legislative power, and it resides in a department separate from the legislative and the executive departments. The judicial department may not exercise any of the functions of one of the other departments, unless the constitution expressly authorizes it to do so. However, standing alone, that constitutional limitation is of little assistance. That is, the concept of separation of powers suggests what judicial power is not, but, without further investigation, it does little to explain what judicial power is.
To make that determination, we must ascertain the intended scope of the “judicial power” described in Article VII (Amended), section 1. That provision does not define judicial power. Instead, Article VII (Amended), section 1, identifies the entities that exercise judicial power, namely, “one supreme court and * * * such other courts as may from time to time be created by law.” Article VII (Original) also merely identified the location of judicial power, establishing it in “a [Supreme] Court, [Circuit] Courts, and County Courts [.]” Like Article III, the text of Article VII (Amended), section 1, offers no other textual clues about the scope of the “judicial power.” That lack of assistance notwithstanding, the present case requires us to determine the intended meaning of that term.
When “interpreting a constitutional provision adopted through the initiative petition,” the court’s “task is to discern the intent of the voters.” Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 56, 11 P3d 228 (2000) (citing Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595 (1993)). In determining that intent, the “best evidence [ ] is the text of the provision itself[; however, the] context of the language of the ballot measure may also be considered.” Id. “If the intent of the voters is not clear from the text and context of the initiated constitutional provision, the court turns to the history of the provision.” Id. (citing Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994)).
As noted above, Oregon voters adopted Article VII (Amended) through the initiative process in 1910. In doing so, the phrase “judicial power” was repeated, without modification, from Article VII (Original) in 1910. The term was [353]*353left undefined and unchanged, except for removal of the capitalization of the letter “J.” In the new provision, the fist of entities that would exercise judicial power was changed slightly, but that change does not reveal any particular intent as to the meaning of the phrase, “judicial power.” Neither are we aware of any historical evidence that suggests that the voters intended to alter the meaning of the term “judicial power” from the meaning that the term enjoyed in 1857. Given the drafter’s decision to cany over the old term into the new amendment, and given the lack of any evidence from any source of which we are aware that, identical phrasing aside, something new and different was intended, we conclude that the voters intended no change to the substantive meaning of the term “judicial power” in their adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 1. See generally State v. Conger, 319 Or 484, 491-502, 878 P2d 1089 (1994) (to understand meaning of text set out in Article VII (Amended), section 5, court examined historical background of identical text in Article VII (Original)).
Because we conclude that the 1910 voters did not intend to change the meaning or scope of “judicial power” in Article VII (Amended), section 1, from what it was understood to include in 1857, we must inquire into the meaning and scope of “judicial power” when Article VII (Original) of the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857. When construing original provisions of the Oregon Constitution, this court ascertains and gives effect to the intent of the framers of the provisions at issue. Stranahan, 331 Or at 54-55. That intent is determined by (1) analyzing the text and context of the provisions, giving words the same meaning that the framers would have ascribed to them; (2) reviewing the historical circumstances that led to their creation; and (3) examining the case law interpreting those provisions. Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 416, 840 P2d 65 (1992). This court’s goal is to apply faithfully the principles embodied in those provisions to modem circumstances. State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 297, 4 P3d 1261 (2000).
As we observed previously, the meaning of “judicial power” is not clear from the text and context of Article VII (Original), section 1. We therefore turn to the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of that provision. In [354]*354doing so, we necessarily, and briefly, address the history of the development of the Oregon judiciary and the judicial power associated with that branch of government.3
The creation of an Oregon judiciary is related to the death, on February 15, 1841, of Ewing Young, the “wealthiest American citizen” from the Pacific Northwest territory. Lawrence T. Harris, A History of the Judiciary of Oregon, in OREGON SUPREME COURT RECORD 73, 75 (1938). Young had died intestate and had no known heirs. Id. Because Young’s business had been such an important economic influence on the territory, the territory’s inhabitants felt that they needed to devise a system to settle his affairs in an orderly fashion. Id. At a meeting involving “ ‘some of the inhabitants of the Willamette Valley,’ ” a “provisional government” was formed consisting of “a Governor, a supreme judge with probate powers, three justices of the peace, three constables, and an attorney general.” Id.
Later, in May 1843, another public meeting was held to institute more formally the provisional government. Id. at 76. At that meeting, a legislative committee was formed, and, in July 1843, that committee presented a report intended to be “the first body of rules or regulations which made any approach to laws” of the Oregon Territory. Id. The report was adopted by vote of the inhabitants of the territory and vested the judicial power “in a supreme court consisting of a supreme judge and two justices of the peace, [and] a probate court * * Id. at 76-77.
It was later determined that the original laws required reorganization, and, in July 1845, the inhabitants overwhelmingly adopted a new Organic Law. Id. at 79-80. Article I, section 8, provided that “[t]he judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, and such inferior courts of law, equity and arbitration, as may by law, from time to time be established.” Organic Law of the Provisional Government of [355]*355Oregon (reprinted in General Laws of Oregon, p 62 (Deady 1845-64)). The Supreme Court was to consist of “one judge.” Id. Section 8 provided farther that, “whenever called upon by the house of representatives, the supreme judge shall give his opinion, touching the validity of any pending measure.”4 Id. The Organic Law, therefore approved of the supreme judge providing advisory opinions to the so-called legislature regarding the validity of proposed measures.
After Congress officially recognized Oregon as a territory of the United States in 1848, An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Oregon (reprinted in General Laws of Oregon, p 66 (Deady 1845-64)), the citizens of the Oregon Territory voted, in 1857, to allow a group of 60 persons to convene and draft a constitution that would serve as a precursor to a petition for statehood. David Schuman, The Creation of the Oregon Constitution, 74 Or L Rev 611, 611-15 (1995). The drafters adapted Article VII (Original), section 1, from Article VII, section 2, of the Wisconsin Constitution. The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 475-76 (Charles Henry Carey ed., State Printing Dept, 1926). Article VII (Original) did not include any provision directing the judiciary to provide advisory opinions at the legislature’s request. The historical record contains no discussion about the meaning or scope of judicial power or any explanation as to why the authorization for advisory opinions expressed in the Organic Law was not included in the new constitution.5 See Claudia Burton, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857 — Part II, 39 Willamette L Rev 245, 253-58, 395-400 (2003) (describing proceedings surrounding the adoption of Article III, section 1, and Article VII (Original), section 1).
[356]*356Because no definitive answer regarding the scope of judicial power has emerged from the constitutional text and historical underpinnings of that text, we turn next to the accepted understanding of the concept of judicial power predating the adoption of the Oregon Constitution in 1857 as reflected in contemporary secondary sources, United States Supreme Court case law, and that of this court. See generally DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or 425, 437, 51 P3d 1232 (2002) (examining legal works that were “pervasive in American courts in 1850s”); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 94-112, 23 P3d 333 (2001) (examining early commentaries and treatises, colonial history, and case law from other jurisdictions).
Although British courts enjoyed the power to announce advisory opinions, the basis for American concepts of justiciability and judicial power lies not in English precedents, but in the structure of government as set out in the United States Constitution and its description of “the uniquely American relationship between the courts and other branches of government.” 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3529, 294 (2d ed 1984). Article III, section 1, of the United States Constitution6 makes reference to the judicial power of federal courts, but without defining the phrase. At the 1787 constitutional convention, James Madison “doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature.” 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 430 (1911). He believed that “[t]he right of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.” Id. In other words, Madison believed that “expounding the Constitution” should take place only in cases “of a Judiciary Nature.” That remark [357]*357suggests that the drafters understood that constitutional exegesis ought to occur only in the context of dispute resolution. We now turn to case law addressing the nature of judicial power.
Early federal case law is more instructive. In 1792, a federal statute provided that disabled Revolutionary War veterans could apply to the federal circuit court for benefits, which would determine veterans’ eligibility. Hayburn’s Case, 2 US 408, 409, 1 L Ed 436 (1792). The Secretary of War then could decide whether to withhold benefits if he suspected that the court had erred in its judgment, and Congress could review the decision of the Secretary of War. In other words, the court’s function was to render a nonfinal opinion, subject to executive-branch revision. As a result, some federal courts refused to enforce the act. The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to enforce the law. Id. At first, the Attorney General’s mandamus petition maintained that its request for relief was “ex officio, without an application from any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution of an act of congress, particularly interesting to a meritorious and unfortunate class of citizens [.]” Id. When the court rejected that argument, the Attorney General claimed that he was acting on behalf of Haybum, a veteran. Id. at 409. The court ultimately declined to issue a decision in the case because Congress had changed the procedure for relief, and the case had become moot. Id. at 410. Furthermore, in a footnote, the Haybum court related, with apparent approval, letters from three lower courts to President Washington. Id. at n 2. The letters rebuffed, on separation-of-powers grounds, the idea that courts could provide the kind of advisory opinion that the statute contemplated. Id.
Viewed narrowly, Hayburn’s Case decided only that the Attorney General could not prosecute the matter ex offi-cio. Once Congress enacted new legislation, the court considered the controversy at an end and refused to consider the matter further; it made no direct comment on the subject of advisory opinions. See generally Maeva Marcus and Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wise L Rev 527 (discussing procedural posture of case). The presence of the letters, however, has led subsequent courts to [358]*358rely on Hayburn’s Case as counseling against the practice of courts issuing advisory opinions.
In 1852, the United States Supreme Court relied on Hayburn’s Case in a dispute involving claims arising out of a treaty between the United States and Spain. United States v. Ferreira, 54 US 40, 49, 14 L Ed 40 (1852). Congress had enacted legislation providing that the federal court in Florida would evaluate the claims and then forward them to the Secretary of the Treasury for approval and payment. Id. at 45. In that instance, the Supreme Court concluded that, where the executive had some discretion in approving the court’s judgment, the lower court was not acting pursuant to the judicial power, because it was providing an advisory, nonfinal, opinion.
Another United States Supreme Court case, discussing a dispute over a state’s ability to grant railroad construction rights, further illustrates the court’s reluctance, during the period just before Oregon statehood, to issue advisory opinions:
“But on this application for an injunction against the construction of respondents’ [rail] road, the chancellor was not bound to decide the question, by anticipation: And, although he may have thrown out some intimation as to his present opinion on that question, he has very properly left it open for future decision, to be settled by a suit at law, or in equity, ‘upon the facts of the case as they may then appear.’ But however probable as this dispute or contest may be, it is not for this court to anticipate it, and volunteer an opinion in advance.”
Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac RR Co v. Louisa RR Co, 54 US 71, 81, 14 L Ed 55 (1851).
Early Oregon cases discussing judicial power are scarce; however, one offers some insight with regard to the question here. Burnett v. Douglas County, 4 Or 388 (1873), involved an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court denying a writ of review. Id. at 389. The appellants had sought a writ of review to challenge the manner of financing a county road and the court’s general order regarding redemption of county-issued warrants. Id. The order, however, was not entered in the context of litigation, but was directed to the [359]*359county clerk. Id. at 390. The court concluded that, in directing the county clerk, the circuit court had not acted in a judicial capacity. Id. at 392. In that regard, the court stated that, in an exercise of the judicial power, “proper parties [must appear] before the court, for in all judicial proceedings there must be proper parties who must be, in some way, particularly affected by the judgment, order or determination.”7 Id. at 391-92.
Some years later, in David v. Portland Water Committee, 14 Or 98, 104-05, 12 P 174 (1886), a number of taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of a statutorily authorized committee that had the power to issue bonds. However, at that point, the committee had not levied a tax on the taxpayers. At the end of the opinion, the court expressed doubt that it had the authority to hear the suit, but decided to consider it anyway: “A question has been raised as to the right of the respondents to maintain the suit — as to whether they have any standing in court. My impressions are adverse to the right; but in view of the importance of the case, we have concluded not to consider [the standing issue].” Id. at 125. The court offered no justification, constitutional or otherwise, for entertaining a case in which the plaintiffs seemed to lack standing, beyond the fact that the court seemed to believe that the public needed an answer. We deem David of little assistance in determining the parameters of judicial power, because it offered no substantial premise for its decision to decide a matter other than its importance. In order to act, courts must exercise “judicial” power; the importance of the issue that the courts are asked to decide, standing alone, does not transform resolution of the issue into an exercise of judicial power.
While the Oregon courts wrestled with the issue, the United States Supreme Court eventually changed its own course and recognized an exception to the federal mootness doctrine that allows for discretionary review of disputes “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Southern [360]*360Pacific Terminal Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 US 498, 514, 31 S Ct 279, 55 L Ed 310 (1911) (recognizing exception). Since that time, every state, except Oregon, has adopted that exception and has employed the exception from time to time in cases involving alleged harms of a short-term effect — harms that are too ephemeral for courts to adjudicate before factual developments render the disputes involving those harms moot.
The United States Supreme Court itself, however, continues to grapple with the constitutional basis for the nonjusticiability of moot disputes, the very concept that led to the creation of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. In Honig v. Doe, 484 US 305, 108 S Ct 592, 98 L Ed 2d 686 (1988), the Court split over both the origin and the parameters of the mootness doctrine. Honig involved a claimed violation of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) respecting two students, Doe and Smith. The majority concluded that, although Doe’s case was moot because he no longer was eligible for EHA benefits, the case remained justiciable because there was a reasonable likelihood that Smith again would suffer the deprivation of EHA rights that had given rise to the action. As part of that analysis, the majority observed:
“Under Article III of the Constitution this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 US 539, 546, [49 L Ed 2d 683, 96 S Ct 2791] (1976); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 US 395, 401, [45 L Ed 2d 272, 95 S Ct 2330] (1975). That the dispute between the parties was very much alive when suit was filed, or at the time the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment, cannot substitute for the actual case or controversy that an exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction requires. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 US 452, 459, n 10, [39 L Ed 2d 505, 94 S Ct 1209] (1974); Row v. Wade, 410 US 113, 125, [35 L Ed 2d 147, 93 S Ct 705] (1973).”
Honig, 484 US at 317-18. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a separate concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority’s comments regarding Article III. The Chief Justice observed that that Court’s mootness cases often purported to find their support in Article III of the United States Constitution, yet the Court simultaneously asserted an exception — cases capable [361]*361of repetition yet evading review — that was not in that section of the constitution:
“If it were indeed Art. Ill which — by reason of its requirement of a case or controversy for the exercise of federal judicial power — underlies the mootness doctrine, the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception relied upon by the Court in this case would be incomprehensible. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States only to cases and controversies; it does not except from this requirement other lawsuits which are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us by the case or controversy requirement of Art. Ill itself, we would have no more power to decide lawsuits which are ‘moot’ but which also raise questions which are capable of repetition but evading review than we would to decide cases which are ‘moot’ but raise no such questions.”
Id. at 330 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). The Chief Justice, recognizing the dilemma, suggested that the federal mootness doctrine enjoyed an “attenuated connection” to Article III that could be disregarded if the court deemed it necessary. Id. at 331. With regard to the case that established the exception, Southern Pacific, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that the exception was premised on pragmatic considerations, rather than Article III. Id. at 330-31 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring).
As we already have explained, this court followed Southern Pacific and adopted that exception in Perry. Like Southern Pacific, Perry purported to recognize the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. In doing so, however, the Perry court simply cited Southern Pacific8 as well as cases from other states, and announced the exception as a convenience to the executive branch of government: “Where [362]*362the question is one involving the public welfare, and there is a likelihood of it being raised again in the future, a court in the exercise of its discretion may decide it for the guidance of an official administrative agency.” Perry, 180 Or at 498-99. Perry thus established an exception to the mootness doctrine without undertaking any effort to determine whether such an exception was compatible with the scope of judicial power granted under the Oregon Constitution.
We cannot assert that the constitutional text and pre-1857 state and federal cases lead to a definitive conclusion regarding the scope of judicial power under the Oregon Constitution. We believe, however, that the prevailing view throughout the American legal landscape in 1857 was that the constitutional grant of judicial power did not include the power to decide cases that had become moot at some stage of the proceedings. As petitioner acknowledges, instances of courts deciding moot cases based on the perceived need to resolve a recurring issue involving the public welfare did not occur until the period between 1895 and 1915. See, e.g.,In re Fairchild, 151 NY 359, 361, 45 NE 943 (1897) (deciding moot election issue because it “was of sufficient importance to require * * * determination by [that] court”); In re Madden, 148 NY 136, 42 NE 534, 535 (1895) (deciding question “of no practical importance in the particular case” because it was likely to recur); Matter of Cuddeback, 3 App Div 103, 39 NY Supp 388, 392 (1896) (deciding moot case because it was of “great public interest”). As we have explained, however, the adoption of Article VII (Amended) in 1910 did nothing to change the earlier understanding of judicial power as that phrase appeared in Article VII (Original).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the framers of the Oregon Constitution, and those who later adopted that constitution, are most likely to have understood the grant of judicial power in the restrained sense espoused in the early Supreme Court cases — that is, an authority limited to the adjudication of an existing controversy. Because the scope of judicial power that they created is limited in the manner just described, this court did not, in 1857, have the authority to create a rule that exceeded that circumscribed grant of power. Neither did the court acquire such authority in 1910.
[363]*363It follows, we believe, that Perry and the cases that relied on Perry were wrongly decided. They are overruled. The more recent cases, such as Barcik, are correct. The judicial power under the Oregon Constitution does not extend to moot cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Petitioner has requested this court to decide a matter that no longer is a controversy between the parties. As we have explained, Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution constrains us from doing so. The circuit court therefore must vacate its judgment and dismiss petitioner’s writ of review as moot.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is vacated.