Yan-Ling X. v. Todd Lyons, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01412
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YAN-LING X., Case No. 1:25-cv-01412-KES-CDB (HC) 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND TO DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 14 TODD LYONS, et al., (Docs. 2, 15) 15 Respondents. 7-Day Objection Period 16 17 Petitioner Yan-Ling X. (“Petitioner”), a federal immigration detainee proceeding by 18 counsel, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 2241. (Doc. 2). 20 The presiding district judge converted Petitioner’s application for temporary restraining 21 order to a preliminary injunction and granted the preliminary injunction on November 7, 2025, 22 ordering Petitioner’s immediate release from custody. (Doc. 12). 23 On December 5, 2025, the petition was referred to the undersigned for the preparation of 24 findings and recommendations. (Doc. 14). On the merits of the petition, Respondents filed a 25 motion to dismiss the petition on December 8, 2025, and Petitioner sought leave of Court to file 26 an untimely reply brief and opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss on January 21, 2026.1 27 1 The Court granted Petitioner’s motion for leave to file the late-filed reply brief on 28 January 22, 2026. (Doc. 19). 1 (Docs. 15, 17). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s 2 petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted in part as to Petitioner’s procedural due process 3 claims. 4 I. Relevant Background 5 On October 22, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition while in custody of the 6 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the California City Correctional Facility in 7 California City, alleging that her arrest and re-detention by immigration authorities on October 8 14, 2025, following her initial encounter with immigration authorities and release more than five 9 years earlier, violates federal statutory and constitutional law. See (Doc. 2 ¶ 1-4). Respondents 10 are Todd Lyons (Acting ICE Director), Sergio Albarran (Field Office Director of Enforcement 11 and Removal Operations, San Francisco ICE Field Office), Kristi Noem (Secretary of United 12 States Department of Homeland Security), Pamela Bondi (Attorney General of the United States), 13 Christopher Chestnut (Warden, California City Correctional Facility), U.S. Department of 14 Homeland Security (“DHS”), and Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) 15 (collectively, “Respondents”). Id. ¶¶ 13-19. 16 In granting a preliminary injunction, the Court ordered that: (1) Petitioner shall be 17 released immediately; (2) Respondents are enjoined and restrained from re-detaining Petitioner 18 unless and until they obtain a travel document for her removal, and unless they follow all 19 procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(d), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and 20 regulatory procedures; and (3) the bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is 21 waived. (Doc. 12 at 12). 22 II. Governing Authority 23 A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus2 24 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the 25 United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court considering an application for a writ of 26 habeas corpus shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why 27 2 As the Court found in its preliminary screening order, the Court has jurisdiction over 28 Petitioner’s claim that she is unlawfully detained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 6). 1 the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person 2 detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 3 B. Relevant Statutory Framework (8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i) and 241.4(l)) 4 As the Court set forth in its order granting preliminary injunction (see Doc. 12 at 5-10), 5 specific regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i) and 241.4(l), govern how and when ICE may revoke 6 the release of a noncitizen who has been ordered removed. Section 241.13(i) permits revocation 7 of release “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant 8 likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 9 241.13(i)(2). Section 241.13(i) also provides for revocation if a noncitizen “violates any of the 10 conditions of release” in the “order of supervision[.]”3 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1). 11 Where a petitioner was “issued a final order of removal, detained, and subsequently 12 released on an [order of supervision],” Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D. Mass. 13 2025), “then released … for several years, and his 90-day removal period expired[,]” the 14 regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i) and 241.4(l) apply and outline the process to be followed, 15 Escalante v. Noem, No. 9:25-cv-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025). 16 In Escalante, the court noted that “[a]fter Zadvydas[v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)], the 17 immigration regulations were revised to implement administrative review procedures for … those 18 who are re-detained upon revocation of their supervised release.” Escalante, 2025 WL 2206113 19 at *3. The court further noted that: 20 Section 241.13(i)(2)[,] [which is] entitled “Revocation for removal[,]” provides that “the Service may revoke an alien’s [supervised] release under this section and 21 return the alien to custody if, on account of changed circumstances, the Service 22 determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (emphasis added). 23 Section 241.4(b)(4)[,] which is entitled “Service determination under 8 C.F.R. 241.13[,]” states that, after supervised release under section 241.13, “if the Service 24 subsequently determines, because of a change of circumstances, that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable 25 future [to the country to which the alien was ordered removed or] a third county, 26

27 3 Respondents do not dispute in either their opposition to Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction or in their motion to dismiss Petitioner’s assertion that she has complied 28 with the order of supervision for over five years. See (Docs. 10, 15). 1 the alien shall again be subject to the custody review procedures under this section.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4) (emphasis added). 2

3 Id. 4 These regulations establish that, when ICE revokes release to effectuate removal, “it is 5 [ICE’s] burden to show a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed.” Id.; see id. 6 (“Imposing the burden of proof on the alien each time he is re-detained would lead to an unjust 7 result and serious due process implications.”); e.g., Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 150 (“ICE’s 8 decision to re-detain a noncitizen like [Mr. Nguyen] who has been granted supervised release is 9 governed by ICE's own regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, 10 (3) based on changed circumstances, (4) removal has become significantly likely in the 11 reasonably foreseeable future.”) (citing Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 12 2023)); Roble v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3196-LMP-LIB, 2025 WL 2443453, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 13 2025) (“[T]he regulations at issue in this case place the burden on ICE to first establish changed 14 circumstances that make removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); 15 Abuelhawa v. Noem, No. 4:25-cv-04128, 2025 WL 2937692, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) 16 (“[U]pon revocation of release, the Government bears the burden to show a significant likelihood 17 that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). 18 Detention is permissible only if ICE can show that there is a significant likelihood of 19 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future or if there was a violation of the order of 20 supervision. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). 21 III. Exhaustion 22 A. Governing Authority 23 “Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 24 filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 25 Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, 26 requires that, “as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and 27 administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 28 (citing United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of 1 exhaustion, ‘no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the 2 prescribed ... remedy has been exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United 3 States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)). “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If 4 exhaustion is required by statute, it may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have 5 discretion to waive a prudential requirement.” Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. 6 Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 7 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion 8 requirement when it is prudentially required, this discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … 9 [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied or properly 10 waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v. Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762, n.8 (9th Cir. 11 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls 12 for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly to be disregarded.”). 13 B. Analysis 14 Neither Petitioner nor Respondents address exhaustion in their filings. See (Docs. 2, 3, 15 10, 11, 15, 17). 16 The Court finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as it would 17 be futile to seek release by administrative means given Respondents’ position that Petitioner, with 18 a final order of removal dated February 4, 2020, is subject to discretionary detention under 28 19 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) pending the effectuation of her removal. Additionally, in the order granting 20 the preliminary injunction, the Court found that Petitioner faces irreparable harm absent the 21 injunctive relief granted. (Doc. 12 at 10) (citing Ferrara v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 2d 351, 22 360 (D. Mass. 2005); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *6 23 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“The Ninth Circuit has also noted that ‘unlawful detention certainly 24 constitutes extreme or very serious damage, and that damage is not compensable in damages.’”)); 25 Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“The Ninth Circuit has 26 recognized ‘the irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention.’”) (citing 27 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017)). For these reasons, the undersigned 28 recommends that the prudential exhaustion requirement be waived for Petitioner’s claim for 1 habeas corpus relief. 2 IV. Discussion 3 As noted in the Court’s order granting the preliminary injunction, Petitioner asserts seven 4 causes of action in her petition that are premised on four main points: (1) there is no significant 5 likelihood that ICE will be able to remove her to China in the reasonably foreseeable future; (2) 6 the Field Office Director did not have authority to revoke her release; (3) ICE failed to afford her 7 a prompt interview following her re-detention as required by its regulations and due process; and 8 (4) the regulations that authorize revocation of release are ultra vires and in excess of ICE’s 9 statutory authority. (Doc. 12 at 4); (Doc. 2 at 12-19); (Doc. 3-1 at 10-19). As set forth below, 10 because the undersigned finds that Respondents have failed to show a significant likelihood that 11 ICE will be able to remove Petitioner to China in the reasonably foreseeable future, and 12 Petitioner’s other arguments seek the same or similar relief (i.e., for immediate release), the 13 undersigned declines to address Petitioner’s other grounds for relief. 14 A. Respondents Fail to Show that Petitioner’s Removal is Reasonably 15 Foreseeable Under the Governing Statutory Framework 16 In their response to and motion to dismiss the petition (Doc. 15), Respondents raise 17 arguments and rely on evidence already considered by the Court in granting Petitioner’s motion 18 for a preliminary injunction. For the same reasons the Court found that Petitioner is likely to 19 succeed on the merits of her claim that the government failed to satisfy its burden of showing that 20 there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner’s removal is in the reasonably foreseeable future, 21 the undersigned finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s procedural due process rights under 22 the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Petition, “Claim Two”). See, e.g., M.S.L. v. 23 Bostock, No. 6:25-cv-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10-12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (finding 24 ICE’s failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) in revoking the petitioner’s release from custody 25 on grounds of “changed circumstances” violated her procedural due process rights); accord 26 Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 27 2025). Accord, Huang v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01308 JLT EPG, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2026 WL 28 279888, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (finding that the petitioner was likely to succeed on his 1 claim that his continued detention violated his procedural due process rights because ICE re- 2 detained the petitioner without complying with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). 3 Respondents newly argue that on the same date the Court issued a preliminary injunction 4 (November 7, 2025), the deportation officer assigned to Petitioner’s case prepared a travel 5 document request for internal review that was “approved on November 24, 2025, and was 6 dispatched to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., the next day.” (Doc. 15 at 4-5). 7 Respondents rely on the Declaration of Deportation officer Carlos G. Ayala that “[t]he Chinese 8 Government has recently been fulfilling travel document requests within [45 to 60] days, but 9 sometimes in a shorter period of time” in attempting to show that ‘she can be expeditiously 10 remove from the United States.” Id. at 6; (Doc 15-9, Declaration of Deportation Officer Carlos 11 G. Ayala (“DO Ayala Decl.”) ¶ 8). From this, Respondents argue that “assuring Petitioner’s 12 presence at the moment of removal is a wholly rational and legitimate, non-punitive objective for 13 detention” and cite cases for the proposition that the Court’s review of ICE’s decision-making is 14 not to reweigh the evidence considered by the agency, but rather to assess the decision-making 15 for reasonableness and appropriate application of agency discretion. (Doc. 15 at 5-6) (citing 16 cases).4 17 There are two problems with Respondents’ argument. First, the argument relies on 18 information and events that post-date Petitioner’s arrest and re-detention and the associated 19 alleged violation of her due process rights. Thus, it does not inform or otherwise undermine the 20 Court’s earlier finding that the stated rationale for Petitioner’s arrest and re-detention – to wit, 21 “changed circumstances” given petitioner’s case was then “under current review by the 22 Government of China for the issuance of a travel document” (Doc. 12 at 6-7) (citing Doc. 10-8, 23 Ex. 7) – does not meet the “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” 24 4 Among the cases cited is Huang v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01308 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 25 2986885, at *1, *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025), the holding of which Respondents characterize as 26 “denying a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by a similarly situated petitioner.” However, after Respondents filed their motion to dismiss, the Huang court granted reconsideration, and 27 upon reconsideration, granted a preliminary injunction, finding ICE failed to show a significant likelihood of the petitioner’s removal such that his detention violated he procedural due process 28 rights. See Huang, – F. Supp. 3d --, 2026 WL 279888, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026). 1 standard required to revoke release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). 2 Second, the outer limit of Respondents’ estimate of the time within which China would 3 issue a travel document (60 days) passed approximately one month ago. Presumably, had a travel 4 document issued, Respondents would have notified the Court; yet, they have made no 5 supplemental filings to confirm whether a travel document has been procured. 6 For these reasons, the undersigned finds that Respondents fail under Section 241.13(i) to 7 show that there any changed circumstances evidencing a significant likelihood that Petitioner may 8 be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Escalante, 2025 WL 2206113 at *3 (“it is 9 [ICE’s] burden to show a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed.”). There is no 10 record evidence of any material changes since the presiding district judge found that “[t]he only 11 changed circumstance that respondents identify is that petitioner’s case is ‘under current review 12 by the Government of China for the issuance of a travel document.” Respondents have failed to 13 answer “why China did not issue a travel document in the past or why China is likely to issue a 14 travel document … in the reasonably foreseeable future (Doc. 12 at 8) and do not in their motion 15 address the fact that Petitioner was issued an employment authorization card on April 2, 2025. 16 As the Court found in its order granting the preliminary injunction, under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7), 17 issuing an employment authorization card for an individual ordered removed is permitted only 18 when that individual, as Petitioner, “cannot be removed or when removal is impractical or 19 contrary to the public interest.” Id. 20 In sum, the undersigned finds that Respondents’ failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 21 241.13(i) violated Petitioner’s procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the 22 U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Huang, – F. Supp. 3d --, 2026 WL 279888, at *6-7; M.S.L., 2025 23 WL 2430267, at *10-12; Truong, 2025 WL 2988357, at *5-6. 24 B. Petitioner’s Other Claims 25 Because the undersigned finds that the Court may grant the full relief Petitioner seeks— 26 for immediate release and to enjoin and restrain Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless 27 and until they obtain a travel document for her removal, and unless they follow all procedures set 28 forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) and 241.13(i) and any other applicable statutory and regulatory 1 procedures—in recommending that the writ should issue as to Petitioner’s procedural due process 2 claim, the undersigned declines to address Petitioner’s other claims which seek the same or 3 similar relief. 4 V. Conclusion and Recommendation 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be GRANTED in part as to Petitioner’s 7 claim alleging violation of her procedural due process rights under the Fifth 8 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Claim Two). 9 2. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for Petitioner and to close 10 this case. 11 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 12 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days 13 after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written 14 objections with the Court. Although this objection period is shorter than provided by Local Rule, 15 such an adjustment is warranted given the nature of Petitioner’s harm, the finding of a violation of 16 the U.S. Constitution by Respondents, and the fact that the parties have extensively briefed the 17 issues involved. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) 18 (“The court may require a response within a shorter period if exigencies of the calendar 19 require.”). Any objections filed should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 20 and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause 21 shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party 22 wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its 23 CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with 24 specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the 25 District Judge when reviewing these findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 26 636(b)(l)(C). 27 /// 28 /// ] The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result 2 | in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 3 || Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 | ITIS SO ORDERED. ° Dated: _ February 20, 2026 | wr ba 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10